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This volume comprises papers that were given at the workshop Information Structure 
and  the Referential  Status of  Linguistic  Expressions, which  we organized  during the 
Deutsche  Gesellschaft  fiir  Sprachwissenschaft  (DGfS)  Conference  in  Leipzig  in 
February  2001. At  this  workshop we  discussed  the  connection  between  information 
structure and the referential interpretation of  linguistic expressions, a topic mostly ne- 
glected  in current linguistics research. 
One common aim of the papers is to find out to what extent the focus-background as 
well as the topic-comment structuring determine the referential interpretation of simple 
arguments like definite and indefinite NPs on the one hand and sentences on the other. 
The interaction of the referential interpretation of NPs with information structure is 
demonstrated by linguistic topics such as: 
Word order, scrambling, scope ambiguities, contrast 
DANIEL  BURING  with  What do  indefinites  do  that  definites  definitely  don't?  gives 
evidence  for  the  interaction  of  focus  background  structuring  with  the  generic  and 
existential reading of  indefinite expressions. He shows that, on  the one hand, generic 
indefinites  form  their  own  accent  domain  via  scrambling  and  that,  on  the  other, 
existential  indefinites  can  only  form  an  accent  domain  together  with  the  predicate. 
Constraints  on  scrambling  of  indefinite  NPs  in  German  are  the  topic  of  JURGEN 
LENERZ'  paper Scrambling and reference in German. He demonstrates that scrambling 
depends essentially on the choice function, which is the interpretation of the indefinite 
article. CARSTEN  BREUL  with  Focus  structure and  the  referential  status  of  indefinite 
quantifications expressions argues  that  scope ambiguities  cannot be  traced  back  to 
different scope relations, but are determined by different focus structures. 
On the basis  of  a broad  data base,  ANITA  STEUBE  with  Correction by  contrastive 
focus  discusses prosodic properties of contrastive accents, the domain of contrast focus 
as well as its syntactic, information structural and contextual properties. 
Determiners, specificity, anaphoricity 
DONKA  FARKAS  in Specificity distinctions shows that specificity is an epiphenomenon 
that breaks down into a variety of differences concerning the way variables introduced 
by argument NPs are given values and how these differences are marked in various lan- 
guages. ELISABETH  STARK  demonstrates in Indefiniteness and specificity in Old Italian 
texts that specificity can be related to topological phenomena and that it has determined 
the grammaticalization of unus to an indefinite article. PAUL  PORTNER  in Topicality and 
(Non-)Specificity in Mandarin explains that the specificity of indefinite expressions is 
gradual and that the impression of unique reference arises if the indefinite can be asso- 
ciated with a topic singleton. CARLA  UMBACH  with (De)accenting definite descriptions 
makes clear that a definite NP denotes a novel discourse referent if  the description of 
the  NP  contains a  focused  element  and  the  definite  article  is  necessary  to  express 
uniqueness. DINA  BRUN  argues in her paper Information Structure and the Status of NP 
in Russian that the indefinite or definite interpretation of Russian bare NPs depends on 
their information structural status in the clause. NOBERTO  MORENO  QUIBEN  and ISABEL 
PEREZ  JIMENEZ  present  in  Information  structure  and  the  referential  status  of  Bare 
Plurals that Spanish NPs without articles get a presuppositional reading if  they are in 
the  background  of  the  sentence.  MICHAEL  HEGARTY,  JEANETE GUNDEL,  and KAJA 
BORTHEN  discuss  with  Information  structure  and  the  accessibility  of  clausally introduced  referents that the Givenness Hierarchy orders anaphorical lexical elements 
with  respect  to  the  salience  of  the  antecedent  and  that  this  salience  is  essentially 
determined by information structure. 
The second part of the volume focuses on the interdependence of the referential inter- 
pretation  of  a particular sentence type and information structure. This is demonstrated 
by topics like: 
Sentence mood, sentence types distinctions, indefinite NPs 
HOKST  LOHNSTEIN  in Sentence Mood constitution and indefinite noun phrases presents 
a compositional theory of German sentence mood and sentence type distinctions, which 
along with a choice function theory accounts for binding effects of indefinites in differ- 
ently marked sentence types. 
HANS-MARTIN  GARTNEK  with On the force  of  V2 declaratives discusses embedded 
German V2 declaratives that share properties with both subordinate relative clauses and 
main clauses. He argues for a hypotactic analysis and that the scopal behaviour of  the 
construction  is derived from its "assertional proto-force", which it shares with similar 
"embedded root" constructions. 
On the basis of the distribution of term answers in well-formed questionlanswer se- 
quences  INGO  REICH with  Question/answer  congruence  and  the  sen~antics  of  w/~- 
phrases  argues that  wh-phrases  should be analyzed as functional expressions with an 
indefinite  core.  Integrating  this  claim  in  Schwarzschild's  (1999)  focus  theory,  he 
outlines the focus/background structures of wh-questions. 
This volume will be followed by ZASPIL volume 24, which contains the proceedings of 
the complementary workshop Sentence Types and  Specificity organized at the ZAS in 
March 2001 .The content of this volume will be attached to the table of content page iv. 
Special thanks go to Mechthild Bernhard and Paul David Doherty for their helping 
hand in preparing the contributions for publication. 
Berlin, November 2001 
Klaus von Heusinger, 
Kerstin Schwabe On the interpretation of wh-clauses in exclamative environments* 
Franz-Josef d'Avis 
University of Lund 
Franz-Josef.dAvis@tyska.lu.se 
1.  Introduction 
In  this  paper,  a  class  of  sentences  in  German  is  discussed  that  are  often  called  wh- 
exclamatives. Examples are in (1). 
(1)  a.  Heinz ist erstaunt, wen Maria eingeladen hat. 
Heinz is amazed  who M.  invited  has 
'Heinz is amazed who M. has invited.' 
b.  Heitzz ist erstaunt, ,vie gross Maria ist. 
'H. is amazed how tall M. is.' 
c.  Wen der alles eingeladen hat! 
who he all invited has 
'The people he has invited!' 
d.  Wie gross die ist! 
how tall she is 
'What is she tall!' 
So called wh-exclamatives can be roughly characterized as wh-clauses that  are embedded 
under exclamative predicates like ersiaunt seidto be amazed at, see (la,  b), or that are used 
as the basis for an exclamation, see (lc, d).' 
One can  ask if  wh-exclamatives are a clause-type of  their  own, in  particular, whether 
they  are  different  from  wh-clauses  in  question  environments,  that  is  under  question 
Pi-edicates2 like to ask or to wonder or used as questions. It is often assumed that wh-clauses 
in  exclamative contexts, both  embedded and unembedded, are indeed different from wh- 
clauses in interrogative or question environments like (2), at least regarding their semantical 
type, see for example Elliot (1971, 1974), Grimshaw (1979, 1981), Zaefferer (1983, 1984), 
Altmann (1 987, 1993). 
(2)  a.  Heinz fragt sich, wen Maria eingeladen hat 
H. wonders who M. invited has 
'H. wonders who M. has invited.' 
The paper is submitted to a special issue of "Theoretical  Linguistics", edited by Klaus von Heusinger and 
Kerstin Schwabe 
I  On predicates that one would  not consider to be exclamative, but which nevertheless  embed wh-clauses 
like in (1) see below. 
These are intensional predicates in the sense of GroenendijWStokhof (1982). 
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b.  Heinz mochte wissen, wen Maria eingeladen hat. 
H. wants to know who M. invited has 
'H. wants to know who M. has invited.' 
c.  Wen hat der alles eingeladen? 
who has he all invited 
'Who has he invited?' 
d.  Wie gross ist die? 
'How tall is she' 
I assume with Grimshaw (1979) that so called wh-exclamatives and wh-interrogatives are 
alike with respect to their syntactical properties. In addition, I think that they are also alike 
semantically. So, what I like to do here is to evaluate the following hypothesis: 
(HI)  So-called wh-exclamatives are of the same semantical type as wh-interrogatives. 
Regarding HI the following points should be discussed: 
(i) Why can certain wh-clauses be embedded under exclamative predicates but  not under 
question predicates, see (3)? 
(3)  a.  Heinz ist erstaunt, wie iiberaus groJ  Maria ist. 
'H. is amazed how very tall M. is.' 
b.  *Heirzz mochte wissen, wie iiberaus groJ  Maria ist 
H. wants to know how very tall M. is. 
(ii)  Why  is  it,  that  ob-clauseslwhether-clauses  are  ungrammatical  under  exclamative 
predicates, but grammatical under question-predicates, see (4)? 
(4)  a.  *Heinz ist erstaunt, ob  Maria zu Hause ist. 
H. is amazed whether M. is at home 
b.  Heinz nzochte wissen, ob Maria zu Hause ist. 
H. wants to know whether M. at home is 
'H. wants to know whether M. is at home.' 
(iii) Why  are  certain  unembedded  wh-clauses  grammatical  as  Exclamations, but  not  as 
Questions, see (5)? 
(5)  a.  Wie iiberaus groJ  sie isr! 
how very tall she is 
b.  *Wie iiberaus groJ  sie wohl ist? 
how very tall she PART is 
(iv) How can one explain the relation between wh-clauses and their interrogative meaning, 
and their use as exclamations. That is: how can one derive the expression of  an emotional 
attitude to a given state of affairs with regard to certain unembedded w-clauses? On the interpretation of wh-clauses in exclamative environments 
I begin  with describing the semantics of  exclamative predicates and the way they interact 
with wh-complements, section 2. In  section 3, I tackle the question in  (i). Section 4 deals 
with the question why ob-clauses can not be embedded under exclamative predicates. In 5 it 
is shown how independent wh-clauses can be used as exclamations. A summary follows in 
5, including some remarks on the differences between the considerations here and those in 
ZanuttiniIPortner (2000)." 
2.  On the semantics of exclamative predicates 
The aim of this section is to describe the semantics of predicates like erstaunt seidro be 
anzazed at and the way they interact with the meaning of their wh-complements, eventually 
giving a characterization of the class of exclamative predicates. 
Consider a sentence like (6). 
(6)  Heinz ist erstaunt, wen Maria geheiratet hat. 
Heinz is amazed who Maria married has 
'Heinz is amazed who Maria has married.' 
Basically the matrix-predicate erstaunt seidto be amazed at denotes a relation between the 
matrix subject and at least two propositions. 
The first proposition describes the true state of  affairs, that is the proposition 'that Maria 
married Heinz', if  she married  Heinz. The second proposition describes in this case what 
the matrix-subject expected to be the true answer to the wh-clause clause,  for example, the 
proposition 'that Maria married Karl', if it was this Heinz expected to be the case. 
I call that the norm-proposition, because it generally describes the matrix subject's idea 
of what counts as the norm regarding the answer to the embedded wh-clause. 
I  assume  that  a  wh-clause  denotes  basically  a  set  of  propositions  in  the  sense  of 
Karttunen (I 977). 
So the meaning of (7) applied to the world w is (S), the set of propositions of the form in 
(9), that are true in the world w, that is the set of propositions, so that there is a person x 
and Maria has invited x in w. 
(7)  wen Maria eingeladen hat 
who Maria invited  has 
(8)  hp [3x pers(x)(w) & p = hw'. eingeladen(maria)(x)(w') & p(w)] 
(9)  hw. eingeladen(maria)(x)(w) 
But the meaning in  (8) is not strong enough, see for example Groenendijklstokhof  1982. 
Consider the example in (10) 
In  a  broader  perspective  the  paper  can  be  seen  to  contribute  to  the research  on  sentences  types,  in 
particular to the question how many there are. If the hypothesis is correct, we could end up with one less. 
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(1 0)  Heinz we@, wen Maria eingeladen hat. 
Heinz knows who Maria invited has 
'Heinz knows who Maria has invited.' 
If  (10) is  true, we want Heinz not only to know for all the people that Maria invited, that 
Maria invited them. We also want Heinz to know that these are all the people that Maria 
invited. That is Heinz should not have a wrong belief  about someone else, who was not 
invited. 
In this sense, the meaning in  (8) is too weak. It makes not sure, that Heinz knows all the 
people Maria invited and only those. 
Heim (1994) solves this problem with the introduction of two answer-concepts that can 
be  seen  as  reflecting  different  aspects  of  the  meaning  of  a  wh-complement. The basic 
meaning  of  the  wh-clause  is not  changed.  It  is  still  a  Karttunen  one. Different  matrix 
predicates can refer to different aspects of the meaning of their wh-complement. 
The answer concepts are in (1 1) and (12). 
(1 1)  Answer]: 
ansl(wh-clause, w) = tt [[ wh-clause]] (w) 
The answerl to a wh-clause in  the world w is the intersection of  the intension of the wh- 
clause applied to world w.  That is the proposition that can be expressed by the conjunction 
of all the answers to the wh-clause that are true in the world w. 
(12)  Answer2: 
ans2(wh-clause, w) = hw' [ ansl( wh-clause, w') = ansl( wh-clause, w) ] 
The answer2 to a wh-clause in  the world w is the set of  worlds where the answerl to the 
wh-clause is the same as in the world w. That is the proposition that the true answers are the 
true answers. 
Answer2  expresses the  strong exhaustive meaning  we  need  for the  relation  between 
matrix predicates like wissenlto know and their wh-complement. 
But  where  do  we  need  the  concept  answerl?  One  case  Heim  mentions  is  given  by 
exclamative predicates like to he amazed at. 
The  norm-proposition  I  mentioned  above, that  is  the  proposition  the  matrix  subject 
expected in sentences like (13), is derived from the negation of the answerl. 
Consider a sentence like (13). 
(13)  Heinz ist erstaunt, wer gekommen ist. 
Heinz is amazed  who come  is 
'Heinz is amazed at who came.' 
If  Heinz is amazed who came, he expected another answer to the wh-clause to be true that 
stands somehow in a relation to the true answer and he expected the true answer to be false. 
But the expected answer is not just the negation of answer2. 
Suppose, Maria and Peter came. The negation of the proposition that Maria and Peter are 
the only persons that came, is the complement set of  the set of  worlds, where Maria and On the interpretation of wh-clauses in exclamative environments 
Peter came and only these two. The complement set is here the set of  worlds, where the set 
of  people that  came is different. But  a world  where Maria, Peter  and  Paul  came is also 
different from the real world. 
Suppose, Heinz  had  expected  that  Maria, Peter  and  Paul  came.  Could  he  really  be 
amazed, if only Maria and Peter came. That is, could (13) be true with respect to this state 
of affairs? The seems to be not the case, cf. also Berman (1994). 
The answerl to the wh-clause in (13) is the set worlds where all persons came that came 
in the real world. The complement set is the set of worlds, where not all persons came, that 
came in the real world. Particularly the world, where Maria, Peter and Paul came is not in 
the complement set of the answerl. 
So, we can think a predicate as erstaunt sein/to be amazed at with a wh-complement to 
relate the matrix subject in the following way to two propositions, one being the answer2 to 
the wh-clause and one being the negation of the answerl, see (14). 
(14)  If Heinz is amazed at who came, he knows: answer2(who came) 
and he had expected: 7  answerl (who came). 
A problem is that, if someone came, a world where none came is also in the negation of the 
answerl . 
But I don't think that (15a) is true, if Heinz expected that none came. 
(15)  a.  Heirzz ist erstaunt, wer gekommen ist. 
Heinz is amazed who come is 
b.  Heinz ist erstaunt, daJ  (iiberhaupt)ienzand gekomnzen ist. 
Heinz is amazed that (anyway) someone come is 
'Heinz is amazed that someone came at all.' 
In a case where Heinz expected none to come, (15b) seems to be appropriate. 
My point here is, that the proposition that is expected must be a subset of the negation of 
the  answerl. It must be  a set of  worlds, where the extension of  the meaning of  the wh- 
clause is not empty. There must be an instantiation of the wh-variable. 
The same is true for the true answer to the embedded wh-clause. Exclamative predicates 
require the  wh-variable  to be instantiated. The set of  relevant  propositions  must not  be 
empty. 
Consider (16) and (17). While (16) can be true 
(1 6)  Heinz we$,  wen Maria eingeladen hat, 
Heinz knows who M.  invited  has 
even if Maria didn't  invite anybody and Heinz knows cxactly that, (17) can not be true in 
the case that Maria didn't invite anybody. 
(17)  Heinz ist erstaunt, wen Maria eingeladen hat 
Heinz is amazed  who Maria invited  has Franz-Josef d'Avis 
So, although both  verbs are factive in  the sense of KiparskyIKiparsky (1970) in that they 
presuppose the truth of the proposition of their that-complement, there are differences w.r.t. 
wh-complements.  To  know  does  not  require  the  wh-variable  to  be  instantiated,  so the 
argument in (18) goes through, cf. GroenendijkIStokhof (1982), that is from (18a) and (lab) 
follows (lac). 
(18)  a.  Heinz knows who Maria has invited. 
b.  Maria did not invite anyone. 
-->  c.  Heinz knows that Maria didn't invite anyone. 
In the case of to be amazed at, a parallel argument is not correct, see (19). 
(19)  a.  Heinz is amazed at who Maria has invited. 
b.  Maria did not invite anyone. 
-1-  c.  Heinz is amazed that Maria didn't invite anyone. 
I take it that  it is presupposed that the wh-variable must be instantiated. This property is 
constant under negation, as it should be. 
(20)  a.  Heinz ist erstaunt, wen Maria geheiratet hat. 
Heinz is  amazed  who Maria married  has. 
b.  Heinz ist rzicht erstaunt, wen Maria geheiratet hat. 
Heinz is  not  amazed  who Maria married  has. 
In both (20a) and (20b) the existence of a new husband is presupposed. 
So, the here relevant properties of the class of exclamative predicates with wh-complements 
are the following: 
(i)  an exclamative predicate describes an emotional attitude to a state of affairs. 
(ii)  it is presupposed that the wh-variable is instantiated, i.e. it exists a positive answer. 
(iii)  we have an alternative proposition, the norm-proposition. The norm-proposition  is 
derived from the answerl to the wh-clause in  a systematic way, as a subset of the 
complement set of the answerl. It must also be a positive answer. 
I assume that  at  least  these  two propositions  are  ordered  on  a  scale in  a  way  that  the 
expected propositon  is the one that sets the norm, and the true proposition is ordered at a 
distance  that  reflects  the  strength  of  the  amazement.  The  stronger  the  matrix  subjects 
amazement, the higher up on the scale is the true proposition. This property is also linked to 
the exclamative predicate and is not part of the meaning of the wh-clause itself. 
That  there  is  indeed  an  emotional  attitude  as  part  of  the  meaning  of  exclamative 
predicates  is  shown by  the  following  consideration:  There are predicates  that  explicitly 
express the non-existence of an emotional attitude towards a certain state of affairs like egal 
sein or nicht jucken/not  care. Those predicates cannot cooccur with exclamative predicates, 
relating to the same state of affairs, see (21).~ 
See Fries (1988) for independent exclamatives On the interpretation of wh-clauses in exclamative environments 
(21)  *Heinz ist erstaunt, wie iiberaus groJ3 Maria ist, aber es ist ihm egal. 
Heinz is amazed how very tall Maria is, but he is indifferent towards this. 
The  properties  one  usually  associates  with  wh-exclamatives,  that  is  expression  of  an 
emotional attitude,  presupposition  of  the  propositional  content, ordering  of  at least two 
relevant  propositions  on  a  scale, follows  in  this  view  solely from the  properties  of  the 
matrix predicates. What the wh-clause does is that it provides via its interrogative semantics 
the possibility to compute the relevant alternative propositions. 
With  exclamative predicates  embedding a wh-clause, we have a relation  between  the 
matrix subject and two different propositions: one describing the true exhaustive answer to 
the wh-clause, the answer2 in Heims terms, and one describing the norm-proposition. 
3.  Special Wh-phrases 
3.1.  Data 
Now I turn  to question (i) in the introduction: Why can certain wh-clauses be embedded 
under exclamative predicates but not under question predicates? 
Consider the examples in (22) and (23). 
(22)  a.  Heinz ist erstaunt, wie iiberaus groJ  Maria ist. 
Heinz is amazed  how extremely tall M.  is 
b.  Heinz ist verwundert, wie enorm breit der EJtisch ist. 
Heinz is amazed how enormously broad the table  is 
c.  Heinz ist verblufft, wie pfeilschnell  der neue Wagen ist. 
Heinz is  stunned  how arrow-fast the new  car  is 
'Heinz is stunned how very fast the new car is.' 
d.  Heinz ist erstaunt, wie saukalt es heute ist. 
Heinz is  amazed how pig cold it today  is. 
'Heinz is amazed how extremely cold it is today.' 
e.  Heinzfindet es erstaunlich, wie riesig Maria ist. 
Heinz finds  it  amazing  how gigantic M. is 
(23)  a.  *Heinz  fragt sich, wie iiberaus groJ  Maria ist. 
Heinz asks himself how extremely tall M.  is 
b.  *Heinz mochte wissen, wie enorm  breit der Ejtisch ist. 
Heinz wants to know  how enormously broad the table  is 
c.  *Heinz  fragt sich,  wie pfeilschnell der neue Wagen ist. 
Heinz  asks himself how arrow-fast  the new  car  is 
d.  *Heinz mochte wissen, wie saukalt es heute ist. 
Heinz wants to know how pigcold it today is 
e.  "Heinz  fragt  sich, wie riesig Maria ist. 
Heinz asks himself how gigantic M. is Franz-Josef d' Avis 
In  (22) we have exclamative predicates embedding wh-clauses  with a certain kind of  wh- 
phrases. In  the relevant  reading, these wh-clauses  are ungrammatical  as complements of 
question predicates as in (23).5 
It seems pretty obvious, which elements are responsible for the contrast in (22) and (23), 
at least regarding a. to d. In the a- and b- cases we have intensifying elements (uberaus and 
enorm) inside the adjective phrase, adverbials to the adjectives. Without these syntactical 
intensifiers, embedding under question-predicates is ok, see (24). 
(24)  a.  Heinz fragt sich, wie groJ  Maria ist. 
Heinz wonders how tall M. is 
b.  Heinz mochte wissen, wie breit der EJtisch ist. 
Heinz wants to know how broad the table is 
I call uberaus etc. syntactical intensifiers in contrast to the intensifying elements in c. and d. 
that come into play by way of a morphological  process. Other than syntactical intensifiers, 
they are not so free w.r.t. the adjectives they combine with. 
But they are responsible for the ungrammaticality of (23c,d). Without them the sentences 
are ok, see (24c, d). 
(24)  c.  Heinz fragt sich, wie schnell der neue Wagen ist. 
Heinz wonders  how fast  the new  car  is 
d.  Heinz mochte wissen, wie kalt es heute ist. 
Heinz wants to know how cold it today is 
(23e)  is  not  so obvious  w.r.t.  to  the analysis of  the adjective phrase.  Riesig  can  be  an 
adverbial as in (25). 
(25)  a.  Heinz ist erstaunt, wie riesig groJ  der Dom ist. 
Heinz is amazed how enormously big the dome is 
In  this  case,  it  is  in  line  with  the  syntactical  intensifiers  Gberaus  and  enorm, but  the 
adjective  groJ3  had  somehow  to  be  deleted  in  (22e  and  23e), if  riesig  was  always  an 
adverbial. 
On  the other hand, we can think of  riesig in (22e and 23e) indeed as an adjective. The 
intensifying element is somehow inherent to the adjective. riesig so means, what it means 
intuitively, namely sehr or riesig groJ,  that is: very or enormously big. The form of  riesig 
without  the inherent  intensifying element is simply groJ,  and groJ3 is of  course ok in  a 
sentence like (23e), see (26). 
(26)  Heirzz fragt  sich, wie groJ  Maria ist. 
Heinz wonders  how tall Maria  is 
Before I come to the possible readings of  the sentences in  (23), there is some connected 
data, see (27) and (28). 
'  I shall come back to the point of identifying the different readings. 
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(27)  a.  Heinz ist erstaunt, welchen Bombenetfolg das neue Stuck hatte. 
Heinz is  amazed,  which  bomb-success the new  piece  had 
b.  Heinz,findet es verbluffend, welche Bullenhitze im  Kino herrscht. 
Heinz finds  it  stunning  which  bull-heat  in the cinema reigns 
c.  Heinz ist verblufft, welchen Affenzahn Maria draujhat. 
Heinz is  stunned  which monkeytooth Maria on it has 
d.  Heinz ist venvundert, welchen Burenhunger Karl mitgebracht  hat. 
Heinz is  amazed  which  bear-hunger  Karl with-brought has 
(28)  a.  *Heinz fragt sich, welche Bullenhitze im Kino herrscht. 
b.  *Heinz mochte wissen, welchen Affenzahn Maria draufhat. 
c.  *Heinz wollte wissen, welchen Bombenerfolg das neue Stiick hatte. 
d.  *Heinz will wissen, welchen Barenhunger Karl mitgebracht hat. 
(29)  a.  Heinz fragt sich, welche Tempera  fur heute im  Kino herrscht. 
Heinz wonders  which  temperature today in the cinema is 
b.  Heilzz mochte  wissen, welches Tempo Maria am liebsten  fahrt. 
Heinz wants to know  which  speed  Maria best of all  drives 
In  this cases we are dealing with noun phrases that are intensified, either morphologically, 
like (27a,b and d) or  inherently like  (27c). Bomben  is  in  these cases a prefix  meaning 
something like enormous. Affenzahn means in this context high speed.6 
If  we can find a more neutral form for this intensified noun phrases, so to speak stripped 
off  their intensified element, embedding under question predicates is ok, see for example 
(29a) for (28b) and (29b) for (28c). This is parallel to the cases with adjectives above. 
The  second  relevant  contrast  concerns  multiple  wh-complements.  Although  they  are 
grammatical under exclamative predicates,7 see (30), there are exceptions. 
(30)  a.  Heinz ist erstaunt, wen Maria wo getroffen hat. 
Heinz is  amazed whom Maria where met  has 
'Heinz is amazed whom Maria met where.' 
b.  Heinz ist verblufft, wem Maria wann geholfen hat. 
Heinz is  stunned whom Maria when helped  has 
'Heinz is stunned whom Maria helped when.' 
c.  Heinz ist erstaunt, wie groJ  welcher Spieler ist. 
Heinz is  amazed  how tall  which  player  is 
d.  Heinz ist verblufft, wie breit welcher FluJ  ist. 
Heinz is stunned  how broad which  river  is 
With the adjective phrases I talked about above, multiple wh-clauses are not grammatical, 
see (3  I 1.' 
- 
"ee  Van 0s  (I 989) on intendifiers 
'  Cf. also Karttunen (1977).  '  See also Lahiri (I99  I). Franz-Josef d'Avis 
(31)  a.  *Heinz ist verbliifft, wie iiberaus breit welcher FluJ  ist. 
Heinz is stunned how extremely broad which river is 
b.  *Heinz  findet  es erstaunlich, wie pfeilschnell welcher Wagen ist. 
Heinz is amazed how very fast which car is 
c.  *Heinz ist erstaunt, wie riesig welcher Spieler ist. 
Heinz is amazed how extremely tall which player is 
d.  *Heinz ist verwundert, wie iiberaus groJ3 welches Miidchen ist. 
Heinz is amazed how very tall which girl is 
I will come back to these examples in connection with the solution to the contrast in (22) 
and (23). But now to the different reading of sentences as in (23). 
3.2.  Possible Readings 
The two different readings  of  sentences like (22) and  (23) can  be  identified in  different 
contexts. 
Lets take for example (22c,e), repeated as (32a, b). 
(32)  a.  Heirzz findet  es erstaunlich, wie riesig Maria ist. 
Heinz finds  it  amazing  how gigantic M. is 
b.  Heinz ist verbliifft, wie pfeilschnell der neue Wagen ist. 
Heinz is  stunned how arrow-fast the new  car  is 
If  we have a context as in (33a), that is: Heinz knew that Maria is gigantic, then Heinz is 
amazed at the degree to which Maria is gigantic. 
(33)  a.  Heinz wuJte, daJ  Maria riesig ist,  aber er ist erstaunt, wie  riesig  sie ist. 
Heinz knew  that Maria is gigantic, but  he is amazed at how gigantic she is. 
Call this the degree-reading. 
In  a context like (33b) it is not the degree Heinz is amazed at, but the fact that Maria is 
gigantic and not only tall or very tall. 
(33)  b.  Heinz wuJte, day  Maria groJ  ist, aber er ist erstaunt, wie riesig  sie ist. 
Heinz knew  that Maria is tall,  but he  is  amazed how gigantic she is. 
It is not the degree to which Maria is gigantic that is amazing. It is taken for granted that 
someone that is gigantic is so to a certain degree. Call this the non-degree-reading. 
It  is  the  non-degree  reading  that  is  not  available  in  a  wh-clause  embedded under  a 
question predicate, see (34). 
(34)  a.  Heinz wuJte, daJ  Maria riesig ist, nun wollte er wissen, wie riesig sie ist. 
Heinz knew that Maria is gigantic, but now he wanted to know how gigantic 
she is. On the interpretation of wh-clauses in exclamative environments 
b.  #Heinz wuJte, daj3 Maria groJ  ist, nun wollte er wissen, wie riesig sie ist. 
Heinz knew that Maria is tall, but now he wanted to know how gigantic she 
is. 
With an adjective like pfeilschnell the degree-reading seems to be  not available at all. So, 
sentences with wie pfeilschnell should be bad under question predicates. This is indeed the 
case, see (35). 
(35)  *Heinz we$,  daJ  der Wagen pfeilschnell ist, nun will er wissen, wie pfeilschnell  er 
ist. 
Heinz knows that the car is very fast, now, he wants to know, how very fast it is. 
With exclamative predicates the only available reading for clauses with wie pfeilschnell  is 
the non-degree-reading, see (36a). 
(36)  a.  Heinz we@',  daJ  der Wagen schnell ist, aber er ist erstaunt, wie pfeilschnell 
er ist. 
Heinz knows that the car is fast, but he is amazed how very fast it is 
b.  *Heinz we$,  daj3 der Wagen  pfeilschnell ist, aber er ist erstaunt, wie 
pfeilsclznell  er  ist. 
Heinz knows that the car is very fast, but he is amazed how very fast it is 
The intensifying elements, whether syntactical, morphological or inherent, refer to extreme 
areas on a scale related to the meaning of the adjective they belong to. These extreme areas 
can be  very  small. In  the extreme case, these  areas are so small, that  a  subdivision  in 
different degrees is no longer possible, see also Rehbock (1997). This seems to be the case 
with pfei[schnell/as quick as lightning. 
Another  hint  in  the  same  direction  is,  that  adjectives  like  pfeilschnell  have  no 
comparative form, so (37) is ungrammatical. 
(37)  *Der  gelbe Wagen ist pfeilschneller als cler griine. 
The yellow car is more fast as lightning as the green one 
Nonetheless, I am not sure if  one should place these adjectives in the same class as non- 
gradable adjectives  like  true or married, that  are  not  possible  at all  in  wiehow-phrases 
introducing a wh-clause. 
The two different  readings,  the degree-reading and  the non-degree-reading,  have also 
effects on what I called above the norm-proposition. In the case of (38) with the predicate 
erstaunt sein it is the proposition describing Heinz' expectations. 
(38)  a.  Heinz ist erstaunt, wie riesig Maria ist. 
Heinz is amazed  how gigantic M. is 
b.  degree-reading: 
Heinz expected Maria to be gigantic to another degree. Franz-Josef d'Avis 
c.  non-degree-reading: 
Heinz  expected  Maria  to be  just  tall  or  even  of  normal  height,  but  not 
gigantic. 
The interesting point w.r.t. the non-degree reading is, that Heinz didn't expect Maria to be 
riesig/gigantic at all. 
The problem is now, how to derive the norm-proposition to the non-degree-reading if the 
norm proposition is actually another answer to the question how gigantic Maria is, that is an 
answer to the question to what degree Maria is gigantic. 
3.3.  Paraphrases to the non-degree reading1 Appositions 
How can we paraphrase the non-degree-reading? I want to go back  to some examples of 
Grimshaw (1979) that she used to show a difference between wh-clauses under exclamative 
predicates and under question predicates. 
Question predicates allow only disjunctive appositions like Torn or Harry in (39a). 
(39)  a.  John wondered who, Tom or Harry, had gone to the movies. 
b.  *John wondered who, (namely) Tom and Harry, had gone to the movies. 
This  kind  of  apposition  to  a  wh-phrase  has  a  certain  effect:  It  is  presupposed  that  the 
content of the apposition is the true instantiation of the wh-variable, that is: Tom or Harry 
had gone to the movies. If  we assume an exclusive or, this means for (39a) that either Tom 
or Harry had gone to the movies. 
The difference to a conjunctive apposition like in  (39b) is, that we still have a choice 
between Tom and Harry. Intuitively, it still makes sense, to ask about which one of the two 
constitutes the true instantiation of the wh-variable. 
A conjunctive apposition on the other hand, or one with just  one element, also presup- 
poses that its content is the true instantiation of the wh-variable. But in theses cases there is 
no choice, and it doesn't seem to make sense to ask about it, see the German examples in 
(40). 
(40)  a.  "Heinz mochte wissen, wen Maria eingeladen hat, Karl und Gustav. 
Heinz wants to know who, Karl and Gustav, Maria has invited. 
b.  *Heinz mochte wissen, wen Maria eingeladen hat, (namlich)  Karl. 
Heinz wants to know who Maria has invited, (namely) Karl. 
Under exclamative predicates, a conjunctive apposition or a one-element apposition is ok, 
see (41). 
(41)  a.  Heinz ist erstaunt, wen Maria eingeladen hat, namlich Karl und Gustav 
Heinz is amazed who Maria invited has, namely Karl and Gustav 
b.  Heinz ist erstaunt, wen Maria eingeladen hat, nanzlich Karl. 
Heinz is amazed who Maria invited has, namely Karl On the interpretation of wh-clauses in exclamative environments 
W.r.t.  the  wh-phrases  with  intensifying  elements,  I  assume  now  that  the  intensifying 
elements are basically like the appositions in (41). 
So  we can paraphrase the non-degree-reading of the sentences in (42) as in (43). 
(42)  a.  Heinz ist verhliifft, wie pfeilschnell der neue Wagen ist. 
Heinz is  stunned  how arrow-fast  the new  car  is 
b.  Heinzfindet es erstaunlich, wie riesig Maria ist. 
Heinz finds  it  amazing  how gigantic M. is 
(43)  a.  Heinz ist verbliifft, wie schnell (,  namlich pfeilschnell,) der neue Wagen ist 
(, namlich pfeilschnell). 
Heinz is  stunned  how fast (, namely fast as lightning,)  the new  car  is 
(, namely fast as lightning). 
b.  Heinzfindet es erstaunlich, wie groJ  (, rzanzlich riesig,)  Maria ist (, niimlich 
riesig) . 
Heinz finds  it  amazing how tall (, namely enormously,) M. is (, namely 
enormously). 
The effect of the apposition is the same as in the examples (39) - (41). It is presupposed that 
the element named in the apposition is the true instantiation of the wh-variable. 
So, for example, in (43b) the question in the embedded wh-clause is actually not about 
how gigantic Maria is, but how tall she is, with  the presupposition that she is enormously 
tall. 
If  the question  in  (43b) is, how tall Maria is, it  is also possible to compute the right 
norm-proposition,  the proposition,  that  was  expected. We are  not  interested  in  different 
degrees to which Maria is tall, that is the expected proposition has nothing to with a certain 
degree, to which Maria is gigantic. 
We are interested in the answers to the neutral question, how tall she is. And an answer 
here could well be that she is of normal height, or even small. By treating the intensifying 
element as an apposition with the mentioned properties, it is possible to derive the correct 
norm-proposition. 
The presupposition of the intensifying elements can also be related to the speaker. This 
is shown by examples like (44). 
(44)  a.  Heinz we$  nicht, wie iiberaus groJ/riesig  Maria ist (*, und ich auch niclzt). 
Heinz knows not, how enormously talllgigantic Maria is (* and I too not) 
b.  Heinz hat vergessen, welche Affenhitze im Kino herrschte (*, und ich auch). 
Heinz has forgotten which monkey-heat in the cinema reigned (* and I too) 
c.  Heinz weiJ3 nicht, wie groJ  Maria ist (, und ich auch nicht). 
Heinz knows not how tall Maria is (, and I too not). 
d.  Heinz hat vergessen, welche Temperatur im Kino war (,  und ich auch). 
Heinz has forgotten which temperature in the cinema reigned (* and I too) 
In the cases where it is clear that the speaker doesn't know the answer to the embedded wh- 
clauses, the whole sentence becomes ungrammatical. That is, in the cases with intensifying Franz-Josef d'Avis 
elements. The neutral adjective or nominal forms as in (44c and d) are ok. That means, the 
speaker has to know the instantiation of the wh-variable. 
The assumption, that the instantiation of the wh-variable named  in the apposition is pre- 
supposed as the true answer to the wh-clause leads to a meaning of the wh-clause with just 
one possible answer: the one given in the wh-clause. 
Exactly this is the reason why the non-degree reading is not possible in question environ- 
ments like (23) above. It simply makes no sense to ask for something the answer to which is 
given in the question. 
This is formulated in the restriction in (45). 
(45)  Wh-clauses  that  presuppose  their  only  true  answer  are  not  allowed  in  question 
environments. 
That does for example not exclude wh-clauses, that presuppose more than one true answer 
like (31a). 
The  contrast  in  (31)  above, that  the  wh-phrases  with  intensifying  elements  are  not 
grammatical  in  multiple  wh-clauses  can  be  explained,  if  we  assume,  that  there  must  be 
more than one instantiation for each wh-variable in a multiple wh-clause, see for example 
Wachowicz (1974). The interpretation of the intensifying element as an apposition with the 
above named properties, excludes that there is more than one instantiation. So, a multiple 
wh-clause is not possible. 
To sum up: 
(i)  W.r.t. the non-degree-reading,  the intensifying elements are  analyzed as a sort of 
apposition, triggering a certain (speaker-related) presupposition, that in turn leads to 
an interpretation with just one true answer, that is named in the apposition. 
(ii)  the  norm-proposition  is  derived  from  the  meaning  of  the  wh-clause  without  the 
intensifying element. 
(iii)  the contrast in  (22) and (23) is derived from the properties in (i) and the restriction 
in (45). 
This answers basically question (i) of the introduction. 
In  this  section  I  discuss  the  question  (ii)  from  the  introduction,  why  oh-clauses  are 
ungrammatical as complements of exclamative predicates, see (46). 
(46)  a.  *Heinz ist erstaunt, ob es regnet. 
Heinz is amazed whether it is raining 
If  ob-clauses  and  wh-interrogatives  have the same semantical  type  that  is the basis  for 
selectional properties of  a matrix predicate, one must discuss why certain predicates select 
only for a subclass. This selectional peculiarities w.r.t. the class of interrogatives are in no 
way restricted to exclamative predicates. On the interpretation of wh-clauses in exclamative environments 
There are different classes of predicates that take only wh-interrogatives, or subclasses of 
wh-interrogatives, or only ob-clauses, or only subclasses of ob-clauses. 
The communication verbs zugeben, gestehen, bekennen/admit take a wh-complement but 
are quite bad with ob-clauses, see (47).9 
(47)  a.  Heinz hat zugestandedzugegeben/bekannt, nit wem er die Nacht verbracht 
hat. 
Heinz has admitted with whom he the night spent has 
'Heinz has admitted whom he spent the night with.' 
b.  ??Heinz hat  zugestanden/zugegeben/bekannt,  ob er die  Nacht  mit Maria 
verbracht hat. 
Heinz has admitted whether he the night with Maria spent has 
'Heinz has admitted whether he spent the night with Maria.' 
This is also the case with verbs like schildern oder beschreibeddescribe, see (48). 
(48)  a  Heinz schilderteheschrieb mir, wo Peter wohnt. 
Heinz described me where Peter lives 
b.  *Hein?.  schilderteheschrieb mir, ob Peter in Hamburg wohizt. 
Heinz described me whether Peter in Hamburg lives 
Schwarz (1993) identifies a class a verbs he calls 'Verben der sequentiellen Abarbeitung' 
like runterrattern  or aufzahledto list that  only take a subclass of  wh-clauses  as comple- 
ments, see (49), and for which he formulates a condition that excludes the ungrammatical 
ones. 
(49)  a.  *Maribel rattert herunter, welches Buch Carmen gelesen hat. 
(=Schwarz 1993: (7a)) 
Maribel lists which book Carmen has read. 
b.  Maribel rattert herunter, welche Biicher/was Camzen gelesen hat. 
Maribel lists whatlwhich books Carmen has read. 
Huddleston (1994) shows for predicates like bezweifelddoubt, zweifelhaft seinhe doubtful, 
fruglich sein/be questionable that they are sensitive w.r.t. to the type of ob-clause they take 
as a complement. They are ungrammatical with alternative ob-clauses, see (50). 
(50)  a.  Ich bezweijle, ob Maria zu Hause ist. 
I doubt whether Maria is at home. 
b.  *Ich bezweijle, ob Maria zu Hause ist oder in der Kirche. 
I doubt whether Maria is at home or in the church. 
What this diverse data suggests is that we must try from case to case to find out the reasons 
for the semantical incompatibility between a class of predicates and a certain type of clause 
cf.  Dipper (1997: fn. 45) Franz-Josef d'Avis 
in complement position. I will do that here for the class of exclamative predicates and ob- 
clauses. 
Actually,  it  is  not  so self-evident,  why a predicate  like to  be  amazed  should not  go 
together with an oh-clause. If  we consider for example a sentence with know like (51), 
(51)  Heinz knows whether it is raining. 
so is the intuition that Heinz knows that it is raining, if it is raining, and that Heinz knows 
that it is not raining, if  it is not raining. Why can't  we interpret a sentence like (52) in the 
same way? 
(52)  *Heinz is amazed (at) whether it is raining. 
That is: if  it is raining, Heinz is amazed that it is raining, and if  it is not raining, Heinz is 
amazed that it is not raining. As for the norm-proposition, Heinz could in  each case easily 
have expected the opposite. 
I think  the relevant factor here is an element that exclamative predicates  share with a 
broader  class  of  predicates  which  are  included  in  the  class  a  emotive  predicates 
KiparskyIKiparsky (1970: 363) characterize as "in  general  all predicates which express a 
subjective value of a proposition rather than knowledge about it or its truth value". 
The important element is that we are dealing with an evaluation of a proposition. For an 
evaluation it seems to be basic to have the possibility of  a relation to a relevant object of 
comparison.'0 This  object  of  comparison  is  w.r.t.  exclamative  predicates  and  the  true 
answer the norm-proposition.  It is the answer to the wh-clause that  describes the matrix 
subject's idea of the norm. So, what an exclamative predicate requires of its complement is 
that  there  are two possible  answers.  And,  as  we  have  seen  in  section  2,  not  only  two 
possible answers, but two positive, possible answers. The last point seems to be directly 
relevant  for the  problem  with  ob-clauses.  In  this  case,  we  have  in  principle  only  one 
possible positive answer, so that we can formulate the following restriction on the relation 
between exclamative predicates and their wh-complements. 
(53)  A  relation  between  an  individual  and  a  wh-complement,  that  is  given  by  an 
exclamative  predicate,  is  well  defined  only,  if  there  are  two  possible  positive 
answers to the wh-clause." 
With the restriction in (), we exclude ob-clauses as complements of exclamative predicates 
and have an intuitively reasonable answer to the question (ii) in the introduction. 
'O  Cf Frics (1994) for the description of emotions as evaluations of state of affairs or objects relative to the 
physical an psychological needs of the person that expresses them. 
"  In d'Avis (2001 :IOI) I have given a somewhat different restriction with a more technical counterpart. This 
is related to a modification of the Karttunen-semantics of ob-clauses I am discussing there. On the interpretation of wh-clauses in exclamative environments 
5.  Unembedded Wh-(exclamatives) 
The fourth  question  in  the  introduction  was how we can  relate  unembedded  wh-clauses 
with their interrogative meaning to their use as exclamations. Examples are given in (54). 
(Capitals stand for emphasis.) 
(54)  a.  Wen DIE geheiratet hat! 
whom she married has 
b.  Wen DIE alles eingeladen hat! 
whom she all invited has 
c.  Wen hat DIE alles eingeladen! 
whom has she all invited 
d.  Wem  DER alles geholfen hat! 
whom he all helped has 
e.  Wie RIESIG die ist! 
how gigantic she is 
f.  Wie RIESIG ist die! 
how gigantic is she 
An  exclamative utterance of the sentences in  (54) expresses an  emotional attitude of  the 
speaker  towards  a  certain  state  of  affairs,  that  is  not  in  accordance  with  his  or  her 
expectations. An  exclamation  on the basis of  a wh-clause presupposes  the propositional 
content of the wh-clause to be true. 
An  interesting  point  w.r.t.  German  is  that  the  position  of  the  finite  verb  does  not 
differentiate between the uses as exclamations or questions. Both V2-clauses, see (54c, f) 
and verb-final clauses can be used as exclamations. 
I assume that exclamation  is an  element related to the use of  language, see also Fries 
(1988) and Rosengren (1992, 1994, 1997). So, how can one imagine the relation between 
the interrogative meaning of a wh-clause and its use as an exclamation? 
Constitutive for an  Exclamation  is an  emotional  attitude  of  the  speaker to a  state of 
affairs, that is presupposed to be true, and a difference between this state of affairs and the 
speakers idea of the norm. 
The point that the expression of an emotional attitude is part of an exclamative illocution 
can  be  made clear with  examples like (55) where  the speaker  at  the same time tries to 
express that he is indifferent towards the relevant state of affairs. 
(55)  a.  Wie SCHON Maria ist! #Aber das ist mir egal. 
How beautiful Maria is! #But I don't mind. 
The presupposed state of affairs is described by the answer 2 to the wh-clause, that is the 
true answer. 
A Hearer expects the speaker to know the answer. Consider the exclamation in (56). 
(56)  S 1:  Wen DIE geheiratet hat! 
whom Maria married has Franz-Josef d'  Avis 
If &  has married Heinz, then S1 should know, that she has married Heinz. This is at least 
what S2  thinks, if he replies (57). 
(57)  S2:  Wen HAT Maria denn geheiratet? 
Whom did Maria PART marry 
If  S1 does not know  the true answer to the question in  (57), the utterance of  (56) as an 
exclamation is defective. 
But the information that Maria married Heinz is not overtly part of the utterance. If the 
speaker knows the true answer, but holds it back, the relevance of the utterance must lie in 
something else. With respect to exclamations this could be interpreted in the following way: 
the relevant aspect is the expression of the speakers emotional attitude to the state of affairs 
that is described by the true answer. 
The connection to the proposition that describes the speakers norm is as in the embedded 
case: the proposition is a subset of the negation of the answerl. For instance w.r.t. (56): S1 
could consider it to be normal, that Maria married someone else. 
But how do we know that the utterance is to be interpreted as an exclamation and not as 
a question? 
The  relevant  factor  is  the obligatory  exclamative  accent,  compare  Rosengren  (1994, 
1997). 
The exclamative accent is easy to  tell  apart from contrast  accents or other focussing 
accents, see Altmann  (1993). Its particular properties are greater maxima w.r.t. the basic 
frequency, greater length  and possibly a higher  intensity, cf. Oppenrieder (1987), (1989), 
Batliner (1988).12 The function of  the exclamative accent is to show, that we are dealing 
with  an  expression  of  an  emotional  attitude.  I  assume,  that  emotions  expressed  by 
exclamations go together with an evaluation of the relevant state of affairs, see Fries (1994). 
An evaluation is possible, if there is an object of comparison. The relevant state of affairs is 
described  by  the true  answer to  the  wh-clause. The object  of  comparison  is  the  norm- 
proposition,  derived  from  the  negation  of  the  answerl.  Exclamative  illocutions  and 
exclamative predicates (with wh-clause) share some basic properties: 
- the propositional content of the wh-clause is presupposed, 
- an emotional attitude towards a state of affairs is expressed, 
- two certain propositions are needed, that are compared with each other 
- the first proposition is the true answer to the wh-clause 
- the second, the norm-proposition, is derived form the complement set of the answerl. 
To exclude wh-clauses with intensifying elements like (58) from being used as a question, 
is actually not so hard now. These wh-clauses have the same properties as the embedded 
ones in that they presuppose their only true answer. 
(58)  Wie UBERAUS GROSS die ist! 
how enormously tall she is 
l2   or  the  connection  between  exclamative  accent  and  emphatical  accent  w.r.t.  declarative  clauses  see 
Wingcrt (1996), for discussion of the intonation inside the wh-phrase see Botz (1995). On the interpretation of wh-clauses in exclamative environments 
And  so  they  are  subject  to  the  restriction  in  (43, they  are  not  allowed  in  question 
environments. 
1 have derived  the exclamative illocution on the basis of  a wh-clause through certain 
properties  of  emotions as part  of  the  language  system. These properties:  existence of  a 
certain state of affairs, evaluation part, derivation of  an  object of comparison  are given by 
the function of the obligatory exclamative accent as the reflection of the emotional involve- 
ment  of  the  speaker.  The  interrogative  meaning  of  the  wh-clause  provides  the  set  of 
propositions that are needed to compute the relevant norm-proposition. 
6.  Summary 
The answers to question (i) and (iii) in the introduction are basically the same. Certain wh- 
clauses are excluded from question contexts because of  the properties of the intensifying 
elements inside the clause-initial wh-phrase. W.r.t. question (ii), ob-clauses are excluded as 
complements of exclamative predicates, because they do not provide two possible positive 
answers. The answer to question (iv) uses the obligatoriness of the exclamative accent and 
some considerations  on  the  properties  of  emotions  expressed  by  linguistic  utterances. 
Concerning these questions, I think the hypothesis in (HI) can be maintained. 
Before I finish, I have a few remarks on a paper by Raffaella Zanuttini and Paul Portner 
which Paul sent me after the DGfS-meeting in ~ei~zi~.''  I think that our considerations go 
in the same direction, though they differ in detail and w.r.t. the evaluation of the syntactical 
properties of  wh-clauses in exclamative environments. As far as the German examples are 
concerned, there is in principle no syntactical difference between wh-clauses in exclamative 
environments and in question environments. The concept of widening that is introduced by 
ZanuttiniIPortner (2000) captures the difference between the norm-proposition and the true 
answer to  the  wh-clause  described  here.  In  opposite  to  Zanuttini  and  Portner,  I do not 
assume that there is a factive component as part of the relevant wh-clause. Factivity comes 
into play either by  way of the interaction  between  the meaning of  the wh-clause or as the 
outcome of  the effect the exclamative accent has  w.r.t.  unembedded  wh-clauses  used as 
exclamations. The difference could become clear  in  examples with  the matrix  predicate 
wissenknow.  Wissen  takes  ob-complements,  see  (59a)  and  also  apparent  exclamative 
complements, see (59b). 
(59)  a.  Heinz we@, ob es regnet. 
Heinz knows that it is raining. 
b.  Heinz we@, wie uberaus groJ3 Maria ist, 
Heinz knows how very tall Maria is. 
In addition wissen takes wh-complements that could be interrogative or exclamative. 
(60)  Heinz we@, wen Maria eingeladen hat. 
Heinz knows, whom Maria has invited. On the interpretation of wh-clauses in eaclamative environments 
Rosengren, Inger  (1992). Zur Grammatik und  Pragmatik  der  Exklamation.  In:  Rosengren  (Hg.)  Satz  und 
Illokution. Bd. I. Tubingen: Niemeyer (= Linguistische Arbeiten 278). 263-306. 
Rosengren, I. (1994). Expressive Sentence Types - A Contradiction  in  Terms. The Case of  Exclamation. 
Sprache undPragmatik 33. Lund 1994. 38-68. 
Rosengren, I. (1997). Expressive Sentence Types -  A Contradiction in Terms. The Case of Exclamation. In: 
Swan,  T.1 Westvik,  0.1.  (Hgg.):  Modality  in  Gerlnnnic  Languages.  Historical  and  Comparative 
Perspectives. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. (= Trends in Linguistics. Studies and Monographs 
99). 
Schwarz, B. (1993): Gewisse Fragesatze  und  gewisse Verben, die sie einbetten. Magisterarbeit, Universitat 
Tubingen. 
van Os, C. (1989). Aspekte der Intensivierung im Deutschen. Tubingen: Narr. 
Wachowicz, K. (1974). On the Syntax and Semantics ofMultiple Questions. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
Texas. 
Wingert,  D.  (1996).  Zur  Intonation  und  Informationsgliederung  von  Exklamativsutzen  des  Deutschen. 
Magisterarbeit, Universitat Tiibingen. 
Zaefferer,  D.  (1983).  The  Semantics  of  Non-Declaratives:  Investigating  German  Exclamatories.  In: 
BauerlelSchwarzelv. Stechow (eds.) (1983). 466-490. 
Zaefferer, D. (1984). Frageausdrucke und Fragen im Deut.sclzen. Zu ihrer Syntax, Semantik und Pragmatik. 
Munchen. 
Zanuttini, R./Portner,  P. (2000). Exclamative  Clauses at  the S)mtax-Scnzantics  Interface.  Ms. Georgetown 
University. Focus structure 
and the referential status of indefinite quantificational expressions* 
Carsten Breul 
Dortmund 
carsten.breul @ruhr-uni-bochum.de 
1.  Introduction 
Many authors who subscribe to some version of  generative syntax account for the two 
readings of such sentences as (la) and (lb) in terms of LF-ambiguity. There is assumed 
to be covert quantifier raising (QR), which results in  two distinct possibilities  for the 
indefinite  quantificational  expressions involved to take scope over each other  (2a, b) 
(see e.g. Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 2000 [1990]: ch. 3, 9, Fanselow & Felix  1993 
[1987]: 192f., Haegeman & Gu6ron 1999: 541, Heim & Kratzer 1998: ch. 7, 8, Kamp & 
Reyle 1993: 279f., 288f.):' 
(1)  a.  Some publisher offended every linguist 
b.  Everyone saw someone 
(2)  a.  vx  33y  [K  (x,  y)l 
b.  3y vx  [K  (x,  y)l 
In this paper, an alternative account is proposed which dispenses with the idea that there 
are different  scope relations  involved in  the readings  of such sentences as in  (1) and, 
consequently, with  QR  as  the  syntactic  operation  to  be  assumed  for  generating  the 
respective LFs. I argue that it is rather focus structure in connection with type semantic 
issues pertaining to the indefinite quantificational expressions involved which result in 
the  different  readings  associated  with  such  sentences  as  in  (1).  The  approach  is 
motivated by an observation which leads to the conclusion that (la) is ambiguous while 
(Ib) is vague.3 This observation is based on an application of Lakoff's (1970) classic so- 
I am grateful to N. Asher, D. Buring, J. Jacobs, T. Kiss, B. Partee, G. Rauh, T. Tappe, C. Umbach for 
comments, discussion,  hints,  advice and questions, and  for food  for thought  in  general  to  all  the 
presenters  of papers at the DGfS-Workshop  on  "Information  structure and the referential  status of 
indefinite expressions" (Leipzig 28 Feb - 3 Mar, 2001), where I presented a version of this paper. 
The paper is submitted to a special issue of "Theoretical  Linguistics",  edited by Klaus von Heusinger 
and Kerstin Schwabe 
See also May 1990 [1977], where the QR account of (supposed) LF-ambiguities of the kind illustrated 
by (1) was introduced and studied in detail for the first time in generative grammar. 
Authors  differ with  respect  to  logical  notations  when  representing  different scope relations.  The 
notation  I use  in  (2) is  adopted  from Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet  (2000 [19901).  Haegeman  & 
Gukron  (1999: 541),  for  instance,  use  the  more  explicit  notation  below  in  representing  the  two 
readings of (2b) (similarly Kamp & Reyle 1993: 279f., 288f.). 
a.  Ax(x=H)+Ey(y=H)&(Sxyj 
b.  Ey(y=H)&Ax(x=H)+(Sxy)  '  That is, neither both are ambiguous, as the above mentioned authors seem to assumc, nor both vague, 
as argued by  Kempson & Cormack (1981). 
ZAS Papers in Linguistics 23, 2001, 23-38 test,  which  I  briefly  recapitulate  and  whose  applicability  in  the  relevant  cases  is 
discussed in the next section. 
2.  Ambiguity vs. vagueness: A problem for the standard account of 
'quantifier scope relations' 
Consider  first how Keenan  (1978:  172) explains  the  difference between  vague  and 
ambiguous sentences. 
There  are many  easily-agreed-upon  instances  of  ambiguous  sentences, such  as  the 
flying planes can be dangerous ones. There are equally many clear cases of  vagueness. 
Thus the Inan  on the table is hurt is vague, not ambiguous, according as the man  is 
Albanian or not. Note  of  course that  the  situations  in  which the  man  is,  or is  not, 
Albanian are quite distinct. But we feel that neither of  these situations is talked about 
in the original sentence. 
We shall propose then the following sufficient condition for a sentence to be judged 
vague, rather than ambiguous, in certain respects: A sentence S is vague according as it 
describes distinct situations a and b if, on a natural occasion of  its use, the speaker of 
the sentence does not  have to know (or believe he knows, a distinction  we will  not 
continue to make) whether in fact a orb  is the case. Thus we may naturally assert that 
the man on the table is hurt without having to know whether the man  is Albanian or 
not, so the sentence is correctly judged to be vague in this respect. 
On the other hand, in a normal assertion of the chickens are ready to eat the speaker 
is expected to know whether the chickens are ready to be eaten or rather are ready to 
dine. So this sentence does not satisfy our criterion of  vagueness, and is more plausibly 
judged  ambiguous.  [...I  All  we  are  saying  then  is  that  if  a  speaker  can  remain 
indifferent  between  alternatives a and b and still meaningfully assert  some sentence 
then the sentence is vague not ambiguous according as a or b obtains. 
Thus, a speaker may make a true utterance by saying The man on the table is hurt in a 
number of possible worlds comprising the set of worlds in which the man on the table is 
Albanian and the set of worlds in which he is not Albanian. And a speaker may make a 
true utterance in saying The chickens are ready to eat in a number of possible worlds 
comprising the set of worlds in which the chickens are ready to be eaten and the set of 
worlds  in which  the chickens are ready to dine. In  deciding  whether  the respective 
utterance is vague or ambiguous we probe into our -  linguistic knowledge informed - 
intuition  as  to  whether  the  speaker  ought  to  or need  not  be  able  to  remove  the 
indeterminacy concerning these different sets of possible worlds in which the utterance 
is true. 
Lakoff's  (1970) so-test  is  designed so as to sharpen our judgement  of whether a 
speaker can remain  indifferent  (as Keenan  says) with  respect to differences between 
states of  affairs which  in  isolation can all  be referred  to truthfully  by  using  a  given 
sentence-string.4  Lakoff  considers  clearly  ambiguous  sentences  such  as  (3a)  in 
comparison to clearly vague sentences such as (3b). 
(3)  a.  Selma likes visiting relatives 
b.  Harry kicked Sam 
4  "A sentence  is  an  output  of  grammar,  a triple  complex  of syntactic, semantic  and  phonological 
information. A sentence-string is  an  uninterpreted surface sentential sequence." (Kempson & Cormack 
1981: 302,n. I.) Focus structure and the referential status of indefinite quantificational expressions 
The ambiguity of (3a) is obvious. (3b) is vague in  that Harry could have kicked Sam 
with his left or his right foot, for example. Lakoff observes that adding and so does/did 
X to (3a, b), as in (4a, b), results in a significant difference as to possible readings. 
(4)  a.  Selma likes visiting relatives and so does Sam 
b.  Harry kicked Sam and so did Pete 
(4b) can be used to refer truthfully to the state of  affairs where Harry kicked Sam with 
his left foot and Pete kicked Sam with his right foot. In contrast, (4a) cannot be used to 
refer truthfully to a state of affairs where Selma likes going to visit relatives and Sam 
hates going to visit relatives but likes relatives who are visiting. That is, it is possible to 
associate one of the vaguely different alternatives of  interpretation with the first clause 
of (4b) and the other with the conjoined so-clause, but it is not possible to associate one 
of  the ambiguously different alternatives of interpretation with  the first clause of  (4a) 
and the other with the conjoined so-clause. These are linguistic effects resulting from 
our knowledge of the lexical-syntactic structure of the sentences involved and the way 
they are semantically computed (which 1  assume is compositional). 
This observation can  be  applied as a test  for distinguishing  ambiguous and vague 
sentences  also  in  cases  where,  supposedly, different  quantifier  scope  relations  are 
involved. (Well-known objections to the applicability of  the test  in  the relevant cases 
will be discussed shortly.) Consider a model in  which there are three Roman and three 
Greek letters and three numbers. (5a) appropriately and truthfully describes the situation 
depicted by (5b). 
(5)  a.  Every Roman letter is mapped to some number, and so is every Greek 
letter 
b.  a  1 
b+  2 
a\  ' 
P  2 
c  ------t  3  Y/  3 
Thus, the clause Every Roman letter is mapped to some number, which  is parallel  to 
(Ib) in  the  relevant  respects,  turns  out  to  be  vague  rather  than  ambiguous.5 Vague 
readings are not to be distinguished by different LF-representations. Thus we have lost a 
motivation  for assuming that  sentences  like (Ib) are  ambiguous between  two  truth- 
conditionally  distinct  interpretations  due  to  reversed  quantifier  scope  relations 
represented along the lines of the logical  formulae in  (2). Consequently, we have also 
lost  a motivation  for postulating  QR, for it  is  the function  of  QR to attain different 
quantifier scope relations. In  contrast to (Sa), however, (6a) cannot be used to refer to 
(6b). So there seems to be genuine ambiguity  involved in  sentences  such as (la), to 
which Some Roman letter is mapped to every number is parallel in the crucial respects. 
(6)  a.  Some Roman  letter is mapped to every number, and so is some Greek 
letter 
b.  a1 
P-2 
c  Y+3 
'  In  a note, Hornstein (1995: 237f.. n. 12) comes to the same conclusion with  respect to the example 
Every nzarl kisseda worizan. In contrast to the approach taken in the present paper, Hornstein, although 
he aims at doing away with QR  as well, still assumes that there are quantifier scope relations at issue 
in such sentences as in (I). It has been argued that the so-test cannot be applied in cases where one of the different 
readings entails the other, i.e. where the different readings stand in the relation of what 
Zwicky & Sadock (1975) call "privative opposition".6 This is because "the existence of 
the more general understanding  [i.e. the entailed one] guarantees that  we will  get all 
possible  understandings" with  the result  that  "we will  always conclude that  we  are 
dealing with a lack of  specification [i.e. 'vagueness']".  (Ib.: 23.) Although true, this is 
no argument against  what  has been  said above about  ambiguity  and  vagueness with 
respect to sentences like (la), (lb), Every Roman letter is mapped to some number and 
Some Roman letter is mapped to every number. For the claim that one reading of such 
sentences entails the other follows on the assumption that these readings correspond to 
the predicate calculus formulae of  (2), for which  it holds indeed that the 3V-formula 
logically entails the V3-formula. However, it is my claim that the differences in reading 
between  the respective sentences do not correspond to these formulae. Hence, there is 
no reason to assume a priori that in the semantics which is appropriate there holds an 
entailment relation between the respective readings as well. Moreover, if  there was an 
entailment relation  between  the readings  of the respective  sentences, then  we would 
expect  to  get vagueness  as the result  of the  application of  the so-test not  only  with 
sentences like (lb), i.e. those which exhibit the every-some order, but  also with those 
like (la), i.e. those which exhibit the some-every order. The fact that this is not the case, 
as shown by (6), proves that the so-test is indeed applicable in the cases in question. 
I would like to present one more argument for the claim that sentences like (la) are 
ambiguous while those like (lb) are vague. Imagine a situation in which various people 
tell you  truthfully what is going on between a group of three girls, Mary Miller, Mary 
Hunt, and Mary Spencer, and a group of three boys, Peter Smith, Peter Jones, Peter Hill. 
A first communicator tells you  that Peter Smith kissed Mary, another that Peter Jones 
kissed Mary, and a third that Peter Hill kissed Mary, without your having any idea about 
which Mary each communicator has in  mind. Your utterance of  (7) is appropriate and 
true with respect to the given domain of discourse, and nobody has the communicative 
right to expect from you that you are able to precisify what you mean by some girl (i.e. 
either 'some specific/singular girl' or 'some girl or other but not some specific/singular 
girl').7 
(7)  Every boy kissed some girl 
You cannot be said to equivocate in uttering (7), and you  are fully justified  in refusing 
to  precisify  along the  lines just  mentioned,  for otherwise you  would  run  the  risk  of 
saying  something  false.'  You  are  as  justified  in  uttering  (7)  as  the  speaker  from 
Keenan's  passage above is justified  in  uttering  The man on the table is hurt without 
knowing whether the man is Albanian or not. 
Compare this  situation with  one in which a communicator tells you  truthfully that 
Peter kissed Mary Miller, another that Peter kissed Mary Hunt, a third that Peter kissed 
Mary Spencer, without your having any idea about which Peter each communicator has 
in mind. Suppose now you uttered (8) with respect to the given domain of discourse. 
(8)  Some boy kissed every girl 
6  See also Kempson & Cormack 1981, for instance. Actually, this argument extends to the whole family 
of tests for ambiguity to which the so-test belongs (called "identity tests" by Zwicky B Sadock). 
7  On the notion of precisification and its relation to the vaguenesslambiguity distinction see Pinkal 1995 
119851, 1991. 
a  Cf.  Pinkalms  (1995  119851:  100) criterion  that  "[plure  vagueness  is  present  when  an  indefinite 
expression does not allow natural precisifications." Focus structure and the referential status of indefinite qunntificational expressions 
Of  course, this utterance is also a true one. However, now I am justified  in reproaching 
you with equivocation, i.e. with not being able to precisify what you mean by some boy 
although  a felicitous  utterance  of  (8) presupposes  that  you  should be.9 You  are  in  a 
communicatively  infelicitous  position  parallel  to  that  of  a  person  who  utters  The 
chickens are ready to eat without knowing whether the chickens are ready to be eaten or 
whether the chickens are ready to dine (although to a much more subtle degree). In this 
case,  you  have  no  communicative  right  to  remain  indifferent  as  to  the  piece  of 
knowledge whether  some specificlsingular  boy  or  some boy  or  other  but  not  some 
specific/singular boy kissed every girl. This difference between  (7) and (8) supports the 
claim that the former is vague while the latter is ambiguous. 
These intuitions might be felt to be delicate and subtle. Yet they  are supported by 
much more robust intuitions about the 'behavior'  of (7) and (8) under negation. 
(9)  a.  It is not true that every boy kissed some girl 
b.  It is not true that some boy kissed every girl 
With respect to the first state of affairs, (9a) is clearly false irrespective of whether there 
was  one specific  Mary  or  some Mary  or  other  who  was  kissed  by  every  Peter.  In 
contrast, we do not know which truth value to assign to (9b) with respect to the second 
state of affairs. In (9a), we are confronted with the negation of one sentence which (i.e. 
the negation)  is false. In  (9b), we are confronted  with  the negation  of  an  ambiguous 
sentence-string which corresponds to one sentence which is false (some Peter or other 
kissed  every  Mary)  and  to  a  second  sentence  about  which  we  do not  have  enough 
information to say if  it is false or true (some specific Peter kissed every ~ar~).'' 
If  we continue to  think in  terms of quantifier scope relations  about the ambiguity 
involved  here,  then  the  problem  is  how  to  generate  different  scope  relations  for 
sentences like (la) and block them for sentences like (lb). This may be done along the 
lines suggested by Hornstein (1995, 1999; see also fn. 5). As an alternative, I propose an 
account  in  terms of  focus structure in  connection  with  type  semantic considerations 
which is not based on scope relations. 
3.  Focus structure and its syntactic representation 
Let us assume that every representation of a root clause has either the general structure 
in (10a) or the one in (lob). 
with one of the three representations in (1  1) as possible realisations:" 
9  Cf.  Pinkal  (1995  [1985]:  81):  "Expressions  that  are  ambiguous  in  the  narrow  sense  require 
precisification." 
10  I implicitly relegate the issue of vagueness and ambiguity to the lexical characteristics of some in this 
argumentation,  which recalls that of Fodor 81  Sag (1982). Indeed, as will  become clear below,  my 
account of the ambiguity of sentences like (8) in terms of focus structure is closely linked to one in 
terms of the lexical  ambiguity of some. The point  of my  approach is that this lexical  ambiguity is 
exploited differently in sentences like (8) as compared to those like (7). 
I  I  In my presentation of the paper at DGfS 2001, I assumed that in thetic sentences there is a FocP as 
well  and that the whole IP moves to spec-Foc. For syntactic reasons which are of no interest in the 
present contcxt, I have abandoned this assumption. Nothing of significance for the semantic questions 
addressed here follows from this modification. (1 1)  predicate focus 
categorical 
FocP 
A 
Foc' 
A 
Foc  IP 
argument focus 
identificational 
FocP 
Foc  ~p 
/  [+foch,]* 
I  [+fochh] 
sentence focus 
thetic 
The concepts of predicate focus, argument focus and sentence focus structures are taken 
from Lambrecht (1994). In his theory, focus structure is defined in relation to a specific 
kind of presupposition, the so-called relevance presupposition, of which there are three 
types, each being associated with one of the three focus structure types. 
The relevance presupposition  associated  with  predicate focus structure determines 
the relevance of  the respective utterance as providing relevant predicative  information 
about  a  discourse  entity  under  discussion,  that  is,  about  a  topic.  (12)  provides  a 
discourse fragment which illustrates a predicate focus utterance in A's  reply, with my 
car or the pronoun  it being the topic expression. (Small capitalisation here and in the 
examples below signifies a nuclear pitch accent on the respective word; a falling pitch 
accent would be appropriate.) 
(12)  predicate focus structure 
Q:  What happened to your car? 
A:  My car/It broke DOWN.  (from Lambrecht 1994: 223) 
A sentence with predicate focus structure corresponds to a categorical sentence from the 
well-known thetic/categorical distinction (see e.g. Sasse 1987, Drubig 1992, Lambrecht 
1994: pass.). 
The relevance presupposition  associated with  argument focus structure determines 
the  relevance  of  the respective  utterance  as  providing  the  missing  information  in  a 
relevant,  variable  containing, that  is,  open  proposition.  (13) provides  an  illustrating 
discourse fragment. X broke down is the relevant open proposition, and the phrase my 
car in A's reply, which is both an information-structural argument"  and identificational 
focus expression, provides an identificational constant for the variable x.'" 
" It should be noted that the "word 'argument' in 'argument focus' is used here as a cover term for any 
non-predicating expression in a proposition, i.e. it includes terms expressing place, time, and manner. 
It  is  neutral  with  respect  to  the  issue  of  the  valence  of predicates  ('subcategorization')  and  the 
argument-adjunct distinction." (Lambrecht 1994: 224.) 
13  For E.  Kiss  (1998).  who distinguishes  informational  from identificational foci, the  latter  must  be 
exhaustive. This is not necessarily  the case for Lambrecht (1994:  122f.). I follow Lambrecht without 
further discussion. Focus structure and the referential status of indefinite quantificational expressions 
(1  3)  argument focus structure 
Q:  I heard your motorcycle broke down? 
A:  My CAR broke down.  (from Lambrecht 1994: 223) 
A sentence with  argument focus structure is also called identificational by  Lambrecht 
(1994). 
The relevance presupposition associated with sentence focus structure is zero. This 
does of course not mean that the utterance is irrelevant nor that it is not associated with 
any presuppositions.  It means that there is neither  a topic nor an  open proposition  in 
relation to which the respective utterance is relevant. An illustration is given in (14). 
(14)  sentence focus structure 
Q:  What happened? 
A:  My CAR broke down.  (from Lambrecht 1994: 223) 
I conceive of a relevance presupposition  as an  assumption held by the speaker which 
belongs to the context of  an utterance and which, just  like any other  resupposition, is 
74  essential for an assertive utterance to be or not to be truth-evaluable.  Associating an 
inappropriate  type  of  relevance  presupposition  with  such  an  utterance  results  in  its 
failure to be truth-evaluable. 
I  will  use  the  categorical/identificational/thetic terminology  in  the  following, 
replacing Lambrecht's (1994) predicate focus structure with categorical focus structure, 
argument  focus  structure  with  identificational  focus  structure,  and  sentence  focus 
structure  with  thetic  focus  structure.  On  the  one  hand,  this  is  because  the 
theticlcategorical terminology and distinction is older and more widely known. On the 
other hand, I have made the experience that especially the terms 'predicate focus' and 
'argument  focus'  tend  to  produce  confusion.  However,  I  adhere  to  Lambrecht's 
threefold distinction of focus structure types both with respect to his characterization of 
them in terms of different kinds of relevance presupposition and with respect to the idea 
that these three types -  categorical, identificational, thetic -  are the possible structural 
realization in an information-structural dimension called focus structure.15 
I  am  assuming that  focus structure  is  incorporated in  syntax  such that  every  root 
clause, and thus its derivation, manifests one of  the three focus structure types. Root 
clauses (or sentences) in the traditional sense, which are focus structurally unspecified, 
have no theoretical status, that is, they do not exist in the theory proposed here. 
The essential  characteristic  of  the derivation of  focus-structured  root clauses - or, 
simply,  root  clauses - is  the  absence  or  presence  of  topic  and  focus  features  and 
consequently the absence or presence of phrase movement to the specifier position of a 
head Foc of  a functional projection FocP (spec-Foc). In categorical and identificational 
sentences, there is movement to spec-Foc. The phrase which moves to spec-Foc carries 
a head  feature  [?fo~~h]  which  is  checked  against the corresponding specifier feature 
[+foch,] in the Foc-head such that both of them are erased (erasure being symbolized by 
the star (*) in the tree structures of  (1 1)). The head feature [+fochh] of  the Foc-head is 
not erased. It is interpretable, that is, it has a semantic function and thus contributes to 
I4  On  the role of  presuppositions  and  context  in  general  with  respect  to  truth  evaluability,  see e.g. 
Chierchia  & McConnell-Ginet  2000  [1990]:  ch.  6; as  to  the  conception  of  'context'  as  a  set of 
assumptions, see Sperber & Wilson 1995 [1986]. 
IS  The other information-structural dimension has to do with the speaker's assumptions about the degrees 
of  identifiability and activeness ('givenlnew') of  discourse entities in  the hearer's mind  and the way 
these assumptions are lexical-syntactically reflected in sentences. the interpretation of the clause.16 If  [-focl-features  are involved, we are confronted with 
categorical  focus  structure,  and  the  phrase  which  moves  to  spec-Foc  is  a  topic 
expression. If  [+foe]-features are involved, we are confronted with identificational focus 
structure,  and  the  phrase  which  moves  to  spec-Foc  is  an  identificational  focus 
expression. In  a  thetic  sentence  there  are no  [kfocl-features, no  FocP  and  thus  no 
movement to spec-Foc. 
For the limited purposes  in this  paper, I restrict  myself  to considerations of  cases 
where  nominal expressions move to spec-Foc. I call these nominal expressions 'DP', 
making no distinction between quantified and non-quantified nominal expression. 
4.  The semantic function of the [kfocl-features 
In truth-functional semantics inspired by Montague (see Thomason (ed.)  1974, see also 
Heim  & Kratzer  1998), transitive  verbs  like  offend  and  see  as  in  (15)  =  (1)  are 
commonly said to be of semantic type <e,<e,t>>. 
(15)  a.  Some publisher offended every linguist 
b.  Everyone saw someone 
If we take a flexible type in situ approach for the complement and the subject DPs with 
which such verbs combine semantically, we see that in principle these may be of three 
types: 
(16)  a.  e  as object and subject 
b.  <<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>>  as object 
c.  <<e,t>,t>  as subject 
The types given in (16b, c) correspond to the generalized quantifier interpretation of a 
subject or object DP, that is, an interpretation as a set of  sets. While DPs like everyone 
or every publisher  arguably have only the generalized quantifier interpretation,''  there 
are other  DPs, including proper  names,  which  are principally  interpretable  either as 
individuals, i.e. type e expressions, or as generalized quantifiers.'8 
Referential expressions can be identified with type e expressions.  It  is well  known 
that indefinite quantificational DPs like someone or some publisher as in (15) above can 
be either referential or non-referential. That is, such DPs are principally type ambiguous 
between the three types mentioned in (16). This holds also for other kinds of  indefinite 
quantificational  DPs, such  as  a  man  or  one man, but  rarely,  if  ever,  for DPs like 
everyone or every publisher (see fn. 17). Let us simplify matters and assume that for the 
16  As to the checking  mechanism  see e.g. Radford  1997: ch. 5, towards which  my  sketch of  [kfocl- 
feature checking is  roughly  oriented. Technically different and for syntax  at large probably  more 
appropriate accounts are available and still others imaginable. There should be no problem for anyone 
of them to accommodate movement of a phrase to the specifier position  of some functional phrase 
with different semantic processing of that phrase depending on differences in the features responsible 
for the movement. 
" According to Partee (1987: 132), there are no e-type readings only for such DPs as are "most clearly 
'quantificational': no man, no men, at most one man,  few  men, not every man, must nzen [but see also 
Partee's  note 21 on nzost-DPs].  Every man could get an e-type reading [...I  in case there is only one 
man; but linguistically it never seems to act as a singular 'referential' term". 
IR  As to the interpretation of proper names as generalized quantifiers, see e.g.  Chierchia & McConnell- 
Ginet 2000 [19901: 512f. Focus structure and the referential status of indefinite quantificational expressions 
latter  the  referential  type  e  is  principally  ruled  out.  These,  then,  are  lexical  facts, 
ultimately determined by the lexical entries for the items some(one), every(one). 
Let us assume that the [rfocl-features in the Foc-head determine the semantic types 
of the phrases in spec-Foc in the following way: 
(17)  a.  [-fochh]  selects type e for a DP in  spec-Foc. 
b.  [+fochh]  selects type <<e,t>,t> for a DP in spec-Foc 
That DPs in spec-Foc of  a [-focl-head  are of  type e is supported by authors who claim 
that topic expressions are referential.19 
If we apply the type selection mechanism in (17) to the examples in (15). we see that 
(15a) is threefold ambiguous, as shown in (18). 
(1  8)  a.  categorical: 
[F~~P  [Some publisher],  Foc~_~,,~  [p  t offended [every 
Jinguistl..e,,e,t,,,,e,t,,ll 
b.  identificational: 
[F~~P  [Some publisher],,,,,,,,  Foc~,~,,~  [IP  t offended [every 
linguist]...  ,<e,t,,,<c,t,~ll 
c.  thetic: 
LIP  [Some publisher], -  ..e,t,,t,  offended [every linguistl~~,,,,,,,,,<eet>>l 
The subject some publisher  may be in spec-Foc  of  a  [focl-head (categorical), or in 
spec-Foc of a [+foe]-head (identificational); or there are no [kfocl-features and no FocP 
at all, and the type selection mechanism  of  (17) does not  apply  (thetic). In  all  three 
cases, the  object  every  linguist  is of  type  <<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>>,  as  type  e  is  ruled  out 
lexically. As regards the subject some publisher, it is of type e in the categorical case, of 
type <<e,t>,t>  in  the identificational case, and  in the thetic case, it  is indeterminate 
between  types  e  and  <<e,t>,t>,  since  its  type  has  not  been  selected.  (I  represent 
indeterminateness or vagueness  between  types  and interpretations  by  the  tilde.)  The 
interpretations of (l8a-c) in h-notation are given in (l9a-c). 
l9  ~eee.$.  Strawson 1971 [1964]: 97, Reinhart  1981: 65ff., Prince 1981: 25lff., 1984: 217f., Sasse 1987: 
555, E.  Kiss  1995: 7, Erteschik-Shir  1997: pass.  As  pointed  out  by  J.  Jacobs  (in  DGfS  2001 
conference discussion),  this raises the problem  that an  every-DP  cannot be topic expression. How, 
then, can cases like the following be explained, where everybody in A's utterance seems to be a topic 
expression? 
a.  Q: Where did everybody go? 
A: Everybody went home. 
The only reason why we may think that everybody in (aA) is a topic expression is that it appears in the 
context  question,  i.e.  its  denotation  is  given  or  'active'  in  Lamhrecht's  (1994)  sense.  However, 
givenness/activeness of an expression's denotationlreferent is no sufficient condition for its being a 
topic  expression  (see  e.g.  ib.:  pass.).  I  would  argue  that  (aA)  is  a  thetic  sentence  and  that, 
consequently,  everybody  is  neither  topic  nor  identificational  focus expression.  Note  that  a  more 
natural  utterance  than  (aA)  in  the  context  of  (aQ)  is  (hi)  below,  which  is  derived  from  the 
identificational focus  structure  (hii) by  a  discourse  or  processing  effort minimization  rule  which 
deletes everything but the identificational focus expression (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1995 [1986]: 21 I). 
b.  i.  Home. 
ii.  HOME,  they went. 
The slight unnaturalness of (aA)  is due to the  fact  that a  wh-question  suggests an  identificational 
sentence as answer, not a thetic one. But only a small amount of pragmatic inferencing is needed  to 
achieve the required contextual effect (in the sense of Sperber & Wilson  1995 [1986]) by  uttering a 
thetic sentence instead of an identificational one in cases like this. (19)  a.  [[(18a)] = [hx : x E  D,  .  x offended every linguist] (some publisher) 
b.  [[(18b)J = [hx : x E D,,,,,  . some publisher x] (offended every linguist) 
c.  U(l8c)l= I(18a)ll -  U(18b)l 
In contrast to (15a), (15b) appears to be only twofold ambiguous, since the selection of 
type e for everyone in  spec-Foc by a [-focl-head  and thus categorical focus structure is 
ruled  out.  As  shown  in  (20),  (15b)  may  have  either  thetic  focus  structure,  or 
identificational focus structure with everyone in  spec-Fo~[+~,,,~,  where the semantic type 
of  the subject everyone is <<e,t>,t> and the object someone is indeterminate between 
types e and <<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>>. 
(20)  a.  identificational focus structure: 
[FO~P   every on el<<,,^>,^> Foc[+foc~  [IP  t saw [someonel, - ..,,,e,t,,,,e,~,ll 
b.  thetic focus structure: 
[IP [Ever~onel<<~,~,,t>  saw [someonel, - ..e,.e,t,>,,e,t>,l 
Actually,  (20a)  and  (20b) turn  out  to  have  identical,  if  vague,  interpretations.  The 
vagueness is due to the type indeterminacy of someone, which produces vagueness in 
the reading of  the VP saw  someone (see (21a)) and consequently in  that of  the whole 
clause (see (2  1 b)). 
(21)  a.  [[saw someone] = 
[hx : x E  D,  . saw x] (someone) -  [hx : x E  D.e,.e,r,,  . x someone] (saw) 
b.  [[(20a)J = [[(20b)] = [hx : x E D,,,,  .  everyone x] (saw someone) 
The LF-difference between  (20a) and (20'0) is semantically conflated to  (21b), which 
itself is vague in the way indicated. 
5.  Taking stock: Focus structure instead of quantifier scope 
It is my claim that what has traditionally been analysed as an ambiguity in terms of the 
scopal relations between existential and universal quantifiers in sentences such as in (1) 
= (15) is more appropriately captured by the focus structure differences just discussed. 
(15)  a.  Some publisher offended every linguist 
b.  Everyone saw someone 
The truth-conditionally  different  interpretations of  a sentence like (15a), which many 
authors have analyzed  in  terms  of  3V vs.  V3  quantifier  scope relations,  reflect  the 
ambiguity between the categorical reading on the one hand and the identificational and 
thetic readings on the other hand. The intuition that there is a reading of (15a) in which 
the speaker has some specific publisher in mind of whom he predicates that he offended 
every linguist, without actually specifying the identity of this publisher (see Kamp & 
Reyle  1993:  289f.),  is  represented  as the  categorical  reading,  where  a  [-focl-head 
selects the referential type e denotation for the indefinite quantificational DP in  spec- 
Foc. In contrast to (15a), (15b) does not have a categorical reading. This corresponds to 
the fact that (l5b) is ultimately not ambiguous at all, as we have seen. I would maintain 
that what linguists have in mind who consider sentences like (15b) to be ambiguous in 
terms  of  quantifier  scope  relations  is  rather  the  vagueness  resulting  from  the  type 
indeterminateness of the indefinite quantificational DP in object position. Focus structure and the referential status of indefinite quantificational expressions 
6.  On  the  structural  ambiguity  contributed  by  thetic  focus 
structure 
Often  it  is possible to  find states of  affairs with  respect to  which  one reading  of  an 
ambiguous sentence is true and the other false. Thus, with respect to the state of affairs 
depicted in  (22a), the categorical clause (22b) is false while the identificational clause 
(22c) is true . 
b.  [~~~p  [Some letter], FOC[-~,,~  [~p  t is mapped to [every 
numberl<<e,<e,t>>,<eet>>ll 
C.  [FO~P  [Some letterl<,e,~,t,  Foc[+focl  LIP  t is mapped to [every 
numberl..e,<e,i,,,,e,i~,ll 
Indeed, this  relation  between  states of  affairs and linguistic  expressions leads to  the 
detection  of  structural  ambiguity.  But does  this  mean  that,  conversely, it  should be 
possible  to  find  ambiguity-sensitive  states  of  affairs  for  every  two  structures  that 
represent an ambiguity? I do not  think so. While each truth-conditional  difference in 
expressions using the same lexical material  is reflected as a structural ambiguity in the 
syntax,  there  is,  as  far  as I  can  see,  no  conceptual  requirement  that  each  case  of 
structural ambiguity correspond to a difference in truth conditions. If this is correct, then 
there is no problem for my account when I concede that there is no state of affairs which 
is  ambiguity-sensitive  such  that  reference  to  it  by  a  thetic  sentence  yields  a  truth 
evaluation not shared by any of the other corresponding  sentence^.'^ In other words: If 
some  thetic  sentence  T  has  either  a  corresponding  categorical  or  identificational 
sentence, as in (20), then T shares its truth evaluation with the corresponding categorical 
or  identificational  sentence.  If  some  thetic  sentence  T  has  both  corresponding 
categorical  and identificational sentences, as in (la), then the truth evaluation  of  T is 
identical  to that of at least one of the two others.  In  still other words: Depending on 
whether a thetic sentence T has one (categorical or identificational) or two (categoricd 
and identificational) corresponding sentences, the set of  truth conditions for T is either 
identical to the set of truth conditions for the one corresponding sentence (CT = CC,,),~' 
or is the union of the sets of truth conditions for the two corresponding sentences (CT = 
Cc u c~).~~  Conversely, for categorical  and  identificational  sentences  which  have  a 
corresponding thetic sentence this means that the LF-difference existing between them 
does not correspond to a difference in truth conditions. Although LF-different, a thetic 
sentence does not  differ truth conditionally  from its corresponding categorical  and/or 
identificational sentence(s). 
20  In the present context I mean by 'corresponding sentences' those sentences which are not distinguished 
by  the  usual  orthographical  representation  of  a  sentence-string,  but  which  have  different  focus 
structures.  " With CT the set of truth cond~tions  for a thetic sentence T;  Cc,  the set of truth conditions for either the 
corresponding categorical or identificational sentence.  ''  With  Cc  the  set  of  truth  conditions  for the  categorical  and  C,  the sct  of  truth  conditions  for  the 
identificational sentence corresponding to T. 7.  Implications and speculations 
The main  objective of  the present  paper  was  to  propose  an  account  of  the  different 
readings  of  such  sentences  as  in  (1)  =  (15)  in  terms  of  focus  structure  and  type 
indeterminateness  instead of  the common quantifier scope explanation. However, the 
approach  taken  here  implies that  different  focus  structure  types  for sentence-strings 
have  to  be  assumed  not  only  for those  cases  where  quantificational  expressions in 
clausal subject and object positions are involved, but for all kinds of  sentence^.'^ That 
is, every root clause (apart from those mentioned in  fn. 23) has one of the three focus 
structure types derived by the syntactic mechanism explained in section 3 above and, in 
the categorical  and identificational  cases, is subject to  the type  selection  mechanism 
postulated in  (17) with attendant semantic implications and, possibly, truth conditional 
effects. I believe that this is indeed the case. For example, sentence-strings like those in 
(23) are indeed focus structurally ambiguous in the way indicated. 
(23)  a. 
a'. 
a". 
a"'. 
b. 
b'. 
b". 
b"' 
C. 
c'. 
c". 
John is ill 
categorical: 
identificational: 
thetic: 
Somebody is ill 
categorical: 
identificational: 
thetic: 
Everybody is ill 
identificational: 
thetic: 
[FO~P tEverybod~l,,~,~,,~>  Foc~+r~,~  [IP  is illI,,,t>l 
[IP tEver~bodyl<,~,~,,~,  [is illI<,,1>1 
The point  is  that  we  do not  always  experience truth-conditional  effects  with  these 
ambiguities. We do not experience truth-conditional effects between  (23a') and (23aU), 
for instance.  On the one hand, this is because the distinction between  the individual 
John  and  the  set of  sets to which  John  belongs  is  truth-conditionally  irrelevantz4 - 
although  not  semantic-computationally  irrelevant,  for  the  direction  of  functional 
application  is  different  between  (23a')  and  (23aM)."  On  the  other  hand,  the 
circumstances in which each of them can be appropriately uttered are disjoint. And this 
is because  their relevance  presuppositions  (see above, sect.  3) are different,  namely 
'John  is  a  topic  for  comment  x'  in  the  categorical  case  and  'x  is  ill'  in  the 
identificational case.26 
23  Except  some  kinds  of  thetic  sentences  like  weather  sentences  (It's  raining)  or  expletive  there- 
sentences  (There  was once a king),  where we know from the presence  of  an  expletive  in  initial 
position that they can neither be categorical nor identificational, as expletives can neither be topic nor 
identificational focus expressions. On expletive there-sentences as thetic  sentences see also Drubig 
1992: 167, pass. 
'"his  does not  seem to be the case with  indefinite quantificational expressions like somebod), as in 
(23b), where the categorical reading with e-type (referential) somebody may be argued to differ truth 
conditionally from the identificational reading with <<e,t>,t>-type (quantificational) so~nebody. 
25  In  (23~1,  thcrc are no differences in the semantic type of every6ody nor, consequently, differences in 
the direction of functional application between  the identificational  and the thetic reading. Hence we 
pet semantic conflation of syntactically different structures.  - 
'hole  that this difference has an intonational reflex in that John will carry the nuclear pitch accent in 
the identificational sentence and no nuclear pitch accent in the categorical sentence. Focus structure and the referential status of indefinite quantificational expressions 
But, of course, the relevance presuppositions of  categorical, identificational and thetic 
sentences  are  always  different,  and  thus  the  circumstances  in  which  they  can  be 
appropriately  uttered  are  always disjoint.  Does  it  make (more than  trivial)  sense to 
compare  the  truth  conditions  of  sentences  which  can  never  be  uttered  in  the  same 
circumstances? If the answer is no, as I am inclined to believe, then the general truth- 
conditional  neutrality  of  thetic  focus  structure  with  respect  to  the  corresponding 
categorical  andlor  identificational  sentence  and  the  truth-conditional  neutrality  of 
categorical and identificational sentences in cases like (23a') vs. (23a") may turn out to 
be a meaningless construct we can do away with. The most appropriate way of viewing 
the  relation  between  focus  structured  sentences,  truth  conditions  and  relevance 
presuppositions may then be this: Every (focus structured) sentence has its own set of 
appropriateness  conditions  of  use  restricted  (among  other  things)  by  its  relevance 
presupposition; the set  of  truth conditions  is relativized to  the set of  appropriateness 
conditions. 
8.  Conclusion and outlook 
In this paper I have discussed an alternative approach to the analysis of one simple type 
of sentences involving indefinite quantificational expressions for which  ambiguities in 
terms  of  quantifier  scope variations  have traditionally been  assumed.  Such sentences 
and  their  different  readings  have  been  used  to  motivate  the  syntactic  operation  of 
quantifier raising  at LF  (QR). That  is, QR  has been  invented  in  order to  derive the 
different quantifier  scope relations that we find in  predicate calculus formulae of  the 
3VIV3-type, which supposedly represent the different readings of such sentences. It has 
been  argued that  these logical formulae do not  adequately express the differences in 
interpretation of such examples and that an account in terms of focus structure and type 
semantic considerations is more appropriate. In this analysis of the respective examples 
there is no need for QR. 
The reader will rightly guess that I am dreaming of being able to dispense with both 
the  quantifier  scope  hypothesis  and  the  QR  mechanism  in  all  the  other  relevant 
examples as well. An attempt at the realization of such a dream will require much more 
work,  a project  which  cannot be launched here. However, in  response to a question 
raised by a commentat~r,~'  I would like to address the case of so-called inverse linking 
phenomena in the Appendix. 
Appendix: Some remarks on inverse linking phenomena 
'Inverse  linking'  refers  to  those  examples  where  the  reading  in  which  a  lower 
quantificational  expression  seems  to  take  scope  over  a  higher  quantificational 
expression is the only one possible or at least the strongly preferred one (see e.g. May 
1990  [1977]:  61ff.,  1985:  pass.,  Heim  & Kratzer  1998:  197f., 221ff.,  233ff.).  The 
following are two cases in point. 
a.  categorical:  John is ILL 
h.  identificational:  JOHN is ill 
" In the discussion of my paper at DGfS 2001. (24)  a.  One apple in  every basket  is rotten  (from Heim % Kratzer  1998:  197) 
b.  Somebody from every city despises it (from May 1985: 68) 
The inversely linked readings of  (24a, b)  are the salient, most natural  ones: In  every 
basket there is one apple which is rotten; every city has at least one citizen who despises 
the city of  which  helshe  is a citizen. The point of  these examples is  that  QR  of  the 
embedded  every-DP  seerns  to  account  straightforwardly  both  for  the  type-semantic 
issues involved in the semantic composition of the sentences (see Heim & Kratzer 1998: 
197f. with respect to (24a)) and for the fact that the pronoun it in (24b) can be bound by 
every city (which it has  to  in  the relevant  reading) given standard assumptions  about 
binding in terms of standard c-command (see ib.: 234f.).'*  As to the question of how the 
problem of  binding may be solved in an approach in  which there is no QR at all, see 
Hornstein (1995: 106ff., 118ff.) for various suggestions. I would like to go into some 
more detail  about the type-semantic  issue addressed by Heim & Kratzer  (1998:  197) 
with respect to (24a). 
Heim & Kratzer (1998:  197f.) present an attempt at a flexible type  in  situ analysis 
which fails. The essential passage is the following (ib.): 
'in' has the same type of  meaning as a transitive verb, <e,et>. So 'every'  must have its 
type <et,<<e,et>,et>>  meaning here. Thus we  get: 
[[in every basket] = hx . for every basket y, x is in y 
We proceed to the next node up by Predicate Modification and get: 
[[apple in every basket] = hx . x is an apple and for every basket y, x is  in y 
Of course, combining the denotation of apple with that of  in every basket by Predicate 
Modification  will  result  in  nothing  but  the  non-salient  (perhaps  impossible)  reading 
where  there  is  one single apple which  is  in  every  basket  and  which  is  rotten.  The 
analysis fails since Heim & Kratzer assume a single, rigid type for in here (but see ib.: 
66f. and fn. 33 below) while allowing a flexible type only for every. However, there is 
no reason to assume that there is only one possible semantic type for a preposition like 
in. To assume type  <e,<e,t>> for in and  to  use Predicate  Modification,  as Heim & 
Kratzer do in the above passage, is only justified if  in is a lexical preposition.29 Yet, in 
every basket within the DP one apple in every basket in the salient reading of (24a) does 
not seem to be a lexical PP. If  it were one, then  in  every basket would denote a local 
space, and it would be possible to substitute the locative deictic pro-form  there for it 
under preservation of meaning.30  This is not possible, as the infelicity of (25B) suggests. 
(25)  A:  One apple in every basket was rotten. 
B:  Yes, you're right. #One apple there was rotten. 
Which semantic type does this 'non-lexical'  in have?" 
28  More precisely,  it is QR  in the form of adjunction to IP that allows for straightforward, standard, 
binding of  the pronoun. In view  of  the problem  that  LF-extraction  of ever)'  city  from the subject 
violates a syntactic island condition, May (1985: 68f.) proposes an alternative to his 1977 analysis in 
which the embedded quantified expression does not adjoin by QR to IP but to its own containing DP. 
With  an accordingly  adjusted  definition of  c-command  the configuration necessary  for binding the 
pronoun is achieved. 
29  See Rauh (e.g. 1995, 1996, 1997a. 1997b) on lexical, grammatical and governed prepositions. 
'O  Thanks to G. Rauh for pointing this out to me.  '' I call it 'non-lcxical' for brevity's sake here. In more cautious terms, it is at least not a typical  lexical 
preposition. Nor is  it a grammatical or governed preposition  in Rauh's (1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b) 
sense. Focus structure and the referential status of indefinite quantificational expressions 
The syntactic bracketing of the DP one apple in every basket, reduced to the essentials 
for purposes of semantic composition, is this: 
(26)  [one [apple [in [every [basket]]]]] 
Obviously, (25) in the salient reading of  (24a), where it is subject, cannot be of type e, 
which  leaves  the  generalized  quantifier  denotation  <<e,t>,t>  for  it.  For  the 
quantificational  determiner one we need  that one of its alternative types  which  yields 
<<e,t>,t>  when  combined, i.e. <<e,t>,<<e,t>,t>> (cf. Heim & Kratzer  1998: 207, n. 
26)."  Consequently, the NP [apple [in [every [basket]]]] is of type <e,t>, that is, of the 
common noun type, just  like apple. The PP in every basket, then, has to be combined 
with <e,t>-type apple so as to result in <e,t>-type apple in every basket. This means that 
the PP in every basket has to be of type <<e,t>,<e,t>>. Every basket being either of type 
<<e,t>,t>  or  of  type  <<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>>,  it  follows  that  the  t  e  of  in  is  either 
<<<e,t>,t>,<<e,t>,<e,t>>  or <<<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>>,<<e,t>,<e,t>>>. 
3rp 
(27)  one apple in every basket I <<e,t>,t> 
one / <<e,t>,<<e,t>,t>>  apple in every basket / <e,t> 
apple 1  <e,u  in every basket / <<e,t>,<e,u> 
in 1  every basket 1 
a) <<<e,t>,t>,<<e,t>,<e,t>>>  a) <<e,t>,t> 
b) <<<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>>,<<e,t>,<e,t>>>  b) <<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>> 
In  sum, a QR-less analysis of  inverse linking sentences like (24a) does not pose  any 
type  semantic problems  if  we take  into  account  that  in here  is not  a  typical  lexical 
preposition and thus not of type <e,<e,t>>. This analysis undermines Heim & Kratzer's 
(1998) suggestion that one can hardly do without QR in view of sentences like (24a). 
32  According  to Heim & Kratzer (1998:  182) every determiner is either of type  <<e,t>,<<e,u,t>> or 
<<e,t>,<<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>>>.  The latter is needed for DPs in object position. 
33  The type for the PP in ever)' basketjust derived, <<e,t>,<e,t>>, is that of the PP in Texas, which Heim 
& Kratzer (1998: 66) assume in their discussion of a Functional Application (FA) alternative to their 
Predicate Modification (PM) analysis of this constituent. As they assume type e for Texas in this PP, it 
follows that they derive <e,<<e,u,<e,u>> as the type for in. Note the systematic relationship between 
this type and the two possibilities given in (27) for in, such that all three types can be expressed in the 
general form <o,<<e,t>,<e,t>>>,  where o is type e or <<e,t>,t> or <<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>> depending on 
which of these the DP complement of the preposition has. It seems appropriate to work with PM (and 
the  corresponding  types)  when  confronted  with  lexical  prepositions  and  with  FA  (and  the 
corresponding  types)  when  confronted  with  non-lexical  prepositions.  Operating  by  FA  in  the 
interpretation of  non-lexical  PPs may  be  an  alternative to considering them  as either  semantically 
vacuous or as denoting "the identity function of the appropriate type" such that a PP like of John is 
analyzed  as  [of  John]  =  [John]  (Heim  &  Kratzer  1998:  62).  Note  that  assuming  type 
<e,<<e,t>,<e,t>>> for of if combined with e-type John results in the PP of John of type <<e,u,<e,u>, 
which can be combined with any type <e,o  expression, such as  father  or proud, for example, so as to 
result in another constituent of type <e,t> (fatherbroud of John) -  a satisfactory result. References 
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1.  Introduction 
In  his  1995 monograph,  Apresyan  suggests  that  it  would  be  extremely  interesting  to 
investigate the means of expressing the definitenesslindefiniteness opposition in languages 
that  do not  have articles (Volume  1, p.  258, fn. 3). In  this  paper, I will  attempt to find 
possible correlations between the organization of  discourse and the positions in which the 
(in)definite  nominals  may  appear  within  a  sentence  of  Russian.  I  will  examine  the 
information structure of Russian sentences and, based on  the previous analyses, provide a 
new account of their organization with respect to information packaging. I will then look at 
various nominal  elements contained in  certain  parts  of  a sentence and arrive at a system 
describing the distribution of NPs in Russian with respect to the information structure. 
The ultimate goal of  this paper  is to establish  and motivate a  system of  correlations 
between  various  types  of  NPs  and  functions of  information  structure. This goal will  be 
achieved by determining which characteristic of  a NP may serve as a criterion allowing to 
provide a one-to-one mapping. 
2.  Information structure of Russian 
In this section, I discuss the organization of Russian sentences with respect to information 
structure. I will consider the main points of previous research and propose a new analysis 
based  on Vallduvi's  approach to the structure of discourse (1992). I will provide a brief 
account of  both  the neutral  and emphatic sentences concentrating on  the role word order 
plays in both contexts.' 
2.1.  Traditional Analyses 
The  two  major  traditional  approaches  to  the  problem  of  sentential  word  orders  and 
discourse  functions  in  Russian  and  other  Slavic  languages  are  Functional  Sentence 
Perspective (FSP) (Mathesius  1964, Adamec  1966, IsaEenko  1966, Sgall  1972, HajiEovb 
* 
The paper is submitted to a special issue of "Theoretical Linguistics", edited by Klaus von Heusinger and 
Kerstin Schwabe  '  In  some important  sources (e.g., Yokoyama  1986; Krylova & Khavronina  1988; King  1995) neutral 
sentences are referred to as non-emotive, while emphatic sentences are callcd emotive.  In this paper, I will 
use the traditional terminology, namely, the neutral vs. emphatic opposition. 
ZAS Papers in Linguistics 23, 2001, 39-57 1974, Krylova & Khavronina 1988, inter al.) and Topic Focus Articulation  (TFA) (Firbas 
1964, Rochemont  1986, Yokoyama  1986, inter al.). According to these analyses, a Russian 
sentence consists of two parts: a theme and a rheme (FSP) or a topic and a focus (TFA). 
The first part of the sentence constitutes given information while the second part constitutes 
new  information. Within these parts, the material may also be arranged along a hierarchy 
known  as  Communicative  Dynamism,  a  notion  introduced  by  Firbas  (1966):  new 
information is more important  and, therefore,  more  dynamic than  older information (see 
Sgall, HajiEovi, & Panevovi 1986 for an overview). 
However,  problems  with  the  two-way  division  were  recognized.  First,  under  the 
traditional approach, all material in a sentence must fall into the theme or the rheme. Rheme 
would contain the focused material and, therefore, theme would have to comprise the rest of 
the sentence including both the topic(s) and the discourse-neutral material. In particular, the 
role of non-focused verb in the division  of  the sentence was questioned. Some additional 
function should be assigned to such a verb,  which  does not seem to fit the definition of 
focus  (or rheme)  and, at  the  same time,  may  not  be  considered  part  of  topicalized  (or 
thematic) material.'  To solve this problem, Firbas (1965) proposed that the verb behaved as 
a  transition  between  the  theme  and  the  rheme.  Therefore,  the  new  sentence  structure 
consisted of three parts: theme, transition and rheme. 
It  was later  observed that non-focused verbs were not the only constituents needing a 
separate treatment. In  fact, the issues connected with the so-called Complex Theme were 
discussed in  Krylova & Khavronina (1988). The authors showed that within the thematic 
part  of  a  sentence, independent parts  could  also be  found.  Along  with  multiple  topics, 
perfectly  possible  in  Russian,  they  observed  the  presence  of  material  not  fitting  the 
description  of  topic as  the  items  of  immediate  interest to both  speakers. The non-topic 
material found in the theme was labeled discourse-neutral material. 
Hence, we have two separate solutions with respect to the informational articulation of 
the sentence material  not fitting into the previously assumed dichotomy. Combining these 
two ideas, i.e. allowing sentential elements other than the verb to appear in the transition, or 
allowing the non-focused verb to be treated  as discourse neutral, we can get a three-way 
division into topic, discourse-neutral material, and focus (cf. King  1995). This trinomial 
articulation is reminiscent of  Vallduvi's  (1992) system of  discourse. His sentence consists 
of a mandatory focus, and the optional ground material responsible for the appropriate entry 
of information into the hearer's knowledge-store.  The ground, in turn, is divided into two 
parts: the link and the tail. The link's task is to direct the hearer to a given address in the 
hearer's knowledge-store under which the information conveyed by the sentence should be 
*  The claim that non-focused verb may not be considered part of the focus seems to some extent valid to me. 
However, Vallduvi (1992), providing the bracketed structures for his examples, always includes such verbs 
into what he refers to as "focus."  In fact, the answer to the problem whether intonationally non-focused 
verbs should be considered foci depends on the context.  Consider the two examples below (the responses 
are from Vallduvi, questions are mine): 
(i) Q:  What did the boss hate? 
A: The boss hated  [F the salty broccoli QUICHE]. 
(ii) Q: What did the boss think about the food? 
A: The boss   h hated the salty broccoli QUICHE]. Information Structure and the Status of NP in Russian 
entered. The link  must  be  sentence-initial  and  may  be  multiple.  Finally,  the  tail  is  an 
element acting as a signal to indicate how the information encoded within the sentence must 
be entered under a given address. The position of tail is not universally constant: it is a non- 
focal, non-link part of the sentence. 
3.  Types of Speech in Russian 
Let us now examine whether the proposed trinomial articulation of information is a solution 
for the discourse organization  of  the  Russian  sentence. Two types  of  sentences  will  be 
considered: neutral and emphatic. As argued by Yokoyama (1986), the difference between 
these two types  of  speech  is  one of  sentence stress:  neutral  sentences have no sentence 
stress, while emphatic sentences have it. I will show that the presence of sentence stress 
plays a crucial role in discourse organization of Russian sentences, their possible structures 
and interpretations. 
3.1.  Discourse-neutral speech 
In  utterances  characterized  by  neutral  intonation  and the  lack  of  sentence  stress,  strict 
connection between  word  order and  discourse functions is observed. Such sentences are 
organized along a scale from given to new information and topics (T) always precede foci 
(F), while  the discourse-neutral  information  (NI) intervenes. Below  are examples of  the 
various patterns of discourse organization: 
(1)  a.  Q:  Kto igraet v  pryatki? 
who plays in hide-and-seek 
'Who is playing hide-and-seek?' 
A:  [p,,  Igrajut] [F deti]. 
play  children 
# [F Deti] [N~  igrajut] . 
'Children are playing hide-and-seek.' 
b.  Q:  cto  delajut  deti? 
what are-doing children? 
'What are the children doing?' 
A:  [T  Deti] [F  igrajut v  pryatki]. 
children play  in  hide-and-seek 
# [F Igrajut v  pryatki]  [T  deti]. 
'The children play hide-and-seek.' 
c.  Q:  Kto  Sil  eto  plat'je? 
who sewed this dress 
'Who sewed this dress?' A:  [T Eto  plat'je] [NI  Sila  mne]  [F portnixa].  T>NI>F 
this dress  sewed me-DAT  tailor 
#[F  Portnixa] [NI  Sila mne] [T  eto plat'je].  #F>NI>T 
#[NI  Sila mne] [T eto plat'je] [F portnixa].  #NI>T>F 
#[F  Portnixa] [T eto plat'je]  [N1  6ila mne].  #F>T>NI 
'A tailor sewed this dress for me." 
The word  orders exemplified in  (la-c) show  that the  only  order of  discourse  functions 
possible for a neutral intonation sentence of Russian is Topic(s) > Neutral  Information > 
Focus. Intuitively, while topic and neutral information are optional, focus, being the source 
of new information, must be present in every sentence: 
(2)  Q:  Kto  Einit  igruski? 
who is-fixing (some) toys-ACC 
'Who is fixing toys?' 
A:  [F Mal'Cikl.1 #[T IgruSkiJ.1  #[N~ Cinit] [T igrugki]. 
(a) boy  (the) toys  is-fixing  toys 
Thus, I conclude that while word order is relatively free in  Russian and is not responsible 
for grammatical  relations in  this  language, it  is fixed with respect  to  the organization  of 
discourse in  the sentences with neutral intonation contour (cf. Junghanns & Zybatow  1995, 
Brun 2000, inter al.) 
3.2.  Emphatic speech 
In  sentences with emphatic intonation, the placement of sentence stress interacts with the 
discourse  interpretation  of  the  sentence.  In  such  sentences,  the  word  order  is  less 
constrained  than  in  non-emphatic  sentences:  the focus  is  indicated  not  by  means of  the 
linear  order of  constituents  but  is  marked  by  stress or intonation  c~ntour.~  Hence, the 
location  of  a focused constituent does not  necessarily coincide with the right edge of  the 
sentence, as is the case with the intonationally neutral sentences. In fact, this word order is 
judged  as marginal: 
(3)  a.  Ivan [F~~~~~]  vypil, 
Ivan  VODKA drank 
b.  [F VODKU] Ivan vypil. 
3  I provide only three examples of impossible word orders with the intended meaning.  However, all other 
structurally possible constructions are also unacceptable with the necessary interpretation and the indicated 
correct variant is the only possible for this context. 
4  According to Russian linguistic literature, Russian has a total of six intonation contours (IK).  In this paper, 
I  will  only  talk  about  the  relevant patterns IK1 (neutral intonation)  and  1K2 (roughly,  stressed  focus 
intonations.)  For  detailed  discussion  of  Russian  intonation  system,  see  Bryzgunova  (1971,  1981); 
Yokoyama (1986), Krylova & Khavronina (1988) among others. Information Structure and the Status of NP in Russian 
c.  ?Ivan vypil [F VODKU]. 
'Ivan drank VODKA.' 
Examples in (3) indicate that the stressed focus may be either sentence-initial or sentence- 
medial, while the judgement  for sentence-final  occurrence is degrading (3c). The following 
rule explains the mechanisms of assigning sentence focus: 
(4)  Focus Rule 
Intonational focus (F,)  overrides focus marked by word order effects unless the two 
coincide. In  the latter case, the double-marked sentence receives degrading status 
due to Economy (Chomsky 199  1, 1992). 
So far, I have established the account of  structural and intonational foci assignment. Now I 
would  like  to  consider  the  status  and  meaning  of  intonational  focus  in  Russian  and 
determine  the  differences  between  the  two  types  of  foci  in  this  language.  Recall  that 
sentence-final  focus  in Russian  (and  other languages) was  described  as a subpart of  the 
sentence where the information is concentrated and, more importantly, as the location of 
new information. However, the role of intonational focus is distinct from this definition. As 
claimed  by  King (1995, following  Kiss'  1993 analysis of  Hungarian  intonational  foci), 
stressed focus constitutes the category of  contrastive foci. In other words, the information 
contained in such foci is not exactly discourse-new, but discourse-present as an implicature 
(e.g.,  within  a  set of  related  items)  and, therefore,  is  recoverable  (see Prince  1981 for 
discussion of the notions of givenness.) Consider the following examples: 
(5)  Neutral Intonation 
Q:  cto  Ivan vypil? 
what Ivan drank? 
'What did Ivan drink?' 
A:  Ivan vypil [pvodku]. 
Ivan drank  vodka 
# Ivan vypil [F VODKU] 
'Ivan drank vodka.' 
(6)  Emphatic Intonation 
Q:  Ivan vypil  vodu? 
Ivan drank water 
'Has Ivan drunk water?' 
A:    net)[^ VODKU]  Ivan vypil.  F,>T>NI 
(No) vodka Ivan drank 
(Net) Ivan [F VODKU]  vypil.  T>F,>NI 
#Ivan vypil [FVODKU].  #T>NI>F, 
'No, it was VODKA that Ivan drank.' These data demonstrate that the intonational focus may not be used in the context requiring 
new  information  as  the  answer,  or  information  from  an  open  set  (Kiss  1993).  The 
intonationally  focused  material  must  belong  to  a  closed  set  of  members.  Hence,  the 
structurally  grammatical  but  intonationally  marked  counterpart  in  (5) is  ruled  out. The 
neutral  intonational  focus,  on  the  contrary,  may  only  be  associated  with  new,  non- 
predictable information and may not be accepted as a contrastive answer as seen in (6). 
3.3.  Implications for the Articulation 
In  section  3.1  I showed that  while  neutral  intonation  sentences  exhibit invariable  order 
among the discourse functions (Topic(s) >Neutral Information >Focus), this is not the case 
for emphatic utterances. In fact, the latter allow for relatively free order of constituents. We 
have seen that the stressed focus may appear in any position within a sentence, thus moving 
the  rest  of  material  around.  Allowing  focus  to  appear  sentence-initially  or  sentence- 
medially, the system must account for other possible deviations from the standard order. 
For  example,  the  apparent  position  of  discourse-neutral  material  may  now  be  distinct: 
discourse-neutral  material  does not  necessarily  occur between  topic  and  focus, but  may 
actually appear sentence-finally. Also, focus may precede topic rather than always follow it. 
However, it is never the case that discourse neutral material precedes the topic: 
(7)  Q:  Deti  lyubyat ovoSEi? 
children like  vegetables 
'Do children like vegetables?' 
A:  [FPOMIDORY]  [T deti]  [NI  lyubyat]!  F,>T>NI 
tomatoes  children  like 
[T Deti] [F  POMIDORY]  [NI  lyubyat]!  T>F,>NI 
#[F POMIDORY]  [NI  lyubyat] [T deti] !  #F,>NI>T 
#[NI  Lyubyat] [F POMDORY] [T deti]!  #NI>F,>T 
'TheIGen children like TOMATOES!' 
Let us now see whether the possible orders of discourse elements contradict the idea of 
Communicative  Dynamism.  The  characteristics  of  intonational  (or  contrastive)  focus 
described in section 3.2 provide grounds for concluding that this type of focus is actually of 
a topic nature. Recall  that it does not  introduce new  information as is required of  a real 
focus, but instead refers to inferable information. Hence, topic and contrastive focus do not 
necessarily  have to occur in some restricted order with respect to one another. As to the 
elements representing discourse-neutral material, as before, they always follow older, given, 
or inferable information and precede new information, since the contrastive focus may not 
appear in  a sentence-final position. Therefore, the Communicative Dynamism hierarchy  is 
preserved both with structural and intonational foci. 
Recall now that in Vallduvi's framework (1992) the focus was the only ineludible part of 
a sentence. This claim seems to be logically verifiable: sentence is a unit of information and 
focus  is  the  part  of  the  sentence  providing  new  information.  However,  considering 
contrastive foci regular topics would permit focusless sentences. To avoid this problem, I Information Structure and the Status of NP in Russian 
propose  that  contrastive  focus  be  considered  as  hybrid  element,  topic-focus.  This 
constituent would be both the source of new information and the connector to the previous 
context. Such a proposal does not contradict Vallduvi's definitions. In fact, topics (or links) 
may be multiple  (in Russian as well as other languages): focus-topic and topics may co- 
occur in one sentence. They must be sentence-initial: we know from the order facts that this 
prediction is borne out. Finally, the position of discourse neutral material (or tail) is not the 
same universally: in  Russian, it may either precede the focus, or occur sentence-finally. 
4.  Russian NP 
Russian  is  a language without obligatory overt determiners  indicating  (in)definiteness  of 
noun phrases in such languages as English or French. The distinction between definite and 
indefinite  nominals  is  an  important  element  of  discourse  and,  therefore,  should  be 
universally  present  in  any  natural  language.  Hence,  the  apparent  difference  among 
languages is not in the presence or absence of the definitelindefinite distinction but rather in 
the  ways  this  distinction  is  expressed.  In  this  section,  I  will  consider  several  such 
mechanisms that will later be used in the analysis to check whether a particular type of NP 
may appear in a certain position within a sentence. 
4.1.  Means of expressing (in)definiteness 
Russian  distinguishes  among  several  ways  of  expressing  (in)definiteness  of  nominal 
phrases: lexical, non-lexical, and syntactic. All three types of distinction will be explained 
and exemplified in the following subsections. One important characteristic common to all 
of  these mechanisms should be mentioned first. While in  languages with overt articles the 
distinction  is usually two-way (i.e. a NP may be either definite or indefinite), in Russian 
there exists an  additional  third  status of  NPs:  unmarked NPs. The NPs  of  this  type are 
ambiguous  with  respect  to  (in)definiteness  and  the  value  is  determined  only  from  the 
context. 
4.1.1.  Lexical Distinction 
The lexical distinction is provided by means of certain overt lexical items placed in front of 
the noun  phrase in  question. These lexical elements may be viewed  as determiners. The 
function of determiners is usually performed by demonstrative pronouns eto (this), to (that) 
or possessive  pronouns  moj  (my), tvoi  (your),  ih  (their),  etc.  Another  group of  lexical 
elements used to distinguish between the indefinite and definite interpretation is the class of 
attributive pronouns, e.g., kaidyj/vsyakij (everyonelanyone), neEto/Eto-nibud'  (something/ 
anything). In these pairs, the left member is unmarked while the right member contributes 
to the  indefinite  interpretation  of  the  NP.  The following  examples  illustrate  how  these 
pronouns affect the interpretation of the NPs they modify: (8)  a.  Cvety  vyanut. 
flowers wither-PRES 
'(ThelGenl0) flowers are withering.' 
b.  Etiltelmoi  cvety  vyanut. 
theselthatlmy flowers wither- PRES 
'Theselthatlmy flowers are withering.' 
c.  Vsyakielkakie-to cvety  vyanut. 
somelany  flowers wither- PRES 
'Flowers are withering.' 
The sentence in  example (8a) when placed  out of  context allows for both interpretations: 
the NP cvety 'flowers' may be considered either indefinite or definite. Example (8b), on the 
other hand, represents  the only possible  definite  interpretation:  similarly to  English, the 
distributive pronouns act as definite articles in  Russian. Finally.  (8c) is an example of an 
unambiguous  indefinite interpretation. In  addition, although the NP in  (8a)  is  treated  as 
unmarked,  some preference  towards  the  indefinite  reading  will  appear  once  the  NP  is 
placed after the verb. I will return to the discussion of the effects the word order has on the 
interpretation of NPs later. 
4.1.2.  Non-lexical Distinction 
(1n)definiteness may  also  be  expressed  non-lexically.  One  of  the  ways  of  non-lexical 
distinction is through the absence or presence of agreement between a noun and modifying 
adjective:  agreeing  adjectives  denote  indefiniteness,  while  non-agreeing  (i.e.  genitive- 
marked or possessive nouns) are unmarked for (in)definiteness: 
(9)  a.  Za  dver'ju slySalsya  ienskij  golos. 
behind door  was-heard woman-MASC.SG.NOM. voice-MASC.SG.NOM. 
'There was a woman's voice heard from behind the door.' 
b.  Za  dver'ju slySalsya  golos  ienSEiny. 
behind door  was-heard  voice-MASC.SG.NOM.  woman-FEM.SG.GEN. 
'The voice of althe woman was heard from behind the door.' 
The factor affecting the interpretation  of  the NPs  in  question  is within  the NP itself. In 
section 4.2, I will consider the effects of  word order changes with respect to the position 
this NP occupies in the sentence. 
Another  interesting  way  of  expressing  definiteness  in  Russian  is  through  verb 
morphology. In particular, perfectivizing verb prefixes denoting the completion of an event 
or action correlate with definiteness. Note that these morphemes do not correspond to the 
aspect dichotomy realized on Russian verbs. In other words, a verb may carry the prefix do- 
, describing event completion, and  at the same time denote  an  imperfective event (e.g., 
dopisat'-PERF,INF 'to  have  finished  writing'  vs.  dopisyvat'-1MPERF.INF  'to  be  finishing 
writing').  The following sentences illustrate the correlation between the verb denoting the 
achievement of a result and the definiteness of the nominal argument: Information Structure and the Status of NP in Russian 
(10)  a.  On napisal  pis'mo. 
he  has-written-PERF letter 
'He has written d?the letter.' 
b.  On dopisal  pis'mo. 
he  has-written-to-the- PERF letter 
'He has written the letter to the end.' 
c.  On dopisyval  pis'mo 
he  was-writing-to-the-~~~-IMPERF  letter 
'He was finishing writing the letter.' 
The example in  (10a) contains the perfective verb denoting a completed activity (i.e. the 
verb has an event focus) and the argument is unmarked. The verbs in examples (IOb&c), in 
turn, have the result-focus reading. Consequently, the direct object NP  is unambiguously 
interpreted as definite. 
4.1.3.  Word order distinction 
Finally, the last method of expressing (in)definiteness of a noun phrase is by means of the 
word order (or the order of constituents) within  a sentence. The correct generalization of 
such  effects  for  Russian  is  that  the  overt  fronting  of  constituents  correlates  with 
definiteness. In  the following examples, we will consider the interpretation of the nominal 
adjunct po doroge 'on (the) road': 
(I I)  a.  On progel  neskol'ko mil'  po doroge. 
he  walked  several  miles on road 
'He walked several miles on a road.' 
b.  On progel  po doroge  neskol'ko mil'. 
he  walked on  road  several  miles 
'He walked several miles on dthe  road.' 
c.  Po doroge on progel  neskol'ko mil'. 
on road  he  walked several  miles 
'It was on the road that he walked several miles.' 
A  similar  observation  was  made  by  Chvany  (1973)  and  King  (1995).  These  authors 
illustrate the effects of fronting by changing the position of the subject and adjunct: 
(12)  a.  Na stole stojala lampa. 
on desk  stood  lamp 
'There was a lamp on the desk.lOn the desk waslstood a lamp.' 
b.  Lampa stojala na stole. 
lamp  stood  on desk 
'The lamp was on althe desk.'  (Chvany 1973:266; King 1995:78) These examples show that the closer the NP appears to the front of  a sentence, the likelier 
its definite reading is. In  addition, we may notice that what seems to matter is the position 
of  the NP with respect to the verb: preverbal position provides for the definite reading: 
(1 3)  Na stole lampa stojala. 
on  desk lamp  stood 
The lamp was on the desk. 
In  fact,  once the  adjunct (1 lb&12a) or the  subject  (I lb) and, crucially,  both  NPs  (13) 
appear before the verb, the interpretation of the NPs disambiguates and becomes definite. 
4.2.  Interactions 
In  the preceding section, we observed that such factors as the presence of  certain lexical 
items  (i.e. words or morphemes), lack or presence of agreement, and differences in  word 
order influence the interpretation of  NPs in Russian. However, so far we concentrated on 
the effects of these factors independently, without looking at possible consequences of their 
interaction.  Let us now  examine whether the  syntactic operation  of  word  order change 
affects other means of definitelindefinite distinction. 
We  will begin with the lexical distinction. Recall that the possibilities were limited to the 
unmarked vs. definite opposition in the case of  distributive pronouns. It was claimed that 
the preferred  interpretation for the unmarked NP is indefinite if  the NP appears after the 
verb, whereas the preverbal position competes between generic and definite interpretations: 
(14)  a.  Vyanut  cvety. 
wither-PRES  flowers 
'??The/@ flowers are withering.' 
b.  Cvety  vyanut. 
flowers wither- PRES 
'TheIGen flowers are withering.' 
However, when the noun is modified by one of the distributive pronouns, the interpretation 
is always definite and the actual position of the NP in the sentence is irrelevant: 
(15)  Vyanut  etilte  cvety. 
wither- PRES theselthat flowers 
'Theselthat flowers are withering.' 
If  we  turn  to  the  non-lexical  means  of  distinction,  we  will  discover  that  the  marked 
indefinite  interpretation  (in  the  case  of  noun-adjective  agreement)  and  definite 
interpretation  (in  the  case of  verb  morphology indicating result  focus)  are  preserved  in 
every possible syntactic position of the NP: Information Structure and the Status of NP  in Russian 
(16)  a.  Za  dver'ju slySalsya  ienskij  golos. 
behind door  was-heard woman-MAsC.SG.NOM voice-MASC.SG.NOM 
'There was a woman's  voice heard from behind the door.' 
b.  ???ienskij  golos  slySalsya  za  dver'ju. 
woman-MASC.SG.NOM voice-MAsC.SG.NOM was-heard behind door 
'A woman's voice was heard from behind dthe door.'" 
(17)  a.  Pis'mo on dopisal. 
letter  he has-written-to-the- PERF 
'The letter he has written to the end.' 
b.  On dopisal  pis'mo, 
he  has-written-to-the- PER PERF letter. 
'He has written the letter to the end.' 
If we consider the unmarked counterparts of the sentences in (16&17), we will see that the 
interpretation  of  the NPs becomes marked in some positions  in the sentence but remains 
unmarked in the others: 
(18)  a.  Golos  ienSEiny  slySalsya  za  dver'ju. 
voice-MASC.SG.NOM  woman-FEM.SG.GEN  was-heard behind door 
'The voice of the woman was heard from behind dthe door.' 
b.  Za  dver'ju slySalsya  golos  ienithiny. 
behind door  was-heard  voice-MASC.SG.NOM  woman-FEM.SG.GEN 
'The voice of atthe woman was heard from behind the door.' 
(19)  a.  On napisal  pis'mo. 
he  has-written-PERF  letter 
'He has written afthe letter.' 
b.  Pis'mo on napisal. 
letter  he has-written-PERF 
'He has written the letter.' 
It is obvious from the translations that the preferred interpretation becomes definite in both 
cases once the unmarked NP is moved to a preverbal position. However, in some cases the 
indefinite  interpretation  is  still  available  even  if  the  NP  is  fronted.  These  cases  are 
characterized by the NP in question appearing within the focus of the sentence. Following 
are three examples of such structures: 
(20)  a.  Q:  Cto  tebya otvlekalo? 
what you  distracted 
'What was distracting you?' 
'  The reason for the degraded status of example (16b) will be considered later.  Previewing the discussion 
still to follow, this sentence has a non-focused NP with  indefinite interpretation  in  a preverbal position, 
which is strongly dispreferred in Russian. A 1 :  General description 
Golos  ZensEiny  slySalsya  za  dver'ju 
voice-MASC.SG.NOM wonlan-FEM.SG.GEN was-heard behind door 
'The voice of a woman was heard from behind dthe  door.' 
A2: Sentence Fragment 
Golos  iensCiny. 
voice- MASC.SG.NOM Woman- FEM.SG.GEN 
'The voice of a woman.' 
b.  PIS'MO  on napisal. 
LETTER  he has-written-PERF 
'A  LE~R  he has written,' 
Example (20a) contains two all-focus sentences as answers to the same question: a general 
description and a verbless fragment. Example (20b) is a case of  an emphatic sentence: the 
focused NP is focus-marked by the intonational peak. In  both cases, the preferred  reading 
for the NPs is indefinite. 
4.3.  Interim summary 
I  would  like  to  sum  up  the  observations  with  respect  to  the  interactions  between  the 
syntactic and other ways of denoting (in)definiteness made earlier. First, we have seen that 
once a NP is marked  for definiteness  or indefinites by  lexical  or non-lexical  means,  its 
interpretation  is  not  affected  by  word  order  effects.  In  other  words,  the  non-syntactic 
marking dominates the syntactic one and overrides the effects of word order. The situation 
is quite different with unmarked NPs: the position  within the sentence seems to affect the 
interpretation of these NPs. In particular, NP fronting results in definite interpretation while 
the interpretation of postverbal NPs depends on other factors such as context. In  any event, 
no unified analysis of the described behavior of NPs may be offered based exclusively on 
what was said so far. I propose that the mechanisms behind the interpretation of unmarked 
NPs are based  on  the information  structure of  a Russian  sentence provided  in  section 3 
above. 
5.  Information structure and the status of NP 
Having developed the mechanisms for determining the status of Russian NPs with respect 
to (in)definiteness, and also having established the articulation for the information structure 
of  this  language, we can  now determine whether any correlations between  the discourse 
function  and  definiteness  exist.  Prior  to  proceeding  with  this  task, I  shall  present  a 
definition of (in)definiteness employed in this work: 
(21)  Definiteness:  Determiners  bear  the  morpho-syntactic  feature  of  +/-Definite. 
Definiteness is a purely syntactic notion. Information Structure and  the Status of NP in Russian 
Note  that  I  assume  that  all  Russian  nominals  are  DPs  and  that  bare  (i.e.,  unmarked) 
nominals are  headed  by  a  phonologically  null  Determiner  which  might  be  specified  as 
[+Definite] or [-Definite]. 
5.1.1.  Discourse-neutral configurations 
First  claim  I  can  make with  respect  to  discourse  functions  of  NPs  in  Russian  is  the 
degrading status of indefinite NPs in non-focus preverbal positions observed earlier: 
(22)  ???Vsyakie deti  edyat moroienoe. 
any  children eat  ice-cream 
'Any children eat ice-cream.' 
We now know that  in non-emphatic  speech, these positions  are reserved  exclusively  for 
topics  or  discourse  neutral  information.  As  was  already  observed  by  many  linguists 
(Vallduvi 1992; King 1995, inter al.), topics tend to be expressed by definite NPs (being the 
source of  old and usually  already mentioned information). In  addition, we may note that 
neutral information may not be discourse new, as this would put it into the focus category. 
Instead,  neutral  nominals  correspond  to  familiar  (in  the  sense  of  Karttunen  [1968]) 
information that does not represent current concern for the interlocutors. Hence, discourse 
neutral  nominals  must  be  interpreted  as  definite.  Such  a  prediction  is  empirically 
confirmed: 
(23)  Q:  Kto  Sil  eto  plat'je? 
who sewed this dress 
'Who sewed this dress?' 
A:  #[T  Eto  plat'je]  [NI Sila  komu-libo]  [F portnixa] 
this dress  sewed ~IIYO~~-DAT  tailor 
'A tailor sewed this dress for anyone.' 
However, the observation that only  definite nominals  may  appear in  neutral  information 
position is not borne out with respect to topics. Indefinite NPs with specific interpretation 
(24) and so-called 'partitive  specifics'  (25) (En$ 1991) are fine as topics (see Cresti  1995 
for an in-depth discussion of indefinite topics in English): 
(24)  Koe-kakaja zvezda pojavilas'  na nebe. 
some  star  appeared  on sky 
'Some (specific) star appeared in the sky.' 
(25)  Q:  Cto  delajut deti? 
what do  children 
'What are the children doing?' A:  [T Kakie-tolkoe-kakie deti] [F  edyat moroienoe]. 
some  children eat ice-cream 
'Some (specific) children are eating ice-cream.' 
The observation that indefinite nominals may appear in the topic position is not surprising: 
cross-linguistically,  indefinites  may  have  a  specific  (i.e.,  presuppositional)  reading  (cf. 
Diesing 1992). Under this reading they refer to a member of a set already established in the 
universe of discourse and act as generalized quantifiers. 
Another type of  indefinite NPs that  may be found in  the topic position  is  a NP with 
generic interpretation: 
(26)  Topic-Focus 
Q:  Cto  delajut deti? 
what do  children 
'What do children do?' 
A:  LT Deti] [F edyat morozhenoe]. 
children  eat  ice-cream 
'GEN  children eat ice-cream.' 
Once again, the NPs with generic interpretation are semantically closer to definite NPs than 
the ones with existential reading in that they describe an exceptionless set of  individuals or 
items.  Hence,  for  the  purposes  of  information  packaging,  the  NPs  with  generic 
interpretation have a characteristic of being specific as their referents are equally easy to be 
picked  out  as the particular  referents  of  the  definite  NPs  (see  Diesing  1992:16-21  for 
discussion of generic NPs in English). 
Let  us  now  turn  to  the  status  of  NPs  functioning  as  foci. Consider  the  following 
examples: 
(27)  All-Focus 
Q:  Cto proisxodit? 
what is-happening 
'What is going on?' 
Al:  [F Detil  kakie-to deti  edyat moroienoe] 
childrenlsome  children eat  ice-cream 
'(#The)  children eat ice-cream.' 
A2:  [F Moileti  deti  edyat moroienoe]. 
my/ these children  eat  ice-cream 
'Mylthese children eat ice-cream.' 
(28)  Neutral Information-Focus 
Q:  Kto igraet? 
who plays 
'Who is playing?' Information Structure and the Status of NP  in Russian 
Al:  [NI Igrajut] rFdeti/vsyakie deti]. 
play  childrenlany  children 
'(#The) children are playing.' 
A2:  [NI Igrajut] [Fmoi/eti  deti]. 
play  mylthese children 
'Mylthese children are playing.' 
These  examples  indicate  that  a  NP  marked  as  indefinite  is  grammatical  in  the  focus 
position. Moreover, the preferred  interpretation for noun phrases occurring within focus is 
indefinite when the NP is unmarked. However, when the NP is marked as definite, either 
lexically or non-lexically, the focused nominal is interpreted as definite. 
5.1.2.  Emphatic Configurations 
In  this subsection, I will examine the dependence on discourse position  of  NPs found in 
emphatic contexts. Examples in (24) below illustrate the possible distribution patterns: 
(29)  Q:  Za  dver'ju slylalsya  laj  sobak? 
behind door  was-heard  bark dogs 
'Was it the barking of dogs that was heard from behind the door?' 
A1 :  ???[F  ~ENSKIJ  GOLOS]  za  dver'ju slylalsya! 
woman-MASC.SG.NOM  voice-MASC.SG.NOM behind door was-heard 
???Za  dver'ju [F  ~ENSKIJ  GOLOS]  slylalsya! 
'It was A WOMAN'S VOICE that was heard from behind the door!' 
A2:  [FGOLOS  ~ENSCINY]  za  dver'ju slylalsya! 
voice-MASC.SG.NOM  woman-FEM.SG.GEN behind door  was-heard 
Za  dver'ju [F  GOLOS TENSCINY]  slyialsya! 
'It was THE VOICE OFTHEWOMAN that was heard behind the door!' 
The data show that the preferred reading for the contrastively focused NPs is definite: the 
indefinite  interpretation  receives  degrading  judgement  while  definite  is  accepted.  As 
expected, the described distribution is not affected by the position of the focused constituent 
within the sentence. 
Finally, the presence of an intonationally focused NP in the sentence does not affect the 
interpretation of the topic: 
(30)  a.  [T  Mal'Eik]  [F PIS'MO]  dopisallnapisal! 
boy  LETTER  has-written/wrote-PERF 
'It was THE LEmR  that the/#a boy has finished writinglwrote!' 
b.  [F  PIS'MO] [T mallEik] dopisallnapisal! 
LElTER  boy  has-writtenlwrote-PERF 
'It was the letter that the/#a boy has finished writinglwrote!' 
Independently of whether the topic of the sentence mal'tik 'the boy'  occurs before or after 
the  contrastively  focused  NP pis'mo  'the  letter',  the  focused  nominal  is  interpreted  as definite. This behavior is expected since (in)definiteness is associated with the discourse 
function of the NP rather than with its position with respect to other discourse elements. 
5.1.3.  Summary 
Summarizing  the  discovered  correlations  between  Russian  discourse  structure  and  the 
status  of  NPs  with  respect  to  (in)definiteness,  I  shall  confirm  the  earlier  proposed 
generalization  about  the  correlation  between  the  position  and  the  interpretation  of  a 
nominal.  Moreover,  such  a  generalization  receives  a  natural  explanation  once  the 
information structure of the sentence is invoked. To recapitulate, the interpretation of an 
unmarked  nominal  depends  on  the  information  structure  function  it  represents:  topics, 
neutral  elements, and contrastive  foci  are definite, while  information foci  are indefinite. 
However, overt marking for (in)definiteness overrides the status of  NP obtained  through 
information structure. In  other words, the effects of  lexical  marking seem to  be  stronger 
than discourse-level effects. 
Although the interpretation of unmarked nominals seems to be accounted for through the 
information structure, an obvious shortcoming of  the analysis proposed so far is in the lack 
of uniformity between  the behavior of marked and unmarked nominals. In  what follows, I 
shall consider other possible solutions for this problem. 
5.2.  Specificity 
In  the previous subsection, I showed that the mapping between  information structure and 
the interpretation  of  NP  is  problematic  when  the notion  of  (in)definiteness  is  used  as  a 
criterion for the distribution of the NPs. Recall  also that main difficulty is caused by  the 
availability of indefinite topics and definite foci. What all types of indefinite topics have in 
common  is  the  underlying  feature  of  specificity:  in  order  for  an  indefinite  NP  to  be 
topicalized,  it  must  have  a  presuppositional  reading.  Naturally,  the  next  candidate  to 
consider  in  order  to  obtain  a  straightforward  system  of  correlations  is  specificity.  The 
definition of  specificity used  in  this paper is given below  (cf. Fodor & Sag  1982, Heim 
1982, Runner 1994, Schaeffer 1997): 
(3 1)  Specificity: A specific nominal has a fixed referent in (the model of) the world, one 
that can be identified by the speaker andlor the person whose propositional attitudes 
are being reported. 
The following predictions can  be made with respect  to the possible correlations between 
specificity of nominals and information structure: 
(i)  Both indefinite and definite topics must be specific. 
(ii)  Contrastive foci must also be specific since they are overwhelmingly expressed by 
definite NPs and involve known or inferable sets of items. 
(iii)  Finally, new information foci should be represented by non-specific nominals. Information Structure and the Status of NP in Russian 
As was shown earlier in this paper, the first two predictions are borne out. As to the third 
statement, the following example indicates to the contrary: 
(32)  Q:  Cto proisxodit? 
what is-happening 
'What is going on?' 
A:  Ivanlmoj syn p'jet vodku. 
Ivanlmy son  drinks vodka 
'Ivanlmy son is drinking vodka.' 
The  subject  nominals  in  (32-A)  represent  the  case  of  novel  definites  (discussed,  for 
example, by Hawkins [I9781 and Heim [1982], inter al.). The referents of such definite NPs 
are established by means of  accommodation (see Clark  1977 and Heim  1982 for detailed 
discussion  of  this  process)  rather  than  through  introduction  in  the  previous  discourse. 
Nevertheless,  the referents of  novel  definites  are specific and, since they  occur in  focus 
position, cause a problem for the analysis involving the connections between specificity and 
information structure. 
We  have seen that neither the morpho-syntactic feature of  (in)definiteness nor the semantic 
notion  of  specificity were sufficient to define the classes of  nominals representing certain 
information structure functions. However, recall that the problem with the new information 
foci associated with specific reading has to do with the way the referent of  the nominal is 
introduced into the discourse. While the specific referents of  novel  definite nominals are 
not introduced through the previous discourse, the specific referents of definite or indefinite 
nominals are necessarily pre-established in discourse. Such a distinction is provided by the 
notion of D(iscourse)-linking (Pesetsky 1987). 
(33)  D-linking: A D-linked nominal has a referent pre-established  in the discourse, or a 
referent belonging to a set pre-established  in  the discourse. Non-D-linked  nominal 
has a referent new in the discourse or in the utterance. 
Note that such a definition requires that the referent of a D-linked element be familiar to 
both speaker and hearer. Now let us consider the system of correlations between nominals 
classified with respect to D-linking and the information structure: 
(i)  All topics must be D-linked since they are either previously mentioned individuals 
or items, or members of a set previously established in the discourse. 
(ii)  Contrastive foci must be D-linked since they represent elements familiar or inferable 
from previous discourse. 
(iii)  Finally,  new  information  foci  are  obligatorily  non-D-linked  since their  referents 
come from sets familiar only to the speaker and, therefore, are new to the hearer. I conclude  that D-linking may be  used  as a criterion  describing  the correlation  between 
information structure and the status of NP in  Russian. Such a choice seems to be justified 
since the nature of the functions of information structure is discourse-motivated. Hence a 
logical  classification  of  elements  representing  information  structure  functions has to be 
discourse-based rather than be defined according to semantic or syntactic features. 
6.  Conclusions 
In  this paper, I have established that Russian NPs can be overtly marked as (in)definite, or 
alternatively appear unmarked for this feature. The status of unmarked NPs is determined 
based on the function of information structure it represents. 
I also showed that  the notion  of  (in)definiteness is not  sufficient to provide a logical 
system of co-dependencies between the functions of information structure and the status of 
NP, both marked and unmarked. Instead, I proposed that the classification of  nominals with 
respect to information structure be based on D-linking (Pesetsky 1987). D-linking, a tool of 
the syntax-discourse interface, appears to be a natural candidate for the connection between 
information structure and the referential status of a nominal. 
Finally, topics for further  research  include an  investigation of  the mechanisms  of  D- 
linking with respect to information packaging in a wider range of languages demonstrating 
free word order and lack of  obligatory overt marking for (in)definiteness. In  addition, the 
development of  a more structural analysis of  the syntax-discourse interface accounting for 
the facts described in this paper is needed. 
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1.  Introducing the Problem 
This paper investigates how (in)definiteness in word order; more specifically, how it in 
the ordering of objects in the Mittelfeld  of German double-object constructions.  As a 
starting point I take what I'll call the Indefinite Puzzle. 
1.1.  The Indefinite Puzzle 
According to Lenerz (1977), dative-accusative (henceforth dat-ace) order in  German is 
unmarked, which means it can occur with all F(ocus)-patterns. Accusative-dative (acc- 
dat) order is marked, re by the fact that it can only occur with selected F-patterns. The 
reader is referred to Lenerz (1977) or Biiring (forthcoming) for the full range of data, 
but a summary of the facts is given in the following table: 
Of  particular interest here is the optionality in word oder in the first column of the table 
(only the dative object is F-marked). The following example illustrates this case (I use 
capitals to indicate pitch accents, both primary and, where relevant, secondary; where 
more than one accent is indicated within a sentence, the last one will be the primary, or 
nuclear,  accent;  focus  patterns  are  elicited  by  lead-in  questions  or  other  lead-in 
material): 
F-marked: 
order: 
dative-accusative 
accusative-dative 
(1)  Wem hast du das Buch gegeben? 
'Who did you give the book (to)?' 
a.  Ich habe dem  SC~uler  das Buch gegeben. 
I  have the-DAT  student  the book given 
b.  Ich habe das Buch dem  sCHUler gegeben. 
I  have  the book the-DAT  student  given. 
'I  gave the book to the student' 
It is important to be clear about the sense of the term 'unmarked'  used here: (1  b) as an 
answer to  the question given is no less acceptable to native speakers than  (la). The 
reason  Lenerz calls acc-dat order  'marked'  relates  to  the  grammar of  German  as  a 
whole: Dat-acc order (the 'unmarked' one) can appear without any other factors such as 
I'd  like to  thank  Summer Kern, Line Mikkelsen  and  an  anonymous reviewer for  their  useful  and 
detailed comments on a draft version of this article. 
Dat only 
ok 
ok 
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Acc only 
ok 
* 
both 
ok 
* 
neither 
ok 
* focus/background  order  recommending  it;  acc-dat order on  the  other  hand,  is  only 
possible where some other factor favors it. I will therefore speak of dat-acc order as the 
lexico-syntactically unmarked order. 
Paraphrasing  Lenerz in  this  way, the optionality  in  (1) arises because both  forms 
have something to recommend them: (la) displays (lexico-syntactically) unmarked dat- 
acc  order,  while  (Ib) displays  unmarked  background-focus  (as  opposed  to  focus- 
background)  order.  The  reader  can  verify  that  this  'tie'  between  lexico-syntactic 
unmarkedness  and  focus-structural  unmarkedness  is  not  found  in  any  of  the  other 
columns in the table above. 
In Biiring (forthcoming) I propose to derive these facts, among others, from a general 
theory of prosodic phrasing, focus and word order; this account will be summarized in 
section 2. My  aim  in this paper  is to address a set of  additional facts only  noted  in 
passing in that earlier work, a representative datum for which is (2): 
(2)  Wem hast du ein Buch gegeben? 
'Who did you give a book (to)?' 
a.  Ich habe dem  SCHUler ein Buch gegeben. 
I  have the-DAT  student  a  book given 
b.  Ich habe ein Buch dem  SCHUler gegeben. 
I  have  a  book  the-DAT student  given. 
'I  gave a book to the student' 
Notice the contrast between (2), which doesn't allow for acc-dat order, and the earlier 
(I), which did. The only difference between the two is that the accusative object in (2) 
is indefinite, where its counterpart in  (1) is definite. The immediate diagnosis for this 
case, it would seem, is that definite NPs want to precede indefinite NPs even more than 
focused NPs want to follow unfocused ones. The question I will explore in this paper is: 
Just  what  is  the  status  of  this  tendency  in  grammatical  theory?  Three  possible 
explanations will be discussed: 
A purely morphosyntactic constraint: 'Definites precede Indefinites' 
A  pragmatic  conspiracy:  Definites  are  often  discourse-old,  indefinites  are  often 
discourse-new. New material is focused, old material is not, so indefinites will follow 
definites because foci follow the non-foci (the background). 
A semantic constraint: Indefinites have no quantificational force of their own, so they 
need to be in  a position that  is mapped onto the nuclear scope (NS) of  a tripartite 
quantificational structure (if they are to be interpreted existentially); this mapping is 
in turn regulated by structural constraints which locate material that is to be mapped 
onto the NS towards the end of the sentence. 
Each of these factors and its relevance for object ordering in word order languages such 
as German has been proposed somewhere in the literature, either without regard to the 
others, or as an  alternative to  one of  them. My conclusion in  this paper  will be that 
indeed  all  of  these factors seem to be  active in  German, and that  none  of  them  is 
sufficient to explain the data alone. Accordingly, I will provide  a way  of  integrating 
them in a unified model, using ranked violable constraints. What Do Definites Do That Indefinites Definitely Don't? 
1.2.  Morphosyntax Isn't All 
Let me start by arguing against a purely morphosyntactic account, which would strive to 
explain the contrast between (1) and (2) by postulating a general prohibition against the 
order indefinite-definite; note that (2b), but not (lb) would violate this prohibition. In 
terms of ranked constraints, this solution would postulate the following ranking:' 
(3)  definite  before  indefinite  >>dative  before  accusative  <<>>background  before 
focus 
I submit, however, that such a constraint cannot be the solution to the Indefinite Puzzle. 
Observe with Lenerz (1977) that the same asymmetry between definite and indefinite 
accusatives shows up if the focused dative itself is indefinite: An unfocused accusative 
can precede it, but only if the accusative is definite: 
(4)  Wem hast du daslein Buch gegeben? 
Who did you give thela book (to)? 
a.  Ich habe einem SCHUler das Buch gegeben. 
I  have a-DAT student  the  book given 
b.  Ich habe einem SCHUler ein Buch gegeben. 
I  have a-DAT student  a  book  given 
c.  Ich habe das Buch einem SCHUler gegeben. 
I  have the book a-DAT  student  given 
d.  *Ich habe ein Buch einem SCHUler gegeben. 
I  have  a  book a-DAT  student  given 
This example aptly provides two arguments against using a general prohibition against 
indefinite-definite order. First, (4a) demonstrates that indefinites can precede definites 
given dative-accusative order. This should be impossible, if  (3) were correct. Second, 
(4d) shows that an unfocused indefinite accusative cannot precede a focused indefinite 
dative, just as little as it could a focused definite dative in  (2b). Clearly, this cannot be 
captured by any constraint that alludes to the definite-indefinite contrast. I conclude that 
reference to the morphological definite-indefinite distinction -  even though  active in 
German, as we will see -  will not help us to solve the Indefinite Puzzle. 
1.3.  The Relation Between Definitenessnndefiniteness and Background1 
Focus 
In  this  subsection  I  will  brie  outline  the  connection  between  (in)definiteness  and 
focusing, and then show why the Indefinite Puzzle cannot be solved by it either.'  The 
connection I am talking about can be illustrated by the following reasoning: 
I  I presuppose familiarity with OT-type analyses and the standard notational devices used therein. 
*  I  assume  here  the  kind  of  theory  of  focus  advocated  in  Selkirk  (1984), Selkirk  (1995),  and 
Schwarzschild  (1999), among others; see von Stechow (1981), von  Stechow (1989).  von Stechow 
(l991),  and the references therein for a discussion of the semantics of focus. (5)  a.  Definites and indefinites differ with respect to the familiarity of their 
referents: 
1.  Indefinites introduce new discourse referents.  .  . 
11.  Definites refer to old discourse referents. 
b.  New material must be in the focus of a sentence, old material constitutes 
the background. 
c.  Therefore, indefinites are always focused, while definites are always in 
the background. 
d.  To the extent that focused elements follow background elements (say, for 
prosodic reasons), it follows that indefinites follow definites. 
While this reasoning is correct over all and might in fact be held responsible for some of 
the ordering restrictions on indefinites, it is simply not strict enough to account for the 
Indefinite  Puzzle. The reason  is  that  several steps  in the  argument are valid  for the 
majority of cases, but not all. Let me make caveats about three of them here: 
Definites refer to old discourse referents. While true in tendency, there are numerous 
exceptions to this, as critics of the so-called 'familiarity theory of  definites'  continue to 
point out, among them unique definites such as the sun, the number 2 or thefirst man on 
the moon and dependent definites as in John lost his keys/the keys to his house. 
New  material  must  be  in  the  focus of  a  sentence, old  material  constitutes the 
background.  I  know  of  no  reason  to  doubt  the  first  half  of  this  claim  (under  a 
reasonably liberal construal of what can pass as non-new, at least), but the second half is 
clearly too strong.  Consider a question-answer  pair  such  as Who did  John's mother 
praise? -  She praised  JOHN.,  a variation  on  Schwarzschild's  (1999:145) ex. (1 1). 
Here John in the answer is discourse old (i.e. the word John has just been spoken in the 
question) and refers to an old discourse referent (the same John that was mentioned in 
the question), yet it is focused. For an enlightening discussion of such cases, sometimes 
-  though I believe misleadingly -  called 'contrastive foci' (e.g. Rochemont 1986), see 
Schwarzschild (1999). 
Therefore,  indefinites  are  always  focused,  while  definites  are  always  in  the 
background. I have just  discussed two cases in  which this equation breaks down for 
definites,  namely  definites  that  introduce  a  new  discourse  referent  (the keys  to his 
house) and  definites that  are in  focus despite being  discourse-old.  On  top of  that, 
indefinites, even  if  introducing a new discourse referent, can be in  the background  if 
their  lexical  material  has  been  previously  mentioned,  as  in  the  following  English 
examples, where a rose is not focused (it is unaccented despite being in  the sentence- 
final position): 
(6)  (After  Dirk  had  conveyed to  Amber  how  much  he likes  roses,)  she FInally 
BOUGHT him a rose. 
The indefinite roses in the lead-in doesn't introduce a discourse referent, so the use of 
an  indefinite in the answer is possible; but it makes the phrase a rose given, so that a 
rose doesn't  need to be focused in  the answer. Thus, while it  is likely to be true that What Do Definites Do That Indefinites Definitely Don't? 
indefinites,  in  declaratives  at  least,  always  introduce  new  discourse  referents,  it  is 
clearly false that they always have to be in focus.' 
As  far  as  the  Indefinite  Puzzle  is  concerned,  all  three  of  the  above  caveats  are 
potentially  relevant here. First, the dative object dem Schuler in  (1) and (2), although 
definite, is in focus. We interpret it either as truly discourse new (in which case it must 
be construed as a dependent  definite or as discourse-unique  in  some other way); or, 
more likely, we accommodate a prior discourse in  which its discourse referent has been 
introduced,  in  which  case it  is an  instance  of  a given  definite  which  is  nonetheless 
focused. Second, the indefinite  accusative  object  ein Buch,  even  though  presumably 
introducing a discourse referent, is not focused, because its descriptive content is given 
in the context (here: the question). Thus the link between definitenesdindefiniteness  and 
background/focus  breaks  down  in  these  examples,  yet  the  fact  remains  that  the 
indefinite can't precede the  definite.  I conclude that  the Indefinite  Puzzle cannot be 
solved by recourse to the focus/background distinction alone.4 
1.4.  A Semantic Mapping Effect 
We have seen that neither a morphosyntactic  'definites precede indefinites'  constraint, 
nor recourse to background/focus structure can explain the Indefinite Puzzle. I believe, 
though, that something along the lines explored in the previous section is true:  While 
they don't need to be in focus, indefinites do need to be with a certain semantic domain, 
namely in a place where they can get existential closure, to borrow a term from Heim 
(1982).  As  noted  there,  indefinites  do not  have  quantificational  force of  their  own; 
rather, their quantificational force is determined by their environment. If  semantically 
an indefinite gets interpreted within the restrictive clause of  a quantifier, it inherits the 
quantificational force of  that quantifier. Only if  the indefinite is interpreted within the 
nuclear scope of a quantifier does it receive an existential interpretation. Kratzer (1995) 
and  Diesing  (1992),  elaborating  on  this  idea  of  Heim's,  have  proposed  that  even 
sentences  without  overt  quantificational  elements  are  mapped  onto  a  tripartite 
quantificational structure involving a nuclear scope and a restrictive clause. I'd like to 
explore the idea that indefinite accusatives such as ein Buch in  (2)  cannot precede the 
dative because they have to be in  a syntactic position  which  will be mapped onto the 
nuclear scope, rather than the restrictive clause, of  a quantificational structure, and that 
position is following the dative. 
Evidence for this general line of reasoning comes from sentences such as (7): 
3  I am less certain that indefinites in questions never introduce discourse referents, given examples like 
Is there an ATM  around here? -  It's right behind you.  Note that, unlike in an example like Did yon 
see a big black cat? -It  went that way. it seems implausible to call an ATM 'specific'  (even in scare 
quotes) in this example. 
An alternative that  comes to mind  is to count unstressed  indefinites as 'focused'  in  some abstract 
sense and  then  insist that arc-dar order  is  impossible  with  an  unstressed  (yet  allegedly  focused) 
indefinite accusative  object, given that  the  resulting  structure will  always  violate  the  'background 
precedes focus' constraint to at least the same degree as the dat-acc structure. Such a strategy is of 
course impossible to adopt in an approach like mine, which tries to reduce effects of focus to effects 
of stressing (unless I want to claim that indefinites are also always 'stressed'  in some abstract sense . . 
). The approach I present below, however, is as close as I can get to this strategy by claiming that 
indefinites do need to be within  a certain domain, and that that domain  wants to coincide with  the 
focus. (7)  Wem wiirdest Du ein Buch schenken? 
'Who would you give a book?' 
a.  Ich wiirde ein Buch einem sCHUlerF  schenken. 
I  would a  book  a-DAT student  give 
b.  Ich wiirde ein Buch dem  SCHU~~~~  schenken. 
I  would a  book  the-DAT student  give 
'I'd give a book to althe student' 
The surprising thing about the two answers in  (7) is that the unfocused  indefinite ein 
Buch  precedes  the  focused  dative  ein/dem  Schiiler.  Why,  then,  are  (7a)  and  (7b) 
possible, but (4d) and (2b) are not? The answer, I believe, is that the indefinites in (7) 
are not interpreted existential, but generic. The sentences can be paraphrased as: 
(8)  typically, if I had an x which is a book, I'd give x to dthe student 
As  opposed  to  that,  the  sentences  in  (2)  involve  an  existential  indefinite;  their 
paraphrase is something like: 
(9)  there is an x which is a book, and I gave x  to dthe student 
It seems that  indefinite accusatives can precede a dative only if  they  are to receive  a 
generic interpretation. If  they are to be interpreted existentially, they have to follow the 
dative, because that is the domain which will be interpreted as part of the nuclear scope, 
and hence receive existential force. 
The reason (2b) and (4d) are unacceptable is thus a complex one: Their overall form 
(indicative mood, perfective tense) makes it pragmatically hard to understand them as 
generic statements. Their generic reading  would be something as far-fetched  as  'for 
typical  x, if  x was a book, I  gave x  to  dthe student'  (people  like myself,  who have 
trained themselves in  getting farfetched readings do actually get this reading for (2b)l 
(4d)). And their word order, in particular the acc-rlut order, makes it impossible to give 
the indefinite accusative ein Buch the pragmatically plausible existential interpretation. 
The  question  obviously  is:  Just  what  constitutes  the  syntactic  counterpart  to  the 
semantic nuclear scope? In our particular case, why can an accusative following a dative 
get mapped onto the nuclear scope, whereas an  accusative preceding  a dative cannot? 
Different authors have given different answers to these questions: According to Kratzer 
(1995) and Diesing (1992), it  is the  VP that  is mapped  onto the  nuclear  scope; an 
accusative preceding a dative would have to be generic if  we were to assume that acc- 
dat order can only arise through VP-adjunction of  the accusative. Krifka (1995), on the 
other hand, argues that the focus  is mapped onto the nuclear scope, a position slightly 
modified by Eckardt (1996), who postulates an abstract category FI-focus, which does 
not necessarily coincide with the focus marked by accenting (Eckardt's FZ-focus),  to be 
the structural counterpart to the nuclear scope; under this view, the acc-dat order must 
entail that the accusative is outside of the (Fl-) focus. 
My proposal  is perhaps  most  similar to that  in  Eckardt  (1996). It crucially differs 
from  it,  however,  in  that  I  assume  that  the  relevant  unit  for  the  syntax-semantics 
mapping  is  in  fact  a prosodic one, the  accent  domain to be  introduced  in  the next 
section. The gist of  the proposal  is that  having an  existential  indefinite accusative  in 
front of the focus cannot yield a structure which both constitutes an improvement over What Do Definites Do That Indefinites Definitely Don't? 
the  dat-acc order  in  terms  of  focus  structure,  and  at  the  same time  allows for the 
indefinite  to  be mapped  onto the nuclear  scope. Such an  acc-dat order  is  thus only 
possible if either the accusative is a generic indefinite, as in (7),  or a definite NP, which 
doesn't care whether it is in  the nuclear scope or not, as in (1). To demonstrate how this 
accounts for the Indefinite Puzzle, I'll first have to introduce the prosody based account 
of  focus-related word order variation proposed in Buring (forthcoming), which will be 
done in section 2. Following that, I will present and motivate a prosody-based account 
of  existential closure in  section  3. With all that  in place I can then give an account of 
how (in)definiteness, focus and the existential/generic dichotomy in prosodic phrasing, 
accenting and word order in German double object constructions in  section 4,  where, 
among other things, a solution to the Indefinite Puzzle will be proposed. 
2.  Variation in Object Order -A  Prosody Based Account 
The cornerstone of  the  analysis I outline in this  section  (essentially that proposed  in 
more detail in Buring forthcoming)  is that  word  order is determined  by  at least two 
kinds  of  constraints:  Constraints  that  refer  to  the  lexico-syntactic  properties  of  a 
constituent,  such  as  its  case,  its  animacy  or  its  (morphological)  definiteness;  and 
constraints that  refer  to  the  properties  of  a constituent in  an  utterance  type, such  as 
whether it is focus or background, and what kind of  semantic interpretation it receives. 
Languages that give more weight to the former, such as English, are traditionally called 
fixed word order languages (since the word order seems invariable if  viewed from the 
morphosyntactic point of view, even though it is of course quite regarding the question 
of  where, say, a focus can occur), while those that give more weight to the latter, such 
as the Slavic languages, are often called free word order languages (though their word 
order is rather fixed if  viewed from a focus/background perspective). 
A  second  hypothesis  I  explore  here  is  that  focus-  and  interpretation-related 
constraints  do  not  directly  in  linear  order,  but  only  indirectly,  via  their  effect  on 
prosodic  phrasing.  Prosodic  phrasing  will  in  turn  be  related  to  word  order  by 
markedness constraints. 
In German, optionality between two word orders arises if the two kinds of constraints 
favor  different  linear  orders; strict  word  order, on  the  other  hand,  is  the  result  of 
agreement between  them. A helpful way to think about this  is that  German has two 
operative grammars, one lexico-syntactically driven, one prosodically driven (and hence 
heavily in  by such things as focus). For each grammars, there is an  optimal form; we 
thus have a lexico-syntactic winner and a, possibly distinct, prosodic winner. Formally, 
I will implement this via a constraint tie. 
2.1.  Lexico-Syntactic Factors 
In  many  approaches, ditransitive  verbs  are taken  to lexically  specify  an  'unmarked' 
order  amongst their  objects.  In  this  paper,  I  follow  an  alternative  line  of  analysis, 
according to which the unmarked order is determined by the interplay of three factors: 
Animacy,  Case,  and  Definiteness.  I  adopt  the  specific  analysis  in  Muller  (1998), 
according to which these are encoded in the form the three constraints in (lo), ordered 
as shown in (I I): (10)  Lexicosyntactic Constraints: 
a.  ANIMACY 
Animate NPs precede inanimate NPs. 
b.  DATIVE 
Datives precede accusatives. 
c.  DEFINITENESS 
Definites precede indefinites 
As these factors are not my primary concern in this paper, I refer the interested reader to 
Muller  (1998)  for  a  discussion  and  justification  of  them.  For  the  purpose  of  my 
presentation  I will  almost  exclusively  consider  cases  involving  animate  datives and 
inanimate  accusatives.  That  way,  I  can  simply  talk  about  the  lexico-syntactically 
optimal  candidate (the one with dat-acc order) and  ignore cases where animacy  and 
case push in different directions, as well as whatever subordinate effects morphological 
definiteness  might  have.  In  the  tableaux  to  follow  I  will  summarize  these  three 
constraints as d-a, reminiscent of 'dative precedes accusative', but this is no more than a 
convenient abbreviatory convention. 
(12)  abbreviatory convention: 
D-A =def  ANIMACY  >> DATIVE >> DEFINITENESS 
I should mention that this system, as developed by Muller, does not predict forms to be 
ungrammatical,  but  merely  degraded.  That  is,  ceteris paribus,  an  inanimate  dative 
preceding  an  animate  accusative  will be  degraded compard to  an  animate accusative 
preceding an inanimate dative (since ANIMACY  outranks DATIVE),  but not unacceptable; 
and even an inanimate accusative preceding an animate dative will be deteriorated, but 
not hopeless. These graded judgements,  whatever their actual implementation, can be 
imported into the system here, but they will be immaterial for most all of the examples 
considered. 
2.2.  Focus 
Let us now turn to those constraints that regard non-lexical  properties of  constituents, 
beginning with focus. Why do foci tend to follow non-foci? I suggest that the answer 
involves two steps: First, German (just like English) has an unmarked prosodic structure 
in  which  more or less each phrasal constituent of  a clause corresponds to an  accent 
domain (AD), the rightmost one of which becomes the head of the intonational phrase 
(iP), and thereby most prominent among the ADS.'  The unmarked structure thus looks 
like (13): 
5  The prosodic correlate of an accent domain is the presence of phrase level stress (marking its head), 
which in turn is a necessary condition for association with a pitch accent. Quite presumably, ADS are 
identical  to  the phonological  phrases  of  Selkirk  (1984)  or  Truckenbrodt  (1999) and  show  other 
prosodic correlates such as boundary  tones, final lengthening, breaks etc. More investigation  of this 
issue is needed, though. The prosodic correlate of the intonational phrase is a final boundary tone and, 
most prominently, an obligatory pitch accent on its head, the nuclear accent. What Do Definites Do That Indefinites Definitely Don't'! 
Second, German (like many languages) adheres to a constraint that requires foci to be 
prosodically prominent, called FocusProminence  or FP for short (Truckenbrodt  1995; 
1999). For example, if  an AD contains an F-marked  constitutent,  it  wants to achieve 
prominence by becoming the head of the iP. Thus in (13), ZP could legitimately contain 
a focus, since it is the head of iP and thereby most prominent. Alternatively, YP and ZP 
could both contain foci, in  which case YP violates FP (it is not the head of iP), but not 
fatally, since any alternative phrasing (e.g. one in which YP, rather than XP, is the head 
of  iP) would  violate FP as well  (e.g. because XP isn't  the head of  iP) plus possibly 
additional con~traints.~ 
What cannot  happen  is that  YP,  but  not ZP is a focus, because  this  involves an 
avoidable violation of FP. To understand this we have to look at the constraints in more 
detail, though: 
Accent  Domain  Formation  To regulate  accent  domain  formation  we  import  the 
following two constraints, more or less directly from Truckenbrodt (1  995): 
( 14)  A(CCENT)D(~MAIN)F(~RMATION) 
a.  STRESSARG(UMENT) 
A thematic argument bears phrase-level stress. 
b.  WRAP  XP 
An XP is contained within one AD. 
STRESSARG  prevents  two  non-overlapping  NPs  (or  any  two  non-overlapping 
constitutents) from being mapped into one big AD, because that way only one of them 
would receive phrase-level stress (qua being the head of that AD). To see this we have 
to  pay  attention  to  secondary  accents,  as  in  the  following  example,  where  meiner 
Mutter. 'my mother', must bear a (secondary) pitch accent, which in turn is indicative of 
phrase-level stress, i.e. the presence of an AD:' 
(15)  Warum warst du  auf der Post? 
why  were you at  the post office 
a.  Ich will  meiner Mutter eine POSTkarte schicken. 
I  want my  mother  a  postcard  send 
b.  #Ich will meiner Mutter eine POSTkarte schicken. 
6  The rcader might wonder if YP and ZP cannot simply form one AD which then becomes the head of 
iP, thereby  avoiding  any  violation  of  FP, as  in  (XP)AD (YP ZP)AD , where  boldface  indicates 
maximal prominence. The answer here is that this phrasing  violates  the formal version  of FP at the 
AD level, because the prosodic word corresponding to YP fails to become the head  of AD, despite 
containing a focus. And it's turtles all the way down: If a phrase contains two or more F-marks with 
neither dominating the other, a FP violation will inevitably occur at some level. 
7  My account  predicts  that XPs preceding  the head  of  iP will  almost  always form an  AD, due to 
STRESS-ARC;  (15) illustrates this with a case in which mny  mother is also focused. It is less obvious 
that unfocused XPs necessarily  form an AD; they certainly do not need to bear a pitch accent, even 
though  they  can.  As  noted  above, the  concept  of  an  AD thus  doesn't  have  a  necessary  prosodic 
correlate, but only entails the possibiliry  of a pitch accent. Daniel Biiring 
The following tableau derives this:* 
WRAPXP,  on the other hand, prevents XPs from being unduely fractured. For example, a 
verbal predicate will be in the same AD as an adjacent argument, given that separating 
them  would  violate  WRAPXP for  XP=VP.  This  is  the  effect  Jacobs  (1992)  calls 
integration, cf. also von Stechow and Uhmann (1986): 
(16)  Gudrun mochte Astronautin werden, und Peter will . . . 
Gudrun wants astronaut become, and Peter wants 
a.  . . . DAMPFschiffe bauen. 
steam boats  build 
b.  # . . . DAMPFschiffe BAUen. 
c.  # . . . Dampfschiffe BAUen. 
'Gudrun wants to become an astronout, and Peter wants to build steam boats' 
Notice, too, that in an argument-head complex, the argument, rather than the head, will 
be the head of the AD, hence prominent (indicated by (NP v),  as in  (a), as opposed to 
(rzp V), as in (c), in the tableaux). This follows from STRESSARG  as well, given that NP, 
but not V is an argument. The overall effect of these constraints is that predicates form 
an  AD with their adjacent  argument, while all other constituents form their own AD 
(see, once again, Truckenbrodt 1995). 
i:  NP,,hiec,  V 
a. 4  (NP V)AD 
b.  (NP)AD(V)AO 
c.  (np WAD 
Nuclear  Stress and Accent:  As  mentioned  above,  ADS aren't  the  highest  level  of 
prosodic structure. Simple sentences like the ones I am concerned with in this paper are 
mapped onto an  intonational phrase  (iP). The only  relevant constraint  in  connection 
with the present investigation is that the head of iP is right-peripheral in German (again, 
just  like in English). This accounts for the fact that in a sentences with more than one 
pitch  accent, such as (15) above, the final one is most prominent,  cf. (18) (where x 
marks AD-level stress and X marks iP-level stress): 
STRESSARG  WRAPXP 
*! 
*! 
( 17)  IpHeadRight (IpHR) 
An iP and the AD that is its head are right-aligned 
(18)  a.  (  x  X  lip 
(meiner  MUtter)a~(eine  POSTkarte schreiben)~~ 
Here and throughout, the a. and b. numbers in the tableaux refer to the example sentence immediately 
preceding the tableau. Where there is more than one candidate structure for a single example sentence, 
I'll use a,, a,', a," etc. What Do Definites Do That Indefinites Definitely Don't? 
b.  *(  X  x  )ip 
(nzeiner MUtter)~~(eine  POSTkarte schreiben)~~ 
In  the following tableaux  I use boldface for the constituent  that  is the head of  iP (I 
continue to use upper case letters for the head of an AD): 
Focus  Prominence:  The  final  constraint  I  borrow  from  Truckenbrodt  (1995)  is 
FOCLJ~PROMINENCE: 
- 
i:  NPNPV 
a. +  (NP)AD (NP v) AD 
b.  (NP)AD(NP v) AD 
(1  9)  FOCUSPROMINENCE  (FP) 
Focus is most prominent.9 
IPHR  ;  STRESSARC  ;  WRAPXP 
*! 
Space does not allow me to discuss the effects of FP with a wider variety of F-patterns, 
cf.  Biiring  (forthcoming), but  let  me  brie  illustrate  three  basic  cases:  Focus  on  a 
rightmost XP, focus on two XPs, and focus on a penultimate XP. 
If  the rightmost phrase in a clause is F-marked, the standard pattern (1  3) will arise, in 
compliance with all constraints discussed: 
The  same  prosodic  structure  emerges  if  two  XPs  are  focused.  One  of  them  will 
inevitably violate FP, but this will be unavoidable: In (a) below, (the AD containing) 
XP fails to become the head  of  iP, in  (b) (the prosodic  word  containing)  it  fails to 
become the head of AD, and in  (c) the same happens to YP. Which structure is chosen 
thus depends on STRESSARC  alone: 
The final and by far most interesting case arises if  a non-final  YP is focused. What we 
observe  is that  the non-final  YP receives the  nuclear  accent,  and  that  no  secondary 
accents can be on the XP(s) following YP: 
(20)  Wem hast  du  eine Postkarte geschrieben? -  Ich habe . . . 
Who have you n  postcard  written?  -I  have 
' As said, the most prominent prosodic constituent within a larger constituent is defined as the head of 
that constituent. The formal version of Fp is: If a is a prosodic constituent at level n which contains a 
syntactic node that is F-marked, a is the head of the prosodic category at level 11 + I  that contains a. a.  . . . meiner Mutter eine Postkarte geschrieben. 
my  n~other  a  postcard  written 
b.  # . . . meiner MUtter eine POSTkarte geschrieben. 
c.  # . . . meiner Mutter eine POSTkarte geschrieben. 
I interpret this to imply that we have one AD that spans from the left edge of the focus 
to the end of the sentencelip. This, obviously, is an imperfect prosodic structure. Why is 
it chosen? Note that in a case like this, STRESSARC,  FP and IPHR are in  con If  perfect 
ADS are  formed,  IPHR  and  FP  cannot  simultaneously  be  met.  Either  the  final  AD 
becomes the head of iP and thereby most prominent, as in (b), which violates FP (given 
that the focus sits in the penultimate AD); or the non-final  AD (the one containing the 
focus) becomes the head of iP, meeting FP but violating IPHR, as in (b'). Alternatively, 
ADF could be sacrificed, as in (a), with the benefit of reconciling IPHR and FP (because 
now the focus is within the rightmost AD). Evidently, this is what happens in German. 
The conclusion is that STRESSARC  must be outranked by IPHR and FP:" 
This  'destructuring'  effect of  non-final  foci has been  observed for various  languages, 
among  them  German  in  Uhmann  (1991:237ff),  where  a  similar  rationale  for  it  is 
offered,  and  Japanese  (see,  among  others,  Nagahara  1994,  Uechi  1998,  and  the 
references therein). The essentials of the analysis adopted here are due to Truckenbrodt 
(1995:ch.5),  where  it  is set in  the context of  a  broader  typology  of  focus-alignment 
effects. The fact that non-final  foci lead to marked prosodic structures is central to the 
explanation  of  focus-related  word  order  variation  in  Biiring  (forthcoming)  to  be 
presented  in  the next  subsection; it  has  also been  adopted for the analysis  of  focus- 
related word order variation in Spanish in GutiCrrez-Bravo (1999). 
In  the  remainder  of  this  paper  I  will  summarize  the  constraints  WRAPXP  and 
STRESSARC  as ADF (reminiscent of accent domain formation) in the tableaux, which is 
violated  whenever  an  AD contains  less  than  an  XP,  or  more  than  an  XP  plus  its 
predicate. 
(21)  abbreviatory convention: 
ADF =  def  STRESSARC,  WRAPXP 
STRESSARC  :  WRAPXP 
* 
* 
i:  XPFYP 
a. 3  (XP YP)AD 
b.  (XP)AD(YP)AO 
b.'  (XP)AD(YP)AD 
c.  (XP  YP)AD 
2.3.  Focus Related Word Order Variation 
IPHR  :  FP 
;  *! 
*! 
i  *! 
We just  saw that  focus on a non-rightmost  XP leads to  a prosodic  structure with  an 
'extra-large'  AD, namely one that extends from the beginning of the focused XP to the 
end of iP (here: the sentence). Only in this way can the focus be maximally prominent 
and be in the rightmost AD in iP. Notably, this extra-large AD could be avoided while 
10  I assume for the sake of this exposition that WRAPXP  is subordinated, too,  though this hasn't  been 
demonstrated. What Do Definites Do That Indefinites Definitely Don't? 
respecting all other constraints if XP and YP could be freely reordered (the use of  {. . .) 
in  the input specification of the following tableaux means that the input is unspecified 
for word order): 
This idea provides the basis of  an account of focus related word order variation: If  an 
XP is unfocused, having it in front of a focused one will provide for a perfect prosodic 
structure which is nonetheless in keeping with FP. 
This isn't quite German, however, because while German allows non-canonical word 
order in  such cases, it doesn't require it. To implement this, we go back to the lexico- 
syntactic constraints discussed  in  subsection 2.1  above and  summarized there as d-a 
('dative  before  accusative').  These  constraints  will  be  used  to  counter-balance  the 
effects  of  the  prosodic  constraints,  assuming  a  ranking  as  in  (22), where  prosodic 
constraints and lexico-syntactic constraints are tied:" 
(22)  IPHR, FP >> ADF  <<>> D-A 
ADF 
+! 
i:  {XPFYP) 
a.  (XP YP)AD 
b.  (XP)AO(YP)AO 
b.'  (XP)AO(YP)AD 
d. +  (XP)AD(YP) 
The effect of  this  tie  is  that  both  the prosodically  optimal  candidate and  the lexico- 
syntactic  candidate  are grammatical, in  other words:  optionality  (where the  two  are 
different, that  is).  To demonstrate  the  effects  of  this,  let  us  go  back  to  our  initial 
example (1), repeated here: 
IPHR ;  FP 
I  *! 
*!  : 
(23)  Wem hast du das Buch gegeben? 
'Who did you give the book (to)?' 
a.  Ich habe dem  SCHUler das Buch gegeben. 
I  have the-DAT  student  the book given 
b.  Ich habe das Buch dem  SCHUI~~  gegeben. 
I  have the  book the-DAT student  given. 
'I  gave the book to the student' 
As said earlier, we can think of such a tie as encoding two different grammars. Thus the 
tableau above abbreviates the two tableaux below, which present the resolution of the 
tie into the 'prosodic grammar' and the 'lexico-syntactic grammar', respectively: 
The alert reader will  have noticed that what is tied  here are not two constraints but rather two sub- 
hierarchies of constraints, which, it must be admitted, constitutes a significant deviation from what is 
normally considered an ordering or ranking. 
ADF  D-A 
* 
* 
i:  { datF  acc } 
a. -t  (DAT acc)A~, 
a.'  (DAT)AD(ACC)AO 
a,"  (DAT)AD(ACC)AD 
b. -t (ACC)AD(DAT)AD 
IPHR  1  FP 
i  *! 
*! i:  { datF acc ) 
a.  (DAT acc)~~, 
a.'  (DAT)AD(ACC)AD 
a."  (DAT)AD(ACC)AD 
b. 4  (ACC)AD(DAT)AD 
We thus have implemented the optional non-canonical  word order. And we derive that 
optionality emerges only if  the lexico-syntactically unmarked order yields an imperfect 
prosodic structure, compare (l)/(23) to (24), which corresponds to the second column in 
the very first table on page 1: 
(24)  Was hast du dem Schuler gegeben? 
What have you the student given 
a.  Ich habe dem Schuler das BUCH gegeben. 
I  have the  student  the book  given 
b.  #Ich habe das BUCH dem Schuler gegeben. 
IPHR  i  FP 
*! 
*! 
i:  { datF acc } 
a + (DAT act),, 
a.'  (DAT)AD(ACC)AD 
a."  (DAT)A~(ACC)A~ 
b.  (ACC)AD(DAT)AD 
Here, since the lexico-syntactically  unmarked dat-acc order also allows for a perfect 
prosodic phrasing, no word order variation is possible: 
IPHR  ;  FP 
*! 
* ! 
ADF 
*! 
ADF 
*! 
D-A 
* 
Our next task is to show why acc-datF  order is impossible if the accusative is indefinite. 
As  shown  above, this  cannot just  be  due to  a lexico-syntactic  constraint  that  wants 
indefinites  to  follow  definites.  I  argued  that  in  order  to  understand  what  kind  of 
constraint is operative here, we have to realize that the incrimated order is possible, but 
only  if  the indefinite  is generic. It is thus an effect of being non-generic,  rather than 
being  indefinite  per  se  that  we  observe  here.  Let  us  therefore  examine  the 
genericlexistential contrast more closely. 
D-A 
* 
i:  { dat~  acc ) 
a. + (DAT)AD(ACC)AD 
a.'  (dat ACC)AD 
b.  (ACC dat)~o 
b.'  (ACC)AD(DAT)AD 
3.  Generic and Existential Indefinites 
As announced  at the end of  section  1, I want to explore the idea that the domain  of 
existential closure, the nuclear scope, corresponds to a prosodic domain. As we saw in 
the previous section, a sentence consists of  a linear sequence of  accent domains (AD,) 
(AD2).  . . (AD,).  With respect to the mapping onto the tripartite structure, I propose that, 
IPHR  I  FP 
*! 
ADF  D-A 
* ! 
*!  * ! 
* What Do  Definites Do That Indefinites Definitely Don't? 
going from left  to  right, the mapping onto the nuclear scope can  start at any  accent 
domain  AD,  , and  then  continues until  the  end  of  the  sentence.  As  an  additional 
restriction, the nuclear scope must be left-aligned with an AD which contains a focus. 
Consider the abstract structure in  (25), which represents a sentence with four accent 
domains, the last two of  which contain foci. I will use  :3  to mark where the mapping 
onto the  nuclear  scope starts  (=the domain  of  existential  closure).  According  to  the 
above idea, (25a) and  (b) represent well-formed mappings, but  (2%)  and (d) do not, 
because in the latter, accent domains which do not contain a focus are mapped onto the 
nuclear scope: 
I will implement this as in (26): 
(26)  ALIGN  NUCLEAR  SCOPE  (ANs) 
The nuclear  scope consists of  complete accent domains, all  of  which  contain 
focus. 
On a speculative note, it is perhaps justified to think of  (26) as an iconicity constraint, 
whose objective it is to mark a domain of content, the nuclear scope, by aligning it with 
a  domain  of form,  ADS containing  pitch  accents. Be that  as  it  may, indefinites  are 
specified as either existential or generic in  the input, a specification which cannot be 
overriden, due to an undominated constraint Faith(3lG): 
(27)  FAITH(3lG) (F~G) 
An  indefinite  specified  as  existential  (generic)  in  the  input  is  interpreted 
existentially (generically) 
In the representations that follow I will use :3 as above in the candidates, and subscript 
indefinites  with 3 or G in the candidates  and the input. Viewed this way, (26) is an 
alignment constraint (because it seeks to align the nuclear scope with a focus), and (27) 
is an inputloutput faithfulness constraint (because it prohibits change of 3 to G and vice 
versa).  12 
(26), in  tandem with (27), will have two distinct effects: Existential indefinites will 
need to be in an AD that contains a focus (so that :3 can precede that AD), while generic 
12  Eventually it might be advantageous, however, to view 3/G  and  :3 as notational shorthands for aspects 
of the interpretation, not parts of the syntactic or prosodic representation. On this view, a candidate 
will consist of an interpretation alongside with prosodic and perhaps syntactic structure(s), and (26) as 
well as (27) are correspondence rules that hold between the different representations that make up a 
candidate (cf. Jackendoff (1997)). Inspired by this perspective 1 refrain from giving a constraint that 
prohibits existential NPs preceding the :s-boundary; there can be no existential indefinites outside of 
the nuclear scope, because being existential and being in the nuclear scope are one and the same thing. 
All there can be is an indefinite that was specified as existential in the input, but winds up generic in 
the output. indefinites need to be in an AD that precedes at least one AD containing a focus (so that 
:z can follow the indefinite while still preceding a focus-containing AD). To motivate 
this, it is instructive to study the genericlexistential contrast under circumstances where 
it does not interact with the other object-ordering constraints. Consider (28):" 
(28)  Wenn man in  die USA einreisen will,  muss man . . . 
if  one  into the  US  enter  wants, must one 
a.  . . . VORstrafen  ANgeben. 
previous convictions list 
b.  . . . VORstrafen angeben. 
'If  you want to enter the US, you have to list previous convictions.' 
These two sentences differ only in their prosodic shape; in (28a) we find two ADS, as 
witnessed by two accents (the latter of which is the most prominent one, due to PHR). 
It expresses the generic reading of this sentence, which happens to be true: If you travel 
to the US and you  have previous convictions, you  have to list them.  In  (28b) we find 
integration, i.e. object and verb form one AD whose head is the object, in  accordance 
with the principles discussed above. It expresses an existential reading, 'if you want to 
enter the US, there must be previous convictions for you  to  list',  which  is of  course 
false. 
Let us start by  deriving (28b), which is run-of-the-mill.  The prosodic constraints in 
ADF favor the integrated structure. F3g and ANS aren't involved here, since the sentence 
doesn't contain a generic NP, and since the indefinite is itself part of the focus (which is 
VP or  some higher  constituent)  (I will  henceforth leave out the AD subscript  in  the 
candidates for perspicuity; note that all parentheses in the candites represent ADS): 
What about  (28a)?  This  structure  will  be  the  optimal  realization  for  a  generic NP, 
provided that we rank F3g and ANS  higher than ADF: 
i:  ACC  ~.3  VF 
a  :3 (ACC3)(V) 
h  4  .2 (Arr2  V) 
" Note  that  most  of  the examples I present  in  this  sub-section involve focused  generic  indefinites. 
Notice the temptation to reduce the in of the genericlexistential  contrast to focus or familiarity along 
the following lines: Generic indefinites are prime candidates for staying unfocused, because they can 
he repeated in a discourse, in order to refer to the genus or kind they name, again and again, whereas 
an existential indefinite cannot be repeated  in order to refer to the same individual again (that's were 
you  use a definite instead). Repeated things  (generic indefinites  or definites) are unfocused, so we 
derive that generic indefinites patterns with definites. 
The cases of focused generics warn  us not to give in  to that temptation: Focused  generics behave 
different  from  focused  existentials, just  as  unfocused  generics  behave  different  from  unfocused 
cxistentials, as I will show later on. 
IPHR  FP  ;  F~G  ANS 
:*: 
:*/ 
i:  ACC ~,3  VF 
a. +  (ACCc):j(V) 
a  :j (ACCj)(V) 
b.  :3 (ACC3 v) 
b.'  (ACCG  :3 v) 
ADF  D-A 
*! 
JpHR  ;  FP  /  F~G  I  ANS 
/*  / 
1%  *!; 
;*  ;*!; 
:*  1  ;  *! 
ADF  D-A 
* 
* What Do Definites Do That Indefinites Definitely Don't? 
We have  thus  captured  the  connection  between  semantics  and  prosody  in  (28).  A 
generic  NP  will  force  separation  into  two  ADS, against  prosodic  constraints  (an 
observation made e.g. by Krifia (1999, sec.1.4.7)). An existential NP will integrate (as 
NPs  generally  prefer  to  do). Each  of  the  resulting  prosodic  patterns  is  the  optimal 
candidate  for  their  respective  NP-type.  There  is  a  one-to-one  correlation  between 
prosodic structure and reading. 
This correlation, however, is not always observed, because crucially, ANS  itself is not 
inviolable. Notice that formation of an object-only AD necessitates formation of a verb- 
only-AD. Since iP is right-headed, the verbal AD will bear the main prominence. This is 
fine in (28a), since the V is focus. It violates FP since the accusative, too, is focus but 
not most prominent within iP; but one violation of FP is unavoidable and thus not fatal. 
The alternative structure (28b) violates FP as well (this time on behalf of V), but looses 
out on Ans. This picture will change if V is not focused: 
(29)  Stimmt  es, daB man samtliche Knollchen  angeben muss?-  Das nicht, aber 
Is correct it  that one  all  parking tickets list  must? -  That not,  but 
man muss. . . 
one must 
a.  # . . . VORstrafen ANgeben. 
b.  ...  VORstrafen angeben. 
'Do you really have to list all your parking tickets? -  Not quite, but you have to 
list previous convictions' 
The former winning candidate, (29a), is unacceptable here. This is because it violates 
FP in making the non-focused  verb angeben, rather than  the focused  NP Vorstrafen 
prominent in iP. We predict the correct form (29b) if we rank ANS  lower than F3g: 
Note  incidentally  that  (29b)  is  optimal  for  the  same  F-pattern  with  an  existential 
indefinite object, too -  as in (28b) (the first tableau). The generic-existential contrast is 
thus prosodically neutralized in these narrow focus cases. 
It is interesting to note that the generic indefinites in  (28a) and (29b) bear stress, in 
the latter case even  main  stress. Data like these have been  noted  in  Biiring (1996:4, 
ex.(6)), and Eckardt (1996:60, ex (31), attributed to I.Kohlhof, p.c.), where it is also 
noticed  that  they  pose  serious  problems  for  focus-based  accounts  of  the 
generictexistential contrast such as Krifka (1995) and Eckardt (1996). It should also be 
noted  that  the present  analysis  is  not  committed  to  any  phrase-structural  difference 
between the sentences with different types of indefinites, as proposed in de Hoop (1992) 
and Diesing (1992). A thorough comparison to these theories is beyond the scope of the 
present investigation, however. 
It  is  quite  conceivable  that  a  similar  constraint-pattern  holds  for  English.  Since 
English is VO, the difference between (V)ao(0)Ao  and (V O)aD  does not result in a shift 
of  the nuclear accent, as it does  in  the German cases in  (28), and  is thus  less easily 
detectable. It has been  observed, though, that subject-integration,  i.e. forming a single 
i:  AccE3VF 
a.  (ACCc):s(V) 
b. -+  (ACCG  :3 v) 
ANS 
* 
IPHR  ;  FP  ;  F~G 
;  *!  ; 
ADF  D-A 
* AD out of a  subject and an  intransitive  verb, interacts  with  genericity.  Consider the 
following contrast from Halliday (1967), reported in Rooth (1996:273): 
(30)  a.  SHOES must be worn. 
b.  DOGS must be CARried. 
Rooth comments: 
"If you bring along no dog at all, you  obey the second regulation, but if you bring 
no shoes at all, you violate the first. If  you carry one dog and bring another on a 
leash, you violate the second regulation; but if  you wear one pair of  shoes and carry 
another pair in a shopping bag, you  obey the first." (Rooth 19962) 
It  should be easy to see that the English subject-verb pattern is entirely parallel to the 
object-verb patterns observed in the German examples in (28): 
(ARGUMENT predi~ate)~~  satisfies  ADF, is  compatible  with  ANS  if 
argument  is  existential,  but  violates  it  if 
argument is generic 
(ARGUMENT)AD(PREDICATE)~~  violates ADF, but satisfies ANS if  argument 
is generic 
In  fact, the  same relative ranking  of  ANS and  ADF would account for these English 
facts, too, even though there doubtlessly are more complications. That this parallelism 
might  not  be coincidental  is also suggested by the fact that  the same 'neutralization' 
observed in (29) above occurs in English: 
(31)  Hey, you've  got to carry your cat here. That's what the regulations  say! - No 
dude, ... 
a.  DOGS must be carried (, CATS can go on a LEASH). 
b.  #DOGS must be CARried 
The same reasoning applies here: The generic indefinite dogs in (31) wants to form its 
own AD, on behalf of ANS,  as the one in (30b). But then the rest of the sentence must 
form  an  AD,  too,  which  would  be  the  rightmost  one  and  therefore  receive  main 
prominence;  and  that  violates  the higher constraint FP.  The result is unacceptable as 
seen in (31b). Therefore, the sentence will be squeezed into one big AD as in (31a). 
Summing up, we have seen that generic indefinites, unlike existential ones, like to 
form an AD of their own. I have proposed to capture this by a constraint that regards the 
mapping between prosodic structure and interpretation which governs the 'cut-off point' 
for the domain  of existential closure, the nuclear scope. This constraint  will not only 
affect generic indefinites  (by forcing them to precede that point), but also existential 
indefinites (by forcing them  to follow it). With this constraint, we finally have all the 
pieces in place to return to the placement of  indefinites in double object constructions, 
and the Indefinite Puzzle in particular. What Do Definites Do That Indefinites Definitely Don't? 
4.  Indefinites In Double Object Constructions 
4.1.  Existential Indefinites in the Background: Solving the Indefinite 
Puzzle 
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  solve  the  Indefinite  Puzzle: Why  can't  an  unfocused 
indefinite precede a focused dative, where unfocused definite accusatives can? 
(32)  Wem hast du  daslein Buch gegeben? 
who  have you the/a  book  given 
a.  Ich habe das Buch dem ~CHuler  gegeben 
I  have  the book  the  student  given 
b.  *Ich habe ein Buch dem SCHUler gegeben 
I  have  a  book  the  student  given 
Recall that an unfocused accusative precedes the dative to improve prosodic structure: 
(DATF  acc V)AD  (lexico-syntactically unmarked) 
(ACC)AD(DATF  V)AO  (prosodically unmarked) 
To understand  the peculiar behavior of  indejt'nite accusatives, or existential  indefinite 
accusatives, to be precise, note that the acc-dat-structure provides no basis for properly 
inserting  the  :3-boundary in  that  case. Inserting  it  in  front  of  the  accusative  would 
violate ANS (because the AD following it doesn't contain a focus), inserting it after the 
accusative would leave the indefinite accusative without existential force, violating F9g. 
The following tableau illustrates this: 
We have thus  solved the Indefinite  Puzzle:  Using acc-dat order to improve prosody 
makes it impossible to get an existential reading for the accusative indefinite. And the 
one candidate which  displays acc-dat order and doesn't  violate any of the indefinite- 
related constraints, (b."),  is neither lexico-syntactically nor prosodically  unmarked; it 
violates both ADF and D-A. 
Let me review the logic of this account once more. It does not say that an  existential 
indefinite generally has to follow the focus; nor does it say that an existential indefinite 
accusative cannot occur with acc-dat order. It merely says that an existential indefinite 
has to form an AD with  a focus, and that the order of the indefinite and the focused 
argument within  that  AD  will  be  determined  by  the  lexico-syntactic  constraints - 
ANIMACY,  DATIVE  and DEF'INITENESS  -  alone, which, in the example above, all favor 
the outcome dat-acc. The remainder of  this subsection is devoted to demontrating that 
this is indeed the correct generalization. 
i:  { Acc3  DATF  V ] 
(2)  a. -+  :3 (DAT accj v) 
(32)  b.  :3 (ACC3)(DAT V) 
b.'  (ACCG):~(DAT  V) 
b."  :3 (acc3 DAT v) 
IPHR  /  FP  F~G 
:  *! 
ANS 
*! 
ADF  D-A 
* 
* 
* 
*!  * ! First, an existential indefinite can precede the focus, if that is what the lexico-syntactic 
constraints  favor.  Consider (33), in  which  we have  an  unfocused  existential  dative. 
DEFINITENESS  doesn't  apply, and both DATIVE  and ANIMACY  favor dat-ucc order, even 
though  that  implies that  the unfocused indefinite precedes  the focus. And indeed  the 
opposite order in (33b) sounds rather awkward: 
(33)  Obwohl  der Verkauf von Schusswaffen an Minderjahrige verboten  ist, 
although the  selling  of  guns  to  minors  prohibited is 
habenSieam28.11.. . . 
have  you on 11/28 
a.  . . . einer Minderjahrigen eine GASpistole verkauft. 
a  minor  a  gas gun  sold 
b.  #. . . eine GASpistole einer Minderjahrigen verkauft. 
a  gas gun  a  minor sold 
Let us next see what happens if  two lexico-syntactic constraints con In (34), ANIMACY 
isn't relevant, and DATIVE  and DEFINITENESS pull in opposite directions. It seems to me 
that the acc-dat order in (34b) is much better than in  the previous example: 
(34)  (Rainer saw a girl at a party we went to, who he wants to see again. He expects 
me to know  her name, because he saw me introduce her to an Italian looking 
guy, so he asks:) 
Wen hast  du  einem  Italiener vorgestellt? 
Who  have .you  an-DAT  Italian  introduced 
a.  Ich habe einem Italiener MARION vorgestellt. 
I  have an-DAT Italian  Marion  introduced 
b.  Ich habe MARION einem Italiener vorgestellt. 
I  have Marion  an-DAT Italian  introduced 
Is this expected under the present account? If DATIVE  strictly outranked DEFINITENESS, 
only  (34a)  should be  grammatical. Recall  from  subsection  2.1, though,  that  in  the 
original conception in Miiller (1998), the lexico-syntactic constraints derive degradation 
rather than  ungrammaticality.  Under that  assumption,  (34b) would  be  degraded, but 
much  better  than  any  of  the  examples  to  which  I  gave  a  #  above.  The candidate 
corresponding to that sentence is marked by Y in the tableau below: 
Note  then  that  (34b) constitutes a (rather rare  and  curious) case in  which  a focused 
accusative  can  precede  an  unfocused  dative.  As  just  discussed, the  present  system 
predicts this, given that accent domain formation isn't relevant  in these cases, because 
78 
ADF  D-A 
*  DEF 
DEF 
DEF 
*  DAT 
DAT 
i:  { ACCF  DAT~  V ] 
a. + :3(dat3 ACC v) 
a,'  (dat~):j(ACC  v) 
a."  :j(dat3)(ACC v) 
a.  Y  :3 (ACCF  dat3 v) 
a,'  :3 (acc)(DAT3 v) 
IPHR  .  FP  .  F3c 
:  *! 
j  *!  i 
ANS 
* ! What Do Definites Do That Indefinites Definitely Don't'! 
the non-focused NP is an existential indefinite.14 It likewise predicts the sharp contrast 
to the cases of acc~  dat in which the dative is definite and could thus form its own AD: 
(35)  Peter weigert sich, mir seine Schwester vorzustellen! Dabei habe ich 
Peter re$~ses  selfme-DAT  his sister to introduce! Albeit have I 
a.  . . . dem Blodmann MArion v~r~estellt.'~ 
the-DAT  jerk  Marion introduced 
b.  #. . .  MArion dem Blodmann vorgestellt. 
Marion the-DAT  jerk introduced 
To sum up, an unfocused existential indefinite has to form an AD with the focus. This 
violates ADF,  but it is necessary to meet the higher constraints F~G  and ANS.  Therefore, 
prosodic considerations will not play a role in  choosing between  acc-dat and dat-ace 
order; only lexico-syntactic-constraints will. In standard cases as Lenerz' (2), the lexico- 
syntactic-constraints  will  unanimously  favor  dat-acc, accounting  for  the  Indefinite 
Puzzle. In other cases, like (34), the lexico-syntactic constraints con with each other and 
a certain degree of word order freedom is predicted. 
4.2.  Generic Indefinites 
In  this  subsection  and  the next I will  look  at those cases which  are  not  part  of  the 
Indefinite Puzzle, but for which the system developed so far makes predictions. Let us 
start by checking how the constraints formulated so far account for generic indefinites 
in double object constructions. 
4.2.1.  Generics Accusatives that Obligatorily Precede Datives 
A  generic  indefinite,  unlike  the  existential  one  in  (2), can  precede  a  focused  co- 
argument and thus allow for a perfect prosodic structure, cf. (36a). In fact, this ace-dat 
order is obligatory here, as (36b) shows: 
(36)  Bisher haben wir Ladendiebe nicht gemeldet, aber nach  der neuen Regelung ... 
so far  have  we shopliftings not  reported but according to the new regulation 
a.  . . . mussen wir Ladendiebe dem GesCHAFT~fuhrer  melden. 
must  we  shoplifters  the  manager  report 
b.  #. . .  mussen wir dem Ge~c~~~~Sfuhrer  Ladendiebe melden. 
must  we the  manager  shoplifters  report 
'So  far we didn't  report  shoplifters but  according to  the new  regulations, we 
have to report shoplifters to the manager' 
This behavior is predicted, given that for a generic interpretation to obtain, the indefinite 
must be in  the restrictive  clause, i.e. preceding  the  :3-boundary. The  :3 in  turn  must 
14  They  present  serious  challenges  for  both  phrase-structure  and  focus~ackgroundstructure  based 
accounts of the genericlexistential distinction, though, as well  as to  accounts which  directly relate 
word order variation to focusing. 
IS  To see that dem Bltjd~nann,  'the jerk', is not focused in this context, consider a sentence in which its 
accent would be nuclear, such as a continuation like . . . ~rnd  trofzden~  rnag  ich den Blodmann ('. . . 
and still I like the jerk'); the nuclear accent has to sit on mag, absolutely not on Blodmann. precede an AD containing the focus, which  means  that the indefinite must precede  a 
focus: 
The exact same pattern obtains if the generic indefinite is itself focused, too: 
(37)  Bisher haben wir Ladendiebstahle nicht gemeldet, aber ab sofort werden wir . . . 
so  far  have  we shopliftings  not  reported,  but as of now  will  we 
a.  . . .  WiederHOlungstater der PoliZEI melden. 
repeat offenders  the police  report 
b.  #. . . der PoliZEI WiederHOlungstater melden. 
the police  repeat offenders  report 
'So  far  we  didn't  report  shopliftings,  but  as  of  now  we  will  report  repeat 
offenders to the police' 
i:  ACCCDATFV 
a. + (ACCc):3(DAT  v) 
b.  (DAT accc :3 v) 
b.'  (DAT) (ACCc):j(V) 
This is again as expected, given that the indefinite needs to get the :g between itself and 
the end of  the sentence (recall  from  the discussion of  cases like (25a) above that  :3 
doesn't  need to precede every AD containing a focus, but merely that it precedes only 
such ADS). This example also shows that optimization of prosodic structure in (36) was 
a welcome  side-effect, but  not the driving force behind the obligatoriness  of  ace-dat 
order, for there is a structure for the unacceptable (37b), namely (b.'), whose prosodic 
structure is perfect, too. But it is ungrammatical, due to the violation of F3G: 
PHR  j  FP  '  F~G 
.  ~  1  *!  i 
ANS 
*! 
* 
ADF  D-A 
* 
* 
* 
4.2.2.  Optional Acc-Dat Order with Generic Indefinites 
In  the examples discussed  in  the previous subsection, there were two constraints that 
favored  ace-dat order; ADF, since the  dative  was  narrow  focus and thus  should  be 
sentence-final  (modulo the  verb, that  is), and ANsIF~G,  since the  generic accusative 
must have a prosodic phrase boundary following it (for : 9 to align with), which means 
it has to precede the focus. Note that the former is a weak motivation, since ADF can be 
overruled by the lexico-syntactic constraints on one resolution of the tie. It is the latter 
motivation that is responsible for the obligatoriness of  ace-dat order, because ANS and 
F~G  dominate the lexico-syntactic constraints. The prediction is thus that if we manage 
to  'switch  off'  ANS and F~G,  we would  observe optionality between  the two orders 
again. This predication is borne out: If  the generic has a chance to form an AD on  its 
own while following its co-argument, both word orders are possible: 
ADF  D-A 
* 
ANS 
*! 
* 
i:  Acc,, DATF  V 
a. -t  (ACC&(DAT  v) 
b.  (DAT) (ACCG  :3 V) 
b.'  (DAT):3(ACC3  v) 
b."  (DAT) (ACCc):j(V) 
PHR  (  FP  j  F~G 
:  *! 
;  *!  : What Do Definites Do That Indefinites Definitely Don't? 
(38)  Damit eine Seite wie diese  funktioniert, ist es wichtig . . . 
so that a  page like  this one functions  is  it important 
a.  . . . dass man verALtete LINKS dem WEBmaster meldet. 
that one  outdated  links  the  web-master reports 
b.  . . . dass man dem WEBmaster verALtete LINKS MELdet. 
that one  the  web-master outdated  links  reports 
'For a page like this to work it is important that you  report outdated links to the 
web-master.' 
The present account predicts this, given that the generic accusative in (3%)  can have the 
:g  following it and preceding a focus (namely the verb), unlike in (37b), where the verb 
is unfocused (see the structure in the tableau below). While this structure violates ADF 
(the  verb  doesn't  integrate  with  its  adjacent  argument), it  is  optimal  under  lexico- 
syntactic considerations. Acc-dat order, on the other hand, allows for optimal prosody at 
the expense of lexico-syntactic markedness, so candidate (a) is grammatical, too, just as 
in (36) and (37) above: 
In the system developed here, the word order freedom in (38) arises from the same tie 
known from double object constructions that do not involve generic NPs, namely that 
between  a  perfect  prosodic  structure  (generic)(nongeneric verb)  and  a  lexico- 
syntactically unmarked structure (dative)(accusutive)(verb).  The prediction, then, is that 
like in the simple cases, the optionality in  word order should disappear if prosody  and 
lexico-syntax favor the same outcome. Again, this seems to be a correct prediction: 
i:  ACCG,F  DATF  V 
a. + (ACCG):3(DAT  v) 
a,'  (ACCc):g(DAT) (V) 
b. -t (DAT) (ACCG):~(V) 
b.'  (DAT) (ACCG  :3 v) 
b."  (DAT):3(ACC3 v) 
(39)  Damit eine Seite wie diese  funktioniert, ist es wichtig . . . 
so that a  page  like this one functions  is  it important 
a.  . . . dass man ERSTbenutzern die NUTzungsrechte erklart. 
that  one novices-DAT  the  terms of use  explains 
b.  #. . .  dass man die NUTzungsrechte ERSTbenutzern ~~KLART. 
that one  the  terms of  use  novices-DAT  explains 
'For a page like this to work it is important that you explain the terms of use to 
first time users.' 
This result follows in the same manner: The optimal structure (39a) meets both ADF and 
DAT,  while the alternative order yields (39b), which violates both: 
IPHR  ;  FP  F3c 
**  1 
i  **  i 
**  \ 
**  i 
i  **  1  *! 
ANS 
*! 
ADF  D-A 
* 
*!  * ! 
* 
ADF  D-A 
* !  *! 
* 
i:  ACCF  DATF,G  VF 
a. 4 (DAT):2(ACC3 v) 
b.  (ACC) (DAT&(V) 
b.'  (ACC) (DATG  :3 V) 
IpHR  .  FP  /  F3c 
.  ** 
**  i 
i  **  1 
ANS 
*! 4.3.  Existential Indefinites in Focus 
I close this section with a look at existential indefinites in focus. This is a rather boring 
endeavor, because these behave just like definites in focus: The reason is that a focused 
indefinite can always form an AD without running the risk of  violating FP, and : 9 can 
then precede that AD in  keeping with Ans, and thus guarantee an existential reading. 
Since a focused accusative wouldn't precede a dative for prosodic reasons, we expect to 
see focused existential indefinites wherever the lexico-syntactic constraints prefer them 
to  be.  The  examples  below  illustrate  two  such  cases.  In  (40)  all  lexico-syntactic- 
constraints favor the dat-acc order, which, accordingly, is the only one possible: 
(40)  Peter wurde fiir schuldig befunden, . . . 
Peter was  for  guilty  found 
a.  . . . einem KolLEgen / seinem CHEF eine BOMbe geschickt zu haben. 
a-DAT  colleague /  his-DAT boss  n  bomb  send  to have 
b.  #. . . eine BOMbe einem KolLEgen / seinem CHEF geschickt zu haben. 
a  bomb  a-DAT colleague /  his-DAT boss  send  to have 
'Peter was found guilty to have send a colleague / his boss a bomb.' 
Example (41) is one of  the sort I didn't  consider much  in this paper; DAT and ANIM 
conflict (with DEF, presumably irrelevantly, siding with DAT); since ADF is neutral on 
the  issue,  the  ace-dat order,  as  preferred  by  the  highest  lexico-syntactic  constraint 
Anim, wins: 
(41)  Die Sache wurde  kriminell, als  sie . . . 
the  thing  became criminal  when they 
a.  . . .  einen GeFANgenen dem  ~~gendetektortest  aussetzen wollten. 
a-Acc prisoner  the-DAT lie detector test  expose  wanted 
b.  #. . . dem  Liigendetektortest einen GeFANgenen aussetzen wollten. 
the-DAT lie detector test  a-ACC prisoner  expose  wanted 
'The whole thing got criminal when they wanted to expose a prisoner to the lie 
detector test.' 
We see, thus, that the definitelindefinite  distinction  is void  if  the pertinent  NP is in 
focus. 
i:  AcC~,3,+an  DATF.~,.  an VF 
a. 4  :3 (ACC3.+,") (DATa,.,,  V) 
b.  13  (DATg.-an) (ACC3,+an  v) 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper explored in  what ways the definintelindefinite distinction in  word order in 
the  German  Mittelfeld.  I  have  found  three  distinct  factors  to  be  relevant,  the 
morphosyntax, focussing, and interpretation. The analysis developed  models  each  of 
them  and  shows  how  they  interact.  Particular  attention  was  devoted  to  the 
interpretation-related  constraints  that  regulate  the  formal  realization  of  the 
IPHR  FP  /  F~G 
** 
j  **  ! 
ANS  ADF  D-A 
DAT 
ANIM ! What Do Definites Do That Indefinites Definitely Don't? 
genericlexistential distinction. I took as my starting point a simple generalization about 
the phrasing-behavior of generic vs. existential indefinites, which was motivated outside 
the  realm  of  double  object  constructions;  I  then  demonstrated  how  that  very 
generalization, when combined with a theory of stress-related word order variation such 
as  that  of  Biiring  (forthcoming),  yields  a  wide  range  of  correct  predications  about 
double object constructions. 
I have tried to control for the various parameters such as focuslgivenness, animacy, 
case, definiteness etc. as scrupulously as I could, and I believe the picture presented in 
this paper to have a fine-grainedness and accuracy that exceeds that of previous studies. 
Nonetheless,  I  could  only  present  here  a  fraction  of  the  different  combinations  of 
parameters that the theory  makes predictions for (about 430,  I believe),  and I won't 
pretend to have been able to reliably test all the others in the privacy of my office. Also, 
while I've been careful to steer clear of some potentially relevant factors such as scopal 
dependencies or more complex F-patterns within  the argument NPs, I have no doubt 
that there are others which make themselves felt in the examples discussed in this paper 
and lead me to wrong interpretations of my findings (I can't shake off the feeling, for 
example, that  some of  the more complex double object constructions may  involve a 
more  articulated  inventory  of  information  structural  categories  than  just  focus  and 
background;  I  resisted  the  temptation  of  introducing  any  further  features  such  as 
'contrast'  or  'topic',  because in  the absence of  clear criteria to test those, they  would 
amount to no more than arbitrary features used to trigger certain word order anomalies). 
More work is waiting to be done. 
Accepting  the conclusion  drawn  in  the present paper, that prosody,  morphosyntax 
and semantics are all irreducible forces in the ordering of arguments, it is worthwhile to 
note that  all three of  them  pull  in  the same direction  in  the majority  of  cases, often 
masking one another; often times, definites are in  the background and indefinites are 
focused, and if  an indefinite isn't focused, that is often because it is generic and as such 
can be repeated.  In  other words, the constraints regularly  corzverge. We could easily 
imagine  and  construct  a  grammar  in  which  the  prosody  wants  foci  to  follow  the 
background  (as in  German), but  in  which,  say, the background  ADS, rather  than  the 
focus ADS, are mapped onto the nuclear scope. Such a grammar would produce a very 
different language from German, presumably one without a clear rule of thumb such as 
'indefinites tend to follow definites', i.e. without convergence of the constraints. 
To take another example, it seems likewise  'natural'  that definiteness and animacy 
should converge in that sense, assuming that we speak about humans and animals more 
often than  we do about  inanimate things,  and  given that  that  which  we speak about 
would generally be encoded as a definite. Formal grammars such as the one used in the 
present paper do not offer an explanation for this convergence. To the extend that such 
convergences are common in grammars, they perhaps hint at something like 'usability': 
A language (as perhaps most systems) is simply more stable and usable if  little changes 
don't yield big effects, that is, in which principles, often redundantly, converge. This is 
at least a conceivable alternative to a reductionist (or 'minimalist')  approach, according 
to  which  convergence must be  attributed  to  one grammar-internal  force;  and, if  the 
findings of this paper are on the right track, it is perhaps the empirically more accurate 
one. Daniel Buring 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper is concerned with semantic noun phrase typology, focusing on the question 
of how to draw fine-grained distinctions necessary for an accurate account of  natural 
language  phenomena.  In  the  extensive  literature  on  this  topic, the  most  commonly 
encountered parameters of classification concern the semantic type of  the denotation of 
the  noun  phrase,  the  familiarity  or novelty  of  its  referent,  the  quantificationallnon- 
quantificational distinction (connected to the weaklstrong dichotomy), as well as, more 
recently,  the  question  of  whether  the  noun  phrase  is  choice-functional  or  not  (see 
Reinhart  1997, Winter  1997, Kratzer  1998, Matthewson  1999). In  the discussion  that 
follows I will attempt to make the following general points: (i) phenomena involving 
the  behavior of  noun  phrases  both  within  and  across languages  point  to  the need  of 
establishing further distinctions that are too fine-grained to be caught in the net of  these 
typologies; (ii) some of the relevant distinctions can be captured in terms of conditions 
on assignment functions; (iii) distribution and scopal peculiarities of  noun phrases may 
result  from  constraints  they  impose on  the  way  variables  they  introduce  are  to  be 
assigned values. 
Section 2 reviews the typology of definite noun phrases introduced in Farkas 2000 
and the way it provides support for the general points above. Section 3 examines some 
of the problems raised by recognizing the rich variety of  'indefinite'  noun phrases found 
in  natural  language and by  attempting to capture their distribution  and  interpretation. 
Common  to  the typologies  discussed  in  the  two  sections  is  the  issue  of  marking 
different types of  variation in the interpretation of  a noun phrase.  In  the light of this 
discussion,  specificity  turns  out  to  be  an  epiphenomenon  connected  to  a  family  of 
distinctions that are marked differently in different languages. 
2.  Definiteness and determinacy of reference 
Definite pronouns,  proper  names  and  definite  descriptions,  i.e., DPs whose  D  is  a 
definite article, behave in many respects as a natural class within and across languages, 
which is why they are often grouped together under the label of  'semantically definite 
DPs'. On the other hand, within the rich realm of semantically indefinite DPs various 
distinctions in terms of  an  ill-defined notion  of  specificity have been  drawn, among 
which  that  between  overt or covert partitives  and  non-partitive  indefinites.  It  is  also 
well-known that 'specific'  indefinite DPs in general, and partitive DPs in particular, are 
closer to  semantically definite  DPs than  their non-specific  or non-partitive  sisters. A 
The paper is submitted to a special issue of "Theoretical Linguistics",  edited by Klaus van Heusinger 
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ZAS Papers in Linguistics 23, 2001, 85-10] good  illustration  of  this  ambivalence  is  found  in  the  morphology  of  the  partitive 
Determiner  in  Romanian.  The partitive  article  in  this  language  is  composed  of  the 
masculine singular (unmarked) form of the indefinite article, un, suffixed by the definite 
article, which bears the inflections of gender and number characteristic for Determiners 
in this language: 
(I)  a.  Unul din studenti a plecat. 
a.Def.Sg.Masc from students has left. 
One of the students left. 
b.  Una din fete a plecat. 
a.Def.Sg.Fem girls has left 
One of the girls left. 
c.  Unii studenli au plecat. 
a.Def.PI.Masc students have left 
Some of the students left. 
d.  Unele fete au plecat. 
a.Def.Pl.Fem girls have left 
Some of the girls have left. 
Evidence for the necessity  of  distinguishing between  various subtypes of  definites and 
indefinites is furnished by data concerning Direct Object Marking, the phenomenon of 
morphologically  marking a certain subclass of  direct objects. Aissen 2001 shows that 
with  respect  to  this phenomenon  DPs form the hierarchy  in  (2) (where I substituted 
Partitive for Aissen's Specific). 
(2)  Personal Pronoun > Proper Name > Definite > Partitive 
Once the relevance of this hierarchy is accepted, a question that arises is what semantic 
parameter is responsible for it. The answer suggested in Farkas 2000 is that what is at 
issue here is the question  of  the latitude the DP allows with respect to the choice of 
value for the discourse referent it introduces. In  the rest of this section I review the gist 
of the earlier proposal concerning the typology of definites so as to have a starting point 
for the discussion of indefinites in the next section, which expands the left hand side of 
the hierarchy. 
Crucial to making the proposal more precise is the assumption that argumental DPs 
(i.e., DPs in argument, rather than predicative positions) introduce discourse referents 
(aka variables), whose possible value is constrained by the information contained in the 
DP. Within  the framework of D(iscourse) R(epresentation) T(heory),  this amounts to 
the claim that such DPs contribute a variable and some condition on that variable. The 
process  of  interpretation  of  semantic  structure  involves  assigning  values  to  these 
variables by  assignment  functions, functions that  have to  meet  the conditions  in  the 
DRT. One linguistically relevant DP typology, I claim, concerns the types of conditions 
induced  by  various  DPs.  Thus, DPs with  descriptive  content  impose  a  predicative 
condition,  i.e.,  a  condition requiring  the  value  of  the  variable  to meet the property 
expressed by the description. The condition contributed by pronouns and proper names 
is of an essentially different type. A higher level classification concerns the details of Specificity Distinctions 
how variables are given values. The latter interacts with the former, since the conditions 
on a variable constrain its valuation. 
The essence of the proposal in Farkas 2000 is that the DP types that form the stations 
of  (2)  differ  with  respect  to  the  type  of  condition  they  impose  on  their  discourse 
referent, which, in turn, has repercussions concerning the degree of latitude in choice of 
value for the discourse referent in question. It is this latter parameter that is crucial for 
semantic (in)definiteness. 
Common to pronouns and proper names is that they do not have descriptive content. 
The condition  they contribute equates the value to be  assigned to  their  variable  with 
another value.  In DRT terms, the construction  rule triggered by  the use of  pronouns 
involves the introduction  of  a discourse  referent  x,,  and an  equative condition of  the 
form x,.  = x,, ,  where x,  must be a discourse referent within  the domain of the input 
DRS.  This  discourse  referent  is  contributed  by  the  antecedent,  in  case  there  is  a 
linguistic  antecedent, or  by  the  context, in  the  case  of  deictic  pronouns.  The  new 
discourse referent x,,. requires an update of the input assignment function relative to it; 
the equative condition  requires the value the updated function f' assigns to x,,  to  be 
whatever the input function f assigned to x,.  Pronouns are felicitously used only in case 
the input DRS K provides an appropriate variable for the discourse referent introduced 
by  the pronoun to be equated with. In  the absence of  such a variable the construction 
rule triggered by the use of the pronoun cannot be completed. 
The condition supplied by proper names is also equative, though of  a different type. 
Following Kripke 1972, I assume that proper names refer rigidly relative to the world in 
which they are used. The name Sarah used  in  an utterance  in  w refers rigidly  to the 
individual Sarah names in w, independently of the linguistic context in which the name 
is used.  One way  of  implementing this proposal is to assume as part  of  the model  a 
(partial) function N from worlds  and names to  individuals in  the worlds in  question. 
Proper names then introduce a variable, x,,. and an equative condition of the form in (3), 
(3)  x,  = N,  (Name) 
requiring the updated evaluation function f' to assign to x,,,  the value N assigns to the 
proper name in  question  in  w, the world  in  which  the discourse  occurs. The special 
rigidity of  proper names consists in  the fact that their reference  is determined by the 
world  in  which  they  are  used  and  is  unaffected  by  modal  parameters  within  their 
linguistic context. 
Descriptions, i.e., DPs with an NP constituent headed by a lexical N, are essentially 
different in that they contribute a restriction requiring the value assigned to the variable 
they  introduce to be an  element  of  the set denoted by  the NP (or, if  you  prefer, an 
element of the set whose characteristic function is denoted by the NP). I assume then 
that descriptions introduce a variable x,,  and a requirement of the form in  (4), 
where A is the set denoted by the descriptive content of  the description.' I chose this 
representation  here rather  than  the more customary  P(x,.),  where P  is the  predicate 
contributed by the descriptive content, in order to highlight the similarity of this view of 
I  I am ignoring intensionality issues here. They would be relevant to the question of the modal index of 
the description, which determines the world or worlds in which the value of x,,, is to fit it. descriptions  to that of treating them as choice functions from A to an element  of  A, 
where A is given by the interpretation of the descriptive content. In what follows, the set 
A denoted by the descriptive condition is referred to as the value set because it provides 
the  set  from which  the  values  of  the variable  introduced by  the  description  may  be 
chosen. The type of condition illustrated in (4) will be referred to as predicative because 
in  effect  it  predicates  the  description  of  the  value  to  be  assigned  to  the  discourse 
referent. 
Following uniqueness-based  accounts  of  definiteness,  and  in  particular,  Hawkins 
1991,  Farkas  2000  suggests  that  the  definitetindefinite  distinction  in  the  case  of 
descriptions involves the question of  whether the value set allows a choice of  value or 
not, in the given context. The difference between definite and indefinite descriptions is 
that  in  the case  of  the former there  should be  no  choice with  respect  to  the  value 
assigned to the variable. The 'no-choice'  situation signaled by the definite article may 
arise either because the description identifies a singleton set relative to the model (as in 
the  case  of  descriptions  such  as  the  present  Queen  of  England), or  because  the 
semantics  of  the  description  ensures  that  the  set  is  a  singleton  (as  in  the  case  of 
superlatives), or, as in most cases, because within the context (i.e., within the domain of 
the input DRS) there is a singleton set A that serves as value set. This latter situation 
obtains  if  there  is  a single discourse referent  that  fits the description  in  the relevant 
domain, or, in case there are more, a single entity can be identified as most salient.'  In 
effect then, the 'no choice' condition can be met relative to the domain of the model, the 
domain of  the input DRS or the subset of the domain of the input DRS containing the 
salient discourse referents in the context. I will assume that the value set relevant to the 
interpretation of a description may be restricted to that of the input DRS or to the salient 
subdomain of the input DRS, in a parallel way to the type of domain restriction needed 
to account for the interpretation of quantifiers.' 
In  order to  capture the  notion of  semantic definiteness,  and  therefore in  order to 
capture what is common to proper names, definite pronouns and definite descriptions, 
Farkas 2000 introduces the notion  of determined  reference. Assuming  K is the input 
DRS to K' and assuming x is new in K' relative to K, x has determined reference iff for 
every function f that embeds K there is a unique way of updating f relative to x so as to 
satisfy K'. More formally, let GM(K)  and GH(K') be the set of  assignments that embed 
K and K'  in M respectively, such that every g'  E GM  (K') is an update of  some g E 
GM(K),  and let Dom(K) and Dom(K') be the set of variables in the universe of K and K' 
re~~ectively.~  The notion of determined reference can then be defined as in (5). 
(5)  Let x be in Dom(K') but not in Dom(K). 
The variable x has determined reference if  for every g', g"  such  that g', g"  E 
Gh,(K') and g'  and g"  update the same g E GM(K),  g'(x) = g"(x). 
According to (5), x is a variable that has determined reference if for every g that verifies 
K, there is  only one way  of updating  it relative to x so as to verify  K'.  Determined 
See Heusinger 2000 for a detailed discussion of how salience is established in discourse. Heusinger's 
approach is compatible with the present suggestions. 
3  Plural definite descriptions can be given an analogous treatment assuming that plural DPs denote sets 
of groups. The definite determiner in this case requires there to be a singleton such set whose element 
is meant as the value of the referent of the DP.  '  A function g' updates a function g if g' agrees with g on all assignment of values for the variables that 
are in the domain of g. Specificity Distinctions 
reference is defined in  dynamic terms: what matters is that  there should be  a unique 
value  for  the  relevant  variable  at  the  time  of  the  update.  The  dynamic  nature  of 
interpretation is crucially used here to capture the determined reference of pronouns and 
definite descriptions  whose  antecedents are indefinite or bound  by  a quantifier  other 
than  the existential. Thus, there may be many  embeddings of  (6a) that  differ on  the 
value they assign to the variable contributed by the italicized indefinite, but if  (6b) is the 
continuation of (6a), the definite description or pronoun will have determined reference: 
for every way of embedding the input DRS, there is a single value that can be assigned 
to the variable contributed by the definite so as to meet the conditions contributed by 
((37). 
(6)  a.  A student came in. 
b.  He/The student sat down. 
We can now characterize the definite article as a signal of  determined reference. The 
valuation property it signals is that in going from K to K' there is no choice relative to 
the value to be assigned to the variable introduced by the DP. 
Common to DPs involving a lexically headed NP is that they introduce predicative 
conditions. Using the definite article signals that the variable has determined reference. 
In  the case of descriptions, this amounts to requiring the appropriately restricted value 
set to be  a singleton. Following Hawkins  1991, I assume that DPs with  the indefinite 
article  lack  this  requirement.  Whether  we  want  to  encode  this  difference  between 
definite and indefinite descriptions at the level of semantic representation or whether we 
want to keep the distinction  as a requirement on the properties of the transition  from 
input DRS  to  output DRS is  immaterial for present  concerns. If  the former route is 
chosen,  we  can  differentiate  variables  with  determined  reference  by  having  them 
preceded  by  an  exclamation  mark.  The  variables  introduced  by  proper  names  and 
definite pronouns will always be of the form !x,,, while those contributed by descriptions 
will  be  of  this form when  the definite article is  used, but  not  in the presence of  the 
indefinite  article.  Assuming  that  the  use  of  the  definite  article  signals  determined 
reference  rather  than  the  fact  that  the  value  set is  a  singleton  has  the  advantage  of 
allowing  a  unitary  account  of  definite  article  use  with  proper  names  and  definite 
descriptions  in  the  languages  or dialects that  allow  (or require)  articles  with  proper 
names. 
The basic  difference between  proper  names  and  pronouns  on  the  one hand,  and 
definite  descriptions  on  the  other  is  that  the  former  type  of  noun  phrases  have 
determined  reference  in  virtue  of  the  type  of  condition  they  contribute,  while 
descriptions  have determined  or non-determined  reference depending on  whether  the 
predicative condition they contribute identifies a singleton set or not. 
Overt partitives are special in that in their case the value set is established by the DP 
argument of the partitive preposition, which we will refer to as the domain DP. This DP 
must introduce a 'plural'  discourse referent (i.e., a discourse referent whose value must 
be a group-level entity). The value of the discourse referent of the partitive DP must be 
chosen from among the elements of this group. The condition they contribute is of the 
form in (7), where A is the discourse referent  contributed by the domain DP. Because the domain 
DP has to refer to a group-level entity with more than one element, partitives are unlike 
definites in that they do not have determined reference. What distinguishes them from 
ordinary indefinites, however, is that a partitive condition is formally more restrictive 
than  a predicative  condition:  it restricts the value domain to the elements of  a group 
denoted by an already restricted variable. As a result, partitives must refer  within  the 
universe of discourse while indefinites do not have  Because of the type of condition 
partitives contribute they must refer within the universe of discourse, while indefinites 
do not have to. 
Ordinary indefinites, which in English are preceded in the singular by the indefinite 
article a(n),  are underspecified  with respect to determinacy of reference. The contrast 
with definites can be accounted for, following Hawkins  1991, by assuming that  they 
form a Horn-scale with definites, and therefore, that using an indefinite form implicates 
that the conditions for the use of the definite are not met. The only condition ordinary 
indefinites impose is that the value assigned to their discourse referent be an element of 
the set denoted by the description. 
Note that the classification discussed here is one of DP types, rather than DP tokens. 
Since ordinary  indefinites  in  English  are not  specially marked, to  be  a subset of  the 
universe of discourse previously identified by a DP. Thus, the italicized indefinite in (8) 
may  be  interpreted  either partitively  or  not,  while  the  partitive  interpretation  is, of 
course, forced upon the partitive DP. 
(8)  a.  Several students came into the room. 
b.  A student was carrying a large banner. 
c.  One of the students was carrying a large banner. 
An  interesting open question is the varying strength of  the blocking relation between 
different  types  of  DPs. Thus, the existence of  the  overt partitive  does  not  appear to 
block the implicit partitive interpretation of ordinary indefinites, while the existence of 
the  definite  does  block  the  determined  reference  interpretation  of  indefinites.  This 
suggests that the distinction between DPs with determined reference and those without 
is more significant than that between various types of non-determined reference. 
Note  that  the  distinctions established  so far  cannot  be naturally  captured  by  the 
parameters  of DP classification  most commonly encountered  in the formal  semantics 
literature. Distinctions in  terms of  types would have difficulty capturing both  what is 
common  and  what  separates  the  various  subtypes  of  semantically  definite  DPs. 
Distinctions in terms of  familiarity/novelty are well-known to encounter difficulties in 
characterizing  the  whole  spectrum  of  formally  definite  DPs. They  would  also have 
difficulty in explaining why proper names, which may be discourse-novel, are placed so 
high  on  the definiteness  scale. The quantificational/non-quantificational  distinction  is 
again not fine-grained enough to be useful here. Note also that attempting to define the 
notional category of definites by reducing it to the property of  referring to a singleton 
Note that what matters for this typology is not the actual size of the value set but rather, the type of 
formal condition contributed by the DP. It may well happen, as Barbara Abbott (p.c.1 pointed out, that 
the domain DP of a partitive contributes an extremely inclusive condition, as in one of  the elements of 
rhe  universe, which will be less restrictive than the value domain of an ordinary indefinite such as a 
matr. Formally, however, the partitive condition restricts the value set relative to the discourse, while 
the predicative condition restricts it relative to the model. Specificity Distinctions 
set would force an unnatural treatment of pronouns and proper names. Moreover, that 
approach would not be useful in explaining why partitives are closer to definites than 
their non-partitive sisters. Note also that the distinction between choice-functional  and 
non-  choice-functional  DPs,  while  relevant  to  the  distinction  between  DPs  with 
descriptive content and those without, is not helpful  in drawing the further distinctions 
needed here. 
The determinacy of reference scale in (2) can be  seen as a scale of specificity: the 
contribution of the various types of noun phrases specifies more or less completely the 
value one is to assign to the discourse referent introduced by the DP. Noun phrases with 
determined reference contribute a condition that specifies this value completely, while 
DPs with non-determined reference do not. Further distinctions can be made in terms of 
how complete specification is achieved, in the case of DPs with determined reference, 
and in terms of how free the choice of referent remains in  the case of DPs with non- 
determined reference. In the next section we look at subtypes of such DPs. 
3.  More or less specific indefinite DPs 
The DP types that fall on the right hand side of the scale in  (2),  within the category of 
DPs with non-determined reference, are collectively referred to as indefinites. Besides 
not being required to have determined reference, the interpretation of these DPs varies 
greatly and so do the overt morphological markings on them. A challenging task for the 
semanticist  is  to  account  for  the  distribution  and  interpretation  of  the  subtypes  of 
indefinites  we find within  a language as well  as  cross-linguistically.  Moving beyond 
descriptive adequacy, the aim is to have a semantic framework which provides the tools 
for  drawing  the  particular  distinctions  needed  for natural  language  description  and, 
optimally, predicts the class of distinctions needed. Below I discuss some subspecies of 
indefinites in the literature, whose characterization, I claim, makes crucial reference to 
the  properties  of  the assignment functions  that  give  values  to the  variable the DPs 
introduce. 
Expanding on  the suggestions  in Section 2, I take it that the semantic function of 
morphemes occurring in the Determiner area of  argumental DPs is to constrain various 
aspects of the function that is to give value to the variable contributed by the DP.~  This 
proposal  is  in  fact  quite  close to the  traditional  view  of  quantifiers.  Recall  that  the 
semantic job  of  quantifiers  in  predicate  calculus  is to  encode more  or less complex 
instructions concerning the way one is to give values to the variable(s) they bind. Thus, 
the universal  quantifier imposes a complex  constraint:  the  variable  it  binds  is to be 
given successive values until the value set is exhausted, and the 'nuclear scope' has to 
be  true  for  all  those  values.  The  valuation  instruction  encoded  by  the  existential 
quantifier, by contrast, is relatively simple: one has to find some value in the value set 
for which the nuclear scope is true. Below we explore the possibility that the various 
Determiners within and across languages encode more or less complex instructions of 
this type. 
6  Items  occurring  in  the  'Determiner  area'  include,  but  are  not  necessarily  limited  to,  articles, 
quantifiers and numerals. We will be concerned here primarily with articles and to a lesser extent with 
quantifiers. The view of specificity that emerges is one in which it is seen as an epiphenomenon that 
breaks down into a variety of differences concerning the way variables are given values, 
differences that may be morphologically marked in various  languages. In the case of 
descriptions, there are two ways in which valuation instructions may be restricted: one 
may restrict the nature of  the function itself, or one may place restrictions on the nature 
of the value set. The restriction imposed by definite and partitive articles are of the latter 
kind: the definite article signals that the value set uniquely determines the value of  the 
variable relative to the input DRS, while partitives signal that the value set is given by 
the  referent  of  the domain  DP. Ordinary, garden-variety indefinite DPs on  the other 
hand, impose no special restriction on the value set beyond the requirement that it be 
atomic, in the case of singular Determiners such as a(n)  in English, egy in Hungarian or 
unh  in Romanian. Garden-variety indefinites pose no special restrictions on the nature 
of  the  evaluation  function  either,  which  accounts  for  the  versatility  of  their 
interpretation possibilities. 'Special'  indefinites encode special restrictions on either the 
value  set  or the nature of  the assignment function  itself. We examine some relevant 
cases below. 
3.1.  Dependency and scopal specificity 
In  Farkas  1994 I argued that the notion of  'specificity'  has been  employed as a cover 
term  for  at  least  three  separate  phenomena,  partitivity,  scopal  specificity,  and 
'epistemic'  specificity.  Here  I  will  discuss  scopal  specificity  in  more  detail.  The 
discussion is phrased in terms of  how scope issues affect the interpretation of variables 
directly,  without  assuming  a  strict  correlation  between  scope  and  configurational 
properties. In line with proposals made in Peacocke 1978, Kuorda 1981, Farkas 1997a, I 
assume that scopal effects are the result of  variation  in evaluation parameters. In the 
case of  argumental DPs, these parameters concern the assignment function that  gives 
them values. 
Scopal specificity concerns the question of whether the interpretation of  a variable 
within  a particular expression  varies  or not  as a result  of the presence of  a variation 
inducing  operator.  One  type  of  scopal  non-specificity  involves  cases  where  the 
interpretation  of  a  variable  co-varies  with  (or  is dependent  on)  the  interpretation  of 
another variable. In  such cases the former variable will be called  'dependent'  and the 
latter  will  be  called,  following  Kadmon  1987,  'the  boss'  variable.  In  order  for 
dependency to occur, the  boss  variable  must  vary,  i.e., it  must  be  given  successive 
values within the course of the interpretation of  a sentence. This may happen as a result 
of it being bound by a quantifier other than the existential, or as a result of it being part 
of a distributive predication. In what follows the case of distributive predication will be 
ignored. 
Following the classical treatment of quantifiers within a dynamic framework, we can 
characterize the job of  the existential as requiring the input function to be updated on 
the variable bound by the existential, whereas the job  of other quantifiers, such as that 
realized  by  every or most is  to  introduce  a  set of  such updates.  Following work  in 
dynamic semantics, and in particular that of  Kamp  1981 and Heim  1982, the update 
required  by  existentials  can  be  taken  as  a default operation,  in  which  case ordinary 
indefinite DPs, just  as definites or proper names, are non-quantificational in the sense 
that they simply trigger the default action, namely an update on the relevant variable. 
DPs such as every student, on the other hand, are quantificational in  the sense that they 
trigger  a complex evaluation procedure. Assuming a tripartite view  of  quantification, Specificity Distinctions 
quantificational  DPs  introduce  a  set  of  evaluation  functions  that  update  the  input 
function on the variable introduced by the DP, and which give it values from the value 
set provided by the description. Each of these functions is an input function relative to 
which  the  expression  in  the  Nuclear  Scope  is  evaluated.  Particular  quantificational 
Determiners impose further conditions on what the results of  such updates must be in 
order for the whole expression to be true (or embeddable) in a model. 
Under these assumptions, the semantic structure of  a sentence such as (9) will have 
the constituents in (10): 
(9)  Every student left, 
(10)  Vx3 [x3 E  {y:  student(y))]  [leave(x3)] 
The familiar truth  (or embeddability) conditions for this expression would require the 
input function f to be such that each of  its updates f'  on xl such that f'(x3) meets the 
condition in the Restrictor, should have updates f'  which meet the condition in the NS. 
The  quantificational  Determiner  every  in  the  quantificational  DP  every  student  is 
responsible  for the introduction  of the functions f',  and  for the role  they  play  in  the 
evaluation of  the  NS. More  generally  then,  quantificational  DPs introduce  a  set of 
assignment functions which serve as input functions to the interpretation of their NS. 
The  contribution  of  every  is  the  introduction  of  the  relevant  functions  f'  and  the 
requirement that the NS be satisfied by updates of each such function. The contribution 
of  a Determiner like most would differ in the requirement imposed: the NS has to be 
satisfied by a majority of updates of the functions introduced by the quantificational DP. 
Indefinite DPs that depend on a quantificational DP co-vary with the values assigned 
to the variable introduced by the latter. If a paper about specificity is within the scope of 
every student in (I  1) 
(1 1)  Every student read a paper about specificity 
the  variable  it  introduces  co-varies  with  that  introduced  by  the  universal.  If  the 
indefinite is independent of the universal, i.e., outside its scope, it does not. In previous 
work I proposed a particular 'in  situ'  treatment of scope based on the premise that the 
choice of  function  that  gives  values  to  variables  introduced  by  non-quantificational 
argumental DPs is not fully determined by the structural position of the DP. In the case 
at hand, the choice between  wide and  narrow  scope for the  indefinite is a matter  of 
choosing a function that the indefinite updates from the functions made accessible by 
the context. What functions are accessible to an indefinite depends on what functions 
have been introduced by the point the indefinite is interpreted. Assuming that the input 
function f is introduced initially and therefore always accessible, and assuming that the 
functions f' that  evaluate  the NS  are available to  variables in  the NS, there  are two 
accessible functions to the variable contributed by the indefinite in  (1 1): f and f'. The 
former choice results in the  'wide  scope',  or  independent, reading of  the indefinite, 
under which the indefinite updates the initial function. The latter choice results in the 
'narrow  scope',  dependent,  reading  of  the  indefinite,  under  which  it  updates  the 
functions f' introduced by the universal. In this latter case the indefinite co-varies with 
the  variable bound  by  the universal.  When the indefinite  is dependent  it is given  a 
sequence of values, just like the universal, with the crucial difference, however, that the functions  responsible  for this  are  introduced  by  the  universal.  The  functions  that 
interpret such narrow scope indefinites are Skolem functions. 
The assumption  made here  is  that  the  main  predication  in  the  NS  is  necessarily 
interpreted  relative  to  the  functions  introduced  by  the  quantifier  but  that  the  novel 
variables are in principle free to be interpreted by any accessible function. At the level 
of semantic representation, I assume that  dependent variables are subscripted by their 
boss  variable. There are then  two semantic representations compatible  with  (1 I), one 
where  the  variable  introduced  by  the  indefinite  bears  the  subscript  of  the  variable 
introduced by the universal, and one where it does not. The former gives the  'narrow 
scope'  reading of  the  indefinite,  while  the  latter  gives the  'wide  scope'  reading.  A 
variable may appear as a subscript on another just in case it is bound by a quantifier that 
introduces a set of functions accessible to the subscripted variable.' 
Note that the dependency parameter  is independent of  the question  of  determined 
reference. Whether  a dependent DP has non-determined reference  or not depends on 
whether for each value of  the boss variable, the context provides a choice of  values. 
Thus, dependency does not entail indefiniteness, which is as it should be, given that in 
appropriate contexts definite DPs may be interpreted as dependent, as exemplified in 
(12). 
(12)  Every  student  was  given  two poems  to  memorize  and  then  had  to  recite  the 
longest of the two to the class. 
Note that  in  order for a dependent DP to have determined reference the context must 
meet  a special  complex condition: for every  relevant  value  of  the  boss  variable,  the 
context  must  supply an  appropriate  singleton  set  to  serve  as  value  domain  for the 
variable  contributed by  the  indefinite.  This  is  why  dependent  definites  have  close 
paraphrases involving a pronoun bound to the boss variable in  their description (in our 
case, the lorzgest poem  of the two poerns  assigned  to hider).  Note  that the special 
interpretation conditions imposed by proper names discussed in Section 2 render them 
incompatible with dependency. The condition imposed on pronouns, on the other hand, 
does not. The valuation properties of a variable introduced by a definite pronoun will be 
inherited from its 'antecedent'. 
Non-determined  reference, on the other hand, is compatible with dependency under 
ordinary  circumstances, which  is  why  ordinary  indefinite  DPs  participate  in  scopal 
ambiguities  so  readily.  Such  indefinites  are  compatible  with  both  dependent  and 
independent interpretations. 
Some  of  the  variation  we  find  within  the  indefinite  article  systems  of  various 
languages concerns the possibility of dependent interpretations. Thus, in Farkas 1997b, 
it is argued that reduplicating the indefinite in Hungarian is a mark of dependency. The 
indefinite in (13), 
(13)  Minden gyerek hozott egy-egy csokrot. 
every child bring.Past a-a bouquet.Acc 
' The question of whether the distinction between dependent and independent variables as well as other 
matters  of  scope should  be  encoded  in  the semantic  representation  or  left  only  as  interpretation 
requirements is an issue that I will not discuss here, since it is not crucial to present purposes. Specificity Distinctions 
can  only  receive  a dependent  interpretation. Moreover,  such  indefinites are felicitous 
only in contexts which supply an appropriate boss variable for the indefinite to co-vary 
with. The condition imposed by a reduplicated indefinite article in Hungarian requires 
the variable to co-vary  with  an  individual or situational boss  variable. Under present 
assumptions, it requires the variable introduced by it to be subscripted by a situational 
or individual variable. The restriction of the boss variable to situation or individual-level 
variables is needed because reduplicated indefinites may not occur within the scope of 
modals: 
(14)  *Mari kell hozzon egy-egy csokrot. 
Mari must bring a-a bouquet. 
Assuming that modals involve quantification over worlds, a narrow scope reading for 
the indefinite here involves co-variation with the modal variable bound by the universal 
quantifier contributed by kell 'must'. 
The fact that reduplicated indefinites in Hungarian may occur only in configurations 
where an appropriate boss variable is accessible follows from the requirement imposed 
by the reduplicated article. Thus, the ungrammaticality of (15) follows from the fact that 
no boss variable is available for the indefinite to depend on: 
(15)  *Mari lit  at most egy-egy gyereket. 
M. sees now a-a child.Acc 
Note  that  as  formulated  here,  the condition  imposed  by  a  reduplicated  indefinite  in 
Hungarian is not equivalent to a condition that would require it to have narrow scope 
with  respect to some operator or, equivalently, a condition  requiring  it to occur in a 
subordinate DRS. Consider the interaction of indefinites and negation. A sentence such 
as (16), 
(16)  Mari is not reading an article on indefinites. 
is ambiguous with respect to the scope of the indefinite relative to negation: under the 
wide scope reading, the claim made is that there is an article on indefinites that Mary is 
not reading (but there may be others that she is), while under the narrow scope reading 
there is no article on indefinites that Mary is reading. This latter reading is represented 
in DRT with the indefinite within the subordinate box introduced by negation. 
An indefinite 'within the scope'  of negation has special interpretive properties. Very 
roughly  put,  the  negative  operator requires  the  expression  in  its  scope  to  be  false 
(unembeddable) under  all  legitimate  assignments, i.e., all  assignments  that  meet the 
conditions imposed by  the expression  in  question. In  the terminology  used here, the 
negative operator then  introduces  a  set  of  functions  that  update  the  input  functions, 
relative to which the expression in its scope is to be evaluated. In the case of a sentence 
such as Mary didn't leave yesterday  the set of  functions in question would differ only 
with respect to temporal  indices within  the relevant interval  defined by yesterday. If, 
however,  the expression  in the  scope of  negation  contains  an  indefinite, the variable 
introduced  by  this  indefinite  may  be  interpreted  with  respect  to  the  set  of  functions 
introduced  by  the  negative  operator,  resulting  in  the  narrow  scope  reading  of  the 
indefinite, or with respect to the input function, resulting in  the wide scope reading of 
the indefinite. In the former case the interpretation of the variable varies: the variable is interpreted by a set of functions ranging over the whole value set. In the latter case, the 
interpretation of  the variable does not vary: it is interpreted by a single function -  an 
update  of  the  input  function. The interpretation  of  an  indefinite within  the  scope of 
negation varies without co-varying with another variable. 
Based on  the above discussion,  one can  identify three distinct ways in  which  the 
interpretation of a variable may vary: (i) The variable is bound by a variation-inducing 
quantifier. This  is the case of  variables  introduced  by  quantificational  DPs.  (ii) The 
variable is dependent on another, i.e., it co-varies with a variable bound by a variation- 
inducing quantifier. This is the case of  indefinites within the scope of universals. (iii) 
The variable is interpreted  by a set of  functions introduced by a non-quantificational 
operator, i.e., an operator that introduces a set of  assignment functions but no special 
variable that it binds. This is the case of  indefinites within the scope of negation. The 
second type of  variation  is compatible with determined reference, the third  is not. In 
what  follows  I  will  use  the  term  quantificational DP to  refer  to  DPs  that  induce 
variation  of  type  (i):  they introduce a variable and a set  of  functions that  update the 
input function relative to the variable in question. The Determiner in such DPs encodes 
instructions concerning the relation  between  the functions  introduced by  the DP and 
their updates relative to the NS. 
Returning  to  reduplication  of  the  indefinite  article  in  Hungarian,  if  it  signals 
dependency rather than simply non-quantificational variation, we expect it not to be licit 
within the scope of negation. That this is indeed the case is shown in (17): 
(17)  *Mali nem lit at egy-egy gyereket se. 
M. not sees a-a child.Acc neg 
(The morpheme se signals that the indefinite is within the scope of negation.) 
Note  that  the distinction  between  reduplicated  and  non-reduplicated  indefinites  in 
Hungarian  cannot  be  captured  by  making  reference  to  type-theoretic  distinctions. 
Assuming  an  ambiguity  between  choice-functional  and  non  choice-functional 
indefinites, as proposed by Reinhart  1997, Kratzer  1998 and Matthewson  1999 in other 
contexts, would  not  be  helpful  either.  Reinhart  1997 assumes  that  choice-functional 
indefinites  are  associated  with  choice  functional  variables  that  may  be  bound  by 
existential quantifiers in  an unconstrained way, which is responsible for the free scope 
of such DPs. Quantificational indefinites, on the other hand, behave like universal DPs 
and  are restricted  in  scope.  This  distinction  cannot  capture  the  requirement  of  co- 
variation associated with reduplicated indefinites. Reduplicated indefinites would have 
to  be  either special choice-functional  indefinites that  have to  co-vary, or special  co- 
varying quantificational indefinites. 
Matthewson  1999, following  Kratzer  1998, suggests that, on the contrary, choice- 
functional indefinites are not subject to co-variation while quantificational  indefinites 
are.  This  distinction  is  not  more  helpful  than  Reinhart's  in  capturing  the  special 
requirement  encoded  in  reduplicative  morphology.  Reduplicated  indefinites  would 
necessarily be quantificational, under this approach, but would still be subject to the co- 
variation condition. The point of this discussion is that assuming an ambiguity between 
choice-functional and non-choice-functional DPs does not render the special condition 
requiring these DPs to co-vary with some other variable superfluous. 
Note that a distinction  in  terms  of  occurrence  in  the main  DRS  as opposed to an 
embedded one, quite naturally made in DRT, is not helpful either, given the observation 
about negation just  made. I conclude then that allowing nominal morphology to restrict Specificity Distinctions 
interpretation  characteristics  of  variables  introduced by  DPs is necessary  in  order to 
account for the interpretive characteristics of reduplicated indefinites in Hungarian. The 
semantic import of  indefinite article reduplication in Hungarian is that of  imposing the 
co-variation restriction on the variable introduced by the DP, on a par with the various 
other restrictions introduced by other Determiners. 
The question  now  arises whether DP properties that  were captured using different 
parameters could not be expressed in these terms. To illustrate, note that under present 
assumptions it is expected (or at least not unexpected) to find a language where nominal 
morphology  is  sensitive to  non-quantificational  variation,  without  distinguishing the 
special type of co-variation Hungarian is sensitive to. In present terms, an indefinite that 
is marked for not being able to vary is a DP that introduces a variable that has to update 
the input function. Such an indefinite would then introduce a variable marked for fixed 
reference. In DRT terms, this amounts to the requirement that the variable occur in the 
main  DRS. An  indefinite that  has  to  vary would  be  a DP that  introduces  a variable 
marked for variation. In DRT terms such indefinites would be required to occur within 
an  embedded  DRS.  Under  the  assumption  made  here,  namely  that  interpretation 
requirements  are made explicit at  the representational  level,  and  that  variables  have 
indices  encoding such  requirements,  the  difference  between  fixed  and  varying  non- 
quantificational DPs may be encoded by assuming that the former have a function index 
fixed to the input functions f, while the latter require a functional index ranging over a 
set of functions. 
Below  I claim that  the two indefinites in  Lillooet Salish discussed  in  Matthewson 
1999 appear to be of just this sort. Matthewson 1999 shows that in Lillooet Salish there 
are two types of indefinites, one marked by the prefix ku- and the other by the prefix ti-. 
Indefinites marked by  ti- may only be interpreted as having  'widest scope', i.e., as not 
varying  or  co-varying.  Such  indefinites  then  are  marked  for  updating  the  input 
func~ion.~  Indefinites marked by ku- on the other hand, must occur within the scope of 
another  quantificational  DP, modal  or  negation.  It  appears  then  that  these  DPs  are 
marked  for  variation,  without  regard  to  finer  distinctions  concerning  the  type  of 
variation involved. In present terms, they require their functional index to range over a 
set of functions. 
The  analysis  Matthewson  herself  proposes  is  different:  for  her,  the  distinction 
between  ti-  and  ku-  indefinites  marks  overtly  the  choice-functional  ambiguity 
mentioned above, that remains covert in English. From the larger perspective of cross- 
linguistic  variation,  however,  it  appears  that  the  ambiguity  posited  by  Kratzer  and 
Matthewson addresses only one aspect among several differentiations within the realm 
of indefinites, and therefore assuming such an ambiguity becomes much less appealing. 
Note  that  extending  the  logic  of  the  ambiguity  proponents  would  make  us  assume 
English indefinites to be ambiguous also with respect to whether they co-vary or not (a 
distinction overtly marked in Hungarian). The parsimonious move is to assume a non- 
ambiguous interpretation  of  indefinites  with  a choice-function-  like mechanism,  and 
allow morphology to place further restrictions on the interpretation properties of  these 
DPs. 
8  Matthewson  1999 notes  that ti-  indefinites  may  co-vary  with  another  variable that  is  bound  by  a 
quantifier just in case their description contains a pronoun  bound by the quantifier in question. Note 
that in present terms, this means that variation in the values assigned to the variable contributed by the 
indefinite results  from  varying  the  value  set  to  which  the  input  function  applies, rather  than  the 
function itself. So far we have seen morphology marking  'wide scope only', non-varying, indefinites, 
indefinites that must vary and indefinites that must co-vary. There is a further type of 
indefinite whose scope is restricted: indefinites that may not have wide scope relative to 
another DP or operator, but which need not occur within the scope of any element, i.e., 
they  are  not  necessarily  co-varying. English  'existential'  bare plurals,  exemplified in 
(18) seem to fit this description. 
(18)  John read poems all afternoon. 
One possible analysis of  these noun phrases, suggested by van  Geenhoven  1996, is to 
treat them as 'semantically  incorporated',  in  which case, in present terms, they would 
not  contribute an  independent  discourse  referent  that  is  given  values  by  assignment 
functions but be part of the predicate. This is essentially the approach to morphological 
incorporation  developed  in  Farkas  and  de  Swart  (2000). The  scopal  properties  of 
incorporated nominals then  follow  from a more basic property,  namely  that  they are 
incorporated. 
Van  Geenhoven  extends her  semantic  incorporation  analysis  to  all  narrow  scope 
indefinites.  Such  a  move,  however,  would  prevent  us  from  distinguishing  between 
ordinary narrow scope indefinites and reduplicated ones in Hungarian. Another line of 
analysis, explored in  Farkas and de Swart, is to treat such bare plurals  as argumental 
DPs  introducing  variables  and  involving  a  null  Determiner  that  comes  with  the 
restriction  of  having  to  be  interpreted  by  the  current,  most  recently  introduced 
assignment  function. This type  of  'local  scope'  DPs are the opposite of  the  'widest 
scope'  DPs exemplified by  ti- indefinites in Lillooet Salish. From the point of view of 
scope, these DPs will behave just like incorporated nominals but for a different reason. 
Incorporated nominals cannot scope independently of their predicate because, in effect, 
they are predicate modifiers. Bare plural argumental DPs, on the other hand, are limited 
in scope by the restriction associated with the null Determiner. 
3.2.  Epistemic (non)-specificity 
Below I suggest that  epistemic specificity can be characterized  in  terms of  variation, 
albeit of  a special type. The question of epistemic specificity arises with respect to the 
interpretation of indefinites such as those in (19): 
(19)  A painting is missing from this room. 
A student in Syntax 1 cheated on the exam. 
These sentences are used in contexts which do not narrow down the choice of value for 
the variable in  question to a unique  entity, and therefore the variable contributed  by 
them does not have determined reference. The speaker may, however, have a particular 
individual in  mind, and the context may make it clear that she does. In  this  case the 
indefinites are epistemically specific. For epistemically specific indefinites all updates 
relative to the variable introduced by the indefinite that are consistent with the speaker's 
point of  view  agree in  the value they  assign  to this  variable.  In  the case of epistemic 
non-specificity, there is variation with respect to the value  assigned to the variable in 
question not only given information provided by the context as a whole but also with 
respect to what the context presents as information available to the speaker. In this case 
then,  the  indefinite  has  fixed, non-variable  reference  relative to the  speaker but  not Specificity Distinctions 
relative to the context as a whole. In order to model the dual status of such indefinites 
one would have to enrich the notion of context along the lines proposed in  Gunlogson 
2001. The crucial  suggestion  there  is to  assume  that  Stalnaker's  common  ground is 
derived from a more basic notion of discourse commitments of a participant. Assuming 
a  two-participant  discourse,  the  context  would  include  two  such  discourse 
commitments, CDa and CDb each determining a context set, ca and cb , defined as the 
intersection  of  the  propositions  in  CDa  and  CDb  respectively.  In  the  case  of 
epistemically specific indefinite DPs, all embeddings of the discourse in ca agree on the 
value they assign to the variable introduced by the indefinite (assuming the speaker is 
a>.9 
4.  Conclusion 
In  conclusion,  it  appears  that  treating  Determiners  as  lexically  encoding  complex 
valuation  instructions allows us to capture the variety of scopal non-specificity we find 
across DP types without having to  introduce additional machinery. We have isolated 
here several ways in  which  the interpretation of  a variable may vary and we saw that 
languages  sometimes mark  DPs for a particular type of  interpretation. The means of 
capturing these distinctions was by way of valuation restrictions, rather than directly in 
terms  of  scope.  The  parameter  of  variation  is  independent  of  that  of  determined 
reference, though it interacts with it. 
With respect  to degree of  scopal independence, the indefinites we examined so far 
can be seen to form the scale in (20): 
(20)  widest  scope  only  >  neutral  >  co-varying,  varying  >  local  scope  only  > 
incorporated nominals 
Lillooet Salish ti- indefinites illustrate the leftmost type, garden-variety indefinites such 
as DPs with a(n) illustrate neutral  scope DPs, Hungarian reduplicated  indefinites  and 
Lillooet Salish ku- marked DPs illustrate the two subtypes on the next rung respectively, 
and English existential bare plurals are 'local scope only'  DPs. Incorporated nominals 
form a rich world of their own, which lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
The distinctions we  have  discussed  here  fall  under  the  rubric  of  constraining the 
assignment function involved in the interpretation of  the DP. Another possible way of 
constraining the interpretation of a variable contributed by a DP is to impose restrictions 
on the properties of the value  set. Subjunctive relative clauses in Romance languages 
for instance, can be seen as imposing a special requirement on the modal interpretation 
of the world parameter of the description, i.e., the question of what world or worlds the 
description  is  interpreted  relative  to.  The  property  known  as  d-linking  is  also 
characterizable in terms of a particular restriction on the value set, namely that it should 
be 'discourse old'. Recent discussions of any in English involve the nature of the value 
set as well. Thus, the widening condition proposed by Kadmon and Landman  1993 is 
also a value set condition. Horn 1999 suggests another constraint on the structure of this 
set, namely that its elements should form a scale. Under this proposal, just  like under 
Kadmon  and  Landman's,  any-DPs have no quantificational force of  their own. Their 
universal flavor is as a consequence of  the fact that even the extreme element of the 
0  For suggestions along similar lines, see Farkas 1994 
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scale is an acceptable value for the variable introduced by the DP. Alternatively,  one 
may assume that such DPs actually require successive evaluation, but unlike universals, 
the  evaluation  is  disjunctive  rather  than  conjunctive,  and, moreover,  the  alternative 
functions are not introduced by the DP itself but must be provided by its context. It is 
this latter property that makes them indefinite under present ass~m~tions.'~ 
Finally,  note that the case of epistemic specific indefinites highlights the common 
thread  between  determinacy of reference and variation, which unites the scales in (2) 
and (20). The determinacy of reference parameter concerns the issue of whether updates 
on the variable in question vary or not relative to the value they assign to it. Determined 
reference  DPs  have  fixed  values  relative  to  each  relevant  input  function.  Non- 
determined reference DPs do not. The various notions of indefinites discussed under the 
scopal specificity  rubric involved the issue of  fixed or  variable reference relative  to 
different parameters. The questions discussed here lead us to examine the details of the 
distribution and interpretation of various types of Determiners in natural languages and 
try to account for the variation we find. 
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Abstract: 
This paper discusses a variant of German V2 declaratives sharing properties with both 
subordinate relative clauses and main clauses. I argue that modal subordination failure 
helps decide between  two rivaling accounts for this construction. Thus, a hypotactic 
analysis involving  syntactic  variable  sharing  must  be  preferred  over  parataxis  plus 
anaphora resolution. The scopal behavior of  the construction will be derived from its 
'proto-assertional force,' which it shares with similar 'embedded root' constructions. 
It is well-known that the syntactic position of finite verbs in German is sensitive to the 
main  vs. subordinate clause distinction. VI  and V2 structures tend to be main clauses 
while  V-final  order  usually  indicates  subordination.  However,  exceptions  in  both 
directions  have repeatedly  been  reported  and even  studied in  more or less detail  (cf. 
Reis 1997 and references cited there.) Here I would like to further our understanding of 
'embedded V2' declarative clauses by investigating the following question. 
(1)  QI:  Are there V2 relative clauses in German? 
I suggest that a proper answer to Q1 requires close analysis of  minimal triples like the 
following. (Finite verbs are underlined in the relevant clauses.) 
(2)  a.  Das Blatt hat eine Seite (I),  die ganz schwarz &. 
the sheet has one side  that entirely black is 
'That sheet of paper has one side that is entirely black' 
b.  Das Blatt hat eine Seite (I),  die &  ganz schwarz. 
c.  #Das Blatt hat eine Seite (\). Die &  ganz schwarz. 
While (2a) involves a standard V-final relative clause and (2c) displays the sequence of 
two independent main clauses, the status of  (2b) is unclear. This will be reflected in the 
following terminological convention. 
(3)  Terminological Convention 
a.  Call  the  second  clause  in  (2b)  'V2  Relative'  (V2R)  if  you  want  to 
emphasize  properties it shares with its counterpart in (24. 
For  comments  and  suggestions,  I  would  like  to  thank  the  participants  of  the  workshop  on 
'Informationsstruktur  und der referentielle Status von sprachlichen Ausdriicken'  at the DGfS meeting 
in Leipzig (2001) and the one on 'The Roots of Pragmasemantics 11'  in Szklarska Poreba (2001). 
The paper is submitted to a special issue of 'Theoretical Linguistics', edited by  Klaus von Heusinger 
and Kerstin Schwabe 
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b.  Call  the  second clause in  (2b)  'Integrated  Verb  Second'  (IV2)  if  you 
want to emphasize properties it shares with its counterpart in (2c). 
Remaining neutral  at this  stage, I will  conflate the two terms  in (3) and refer to the 
sentence type at issue as 'V2WIV2.' 
To begin with, the following three properties of V2WIV2 should be noted. 
(4)  (Curious) Properties of VZWIV2 
a.  V2WIV2  has  to  be  immediately  preceded  by  non-final  phonological 
boundary marking (I). 
b.  V2WIV2 can only modify indefinites in the putative matrix clause. 
c.  V2RJIV2 is able to restrictively modify its antecedent. 
(4a) is important for distinguishing V2WIV2 from parenthetical counterparts, for which 
most  of  the  generalizations  discussed  here  do  not  hold.  The  issue  of  quantifiers 
compatible with V2WIV2 indicated in (4b) will not be taken up in this paper, although 
one way to account for it may be inferable from the analysis presented below.' (4c) can 
be substantiated by the observation that the initial clause in (2c) triggers the Horn-scale 
implicature (5). 
(5)  The sheet of  paper has no more than one side 
(5) arises  in  order to  restore  informativity  to  an  otherwise  vacuous  sentence, given 
world knowledge such as is expressed in (6). 
(6)  Vx [ Sheet of Paper (x) +  3Y  [ Y = {z  I  Side of (z, x) ) A IYI  = 2 ] ] 
The  inconsistency  of  (5)  and  (6) then  result  in  pragmatic  anomaly  (#).  Crucially, 
implicature (5)  does not arise with (2a) or (2b). This is evidence that there the initial 
clause is not evaluated in  isolation. Instead the indefinite  description  is semantically 
intersected  with  the  content  of  the  adjacent  clausal  modifier,  i.e.  it  is  restrictively 
modified. 
Another curious property of V2WIV2 concerns scope. 
(4)  d.  V2WIV2 forces its indefinite antecedent to take wide scope, 
Thus, consider (7). 
(7)  a.  Maria mochte einen Fisch fangen (I),  der kariert  &. 
Maria wants  a  fish  catch  that checkered is 
'Mary wants to catch a fish that is checkered' 
b.  Maria mochte einen Fisch fangen (I),  der &  kariert. 
c.  Maria mochte einen Fisch fangen (\). Der &  kariert. 
Here only (7a) is neutral  as for the scope of the indefinite. (7b) and (7c), on  the other 
hand,  invariably  induce a de  re  reading.  In  order to account for that effect, we may 
assimilate (7b) to (7c) on the basis of (8). 
1  For detailed discussion and an account based on different premises, see Gartner (1998, forthcoming) 
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(8)  Paratactic Hypothesis (PH)~ 
V2WIV2 is a case of parataxis. 
This  could  be  fleshed  out  syntactically  by  postulating  the  existence of  a  functional 
category z~,,  which takes V2RIIV2 as its complement and another clause containing an 
indefinite as its specifier. (9) illustrates that idea. 
PH predicts  that  V2WIV2  involves anaphora resolution  like (7c), that process being 
subject to standard conditions  on accessibility. Therefore,  (7b) would require a de re 
reading of the indefinite. 
A closer look at pronouns linking the two clauses provides a fairly subtle additional 
argument in favor of PH and the concomitant amphora-resolution view of V2WIV2. (2) 
has already shown that all three constructions tolerate weak demonstratives. (10) adds 
w-pronouns and personal pronouns, none of which can figure in V2RlIV2. 
(10)  a.  Das Blatt hat eine Seite (/), welche ganz schwarz &. 
b.  *Das Blatt hat eine Seite (I),  sie ganz schwarz &. 
c.  *Das Blatt hat eine Seite (I), welche &  ganz schwarz. 
d.  *Das Blatt hat eine Seite (/), sie  ganz schwarz. 
e.  *Das Blatt hat eine Seite (\). Welche &  ganz schwarz. 
f.  #Das Blatt hat eine Seite (\). Sie &  ganz schwarz. 
This is summarized in (I I) (wd = weak demonstrative; w = w-pronoun; pers = personal 
pronoun). 
(1 1)  Pronoun Compatibility 
a.  Standard Relative Clauses:  [+ wd I/ [ + w I/ [ - pers  ] 
b.  V2RlIV2:  [+wd]/ [-w]/[-pers ] 
c.  Cross-sentential anaphora:  [+wd]l[-w]/[+pers] 
The following paradigm, again  in  the  domain  of  weak  demonstratives,  provides  the 
crucial contrast. 
(12)  a.  *Es gibt  Lander (I),  da  das Bier ein Vermogen m. 
It  gives countries  there the beer a  fortune  costs 
b.  Es gibt Lander (/), da-  das Bier ein Vermogen. 
c.  #Es gibt Lander (\). Da koster das Bier ein Vermogen. 
While most weak demonstratives are (homonyms of) relative pronouns, the pronoun da 
('there') is not. It can  be used  in contexts of cross-sentential  anaphora but is banned 
from V-final  relative clauses. Its compatibility with V2WIV2 (12b) indicates that this 
construction patterns with cross-sentential anaphora. 
However,  the picture just  outlined must be further complicated  in  the light of  the 
following question. 
See Girtner (1998, forthcoming) for a comprehensive version of PH, including independent empirical 
evidence and a DRS-update mechanism able to cope with (most of) the scope facts. 
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(1 3)  42:  Does PH predict the possibility of modal subordination for V2lUIV2? 
Curiously, this prediction underlying PH/Q2 is not borne out, as (14) demonstrates. 
(14)  a.  Maria mochte einen Fisch fangen (I), den sie essen m. 
Maria want  a  fish  catch  that she eat  could 
'Mary wants to catch a fish that she could eat' 
b.  *Maria mochte einen Fisch fangen (I), den kiinnte sie essen. 
c.  Maria mochte einen Fisch fangen (\).  Den  sie essen. 
Note, however, that property (4a) makes one suspect that V2WIV2 does not give rise to 
text  formation  the  way  a  sequence of  sentences  does.  In  fact,  integration  into  the 
preceding clause is obligatory, given property (4e). 
(4)  e.  V2FUIV2 forms an 'information unit,' definable as a single partition into 
focus and background, with its putative matrix clause. 
(4e) is one of the essential building blocks in developing a formal account for the facts 
in (14). Thus,  according to  Groenendijk&Stokhof  (1989)  (cf.  Honcoop  1998, Saeb0 
1999). modal subordination involves a propositional  discourse referent provided by an 
antecedent  clause  and  picked  up  by  a  covert  anaphor  in  the  restrictor  of  a  modal 
operator  in  the follow-up clause.'  Given (4e), however, V2WIV2 is itself  part  of  the 
minimal proposition able to provide the required discourse referent. That is, V2WIV2 is 
evaluated  before  the  required  discourse  referent  may  become  available. Therefore, 
modal subordination must fail and unacceptability of (14b) is predicted.4 
Unfortunately, this way of dealing with (14b) runs into additional problems with PA. 
Q3 formulates the relevant issue. 
(15)  Q3:  Doesn't PH rely on the mechanism of anaphora resolution and thus 
evaluation of V2RlIV2 after evaluation of the putative matrix clause? 
Clearly, in order to avoid contradiction I must revise PH. I suggest that PH be replaced 
by (16).~ 
Concretely, Groenendijk&Stokhof (1989:38ff) argue that (i) should be given the meaning in (ii), 
(i)  Ein Tiger konnte hereinkommen (\I. Der wiirde dich zuerst fressen. 
(ii)  Possibly (a tiger comas in) and necessarily (if a tiger comes in, it eats you first) 
Technically this is implemented as in (iii). 
(iii)  a.  would v=  hp  1  I "D,,,,,,,,,  VJ I  A "p I 
b.  possibly $ = EDhp [ 0.1 'D  A "p  I(@) 
'by  dynamic  conjunction'  +  'some  plausible  assumptions  about  the  semantics of  this 
extension of  DIL' + 'some obvious reductions': 
c.  hp10.1$~  L[O*VIA"PI 
Crucially, the indefinite in + becomes accessible for dynamic binding of a pronoun in y,  within the 
scope of  . 
As far as I can see, this account carries over to the presuppositional theory of modal subordination 
developed in Geurts (1999). 
This move will leave the above mentioned pronoun facts without a satisfactory account. On the force of V2 declaratives 
(16)  Hypotactic Hypothesis (HH) 
V2WIV2 is a case of standard (relative clause) hypotaxis. 
Under  HH,  V2WIV2  would  share  a  variable  with  its  indefinite  antecedent, due  to 
syntactic copying. Thus, the issue of anaphora resolution does not arise. Of course, HH 
generates the follow-up question in (17). 
(17)  44:  How can V2WIV2 and standard relative clauses be distinguished on the 
basis of HH? 
The answer to 44  lies in property (40, the final one discussed in this paper. 
(4)  f.  V2WIV2 is an instance of 'embedded root phenomena' (a.k.a. 
'dependent main clause phenomena'). 
Building on  earlier work  in  this  area (cf. Hooper&Thompson  1973, Wechsler  1991, 
Reis 1997), I would like to defend the following hypothesis. 
(18)  Proto-Force Hypothesis (PFH) 
V2 declaratives have proto-assertional force 
Proto-assertional force forces V2RIIV2 together with its indefinite antecedent out of the 
scope of modal operators and negation (among many others). Interaction with negation 
is documented in (19). 
(19)  a.  Kein Professori mag eine Studentin (I), [ die ihni nicht  ] 
No  professor likes a  female  student  who him not  cites 
'No professor likes a female student that doesn't cite him' 
b.  *Kein Professori mag eine Studentin (I), [ die zitiert ihni nicht ] 
Since the negative quantifier in (19) binds the personal pronoun, the modifying clause is 
forced into the scope of negation. This fails in the case of V2RIIV2. 
My claim  then  is  that  combining HH  and  PFH  properly  treats  the  properties  of 
V2RIIV2. HH prevents modal subordination, which accounts for the unacceptability of 
(14b). PFH prevents syntactic 'scopal subordination.'  This predicts the unacceptability 
of (l4b) and (19b), as well as the unavailability of a de dicto reading in (7b). 
At this stage, I cannot present a formal theory underlying PFH. Yet, a number of 
adequacy criteria indicative  of  the  structure  of  such  a  theory  are  fairly clear. Thus, 
consider (20). 
(20)  Adequacy Criterion for PFH 
'Embedded Force Exclusion' should be met. 
This well-known issue has recently been raised again by Green (2000, p.440). 
(2  1)  Embedded Force Exclusion (EFE) 
If  cp is either a part of  speech or a sentence, and  cp contains some indicator f of 
illocutionary force, then cp does not embed. Hans-Martin Gartner 
Thus, it  is  preferable to  avoid  simplistic direct endowment of  V2 declaratives  with 
assertional force (potential).  This requirement  is  met by  PFH. Proto-forces  will  then 
have to be supplemented by (projection) rules of the following kind. 
(22)  Proto-Assertional Force Construal 
a.  Unembedded  proto-assertional  force  translates  into  assertional  force 
(potential). 
b.  Embedded proto-assertional force can be 'absorbed' by assertional force 
(potential) if there is no intervener. 
c.  Embedded  proto-assertional  force can  be  'absorbed'  on  arguments of 
predicates that denote acts of assertion etc. 
d.  Non-absorbed  proto-assertional  force  leads  to  semanticlpragmatic 
deviance. 
(22c)  takes  care of  complementation  by  V2  clauses,  the  content of  which  is  not  a 
speaker assertion. An example is given in (23). 
(23)  Ich hoffe du glaubst mir 
I  hope you believe me 
The main theoretical burden of (22) rests on a notion of  'intervener,'  which will have to 
be the subject of further re~earch.~ 
In  sum, I have argued that V2RlIV2 should be given a hypotactic analysis. Its scopal 
behavior,  resulting  in  modal  subordination  failure,  must  be  derived  from  its  proto- 
assertional force. Proto-force in  turn should be  linked  to the embedded root  nature of 
V2RlIV2. If  such an analysis is on the right track it would also justify giving a positive 
answer to question Q1. 
References: 
Gartner, Hans-Martin (1998): "Does German Have V2 Relative Clauses?" Sprache zrnd  Praglnatik 48. 
Giirtner,  Hans-Martin  (forthcoming):  "Are  There  V2  Relative  Clauses  in  German?"  Journal  of 
Conlparative Gen?~anic  Lir~gz~isfics  3.3. 
Geurts, Bart (1999): PI-emppositions  and Pronouns. Oxford: Elsevier. 
6  To the extent that material  in the scope of a universal quantifier is not (directly) asserted, universal 
quantifiers may count as 'interveners.'  It is therefore  important  to  note that  V2MV2 can  -  under 
certain conditions (see Gartner  1998, forthcoming) - modify an ~ndefinite  in  the scope of a universal 
quantifier. This is shown in (i). 
(i)  a.  Jedes Haus  hat ein Zimmer, [ in dem  &  es gemiitlich ] 
Everj house has a  room  in thatDAr  is it  COS)' 
h.  Jeder Berg;  hat eine Flanke, [ uber die  &  eri sich leicht besteigen I 
Evev  nlountain has a  face  over thatAcc lets it itselfeasil)' climb 
'Every mountain has a face across which one can climb it easily.' 
However, a functional  interpretation  of the  indefinite  as proposed  by  Groenendijk&Stokhof (1984) 
would  remove the  content  of V2RIIV2 from  the scope of  the  universal  quantifier ever)'  house, as 
indicated in (ii). 
(ii)  3f[ R(f) A Vx.COSY-ROOM(f(x)) A Vy[ HOUSE(y) +  HAVE( y, f(y)) I  I On the force of V2 declaratives 
Green, Mitchell S. (2000): "Illocutionary Force and Semantic Content," Lingnistics and Philosophy  23: 
435-473. 
Groenendijk,  Jeroen  & Martin  Stokhof  (1984):  "Interrogative  Quantifiers  and  Skolem  functions,"  In 
Groenendijk,J.&M.Stokhof, Studies on the Semat~tics  of Questions and the Pragmatics of Answers, 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Amsterdam. 165-208. 
Groenendijk, Jeroen & Martin  Stokhof  (1989):  "Dynamic  Montague  Grammar,"  ITLI  Prepublication 
Series X-89-04. University of Amsterdam. 
Honcoop,  Martin  (1998):  Dynamic  Excursions  on  Weak  1slrmrl.s.  The  Hague:  Holland  Academic 
Graphics. 
Hooper, Joan & Sandra Thompson (1973) "On the Applicability  of Root Transformations," Linguistic 
Inquir)' 4: 465-497. 
Reis, Marga (1997): "Zum syntaktischen  Status unselbstiindiger  Verbzweit Satze," In  D'Avis,  F.  & U. 
Lutz (eds.), "Zur Satzstruktur des Deutschen,"  Arbeitspapiere  des SFB 340 Nr.  90. Stuttgart and 
Tubingen. 121-142. 
Szba, Kjell Johan (1999): "Discourse Linking and Discourse Subordination." in Bosch, P. & R.  van der 
Sandt (eds.), Focus. Cambridge: CUP. 322-335. 
Wechsler, Stephen (1991): "Verb Second and Illocutionary Force." in  Leffel, K. & D. Bouchard (eds.), 
Views on Phrase Strnctrrre. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 177-1  91. Information Structure and the Accessibility of Clausally Introduced 
Referents* 
Michael Hegarty  Jeanette K. Gundel  Kaja Borthen 
Louisiana State Universio  UniversiQ of Minnesota  NTNU, Trondheim 
mhegarl @Isu.edu  gunde003@tc.umn.edu  kaja.borthen@hf.ntnu.no 
1.  Introduction 
When certain entities are introduced into a discourse by a clause (or sequence of clauses), 
they  are accessible to  immediate subsequent reference with  demonstrative pronouns, but 
comparatively inaccessible to reference with the personal pronoun it, as noted by Webber 
(1988, 1991), among others.' 
For example, when  the first sentence in  (la) introduces the situation of there being a 
snake on the speaker's  desk, the demonstrative pronoun  that in  the second sentence can 
refer to this situation; and with this second mention  of  the situation, the pronoun  it in the 
third sentence can also refer to this situation. But in (lb), the personal pronoun it cannot be 
felicitously used for immediate subsequent reference to the situation introduced by the first 
sentence; it is more naturally interpreted as referring to the snake itself. 
(1)  a.  There was a snake on my desk. That scared me. It scared my office-mate 
too. 
b.  There  was  a  snake on  my  desk. It  scared  me.  [it  = the  snake,  not  the 
situation] 
In  (2), an  act introduced  into the discourse is subject to immediate subsequent reference 
using that, but it is more naturally interpreted as referring to the leaf collection, not the act 
of destroying it. 
(2)  A:  Max destroyed his leaf collection last night. 
B:  That was dumb.  [that can refer to the act of destroying the leaf collection] 
It was dumb.  [it = the leaf collection, not the act 
of destroying it] 
In  (3), the same referential  behavior  is exhibited  by  the fact,  introduced  in  the opening 
quote, that Mr. Montanarelli and his associates believe Ms. Lewinsky, and the court does 
not. 
The paper is submitted to a special issue of "Theoretical Linguistics",  edited by Klaus van Heusinger and 
Kerstin Schwabe 
I  Our examplcs here will be from English, although similar restrictions on pronominal reference to clausally 
introduced entities can be found in other languages. 
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(3)  a.  "We believe her, the court does not, and that resolves the matter," Mr. 
Montanarelli said today of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony that she had an 
independent recollection of the date. (New York Times, May 24,2000) 
a'.  "We  believe  her,  the  court  does  not,  and  it  resolves  the  matter,"  Mr. 
Montanarelli  said  today  of  Ms.  Lewinsky's  testimony  that  she  had  an 
independent  . . . 
The same can be observed for a proposition in (4), and a complex situation in (5), 
(4)  . . . University  of  Michigan  psychologists  David  Lykken  and  Auke  Tellegan  ... 
speculated in  their analysis of  twin  studies that "trying  to be happier  [may be] as 
futile as trying to be  taller and therefore  is counterproductive."  ... Do we really 
believe that  Romanian  orphan babies  left  alone  in their beds  will  have the same 
potential for happiness as those raised by  caring parents of  ample means? That is 
precisely what quotes such as those above will be taken to imply. 
(Cook-Deegan, Robert. 2001. Hype and hope. American Scientist 89.1:62-64.) 
#It is precisely what quotes such as those above will be taken to imply. 
(5)  "The fact that you can get a sheep or a mouse that looks normal," said Stuart 
Newman, a developmental biologist at New York Medical College, "doesn't  mean 
that some subtle things haven't  gone wrong in brain development that you wouldn't 
necessarily notice in  a sheep, but you  would  in a human  ... Cloned humans might 
show higher rates  of  cancer or other diseases, but  we'd  only find out by  cloning 
them and waiting to see if disaster strikes. 
None of this means, however, that cloning services won't someday be marketed 
to desperate people-or  even that human cloning isn't  going on right now. (Talbot, 
Margaret. February 4, 2001. New York Times Magazine, Section 6,  p.45.) 
# None of it means, however, . . . 
In  (6), that  refers  to  the  proposition  or  statement  that  the poodle  is  one  of  the  most 
intelligent dogs around. The pronoun it would have been infelicitous here.2 
(6)  A:  I read somewhere that the poodle is one of the most intelligent dogs around. 
B:  well  uhm..I  definitely  wouldn't  dispute  that.  (Switchboard  Corpus,  Dialog 
20 19) 
B':  ??well uhm..I definitely wouldn't dispute it. 
This paper will examine the role of various factors in affecting the salience, and hence the 
accessibility to pronominal reference, of entities introduced into a discourse by a full clause. 
We begin with the premise that the possibility of  pronominal reference with  it versus that 
depends  on  the  cognitive  status  of  the  referent,  in  the  sense  of  Gundel,  Hedberg  and 
In  (6B), stress can fall on the demonstrative pronoun, or elsewhere in the utterance. In (6BS),  in contrast, 
the  personal pronoun  it cannot bear stress.  The point  here  is  that  (6B')  is  infelicitous  with  any stress 
pattern. Information Structure and The Accessibility of Clausally Introduced Referents 
Zacharski (1993). This formulation of the problem provides grounds for an explanation of 
the data presented above, and provides a framework within which we examine the role of 
various other factors in promoting the salience of  a clausally introduced entity, including 
the  information  structure of  the utterance  in  which  the entity is introduced.  For entities 
introduced by clausal complements to bridge verbs, we show that the information structure 
of  the utterance introducing the entity has a partial, or one-sided, effect on the salience of 
the entity. When the complement clause is focal, the salience of the entity depends only on 
its  referential  givenness-newness  (in  the  sense of  Gundel  1988,  1999b),  as  we  would 
expect. But  when  the  complement clause  is  ground  material,  the salience  of  an  entity 
introduced  by  the clause is enhanced.  Other factors, including the presuppositionality  of 
factive  and  interrogative  complements,  also  serve  to  enhance  the  salience  of  entities 
introduced by complement clauses. 
2.  The Givenness Hierarchy 
The contrasts  noted  in  the  previous  section  can  be  insightfully  formulated in terms  of 
proposals made by Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski  (1993, and earlier work) regarding the 
relationship  between  referring forms and  speaker assumptions  about  the cognitive status 
(memory and attention state) of  a referent on the part of the addressee. 
Gundel,  Hedberg  and  Zacharski  propose  that  determiners  and  pronouns  constrain 
possible interpretations of  nominal  forms by conventionally signaling the cognitive status 
that the intended referent is assumed to have in the mind of the addressee. This helps solve 
a general problem posed by the fact that the descriptive content encoded in  the form of a 
referring expression typically underdetermines the intended referent of the expression on a 
particular  occasion  of  use. For  example, in  (7), the  content words  of  the  phrase  these 
primitive  reptiles do not uniquely determine which primitive reptiles are being referred to, 
but  the  determiner  these  serves  to  restrict  possible  referents  to  ones  that  are  currently 
activated (that is, in working memory) for the addressee. 
(7)  A restudy of pareiasaurs reveals that these primitive reptiles are the nearest relatives 
of turtles. (M.S.Y. Lee, The origin of the Turtle Body Plan. Science, v.261, 1993, 
1649). 
Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski identify six different cognitive statuses (under a total linear 
order, as discussed below). The array of  statuses is called the Givenness Hierarchy: 
Figure 1.  The Givenness Hierarchy  (GH)  and associated forms in English 
in  uniquely  type 
focus  >  activated  >  familiar  >  identifiable  >  referential  >  identifiable 
I  it)  { the N)  ( indefinite this N]  [a  N) 
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Statuses on the hierarchy correspond to memory and  attention  states, ranging from most 
restrictive, 'in focus', to least restrictive, 'type identifiable'. The forms serve as processing 
signals which assist the addressee in  restricting possible interpretations. In  (8) below, for 
example, the nominal forms used signal the restrictions on interpretation shown at right.' 
(8)  I couldn't sleep last night 
Form used  Signaled restrictions 
a.  A dog next door kept me awake.  -- (at least) type identifiable 
b. This dog next door kept me awake.  -- (at least) referential: associate a 
representation by the time sentence is 
processed 
c. The  dog next door kept me awake.  -- (at least) uniquely identifiable: associate a 
unique representation by time NP is 
processed 
d. That dog next door kept me awake.  -- (at least) familiar: in memory 
e.  This dog/that/this kept me awake.  -- (at least) activated: in working memory 
f. It kept me awake.  -- in-focus: center of attention 
The statuses  are  in  a  unidirectional  entailment  relation.  If  something is  in  focus,  it  is 
necessarily activated; if  it is activated, it is necessarily familiar; and so on. The theory thus 
correctly predicts that a given cognitive status can be appropriately coded by a form which 
explicitly signals that status, but also, in general, by forms whose meanings are entailed by 
that status. In (9), for example, the phrase these systetns explicitly signals that the referent is 
activated,  since  this  is  part  of  the  meaning  of  the  proximal  demonstrative determiner 
thislthese in English. 
(9)  These incredibly small magnetic bubbles are the vanguard of a new generation of 
ultradense memory storage systems. These systems are extremely rugged.. . 
[Gordon Graff. Better bubbles. Popular Science 232(2):68 (1988)l 
The determiner these in  these systems  is appropriate since the intended referent was just 
introduced in the preceding sentence and therefore could be expected to be activated for the 
addressee. But since anything activated is also familiar, uniquely  identifiable, referential 
and type identifiable, other forms would have been appropriate here as well, including those 
systems, which requires familiarity, the systems, which  requires the ability to  associate a 
3  As  a  practical  matter  for the  linguistic  theorist  seeking to  discover  the  form-status correlations  for  a 
language, it is essential to determine the cognitive status of an entity on a particular occasion of reference 
independently of the linguistic form used by the speaker or writer on that occasion. This can be done by 
examining prior mention  of the entity  in the discourse, the environmental salience of the entity on thc 
occasion of reference, the descriptive content of the nominal form used on the occasion of reference, and 
other clues to the cognitive status assumed for the entity  by  the speaker (or writer) on the part of  the 
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unique  representation,  or  ultradense  memory  storage  systems,  which  requires  only  the 
ability to identify the type. 
The use of  less restrictive forms has limits, however. The indefinite article is rarely used if 
the status is higher than referential, and typically implicates non-familiarity.  Most in-focus 
referents are not coded with demonstratives, even though they could be; and demonstratives 
often implicate a focus shift. Such facts follow from interaction of the Givenness Hierarchy 
with general pragmatic principles involved in language production and understanding (see 
Grice 1975, Sperber and Wilson  1986195). The implicational nature of the GH gives rise to 
'scalar implicatures', in the sense of Horn (1972), which further restrict the distribution and 
interpretation of referring forms (see Gundel, et al 1993, Gundel and Mulkern 1998). 
With  this background, Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski propose  that  the possibility of 
reference with personal pronouns versus demonstratives depends on the cognitive status of 
the  referent.  While  both  types  of  pronouns  restrict  possible  referents  to  those  that  are 
activated ( in working memory), personal pronouns also require the more restrictive status 
in focus, that is, their referents must be the current center of  attention. This is illustrated in 
(10)-(11) below, from Gundel et al (1993). 
(10)  a.  My neighbor's bull mastiff bit a girl on a bike. 
It's the same dog that bit Mary Ben last summer. 
b.  Sam found an abandoned dog. It had a broken leg. 
(1 1)  Sears delivered new siding to my new neighbors with the bull mastiff. 
#It's  the same dog that bit Mary Ben last summer. 
That's the same dog that bit Mary Ben last summer. 
In (lo), an entity introduced prominently in the first sentence is rendered in focus, and then 
referred  to  by  a  personal  pronoun  in  the  second.  In  (ll), an  entity  introduced  more 
peripherally in the first sentence is made activated, but not in-focus, and can be referred to 
more felicitously by a demonstrative than a personal pronoun in the second. 
This permits an explanation of the facts in section  1 in terms of the Givenness Hierarchy. 
For  example,  in  (2), at  the  conclusion  of  A's  utterance,  the  act  of  destroying the  leaf 
collection can  be  assumed  to be activated, since it was just  introduced in  the preceding 
sentence, but not in focus; the focus of  attention after the utterance is processed is on the 
referents  of  the  major  arguments  in  (2A),  specifically,  John  and  the  leaf  collection. 
Similarly, in (5), the complex situation consisting of potential drawbacks to human cloning 
is rendered activated by  the first paragraph, but  we can assume that  it is not rendered in 
focus given the higher salience conferred by this passage on cloned humans, rates of cancer, 
and  other  referents of  main  clause  arguments. Accounts of  other examples in  section  1 
proceed along similar lines. 
In  the following section, we examine factors that contribute to bringing an entity into 
focus,  including  the  role  that  information  structure  plays  in  determining  the  cognitive 
statuses of referents introduced by clauses and thus the nominal forms which can be used to 
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3.  What brings an entity into focus of attention? 
3.1.  Syntactic structure 
The framework outlined  above makes  predictions  about  the  appropriateness  of  different 
pronominal forms depending on whether or not the intended referent can be assumed to be 
in focus for the addressee. Although the theory itself does not predict what brings an entity 
into focus, Gundel et al (1993:279) suggest that "the entities in focus at a given point in the 
discourse will be that partially-ordered subset of  activated entities which  are likely to be 
continued as topics of  subsequent utterances."  Membership in this set is partly, though not 
wholly,  determined  by  syntactic  structure.  For example,  subjects  and  direct  objects  of 
matrix sentences are more likely to bring an entity into focus than elements in  subordinate 
clauses and prepositional phrases. For similar reasons, the focus of attention at the end of an 
utterance is more likely to be on the thematic arguments of the verb of  a clause within the 
utterance (including the main clause), than on the proposition, fact, or situation expressed 
by that clause  (cf. the Centering Algorithms of Grosz, Joshi and Weinstein  1983, 1995). 
A fact or proposition  introduced by an NP within  a clause is  thus  more  likely to be 
brought  into focus than  one which  is introduced  by  the whole clause. Compare (12) and 
(13) with the examples in (3) and (4) above, for example. 
(12)  a.  At that moment, Maria brought up another fact. It sent shivers down my 
spine. 
b.  Alex then introduced a new proposition. But it was immediately pooh- 
poohed. 
(13)  Last November, Bailey and Daniel Halperin of the University of California 
San Francisco wrote an article for The Lancet in which they pointed to evidence 
that circumcision protects against HIV, and accused public health agencies of 
disregarding it. [New Scientist, July 8, 2000: 181 
A possible reason for why nominal forms are more likely to bring an entity into focus is 
that  they  are not  higher  order expressions.  The difference  in  semantic type determines 
different  referential  behavior, possibly  correlated with  different criteria of  individuation. 
Hegarty  (2001)  discusses  this  connection,  proposing  that  the  denotation  domains  of 
nominal  expressions  such  as  those  in  (12)  are  unordered  sets,  and  that  elements  of 
unordered sets are conceptualized as fully individuated, discrete objects, akin to concrete 
objects.  Like  concrete  objects,  they  can  be  rendered  immediately  in  focus  upon  their 
introduction into a discourse, depending, as in (10)-(1 I), on whether they are introduced in 
a sufficiently central syntactic position within the introducing sentence. 
3.2.  Less overt factors 
Conditions which appear to boost the salience of entities also include less overt factors such 
as presuppositions  and prior beliefs, and even inquisitive looks, all of which can cause an Information Structure and The Accessibility of Clausally Introduced Referents 
entity to be "reprocessed",  and thus brought into focus, even when it is overtly mentioned 
only once (see Borthen et al  1997 and Gundel et a1  1999). 
In  (14), a baseline case for comparison, the speaker, upon clausally introducing the fact 
that  linguists  earn  less  than  computer  scientists,  can  assume that  this  fact  is  rendered 
activated, but  not  in-focus, for the hearer, leading to a preference for that over  it  in  the 
follow-up reference to this fact. 
(14)  a.  1  hear linguists earn less than computer scientists, and that's terrible. 
b.  ??I  hear linguists earn less than computer scientists, and it's terrible. 
In  (15), in  contrast, the follow-up reference is made by  another speaker, which results in 
somewhat more complicated inferences regarding the cognitive status of the fact at issue. 
(15)  Speaker A:  I just read that linguists earn less than computer scientists. 
Speaker B:  (i.)  That's terrible!  (ii.)  It's terrible! 
At the completion of A's utterance, B can assume that the fact that linguists earn less than 
computer scientists is at least activated for A. In response B(i), B signals the assumption 
that  this  fact  has  been  activated,  but  possibly  not  brought  into  focus by  A's  utterance, 
thereby  inviting  A  to  infer  that  the fact  is  news  to  B. In  response  B(ii), B  signals the 
assumption that the fact is in focus for A, or ought to be, consistent with it being accepted 
background  information for discourse in  the relevant  social circle; this  invites A to  infer 
that B already knew the fact. 
In (16) below, the proposition that B has a dental appointment is clausally introduced by 
A's  utterance. This, by itself, suffices to activate the proposition, but  not to bring it into 
focus, accounting for why the response (l6)B' sounds unnatural. 
(16)  A:  You have a dental appointment at noon. 
B:  That's true.  B':  ??It's true.  B":  It's true, then. 
But  (16)B"  is  noticeably  more  acceptable  than  (16)B'.  Following Gundel, Borthen  and 
Fretheim (1999), we suggest an explanation of  this fact, drawing on a relevance-theoretic 
approach to the pragmatics of language understanding (Sperber and Wilson  1986195).  then 
in B"  functions as an interpretive particle which conveys the meaning that the content of the 
sentence it is appended to follows by way of  inference from something the addressee just 
said. The response by  B  in  (16)B"  means essentially, "Given  A's  assertion that I have a 
dental appointment at noon, then I can take it as confirmed that I have a dental appointment 
at noon." The only way B's utterance can yield contextual effects for A is if A's utterance 
confirmed the truth of  a proposition that  B had been questioning, and B knows that A is 
aware of this. Thus, the fact that B had a dental appointment at 3 was not activated for the 
first time by A; rather, A's  utterance brought  into focus a fact that was already mutually 
manifest to both A and B beforehand, thereby licensing the use of it in B". 
Salience can also be boosted non-linguistically. For example, the exchange in (17) below 
is fully natural if A gives B a skeptical look during the indicated pause. Michael Hegarty, Jeanette K. Gundel & Kaja Borthen 
(17)  A:  Why didn't you come to the rehearsal yesterday? 
B:  I thought I told you. I had to help Peter move. (Pause) It's true! 
The skeptical  look communicates A's skepticism  about the truth  of  the proposition just 
expressed  by  B,  thus  causing  the  proposition  that  B  has  to  help  Peter  move  to be 
reprocessed  (by  both  A  and  B)  and  assuring  that  it  is  mutually  in  focus,  making  it 
accessible to reference with it. 
Salience of an entity in the environment also suffices for pronominal reference with it. If 
A and B are in a room together with a baby who suddenly begins to walk, A can produce 
the utterance in (IS), or, if A sees B watching the baby walk, the utterance in (19). 
(18)  Will you look at that! The baby's walking. (Jackendoff 2001) 
(19)  Isn't it great?  [it = the fact that the baby is walking] 
3.3. The referential behavior of different types of clausally introduced referents 
Another factor which  seems to  have an effect on  whether or  not  a clausally  introduced 
entity  is  brought  into  focus  is  the  degree  of  world  immanence  of  the  entity  and, 
correlatively, its manner and degree of individuation. Asher (1993) suggests that there is a 
spectrum of world immanence. Events and states, which have causal, spatial and temporal 
properties, have high world immanence:  "purely abstract objects"  such as propositions and 
thoughts have very low world immanence, and their individuation principles depend more 
on the means we use to describe them than  on  independent properties  of  objects  in  the 
world. Facts and situations are somewhere in between. Interestingly, this distinction appears 
to correlate with the accessibility to reference with it versus this or that when the entities in 
question are introduced by clausal constituents. Events, whose individuation properties are 
largely  independent  of  the  means  we  use  to  describe  them,  have  referential  properties 
similar to those of concrete objects and other referents denoted by nominal constituents of 
clauses, as seen in  (20), where either it or a demonstrative this/that can refer to the event 
described in the first clause. 
(20)  a.  John broke a priceless vase. That happened at noon.  [that = the event] 
b.  John broke a priceless vase.  It happened at noon. [it = the event] 
Such facts are explained if  we assume that the individuating properties that events share 
with  referents of  nominal constituents make it more likely that they will be brought into 
focus immediately subsequent to  their  introduction  with  a full clause. The addressee,  in 
processing the first sentence in (20), posits a relation  'break'  between John and a vase, and 
this  relation  involves  an  event  of  John  breaking  the  vase.  In  the  terms  of  Discourse 
Representation  Theory,  with  an  underlying  event  semantics  for  active  verbs,  the 
introduction of  break'(u,  v,  e),  into a DRS, for discourse entities u, v  satisfying John@) 
and vase(v), requires a discourse entity e for the event in which John broke the vase. 
' Since tl~at  merely requires activation of its referent, and anything in focus is also activated, in focus entities 
can be referenced with either that or it. 
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Situations are somewhat less accessible to reference with it, as seen in (21). 
(21)  a.  John broke a priceless vase. Thatlthis was intolerable to the embassy. 
b.  John broke a priceless vase. ??It was intolerable to the embassy. 
The predicate  intolerable in  (21) precludes  an interpretation on  which the demonstrative 
pronoun refers to the event of John breaking the vase, since an event is unchangeable once 
it has occurred, and thus cannot fail to be tolerated. The situation of John breaking the vase, 
in  contrast, includes  its  ramifications,  and those at least,  are subject to amelioration  or 
change, making it sensible to say that the situation is intolerable to the embassy, which will 
therefore require  a change in the situation  (realized as a change in the consequences or 
ramifications)  without any change in  the associated event in  which  the vase was broken. 
The inclusion, or potential inclusion, of ramifications as part of  a situation, but not as part 
of  an  event, is  plausibly what  makes  a situation not  clearly delimited  in  spatiotemporal 
extent, and therefore less fully or clearly individuated upon introduction than an event. 
Thus, situations,  which  are  less world  immanent than  events, and less susceptible to 
individuation by  spatiotemporal extent, are also less likely to be brought into focus upon 
first introduction with a full clause. The examples in (1) and (5) bear this out.  Example (3) 
shows  that  facts  pattern  with  situations,  and  not  with  events,  in  their  availability  for 
subsequent  pronominal  reference.  Finally,  as  examples  (4)  and  (6)  show,  clausally 
introduced propositions, which  lie at the low end of  the world  immanence spectrum, are 
typically  not  available  for  subsequent  pronominal  reference  with  it.  The  proposition 
expressed by  an  utterance  is  activated by that utterance but  is typically  not brought  into 
focus. 
In  order for an utterance to bring some entity into focus it  is  necessary, (though not 
sufficient) that the entity be directly expressed as part of  the propositional content of the 
utterance. This explains, at least partly, the contrast between events on the one hand, and 
situations, facts and  propositions  on  the  other.  Speech  acts  (i.e.  acts  performed  by  an 
utterance, which are not part of the propositional content) are thus never brought into focus, 
and consequently inaccessible to subsequent reference with  'it'.  This is illustrated in (22) 
and  (23). 
(22)  Thorne:  So  you fired her? 
Eric:  We're going to do a lot more than just fire her, Thorne. 
Thorne:  What does that mean?  (from the TV soap opera "The Bold and the 
Beautiful") 
#What does it mean? 
(23)  A.  John snores. 
B.  That's rude. 
B'.  It's rude. 
In (22), the demonstrative that is interpreted as referring to Eric's statement 'We're going to 
do more than just fire her'. This interpretation is impossible if  that is replaced with it, and Michael Hegarty, Jeanette K. Gundel & Kaja Borthen 
the  resulting  sentence  is  thus  unacceptable  in  this  context.  In  (23),  the  demonstrative 
pronoun that in (B) is ambiguous between an interpretation where it refers to the act of John 
snoring and an interpretation where it refers to A's illocutionary act of  informing B of this 
fact. By contrast , (23B') can only have the former interpretation. 
4.  The role of information structure 
The cognitive status, and therefore the accessibility to pronominal reference, of a clausally 
introduced entity is partly constrained by the information structure of the utterance in which 
it is introduced into a disc ours^.^ In  particular, information structure yields some striking 
effects, but  also a surprising asymmetry, when higher  order entities are introduced by (or 
within) clausal complements. 
Entities introduced by clausal complements to bridge verbs, such as think, believe, and 
say, exhibit  the  familiar pattern  of  being  rendered  activated,  but  not  in-focus,  through 
mention by  a clause. This is shown by the naturally occurring example in  (24) below, as 
well as by the constructed data in (25), tested on a small survey of English speakers6 
(24)  Ising reportedly believed that his negative results would hold in higher dimensions 
as well. 
In this conjecture he was wrong.  (American Scientist 88:385) 
In this/ #it, he was wrong. 
(25)  A:  Alex believes [F that the company destroyed the FILE]. 
B:  That's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge 
B':  #It's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge. 
When (25A) is used with the focus-structure shown, to introduce the proposition  that the 
company destroyed the file, the response by B using that is much more felicitous than the 
response with it. However, it and that are equally good when the complement clause is in 
the ground (theme; topic) of A's utterance, as in (26A). 
(26)  A:  Alex  INSISTSEiELIEVES] that the company destroyed the file. 
B:  But that'slit's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge. 
5  By information structure, we mean a bifurcation of material in an utterance into what has been called focus 
versus ground, comment versus  topic, or rheme versus theme. This notion  is  not  to be  identified  with 
contrastive focus or with  the more general distinction between  new versus old information. Information 
structural focus is  also distinct from the  cognitive status  'in  focus'.  See Vallduvi (1990)  and  Gundel 
(1999a)  for more detailed discussion of related terminological  and  conceptual issues. We will  indicate 
information structural focus by the subscript 'F'. 
6  The use of it in (24) would be just as infelicitous if the PP were not preposed. Thus, the infelicity of it in 
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Since an entity associated with the ground (theme; topic) is already at least familiar to the 
addressee  prior  to  the  utterance  (see  Gundel  1988  inter  alia),  its  mention  within  the 
utterance  suffices to  bring it into the focus of  attention, if  it  does not  already have that 
status. 
In  (24)-(26), relational  givenness/newness  and  referential  givenness/newness  (in  the 
sense of  Gundel  1988, 1999a,b) are coextensive. For example, the information structural 
focus in (25)  represents a proposition that is not only new in relation to the topic (what Alex 
believes), but also referentially new to the hearer; and the clausal complement in the ground 
of  (26) expresses a proposition  which  is not  only given  in  relation  to  the informational 
structural focus, but also referentially  given in  the sense of  being already at least familiar 
and probably  also activated. But material  in  the informational  focus doesn't  have to be 
referentially new (see Gundel 1980, 1999a,b, Vallduvi 1990, Lambrecht 1994). So  when we 
have a bridge verb  complement which is an  information structural  focus, but  is already 
activated  in  the  discourse,  which  factor  wins  out?  Is  an  entity  expressed  by  such  a 
complement  rendered  in  focus  or  does  it  remain  merely  activated?  Is  it  accessible  to 
reference with it, or only with that?  Consider (27B2). 
(27)  Al:  I believe that the company destroyed the file, but not everybody does. 
B 1:  What does Alex believe? 
A2:  Alex believes [F that the company destroyed the file]. 
B2:  But it'slthat's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge. 
(27B2) suggests that it is referential  givenness (i.e. cognitive status of a discourse entity), 
and  not  relational  givenness  (i.e.  topic-focus  structure),  that  determines  whether  the 
complement of a bridge verb will be brought into focus. 
But now flip the problem around. Content in the topiclground of an utterance does not 
always have a high  degree  of  referential givenness. It's cognitive  status may be merely 
familiar, but not necessarily activated.  So when we have a bridge verb complement which 
is ground material, but new to the discourse, which factor wins out? Is an entity introduced 
by such a complement rendered  in-focus, because it is in the ground, or merely activated, 
because it is new to the discourse? Is it  accessible to reference with it, or only with  that? 
Consider (28) [secondary stress on murdered]: 
(28)  a.  Alex is hopeless. 
b.  He [F INSISTS] that Tom was murdered, for example, 
c.  -- even though there's not a shred of evidence for that. 
-- even though there's not a shred of evidence for it. 
Use of  it is as felicitous  as that in  (28c). The information  structure of  (28b) forces the 
addressee to accept the content of the complement clause as already familiar, so that (2%) 
renders  it  in  focus,  making  it  available  to  reference  using  it.  Thus,  presentation  of  a 
clausally introduced entity in the ground of an utterance is another way to promote salience, 
and bring the entity into focus, even if it is, in fact, new to the discourse. Michael Hegarty, Jeanette K. Gundel & Kaja Borthen 
With bridge verb complements, we thus appear to have an asymmetric situation: bifurcation 
into focuslground has no effect on the cognitive status of  an  entity introduced within the 
information structural focus.7 But it can have an effect when an entity is mentioned (even 
introduced) within ground material, because mention  within the ground necessarily signals 
a higher cognitive status for the entity. This conclusion is preliminary, however, in that the 
judgments are subtle, and naturally occurring data that would bear directly on the issue is 
sparse. 
5.  Lexical structure versus information structure 
When  the  bridge  verb  in  (25)-(28)  is  replaced  with  a factive  verb,  demonstrative and 
personal  pronouns can both  be used to  immediately refer  to  the entity expressed  by the 
complement clause, regardless of  the information structure of  A's  utterance. (Constructed 
data surveyed on a sample of English speakers.) 
(29)  A.  Alex verified that the company destroyed the file. 
B.  That's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge. 
B'.  It's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge. 
Thus, the contrast in (25) between subsequent reference with it versus that is not exhibited 
in (29), and the contrast between  (25) and (26), exhibiting a partial effect of  information 
structure on  cognitive status, is  also  absent.  The lexical  semantics  of  the  factive verb 
enforces  the  condition  that  the  entity  expressed  by  the  complement  clause  be  already 
familiar (or at least capable of being accommodated as familiar) to the addressee, so that its 
further mention in A's utterance renders this entity in focus. 
In  order to understand this fully, it is useful to note that this pattern  is not confined to 
complements of factive verbs. It is also obtained in complements to certain non-factive (and 
non-bridge) verbs, including agree, emphasize, deny, and doubt, and in complements to the 
non-factive adjectival predicate be certain.' 
(30)  a.  Alex and Susan agree that the company destroyed the file. 
I'm surprised that they believe it. 
b.  Alex and Susan agree that the company destroyed the file. 
I'm surprised that they believe that. 
(31)  A:  Alex is certain that the company destroyed the file. 
B:  That's false: the file has been submitted to the district judge. 
B':  It's false: the file has been submitted to the district judge. 
'  Gundel (1999a) makes a similar observation, concluding that mention  within  the information  structural 
focus (her 'semantic focus')  doesn't  necessarily bring an entity into focus of attention. 
8  Cattell  (1978)  noticed  that  these  non-factives  pattern  with  factives  in  wh-extraction  from  their 
complements. See also Melvold (1991), Hegarty (1992), and Schulz (1999) for discussion of this class of 
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As with factive predicates, the pattern  in (30)-(31) is one in which it is at least as felicitous 
as that in referring to the content of the complement clause, and, in some cases, more so. 
The predicates  in  (30)-(31) are not  factive  (in the sense made clear by  Kiparsky  and 
Kiparsky 197  1) since they don't commit the speaker of the ascription in which they occur to 
the truth  of their complement clauses. However, they share with factives a slightly more 
subtle  semantic  property:  they  are  felicitous  when  the  proposition,  fact,  or  situation 
expressed by  the  complement clause is  not  an  entirely new  entity, but  rather,  an  entity 
already accepted  as given  or familiar  in  the discourse.  The ascriptions  with  agree and 
certain  in  (30)-(31),  as  well  as  the  factive  ascription  in  (29), would  be  odd if  used  to 
introduce  into the discourse the fact or proposition  that  the company destroyed the file. 
Using  a  situation  variable  in  the  semantics,  in  the context of  Discourse Representation 
Theory (Kamp and Ryle  1993), the interpretation of the factive ascription in  (29) can be 
expressed by  the Discourse Representation  Structure  (DRS) shown  in  (32) below.'  The 
ascriptions with agree and certain in (30)-(31), though  non-factive, would have identical 
DRS's, with trivial substitution of the verb denotations. 
In  contrast, a belief  ascription such as that  in (25A), using a bridge verb,  is interpreted 
semantically  as  just  a  relation  between  Alex  and  the  proposition  expressed  by  the 
complement clause. A DRS for (25A) is presented in (33). 
%, 
u, v, Z, S 
Alex (u) 
Company (v) 
File (z) 
destroy (v, z, s) (wo) 
verify (u, hw[ destroy (v, z, s)(w) I) 
Of  course, the ascription made by A in  (25) could express a proposition which is already 
familiar to the hearer. The property distinguishing bridge verbs from the factive and other 
predicates discussed here is not that  the content of the bridge verb complement must be 
\, 
9  Subordinate DRSs are abbreviated as formulas here to save space. For semantic representations using a 
situation variable, see Ginzburg (199Sab), and, for similar structures with an event variable, Higginbotham 
(1985,  1989). Schultz (1999) presents a proposal  very  similar  in  spirit to that  represented  in  (32), but 
implemented quite differently in the context of Heim's (1982) File Card Semantics. 
u, V,  2,  S 
Alex (u) 
Company (v) 
File (z) 
believe (u, hw[ 3s[destroy (v, z, s)(w)] I) Michael Hegarty, Jeanette K. Gundel & Kaja Borthen 
unfamiliar, but only that  it can be. Bridge verbs, unlike other predicates discussed here, do 
not assume the familiarity of the content of the complement. 
Interrogatives  pattern  with  factive  complements  with  regard  to  the  status  of  abstract 
entities mentioned by or within them. Naturally occurring data are shown in (34) and (39'' 
(34)  One common attribute of a scientist is an unusually acute sense of numbers and their 
implications. I think it was Bertrand Russell who once observed that mankind would 
rather  commit  suicide  than  learn  arithmetic.  In  other  words,  the  meaning  and 
implications of  some numbers  are often  lost on  most people - even  when  those 
numbers bring  a  very  important  message.  George Bernard  Shaw stated  that  one 
distinguishing  characteristic  of  an  educated  person  is  that  he  or  she  can  be 
emotionally moved by statistics. 
A sense of  numbers -  why do I dwell on this observation? Perhaps it's because 
we who come from a background of  engineering, mathematics and science tend to 
convey  concepts  and  findings  in  terms  of  numbers;  yet  many  for  whom  our 
messages  are  intended  find  our  communications  (full  of  numbers  as  they  are) 
unappetizing,  boring,  unconvincing  and  a  bit  standoffish.  (American  Scientist 
88:378) 
(35)  Where and for how  long  saguaro,  cardon,  and organ  pipe  lived  together  before 
moving into the Sonoran Desert is currently unknown. Thus, we do not know where 
these species evolved the phenological differences that reduce their joint reliance for 
pollination on a single species of nectar-feeding bat. 
One hint about this, however, comes from geographic variation in the timing of 
peak flowering in organ pipe. [This can be felicitously replaced with it here, without 
affecting interpretation:] 
One hint  about it, however, comes from geographic variation  in  the timing of 
peak flowering in organ pipe. [it = where these species evolved the differences that 
reduce their joint reliance for pollination on a single species of nectar-feedingbat.] 
Constructed data has been  tested on  a small survey of English  speakers, with the results 
shown in (36)-(37). 
(36)  A:  Alex wonders whether the company destroyed the file. 
B: It's not likely. The file contained no incriminating information. 
B: That's not likely. The file contained no incriminating information. 
[itlthat = that the company destroyed the file] 
(37)  a.  Alex wonders who destroyed the file; it has impeded the investigation. 
b.  Alex wonders who destroyed the file; that has impeded the investigation. 
[ittthat = that someone destroyed the file] 
'O  Also, note  that  the  first  paragraph  of  (35) could  felicitously  be  followed  by  it  is  a  nzj'sten,,  with  it 
interpreted as specified at the end of the example. 
124 Information Structure and The Accessibility of Clausally Introduced Referents 
The possibility  of  immediate subsequent  reference  with  a personal  pronoun  in  (36)-(37) 
follows  from  the  presuppositional  nature  of  questions.  To  simplify,  within  DRT,  the 
wonder-ascription  in (36A) should be represented with a DRS of the form shown in (38), 
where  cp  is an  appropriate  relation  between  Alex  and the proposition p specified  on  the 
penultimate line of the DRS." 
(38) 
Interpreted as in (38), the wonder-ascription in (36A) is a question about the proposition 
that the company destroyed the file. This should be the form of any semantic account of the 
wonder-ascription  which captures the presuppositionality  of  the embedded question: the 
proposition that the company destroyed the file must be an established discourse entity prior 
to the utterance of  (36A), or it must be accommodated in  the sense of  Heim (1982).  The 
assertive  content of  (36A)  should be captured  in  the  last  line  of  the  DRS,  cp.  On  one 
realization of 9,  given in Hegarty (2001), (36A) asserts that Alex is in the state of wonder 
with respect to the proposition that p holds of the actual world, w,. 
The embedded interrogative in (37) is also presuppositional: it pertains to the property 
that holds (across worlds) of those who destroyed the file, and asserts of  it that Alex  is in 
the relation of  wonder to this property instantiated on the actual world. The property must 
be  either established prior to the utterance of  (37), or accommodated on the occasion of 
utterance. A DRS expressing the semantic interpretation of the wonder-ascription  in (37) 
should therefore have the form shown in (39). 
.  . 
- 
u, v, z,  s, p 
Alex (u) 
Company (v) 
File (z) 
P(w) = hwhu3s[destroy (x,  z, s)(w)] 
cp 
u, v, z,  s, p 
Alex (u) 
Company (v) 
File (z) 
p(w) = hw3s[destroy (v, z, s)(w)] 
cp 
A simple representation of the assertion of the wonder-ascription in (37) is cp = wonder (a, 
P(w0)). 
I  I  To unsimplify, questions are, in fact, constrained not only by the formal semantic condition captured here, 
but  by  rich  contextual conditions on what  would  count as a  suitable answer  to  a question  in  a  given 
context. See Ginzburg  (1995ab)  and  Asher  and  Lascarides  (1998).  The important  point,  for present 
purposes, is that these accounts would incorporate, and add to, the presuppositional condition given here. 
The proposals  sketched here would  therefore be a part  of  an  account given  according  to these  richer 
theories of the interpretation of questions. Michael Hegarty, Jeanette K. Gundel & Kaja Borthen 
The content of p, specified in  the penultimate line of  the DRS in  (38), is thus mentioned 
again within the condition  cp. The penultimate line in (38) thus enforces double processing 
of the proposition that the company destroyed the file, rendering it in-focus at completion of 
the wonder-ascription in (36A). The penultimate line in (39) does the same for the property 
"destroy the file"  at completion of the wonder-ascription in (37). Thus the penultimate line 
expressing the presuppositionality of questions in (38) and (39) is analogous to the effect of 
the penultimate line of the DRS for factive (and similar) ascriptions, in (32) above. 
Thus, the presuppositionality  involved in  the lexical structure of  a factive (or related) 
predicate,  and  the  semantic  presuppositionality  of  embedded  questions,  are  additional 
factors which  can bring an entity into focus. In  these cases, information structure has no 
bearing on the cognitive status of the clausally introduced entity. 
6.  Conclusion 
In  this  paper,  we  addressed  the  fact  that  clausally  introduced  entities,  immediately 
subsequent to their introduction into a discourse, are typically accessible to reference with a 
demonstrative pronoun, but not with the personal pronoun it. We found that this fact can be 
explained on the basis of the observation that such entities are typically activated, but not 
brought into focus, upon their introduction to a discourse. However, clausally introduced 
entities  are,  in  fact,  sometimes  referenced  with  it  immediately  subsequent  to  their 
introduction.  An  examination  of  the  discourse  environments  in  which  this  is  possible 
provides important insights into the various syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic factors that 
can boost the salience of an entity and bring it into focus. 
We've shown that  information structure, in  the sense of a focuslground bifurcation, is 
one such factor when an entity is mentioned with a bridge verb complement, but only in a 
way which  is asymmetric, depending on whether the entity is mentioned  within  focal or 
non-focal material. When the complement is focal, there is no effect: the cognitive status of 
an  entity  expressed  by  a  focal  complement  depends  entirely  on  the  referential 
givennesslnewness (i.e. the cognitive status) of the entity. But when the complement is part 
of the ground (topicltheme), the entity is brought into focus. 
In  factive complements and embedded questions, the lexical nature of  the embedding 
predicate and the semantic nature of the construction require an entity mentioned with the 
subordinate clause to be  treated as referentially  given  independently of  the  information- 
structure of the utterance. 
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Although the linear order of arguments (and adverbials) in German is relatively free, it 
underlies  certain  restrictions;  these  don't  apply  to  the  so-called  unmarked  order for 
arguments (Lenerz 1977) and adverbials (FreyIPittner 1998). It is a common assumption 
to take the unmarked order as basic and derive all other orders from it by scrambling, 
whatever  its  specific  characteristics  may  be  (cf.,  amongst others, HaiderIRosengren 
1998). The observable  restrictions  obtaining  for some linear  ordering  may  then  be 
considered  as constraints  on  a movement operation  (scrambling).  Some well  known 
restrictions are given in  (I), exemplified by the linear order of  indirect (10) and direct 
object (DO). In the examples (2) -  (4), the focussed NP is the questioned argument, e.g. 
Q:IO in (2): 
(1)  a.  [fdef 101 z  [kdef DO] : "unmarked order", regardless of focus position 
(cf. (2a), (3a), (4a)). 
b.  [+def DO] > [IO].G  : scrambling of [+def, -F] is ok (cf. (2b)). 
c.  *[kdef DOIF> I0  =Don't  scramble focus !  (cf. (3)) 
d.  *[-def DO] z  Don't scramble (existential)  indefinites !  (cf. (4)) 
(2)  Wem hast du das Buch gegeben?  Q :  I0 
'Whom did you give the book 1' 
a.  Ich habe [demleinem StuDENten]~  das Iein Buch gegeben. 
[kdef. IO]F  > [kdef. DO] 
I  have  the/  a  student  the /a  book given 
("unmarked order") 
b.  Ich habe das Buch [demleinem StuDENten]~  gegeben 
[+def. DO] > [fdef. IO]F 
I  have  the book  the /  a  student  given 
(scrambled [+def DO,-F] is 0.k.) 
'I gave the book to the student.' 
(3)  Was hast du dem Studenten gegeben?  Q:DO 
'What did you give to the student?' 
a.  Ich habe dem Studenten [das BUCHIF gegeben. 
[+def. 101 > [+def. DOIF 
I  have  the  student  the  book  given  ( "unmarked order") 
b.  *?Ich habe [das BUCHIF  dem Studenten gegeben. 
*[+def. DOIF  > [+def. 10] 
I  have  the  book  the  student  given  (*scrambled focus) 
'I gave the student the book.' 
ZAS Papers in Linguisrics 23, 2001, 129-139 (4)  Wem hast du ein Buch gegeben?  Q : I0 
'Whom did you give a book?' 
a.  Ich habe [demleinem StuDENten]~  ein Buch gegeben 
[kdef. IOIF  > [-def. DO] 
I  have  the/  a  student  a  book  given 
("unmarked order") 
b.  *Ich habe ein Buch [dem StuDENtenIF  gegeben. 
*[-def. DO] > [+def. IOIF 
I  have  a  book  the  student  given 
(*scrambled indefinite NP) 
c.  *Ich habe ein Buch [einem StuDENten]~  gegeben. 
*[-def. DO] > [-def IO]F 
I  have  a  book  a  student  given 
(*scrambled indefinite NP) 
'I gave a book to the student.' 
As the standard examples in  (2)-(4) show, I0  > DO is assumed to be the unmarked 
order for most  verbs  taking  two objects; here,  no  specific  restrictions  apply:  every 
distribution  of  definite or indefinite NP and focus is possible for that  order, cf. (2a), 
(3a), (4a). Scrambling a definite DO to the left of a focussed I0  gives a possible order, 
too, cf. (2b). If, however, the scrambled DO is a focussed NP, it must not be scrambled 
in front of an 10,  cf. (3b). Thus,  (lc) "Don't  scramble focus!" is a crucial restriction on 
scrambling in German. It  may be accounted for by the interaction  of focus placement, 
focus projection and, possibly, the proper assignment of prosodic features (cf., amongst 
others,  Biiring  1997, 2001,  von  Heusinger  1999). Thus, this  restriction  may  find  a 
plausible  functional  explanation ensuring  the proper  interpretation  of  a sentence wrt 
background-focus structure and the formal means for its expression, i.e. linear order and 
prosodic prominence. 
There is, however, an  additional restriction, for which, to my knowledge, so far no 
explanation  has  been  proposed.  As  (4b),  (4c)  show, an  indefinite DO should not  be 
scrambled across an 10,  even if the condition (lc) on focus-scrambling is not violated. 
Examples  (4b), (4c)  suggest  that  scrambling  of  an  indefinite DO is  not  possible  in 
general. As (5a), however, shows, the scrambled DO einen obszonen Witz ('an obscene 
joke') may be scrambled under certain conditions: 
(5)  Wem erziihlt  Peter einen  obszonen  Witz? ,,Whom does Peter tell  an  obscene 
joke?" 
a.  Peter erzahlt einen obszonen Witz  immer einem Schulfreund. (generic) 
Peter tells  an  obscene  joke  always a-DAT schoolmate 
'Peter tells an obscene joke always to a schoolmate.' 
As far as is known, in this case the scrambling must be to a position outside the VP, as 
indicated by the temporal adverbial immer ('always')  which is assumed to indicate the 
left  boundary  of  VP.  In  this  case, the scrambled  DO may  receive  a non-existential, 
generic reading. Thus, the proper constraint on scrambling is assumed to be (Id) "Don't 
scramble  existential  inclefinites!". Generic  indefinites,  however,  may  be  scrambled 
(provided that the sentence itself allows for a generic interpretation). Scrambling and Reference in German 
It  should be  pointed  out, however, that  this  restriction  is still too  weak:  Scrambling 
across a subject (6a) is still not possible, whereas the (generic) subject itself  may be 
scrambled as in (6b). 
(6)  a.  *weil einen obszonen Witz immer  Peter  einem Schulfreund erzahlt, 
since an  obscene  joke  always Peter a-DAT  schoolmate  tells 
b.  weil obszone Witze immer an Herrenabenden erzahlt werden. 
since obscene jokes  always on boy-nights  told  become 
'Since obscene jokes will always be told on boys' nights.' 
Thus, scrambling seems to be  also sensitive to the syntactic hierarchy of  arguments. 
Possibly, the restriction as stated above in  (Id) is also too strong: In  some cases the 
scrambling of  existential  indefinites  seems to me to  be  possible,  as  will  be  shown 
below, cf. (14b). 
In  the  following, I will  try  to  present  the  outlines  of  a possible explanation for the 
restriction (Id), based on a proposal governing the proper referential interpretation  of 
indefinite NPs. 
Before doing so, however, let me point out some crucial shortcomings of some current 
proposals. 
It  has been  assumed that syntactic structure shows a bi-partition parallel to the bi- 
partition  of  a  formula  of  standard  predicate  logic  (cf.  Diesing  1990  and  much 
consecutive discussion). A quantified logical formula like 
(7)  Vx (man (x)) 3y (woman (y) A love (x, y)) (every man loves a woman) 
may be split into a restrictive clause defining the domain of the universal quantifier (Vx 
(man (x))) and the so-called nuclear scope (3y (woman (x) A love (x, y))) containing the 
assertion being made of the individual(s) in the restrictive clause. 
(7)  a.  Vx (man (x))  1111  3y (woman (y) A love (x, y)) (every man loves a 
woman) 
restrictive clause  1111  nuclear scope 
(CP) ,,[  .... [Sadv  1111  vp[ .... I] 
V,  GEN  1111  3 
So, some authors have assumed that the part of a sentence before  the sentence adverbial 
corresponds to the restrictive clause, the part following the adverbial representing  the 
nuclear scope. The readings in  (8a,b) are thus assumed to follow from a syntactic bi- 
partition corresponding to the bi-partition of the formula of  standard predicate logic. 
(8)  a.  weil ein Feuerwehrmann,  natiirlich immer [vp ti  beREIT ]vp ist: 
generic reading 
because  a  fireman  naturally always  ready  is 
'because a fireman is of course always ready' b.  weil natiirlich immer [vp ein Feuerwehrmann beREIT Ivp ist: 
existential reading 
because naturally always  a  fireman  ready  is 
'because there is of course always a fireman ready' 
Notice, however, that there is no reason why the syntactic structure should correspond 
to a fairly arbitrary partition of a formula of standard predicate logic as the latter was 
not  devised  to  reflect  syntactic  structure  at  all.  Consequently,  a  proper  semantic 
structure giving us a compositional semantic interpretation of sentences like (8a) or (8b) 
will deviate from the fairly simple format of  (7),  as a more detailed representation  in 
categorial grammar would show immediately. Such representations are indeed based on 
the syntactic structure which is taken to be independent of semantic translations like (7) 
and exist prior to them. 
For  this  reason,  I  tried  to  provide  an  independent  motivation  for  the  syntactic bi- 
partition (Lenerz 2001). I assumed that the part preceding the sentence adverbial (thus: 
outside  the  VP)  be  interpreted  as  the  part  of  the  sentence  containing  background 
information  (B-part)  whereas  the  VP  proper  be  the  part  containing  the  focussed 
elements (F-part), i.e. the new information being asserted to hold true of the B-part. 
(7)  b.  (CP)  ,p[  .... [ Sadv  1111  vp[ .... I] 
B-part  1111  F-Part  (background vs. focus) 
b-determined reference  1111  isc-dependent reference 
(isc = immediate sentence constituent) 
This provided a first step towards an explanation of  the scrambling restriction (Id): 
The reference of the elements in  the B-part is plausibly established by background 
information  (b-determined  reference).  Thus,  indefinites  in  the  B-part  should  be 
interpreted as given or known in  their reference, hence as generic. On the other hand, 
the referential expressions in the F-part represent new information. Their reference is, 
however, restricted  by  other  referential  expressions in  the  sentence  as a  whole,  i.e. 
dependent  on  immediate sentence constituents  (isc-dependent reference).  Although  I 
think that this proposal was basically on the right track, it has two shortcomings: First, 
in the light of recent work of Frey (2000) the characterization of the bi-partition into "B- 
part"  and  "F-part"  is  misguided.  Rather,  as  Frey  (2000)  points  out,  the  sentence 
adverbials  (or,  more  precisely,  possibly  the  temporal  adverbials)  marking  the  left 
boundary of the VP proper distinguish between a field containing a (number of) topic 
phrase(s) and the VP proper containing only the cominent (cf. also Rizzi  1997), cf. (12) 
below. 
Second, the restriction of the reference of isc-dependent expressions seems to me far 
more general than I assumed in Lenerz (2001). 
Let us therefore take a closer look at  the referential properties of indefinite NPs. 
Indefinite determiners may be interpreted as choice functions which pick an arbitraly 
referent out of a "reference set" which is characterized by the noun (cf. von Heusinger 
1997). The proper choice of the "reference set"  of a given  NP itself  is dependent on 
(restricted by)  the reference of  expressions  which  c-command  the NP in  D-structure 
(X t  ref.dep. t  Y = Y is referentially  dependent on /referentially  restricted by X); 
hence the  'unmarked order'  of  arguments (SU< IO< DO< V) which does not underlie Scrambling and Reference in German 
any restrictions w.r.1. context / information structure I referential status: SU t  ref.dep 
c  I0  t  ref.dep. c  DO. 
So, in (9) the indefinite NP ein Buch does not refer to any arbitrary element of the set 
of  books  but  is  in  its  reference  restricted  by  at least  the  c-commanding  referential 
expressions der Professor  and dem Studenten. A rough rendering of its interpretation 
may be given as (9b). 
(9)  a.  weil (der) Professor (dem) Studenten gestern  ein  Buch gegeben hat. 
since the professor  the-DAT student yesterday a-ACC book  given  has 
'Since the professor gave the student a book.' 
(9)  b.  ein Buch = [I  an arbitrary element of the set of books which were 
available yesterday to the professor and the student  I] 
Here, 'available' is a rather vague term synonymous with what I dubbed dependent or 
restricted further above. 
Similarly,  the  reference  of  the  indefinite  NP  einem  Studenten  in  (9c)  may  be 
paraphrased as (9d). 
(9)  C.  weil der Professor  gestem  einem  Studenten das  Buch gegeben hat. 
since the professor yesterday a-DAT student the-ACC book  given  has 
'Since the professor gave a student the book.' 
(9)  d.  einem Studenten =  [I an arbitrary element of the set of students which 
were available yesterday to the professor  I] 
The essential idea now is that an indefinite NP looses its referential dependency if it is 
scrambled. Different versions of this idea come to mind, as W. Frey (p. c.) pointed out 
to me: In a strong version, a scrambled NP looses its referential dependency altogether. 
In this view, a scrambled NP has to be interpreted as referring to an arbitrary element of 
the rzon-restricted set of  elements defined by the noun. A weaker version  would hold 
that a scrambled NP looses only the referential dependency which extends from those 
referential  expressions across  which  it  has  been  scrambled.  I have not  been  able to 
decide empirically which version is correct. One observation may be in  favor of  the 
weak  version:  Scrambling  across  an  object  NP  (IOa)  seems  to  result  in  a  weaker 
deviation than scrambling across an object and a subject (lob): 
(10)  a.  ?*wed der Professor ein  Buch  dem  Studenten gegeben hat. 
since the professor  a-ACC book  the-DAT student  given  has 
'since the professor gave a book (to) the student.' 
b.  *wed  ein  Buch  der  Professor dem  Studenten gegeben hat. 
Since  a-ACC book  the professor the-DAT student  given  has 
Similar  grades  of  ungrammaticality  may  also  be  observed  with  scrambling  across 
adverbials. This is an  area requiring some further  investigation.  It follows, however, 
from both versions that the scrambling of an indefinite NP results in a loss of its proper 
referential dependency. Thus, a proper interpretation of  the sentence will no longer be 
possible if the sentence consists of  a specific predication made of  its subject NP. So, in 
the strong version  of  the principle  of  referential dependency, an  interpretation  of  an 
ungrammatical sentence like (lob) will be something like (1 1), certainly a paraphrase of 
an utterance which does not make any sense. (1 1)  *it is  true  for  [I  any arbitrary  book  I]  that  a  specific professor  gave it  to  a 
specific student at a specific time. 
So far,  a  concept  of  the  referential  dependency  of  indefinite  NPs  will  enable us  to 
account  for the  ungrammaticality  of  scrambled  NPs  if  they  are to  be  interpreted  as 
existential. 
In  order  to  account  for  the  generic  interpretation  of  (at  least  some)  scrambled 
indefinites,  we  will  have  to  take  a  closer  look  at  the  topological  and  hierarchical 
structure  of  German  sentences.  As  Rizzi  (1997), Fry  (2000),  Freyffittner  (1998), 
Meinunger (2000) have pointed out, there are several functional projections above VP, 
giving us two or three "fields"  for scrambling. Details of the differences between the 
various proposals aside, it seems necessary to assume at least a number of topic phrases 
(TopP) above VP, constituting a field for scrambling which may also contain at most 
one Focus Phrase (FocP). Also, there is, of course, still the VP proper which is a field 
for  (VP-internal)  scrambling.  Following  Frey  (2000),  one  may  in  addition  assume 
scrambling to a field between the sentence adverbial and a temporal adverbial at the left 
periphery of the VP. 
(12)  (at least) three scrambling- "fields": 
[ CP ?[TO~P*  (FocP) TO~P*  ?[Sad" .  .  . ?[TempAdv vp[(SU) .  . . I]]] 
I shall not  be concerned with  a detailed analysis; for valuable observations and their 
theoretical implications cf. Frey (2000). For my present purpose, it suffices to point out, 
following  Frey  (2000), that  the  Topic Phrases  in  (12)  are  to  be  interpreted  not  as 
'familiarity'-topics  but  as  'aboutness'-topics. This is immediately  made clear by  the 
example (13), taken from Frey (2000). Here, the context given in  (13) provides for an 
'aboutness'-interpretation  of  the NP Otto. The following sentence (l3a) complies with 
this, as Otto is in an ('aboutness')-topic position. (13b) is not a proper successor for (13) 
since Otto in (13b) is not an 'aboutness'-topic. 
(13)  Ich erzahl dir ma1 was von Otto. ,Well, I'll tell you something about Otto.' 
a.  Nachstes Jahr wird Otto wahrscheinlich seine Kollegin  heiraten. 
next  year will  Otto probably  his  colleag~~elfem.)  marry 
'Next Year. Otto will probably marry his colleague.' 
# Nachstes Jahr wird wahrscheinlich Otto seine Kollegin  heiraten. 
next  year will  probably  Otto  his  colleague marry 
From  the  assumption  that  we  are  dealing  with  'aboutness'-topics,  it  follows 
immediately  that  non-referring  expressions  like  keiner  ('nobody'),  not  being 
'aboutness'-topics, cannot appear in this position. 
If  this is basically correct, as I assume, the possibility of a generic interpretation of 
NPs  which  have been  scrambled  to a  topic-position  follows:  If  an  indefinite  NP  is 
scrambled to a topic-position, it becomes an 'aboutness'-topic, the rest of the sentence 
being a comment on this topic. In other words, a topic-comment structure establishes a 
kind of  secondary prediction. The comment itself, containing the primary predication 
(subject-predicate, possibly represented inside the VP) has to make sense w.r.t. the topic 
it is about. Thus, a scrambled generic NP requires, of course, a generic comment, as in 
(14a). Scrambling and Reference in German 
(14)  a.  weil  naturlich  oft  mit  ihren Kindern spielen. (GEN) 
since fathers naturally ofen  with their children play 
'Since fathers do of course often play with their children.' 
If  this analysis is correct it does not follow however that a NP which is scrambled to a 
topic-position  must be interpreted as generic. Thus, given  a proper specific comment, 
the scrambled NP should also be interpretable with  a specific existential reference, as 
(14b), I believe, shows. 
(14)  b.  weil  natiirlich auch gestern mit ihren Kindern spielten. (3, specific) 
Since fathers naturally also yesterday with their children played 
'Since also yesterday fathers played with their children.' 
Notice that in my present analysis this is predicted whereas with a bi-partition analysis 
along the lines of (7a) a generic reading is stipulated, and an existential reading for a 
scrambled NP is  ruled  out. The same holds for my  previous  analysis  (7b) since the 
reference  of  a scrambled NP in  the B-part of  the sentence (referring  to  background 
knowledge) has to be taken to be established, hence an existential reading should not be 
possible. I conclude. thus, that the restriction on the scrambling of indefinites as given 
above is wrong. The correct restriction seems to be (15): 
(15)  a.  don't scramble indefinites inside the VP (=this follows from referential 
dependency) 
b.  indefinites which are scrambled to the topic-position are only allowed if 
they  can  be  interpreted  as  referentially  independent  from  referential 
expressions which they c-command in the scrambling position. 
Both  parts  of  this  condition follow  from  a  proper  theory  of  referential  dependency 
together with a proper theory of topic-comment-structure and its interpretation. Details 
of both theories will of course have to be worked out. 
In  the  rest  of  this  paper,  I  will  discuss  some  ramifications  and  some  possible 
consequences of a theory of referential dependency. 
As pointed out above, scrambling across a subject is ungrammatical  in  most cases, 
cf. (16). 
(16)  *wed Eisbaren  naturlich  Paul  gestern  fotografierte. 
Since polar bears(ACC)  naturally Paul yesterday  took-pictures-of 
This statement has to be relativized, however, given examples like (17). 
(17)  weil  Eisbaren  naturlich  alle mogen / niemand mag. (GEN) 
Since polar bears(ACC)  naturally all  like  /nobody  likes 
'Since, naturally, everybody 1 nobody likes polar bears.' 
Here a subject NP with a universal quantifier (alle 'everybody') or a negated existential 
quantifier  (niemand , 'nobody')  does  not  block  scrambling  of  the  indefinite  NP 
Eisbaren ('polar bears').  It  cannot  be  the  generic quality  of  the  subject NP  as such which allows for scrambling, as (18) shows, where the generic indefinite NP Eisbiiren 
('polar  bears')  has  been  scrambled  across the  generic  subject  NP  ein  Eskimo  ('an 
Eskimo'). 
(18)  *wed Eisbaren naturlich ein Eskimo gerne jagt. 
since polar bears naturally an Eskimo gladly hunts 
'since an Eskimo likes to hunt polar bears.' 
The facts are far from clear especially as one tends to utter sentences like (17) or (18) 
with a bridge accent, stressing the scrambled NP (Eisbaren) as well as the subject NP 
(alle,  keiner,  ein  Eskimo).  This  specific  intonation  pattern  seems  to  'rescue'  the 
sentences. (For details of a proper analysis of bridge accent structures cf. Biiring 1997, 
among others). With  normal  sentence intonation,  however,  (18)  seems to  me  to  be 
ungrammatical.  What would follow along the lines of explanation which I suggested is 
the following: 
While (17)  is  a  possible  topic-comment  structure,  (18)  is  not. In  (17), a kind  of 
'secondary  predication'  is  made  of  polar  bears  in  general:  Everybodylnobody  likes 
them.  In  (18)  however, the comment  on  the topic  phrase  Eisbaren  does  not  seem 
reasonable: It does not make much sense to assert of polar bears that in general  it is true 
that  any  (generic)  Eskimo  has  the  property  of  liking  to  hunt  them.  So, again,  an 
explanation for the constraint to scramble across referentially restricted subjects (as in 
(18), as opposed to (17) with subject NPs which are not restricted referentially) relies on 
a  proper  theory  of  referential  dependency  and  a  proper  theory  of  topic-comment 
structure and its interpretation. 
Another  observation  concerns  the  order  of  arguments  in  the  topic  field.  As 
Meinunger  (2000)  points  out, Rizzi's  (1997) proposal  of  a  series  of  topic  phrases 
wedged in between the functional projections CP on  the left and possibly IP or some 
part of it on the right, cf. (12), has to be revised: Meinunger analyzes the Topic Phrases 
as  Agreement  Phrases. Their  unmarked  hierarchical  order seems to  be  the  same as 
inside the VP, as (lYa,b,c) show. 
(19)  a.  weil Paul  seiner  Freundin  Schmuck  natiirlich  gerne  schenkt. 
since Paul his-DAT girlfriend jewelleyr(ACC) naturally gladly donates 
'Since Paul likes to give his girl friend jewellery' 
b.  *weil Paul Schmuck  seiner  Freundin  natiirlich  gerne  schenkt 
since Paul  jewellety(ACC) his-DATgirl-friend  naturally gladly donates 
c.  *weil Schmuck  Paul seiner  Freundin  naturlich  gerne  schenkt. 
Since  jewellery(ACC) Paul his-DAT girlfriend  naturally gladly donates 
All  the  arguments  in  these  sentences  are  scrambled  across  the  sentence  adverbial 
natiirlich  ('naturally'),  thus  above  the VP-projection.  If  their  ordering  violates  the 
unmarked order SV>IO>DO, as in (19b,c), the sentence is ungrammatical. If this is true, 
it indicates strongly that referential dependency does not only apply inside the VP but 
inside  the  whole  'middle  field'  of  German  sentences,  i.e.  to  the  whole  part  of  the 
sentence below the CP. 
The initial field, however, does not seem to participate in  the overall relationship of 
c-commanding referential  dependency.  Thus, a  NP  in  SpecCP retains its  referential 
dependency from its original position. Hence, movement to SpecCP does not have to 
obey the restrictions  which  hold  for scrambling; consequently,  any NP  (or any other Scrambling and Reference in German 
maximal projection) may be placed in the initial field no matter where its source in the 
base structure is. This can be shown quite clearly if  we consider possessive phrases, a 
good  example  of  referential  dependency.  A  possessive  pronoun  may  refer  to  a  c- 
commanding NP only in the unmarked order (20a): 
(20)  a.  Gestern  hat  tatsachlich (der)  Peter, seinen ,  Bruder gelobt. 
yesterday has actually  (the-NOM) Peter,  his,  -ACC  brother praised 
'Yesterday, Peter actually praised his brother.' 
b.  * Gestern  hat  tatsachlich seinen ,  Bruder  (der)  Peter, gelobt. 
yesterday has actually  his,  -ACC brother  the-NOM Peter prarsed 
c.  *Gestern  hat seinen ,  Bruder  tatsachlich der  Peter, gelobt. 
Yesterday has his,  -ACC  brother actually  the-NOM Peter, praised 
d.  Seinen ,  Bruder  hat (der)  Peter, gestern  gelobt. 
His ,-ACC  brother has the-NOM Peter, yesterday praised 
If  the possessive phrase is scrambled, as in  (20b,c), it looses its co-reference with a NP 
across which it has been scrambled. If, however, the possessive phrase is moved to the 
initial position  as in  (20d), it retains the possibility of co-reference with the subject NP 
across which it has been moved. (Non-co-referential readings of the possessive pronoun 
are possible throughout since they do not show the kind of (co)-referential dependency 
requiring the corresponding c-command relations.) 
A closer look reveals, however, that the conditions are a little more complicated if  we 
consider the interaction with adverbials. If  my judgement  is correct, then movement of 
an object NP to the sentence initial position seems only possible if the subject has been 
scrambled from its VP-internal position, as the examples in (21a-c) show. 
(21)  a.  Eisbaren  hat  Paul natiirlich  immer geliebt. 
polar bears(ACC) has Paul naturally always loved 
'Polar bears, Paul always loved them' 
b.  Eisbaren  hat natiirlich  Paul  immer  geliebt. 
polar bears(ACC)  has naturally Paul  always loved 
c.  *Eisbaren  hat  natiirlich  immer  Paul  geliebt. 
polar bears(ACC)  has naturally always  Paul loved 
The case is different if the subject is moved to SpecCP as in (22). In this case the object 
Eisbaren 'polar bears'  may either remain inside the VP (22a) or be scrambled to a topic 
position (22b). 
(22)  b.  Paul hat natiirlich  immer  Eisbaren  geliebt. 
Paul has naturally always polar bears (ACC)  loved 
a.  Paul hat  EisbLen  natiirlich  immer geliebt. 
Paul has polar bears(ACC) naturally always loved 
'Paul has of course always loved polar bears.' 
Still, both  sentences  seem to have a  slightly different  interpretation.  What comes to 
mind in the present discussion is the idea that here, too, referential dependency plays a 
role.  For the  cases  in  (21), my explanation  would  be  as  follows:  Let  us  assume  a 
referential dependency between the subject and the temporal  adverbial. If  the definite subject Paul stays in its base position inside the VP, as in (21a), the temporal adverbial 
immer  ('always')  is  not  restricted  referentially.  Thus,  (21a)  would  have  the 
interpretation that for  all times in the universe it be true that the specific individual Paul 
loves polar  bears, clearly not a reasonable  assertion, given that individuals like Paul 
only live for a specific period  of  time.  In  (21b), however, the temporal  adverbial is 
referentially dependent from the scrambled subject which c-commands it from its topic 
position. In this case, immer ('always') may only refer to all times available to Paul, as 
it were, giving the intended interpretation. Similar considerations will apply to the slight 
difference in meaning between (22a) and (22b). Whatever the details of the analysis will 
turn out to be, what (21) and (22) show us is that there exists some paradoxical kind of 
interaction between scrambling and movement to SpecCP which has to be investigated 
in more detail: A temporal adverbial seems to be referentially dependent from a subject 
in  SpecCP. This looks as if  movement to  SpecCP presupposes  scrambling to a topic 
position in which the required referential dependency is established. On the other hand, 
an object in SpecCP seems to retain its referential dependency from its base position. 
As regards possessive phrases, they also show that  it  is necessary to assume such an 
interaction between scrambling and movement to the initial position. As (23a) shows, 
scrambling of  the definite I0  dein Otto ('the-DAT Otto') to a topic position enables us 
to  interpret  the  subject  NP  sein  Vater  ('his  father')  with  a  co-referent  possessive 
pronoun, as indicated by the indices. This is not possible for (23b). Here, the subject is 
scrambled to a topic position  in which its possessive pronoun is not c-commanded by 
the  co-referential  NP  Otto, hence  cannot  be  interpreted  as  referentially  dependent. 
(Again, as in (20), non-co-referential readings are possible.) 
(23)  a.  Allerdings wird dem Ottoi wahrscheinlich sein, Vater t das Auto 
ausleihen. 
Indeed  will  the-DAT Ottoj probably  hisj  father  the car  lend 
'Indeed, Otto's father will probably lend him the car.' 
b.  *Allerdings wird seini Vater wahrscheinlich t dem Ottoi das Auto 
ausleihen. 
Indeed  will  hisi  father probably  the-DAT-Otto;  the cur  lend. 
(24)  a.  Sein; Vater  wird dem  Ottoi  wahrscheinlich  t  das Auto ausleihen. 
Hisi  father will the-DAT Ottoi probably  the car  lend 
'Probably, Otto's father will lend him the car.' 
b.  *Seini  Vater  wird wahrscheinlich  t  dem  Ottoi das Auto ausleihen. 
His;  father  will probably  the-DAT Otto; the car  lend 
Fronting of  the possessive  phrase in  (24a) is possible with  the co-referential reading. 
Given  the  scenario I  assumed  so far, this  is  explained  if  we  assume the  structure 
indicated  by  the  trace  in  the  VP-internal  subject  position,  i.e.  if  we  assume  an 
underlying  structure with  the  I0 scrambled  to  a  topic  position.  (24b),  however,  is 
ungrammatical with a co-referential reading. This would be explained if  we assume an 
underlying structure in which the fronted phrase originates in  the position  indicated by 
the trace. 
Many puzzles remain. What the preceding discussion of  but a few cases of  referential 
dependency, however, shows, to my mind, is that the area of application of the concept Scrambling and Reference in German 
of  referential  dependency  is  quite  diversified  and  the  crucial  facts  are  as  yet  not 
understood  very well  at all. Furthermore, it seems to me, the very  general concept of 
referential dependency, if  correct, may also be relied upon to derive the property and 
position of personal pronouns and other referential expressions. Hence, binding theory 
and a proper theory of the interaction of quantifiers may eventually turn out to follow 
from a general theory of referential dependency yet to be elaborated. 
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Abstract 
Sentence  mood  in  German  is  a complex  category  that  is  determined  by  various 
components of  the grammatical system. In  particular, verbal mood, the position of  the 
finite verb and the wh-characteristics of  the so called 'Vorfeld'-phrase are responsible 
for the constitution of  sentence mood  in  German. This article proposes a theory  of 
sentence mood  constitution in  German  and  investigates the  interaction  between  the 
pronominal  binding  of  indefinite noun  phrases  which  are  semantically analyzed  as 
choice functions. It  is shown that the semantic objects determined by  sentence mood 
define different kinds of  domains which have to be uniquely accessible as the range of 
the choice function. The various properties of  the  pronominal binding  of  indefinites 
can be derived by  the interplay of  the proposed theoretical notions. 
1.  Introduction 
Since at least Frege (1892) a sentence is analyzed as a mood operator that is combined 
with a proposition. While Frege introduced only an assert operator (!), Stenius (1967) 
and, in  following contributions Lewis (1970), Bierwisch (1980) and others', proposed 
that sentences contain two components in general: a mood or attitude component and a 
propositional component, the sentence radical. 
(1)  sentence 
/\ 
Imood  ]  {radical  )  (Stenius 1967) 
attidute  proposition  (Bierwisch 1980) 
Montague (1974) claimed that the formulation of truth conditions for declaratives have 
to  be  extended  to  fulfillment  conditions  in  order  to  capture  imperatives  and 
interrogatives  adequately.  Hausser  (1980),-using  the  Montegovian  framework, 
proposed  a  semantic analysis  for various  sentence  moods  which  tries to explain the 
differences by  assigning to each sentence mood a different logical type. Brand  et al. 
(1992), ReisJRosengren  (1992) developed  a compositional  system of  sentence moods 
which  tries  to account  for the various  kinds of  wh-constructions  in  a compositional 
fashion by  strictly using the grammatical means in order to drive the semantic effects 
for interpretation. In  Cheng (1991)  and  Brandner  (2000) wh-movement  is  analyzed 
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view about the topic of sentence mood. 
ZAS Papers in Linguistics 23, 2001, 141  -157 under  the perspective of  sentence type marking. The purpose of  clausal  typing  is to 
mark the illocutionary force of a sentence. In  a similar way, I suggest, the force phrase 
mentioned in Chomsky (1 995) and Rizzi (I  997) has to be interpreted. 
In  Lohnstein  (2000) a compositional theory of  sentence mood  is developed  which 
makes crucial use of  the category verbal mood and the syntactic operations of  A-bar- 
and head movement. This theory takes verbal mood to be a functional category which 
projects a mood phrase MP as being the highest projection of  the clause. It licenses a 
specifier position and takes as functional argument a tense phrase TP. The differences in 
the lexical fillings of the head position Ma, and the specifier position SpM of the MP, 
lead  to  different  sentence  moods  and  their  respective  interpretations  in  a  strictly 
compositional  fashion. The ingredients of  the composition belong to the interpretation 
of the  different  verbal  moods,  the  index  partitioning  property  of  propositions,  the 
semantic characteristics of [+ wh]-phrases (being A-bar moved to the position SpM) and 
the contribution of  head-movement  of  the finite verb from the base position Vo to MO 
passing  I". By  this  means  the  head  movement  constraint  (HMC)  first  proposed  by 
Travis (1984) is obeyed. It  is  shown  that  verbal  moods,  in  analogy  to  the  temporal 
interpretation of tense, determine relations between the actual world and alternatives to 
it. The differences in  interpretation are related to different conversational backgrounds 
in the sense of Kratzer (I 978, 1991). 
In  this article the basic elements and operations, which appear to be necessary for a 
theory  of  sentence mood  are  introduced  and  the  semantic  properties  of  the  regular 
grammatical means are related to the semantic components and their co~uposition  in a 
1:l  fashion. This  leads to a direct mapping  between  the syntactic structures and  the 
objects of the semantic interpretation. 
The  referential  accessibility  of  indefinite  noun  phrases  by  pronominal  binding 
depends  on  the choice  of  the  sentence mood. As  proposed  in  Egli  (1991) and  von 
Heusinger (1996, 1997) noun phrases can be interpreted by a term building &-operator, 
which is interpreted as a choice function mapping the donation of  a noun (i.e. a set of 
individuals)  to  some member  of  that  set.  Various  data belonging  to  the  interaction 
between sentence mood and the binding of indefinite NPs allow for an explanation in 
terms of the proposed theory of sentence mood constitution and the interaction  with the 
theory which treats NPs as choice functions. As will be shown, indefinite NPs can only 
be bound by a pronoun if the range of the choice function is uniquely given. This is not 
the  case  if  the  indefinite NP  occurs  in  interrogative  contexts.  If  the  indefinite  NP 
appears in a declarative, imperative, or some other construction, its referential binding is 
less problematic. 
2.  Syntactic assumptions 
In German as well as in English (and the other Germanic languages too) not all verbal 
moods  allow  for  question  formation.  First  of  all,  the  imperative  verbal  mood  is 
incompatible with fronted [+wh]-phrases. 
(2)  *Wen bring zum Bahnhof? 
(Who bring to the station?) 
Clauses marked with subjunctive I behave similarly, Sentence mood constitution and indefinite noun phrases 
(3)  *Wen bringe er zum Bahnhof? 
Who bring (-subj  I) he to the station? 
These  sentences  are  well  formed  if  the  verbal  mood  is  changed  to  indicative  or 
subjunctive 11. 
(4)  Wen bringttbrachte Peter zum Bahnhof? 
(Who brings/(would bring) Peter to the station?) 
Furthermore, subjunctive I and imperative clauses do not form sentences which can be 
interpreted  truthfunctionally.  That  is, even  if  a  [-wh]-phrase  has  been  moved  to the 
sentence initial position, no truthfunctional evaluation is possible. Note that, although 
[+wh]-movement  is prohibited  in  the  case of  imperatives  -see  (2) and  (3)-,  [-wh]- 
movement is not, as shown by (5). 
(5)  (i)  Den Kollegen bring zum Bahnhof! 
(The colleague bring to the station!) 
Bring the colleague to the station! 
(ii)  Den Kollegen bringe er zum Bahnhof! 
(The colleague bring (-subj I) he to the station!) 
Again,  the  corresponding  sentences  with  verbal  mood  changed  to  indicative  or 
subjunctive I1 allow for evaluation according to truth or falsity. 
If  we  look  at  long  wh-movement from  a  complement  clause  into  an  imperative 
matrix clause (so called wh-imperatives) the wh-phrase is possible at the left periphery 
of  imperative  clauses.  However,  the  scope of  the  [+wh]-phrase  is  restricted  to  the 
embedded clause.' 
(6)  (i)  Wohin, sag mir, dass Du nie wieder gehst! 
(To which place tell me that you will never go again!) 
(ii)  Sag mir, wohin Du nie wieder gehst! 
(Tell me to which place you will never go again!) 
These data provide strong evidence for a systematic interaction between verbal mood in 
German and other syntactic operations especially [kwh]-fronting, which are relevant to 
the sentence mood distinctions. 
In  order to relate the category verbal mood to the fronting of wh-phrases I assume 
that the verbal mood in German establishes a functional category MP with a specifier 
position  SpM. This functional category replaces the classical CP-projection, which is 
motivated on purely positional grounds for main clauses. On the one hand, replacement 
of these projections by a morphologically motivated functional category meets the need 
for the derivation of syntactic structures from morphological and lexical units. On the 
other hand it provides a syntactic domain in  which sentence type and sentence mood 
distinctions can be expressed, in that a systematic interaction of the various components 
can take place in a uniform system and at the same time in a uniform fashion. This is a 
necessary  requirement  for  all  natural  languages  as  Cheng  (1991),  Brandner  (2000), 
Lohnstein  (2000)  have  pointed  out.  The  consequences  according  to  syntactic  A'- 
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movement and head movement are minimal in that A'-  movement targets SpM instead 
of  SpC and  head  movement  of  the  finite  verb  targets  Ma instead  of  Co. The left 
periphery of German main clauses then looks like that described in (7). 
The theoretical advantage of these assumptions about the left periphery of German main 
clauses belongs in the first place to the uniform domain in which the sentence mood is 
determined, and second to the interaction of its constituting components, which meet in 
a well defined domain of the syntactic structure. 
Since Thiersch  (1978) and den  Besten  (1977) it  is  assumed that main  clauses in 
German are derived by two root transformations, one of which moves the finite verb to 
the left  periphery,  while  the other moves one constituent from the middle field to a 
position  in front of  the finite verb.  According to  the  [kwh]-characteristics  of  this  so 
called 'Vorfeld'  phrase a wh-question results if  this phrase contains a [+wh] feature. A 
declarative sentence results if the phrase is marked [-wh], or is unmarked with respect to 
the wh-specification.  If  the position SpM remains empty a yln-question results. These 
options are available only if  the verbal mood is either indicative or subjunctive 11. If the 
verbal mood is either imperative or subjunctive I question and declarative formation are 
blocked, but yield other types of modal interpretation.' 
Before going into the details of the semantic interpretation for syntactic movement 
processes  let us take a closer  look  into the relational  properties  of  verbal  mood. As 
pointed out in Farkas (1992) and Quer (1998) a shift in the mood involves a shift in the 
model of interpretation of the respective proposition. 
According  to  main  clauses  it  can  be  observed  that  propositions  marked  with 
imperative  mood  are only  interpretable  with  a progressive  reading,  while  sentences 
marked with subjunctive I allow for a present or progressive reading only. In both cases 
the  respective  proposition  allows  only  for  an  interpretation  with  a  word  to  world 
direction of fit. If the verbal mood is indicative or subjunctive I1 the direction of word- 
world-fit reversed in that the words have to fit the world.4 
These elementary distinctions  suggest  that  verbal  moods divide  into  at  least two 
classes  with  respect  to  the  word-world  direction  of  fit  together  with  their  modal 
interpretation.  Both  classes  supply  a  specific  contribution  to  the  sentence  mood 
respectively. The table in (8) lists the differences: 
Although the theory proposed in Lohnstein (2000) covers these cases too, I will not go into further 
exploration here. 
This distinction  was  introduced  by  Searle (1975) to discriminate  speech  acts, but  it  seems to  be 
relevant even with respect to semantic differences. Sentence mood constitution and indefinite noun phrases 
Elaborating the semantic intuitions more closely, we can assume that the two classes of 
verbal mood relate propositions to different kinds of conversational backgrounds in the 
sense of  Kratzer  (1978,1991). In  Lohnstein  (2000) I proposed  that  at least two such 
domains have to be identified in order to capture the relevant distinctions: an epistemic 
and a factive domain. Propositions marked with imperative or subjunctive I are related 
to the factive domain, while propositions marked with indicative or subjunctive 11  are 
related to the epistemic domain5. In  model theoretic terms we can identify the factive 
domain with definition of the model and the epistemic domain with knowledge about it. 
These two domains are interrelated in  systematic ways. Take the factive domain to 
include all facts in the past, the present and the future of the actual world.; and take the 
epistemic  domain  to  include  all  contents  which  are  knowable.  Assume  further that 
human beings distinguish well between the outer world  (of  facts) and the inner world 
(of knowledge). This distinction goes back at least to Descartes'  'res extensa'  and 'res 
cogitans'. 
However, relating the two domains to the word-world-direction of  fit, the notion of 
making something topical plays a major role. The states of  affairs we know about the 
actual  world  belong  to  the  past  or  present,  but  the  future  ones  are  not  accessible 
epistemically. Furthermore, the states of  affairs in  the past  will never be made topical 
again. On the other hand, we do not know things which will be facts in the future of our 
world, but exactly these things will become topical. The distinction between epistemic 
and factive domain is intended to grasp exactly these intuitions. 
It now follows that only propositions from the epistemic domain can be true or false, 
and that propositions from the factive domain are truthfunctionally not evaluable. The 
main  properties  of  imperative  and  subjunctive  I-clauses  are then  derivable from  the 
properties of the factive domain, together with general principles of interpretation. 
world has to fit words: 
imperative 
subjunctive I 
* yln-questions 
* wh-questions 
* assertion 
(8) 
3.  The semantics of sentence mood 
words have to fit world: 
indicative 
subjunctive 11 
yln-question 
wh-question 
assertion 
Let us now take a closer look at the semantics of questions and declaratives. According 
to GroenendijkJStokhof  (1982,  1984, 1996), Higginbotham  (1996), questions denote 
exhaustive partitions of the class of possible answers. For a y/n-question  like (9)(i) this 
partition is given as in (9)(ii). 
(9)  (i)  Did Peter stroke the cat? 
(ii)  (Peter stroke the cat I  Peter did not stroke the cat] 
Since every proposition induces a bipartition of  the set of  indices (i. e. pairs of  world- 
time  points), the  proposition  from  (9) separates  the  class  of  indices  for  which  the 
5  Further elaboration is necessary to account for the main use of the subjunctive I in German, namely its 
use in indirect speech. Several suggestions regarding this can be found in BredelLohnstein (2001A). 
See also Farkas (1994), Quer (1998). proposition  'Peter  stroke  the  cat'  is  true  from  the  class  of  indices  for  which  the 
proposition  'Peter  did not stroke the cat'  is true. That is, every proposition  leads to a 
bipartition  of  possible world  states.  In  general,  a bipartition  contains two classes of 
indices. In  one class are those indices at which the proposition  is true, and the other 
class contains all indices at which the proposition is false (or rather the negation of the 
proposition is true). The essential and general characteristic of  a partition from a set is, 
that  it  divides its  members  into  disjoint  (equivalence-) classes,  which  unite  into the 
whole set under set union. The elements in each class  are equivalent  with  respect  to 
some property. 
According to that, a proposition resembles a y/n-question, in that it leads to a similar 
semantic object, namely a bipartition. This object P is shown in (10). 
(10)  P = {x  stroke the cat I  x did not stroke the cat) 
Together with a wh-phrase, a wh-question as in  (1 1) (i) leads to a more differentiated 
partition as in  (1 1) (ii), where Peter, Fritz and Clara are the relevant individuals in the 
context of dis~ourse.~ 
(I  I)  (i)  Who stroke the cat? 
(ii)  Peter stroke the cat & Fritz stroke the cat & Clara stroke the cat 
Peter stroke the cat & Fritz stroke the cat & Clara did not stroke the cat 
Peter did not stroke the cat &Fritz did not stroke the cat & 
Clara did not stroke the cat 
(11)  (ii)  has  the  structure  of  a  Boolean  lattice  which  is  closed  under  negation  and 
conjunction. This lattice is formed from the semantic content of  the proposition together 
with  the  semantic content  of  the  wh-phrase.  It  remains  to  be  determined  how  the 
semantic contribution of the proposition interacts with the semantic contribution of  the 
wh-phrase to yield the lattice in (1  l)(ii). 
The proposition -as  we have just seen- corresponds to a bipartition of possible states 
of  affairs (or indices). Assume now, that a wh-phrase denotes a partition too. Then the 
wh-phrase WHO denotes the exhaustive set of equivalent classes of people, WHERE 
denotes the exhaustive set of equivalent classes of  locations, WHEN denotes the set of 
all temporal  equivalent intervals, and so on. The denotation of  WHO from our earlier 
context of discourse looks like (12). 
(12)  WH = {Peter  I Fritz  I  Clara] 
If  we now combine each element from the propositionally induced bipartition P in (10) 
with each element from the partition WH in  (12) building the Cartesian product P  x 
WH, we obtain the partition in (13). 
(13)  WH x P = {Peter  I Fritz I  Clara) x {x  stroke the cat I  x did not stroke the cat} 
=  [Peter stroke the cat I  Peter did not stroke the cat I 
Fritz stroke the cat I  Fritz did not stroke the cat I 
Clara stroke the cat I  Clara did not stroke the cat) 
6  See GroenendijWStokhof (1982, 1984, 1997), Higginbotham (1996). 
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This partition still does not build the lattice we are after. We furthermore have to extend 
each  class  with  all  other  classes in  such  a way  that  each class  contains all  but  the 
contradicting propositions. That means that we may combine the elements 'Peter stroke 
the cat'  and 'Fritz did not stroke the cat' which are compatible, but we are not allowed 
to combine  'Peter stroke the cat' with  'Peter did not stroke the cat', because the latter 
combination  would  lead  to  a  contradiction.  With  this  operation  -closure  under 
conjunction- we yield exactly the lattice in (I l)(ii). 
We are now able to derive the semantic object which corresponds to a wh-question 
from the semantic content of the wh-word and the semantic content of the proposition, 
using the concept of the partition in a unique manner. 
Following this,  we may look how  an  assertion is formed using  exactly the  same 
material and processes, except that we use a [-wh]-phrase  instead of the [+wh]-phrase. 
A [-wh]-phrase denotes a partition of exactly one class. For instance, the [-wh]-phrase 
'Peter'  denotes the (trivial) partition WH-  = { Peter 1. If we combine this partition with 
the bipartition  given by the proposition  in  the same way  as we combined  the [+wh]- 
phrase  with  the  proposition,  we  must  build  the  Cartesian  product.  As  a  result,  we 
receive the structure in (14). 
(14)  WH-xP  =  { Peter ) x {x  stroke the cat I  x did not stroke the cat) 
-  -  {Peter  stroke the cat I  Peter did not stroke the cat} 
Again, we have built a Cartesian product, in this case from WH-  and P. The operation 
of forming all classes by combining those elements which do not contradict the other is 
now a trivial matter, because there is no possibility to form any combinations without 
encountering contradictions. By using the [-wh]-phrase the bipartition in (14) is reduced 
to the class of  indices at which P applied to 'Peter'  is true, leading to an assertion, as 
required. 
Let us now look more closely at a topic Gottlob Frege (1892) has pointed out in his 
'Logical  Investigations'  (Logische  Untersuchungen).  Frege  (1986?35)  writes:  "Wir 
erwarten  ja  zu  horen  oder  nein.  Die  Antwort  Ija'  besagt  dasselbe  wie  ein 
Behauptungssatz;  denn  durch  sie  wird  der  Gedanke  als  wahr  hingestellt,  der  im 
Fragesatz schon vollstandig enthalten ist. So kann man zu jedem Behauptungssatz eine 
Satzfrage bilden. [...I 
das Denken  -  das Fassen des Gedankens 
das Urteilen  die Anerkennung der Wahrheit des Gedankens 
das Behaupten  -  die Kundgabe des Urteils 
Indem wir eine Satzfrage bilden, haben wir die erste Tat schon vollbracht."' 
Frege  therefore  distinguishes  three  different  acts  forming  an  assertion.  First,  the 
capturing of the idea (das  Fassen  des Gedankens) corresponds to the  structure of  a 
proposition, by being related to a yln-question (Satzfrage). 
Second,  the  acknowledgement  of  the  truth  (Anerkennung  der  Wahrheit  des 
Gedankens) is built by committing oneself to the truth of the proposition. In terms of  a 
'  We expect to hear 'yes'  or 'no'. The answer 'yes'  means the same as the assertion, because it claims 
that the thought, which is entirely contained in the question, is true.Therefore it is possible to form a 
question from every assertion. [...I 
the thinking  the capturing of the thought 
the judgement  the acknowledgement of the truth of the thought 
the claim  the announcement of the judgement 
By forming a yln-question, the first act is already achieved." bipartitioned  space  of  indices,  'committing  oneself  to  the  truth  of  the  proposition' 
means to reduce the bipartitioned set of indices to that class in which the proposition is 
true. 
Third, the announcement of the judgement (Kundgabe des Urteils) corresponds to the 
process  of  adding  the  reduced  bipartition  to  the  context  of  discourse.  In  order 
theoretically  to  reconstruct  this  process  we  can  use  a  notion  originally  proposed  by 
Stalnaker (1978) and elaborated more closely in discourse representation theory.'  The 
basic operation we need here is modeled by an update function of the information state 
of a discourse. 
Take CG to be the common ground in a discourse. CG is the set of  all propositions 
the participants take for granted. This set defines the set A of all indices at which all 
propositions from CG are true. In order to add new  information to the discourse new 
propositions have to be added to CG, thereby reducing the indices in A. By adding more 
information to CG the indices compatible with all these informations shrink. This means 
that  if  there is more information available the set of possible alternatives compatible 
with this information is smaller. Updating a given CG with some semantic object p to 
CG'  is performed by the update function  'O'  which  looks like in  (15)(i). The set A of 
indices reduces through set theoretic intersection, because the indices in  A'  have to be 
compatible with the further proposition p. This is shown in (l5)(ii). 
(15)  (i)  CG'=CGOp=CGu(p) 
(ii)  A' = A n  p 
As is clear from the outset, the information state in a discourse is not only influenced by 
assertions (the usual case) but also by questions, imperatives, etc. 
Returning now to the three acts Frege found in  assertions, I want to show that the 
essential  properties  of  these  acts  appear  not  only  in  assertions  but  that  they  are 
constitutive in forming all sentence moods. 
As  we  have  already  seen  the  compositional  process  of  forming  a  wh-question 
contains the proposition  together with the  wh-phrase.  In  order to ask a question, the 
question  has  to be  added to the  discourse. We therefore  have  the  situation  that  the 
discourse is not updated with a single proposition, but with a set of alternatives given by 
the Boolean lattice. Each class of elements does allow for updating the information state 
of  the  discourse.  For  instance,  if  the  question  'who  stroke the  cat'  is  added to the 
discourse, every class from (1  l)(ii) is a possible candidate for the update function. So, 
for instance, the discourse can be updated by the class 'Peter stroke the cat and Fritz and 
Clara did not stroke the cat'. Then the information state updates the discourse in another 
way, as if the class 'Peter did not stroke the cat and Fritz and Clara stroke the cat' would 
have been added to the CG. Discourses that do not reduce these alternatives properly do 
not have a proper structure, because too many possible continuations are left open. It 
follows from that, that questions need answers. As a result, questions in general allow 
for several possibilities by which to update the discourse. These updated alternatives are 
usually reduced by answers from other participants of the discourse. 
Since the  formation  of  a  yln-question  does  not  need  any  other  element  than  the 
propositionally  induced  bipartition,  this  semantic  object  is  added  to  the  discourse 
without  reduction,  differentiation  or  any  other  semantic  operation  to  modify  its 
structure. It discloses exactly two options of continuation. 
8  See Haas-Spohn  (1991) for a detailed summary Sentence mood constitution and indefinite noun phrases 
To  form  a  declarative  sentence  one  has  to  combine  a  [-wh]  phrase  with  the 
propositionally induced bipartition. This yields the reduction of the bipartition of the set 
of  indices to the class of those at which the proposition  is true. Asserting, then, means 
adding the reduced bipartition (the judgement in Frege's  sense) to the CG. 
The following table contains the relevant objects, features and operations, which are 
necessary to derive the respective semantic properties of yln- and wh-questions as well 
as declaratives. 
From the content of this table it can be seen which elements are necessary in order to 
derive the respective  objects.  Furthermore,  it becomes clear that the variation  in  the 
mood specification depends on the difference of  the involved [kwh]-phrases only. The 
sentence mood results as the outcome of the operation. 
It  is  important to  note that  the compositional  processes  work  if,  and only  if, the 
verbal  mood  is  indicative or subjunctive 11.  They do not work  if  the verbal  mood  is 
imperative or subjunctive I as the following examples from German suggest. 
(17)  (i)  indicative/subjunctive I1 
a.  Wem gibtlgabe Maria ein Buch? 
(Whom giveslwould give Mary a book?) 
b.  GibWgabe Maria ihrer Freundin ein Buch? 
(Does/would Mary give her girl friend a book?) 
c.  Ein Buch gibtlgabe Maria ihrer Freundin. 
(A book gives/would give Mary her girl friend.) 
(ii)  imperativelsubjunctive I 
a.  *Wem gibtlgebe Maria ein Buch?  *deiner Freundin 
(*Whom give a book?)  (*your girlfriend) 
b.  GibIGebe Maria ein Buch?  *Ja/Nein 
(Givelgive -subj  I Mary a book?)  (*yes/ no) 
c.  Deiner Freundin giblgebe ein Buch.  *wahr/falsch 
(Your girlfriend givergive-subj I a book?)  (*true/ false) 
features 
+wh 
0 
- wh 
The example in  (17)(ii)  (a) is ungrammatical  because,  as we have already  seen, the 
[+wh]-phrase is incompatible with a proposition which is related to the factive domain. 
Fronting of the finite verb in (17)(ii) (b) does not lead to a yln question as in (17)(i) 
(b). Again, this is because the factive domain does not allow for a bipartition at all9. In 
(17)(ii)  (c) no  assertion  derives by  fronting a  [-wh]-phrase  as opposed to (17)(i)(c). 
Again  the  reason  is  that  there  is  no  partitioning  possible  on  the  factive  domain. 
Although the construction is well formed no effects concerning the sentence mood are 
apparent. 
[+I-wh]-objects 
Peter, Fritz, Klara 
0 
Peter 
bipartition 
p 
l 
P 
-1 
P 
-1 
The reason for the impossibility  of truth  or falsity  is therefore the same as for the impossibility of 
forming a yln question. 
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operation 
bipartion  becomes 
differentiated 
bipartion  remains 
unmodified 
bipartition  becomes 
reduced 
mood 
wh- 
interrogative 
yeslno- 
interrogative 
declarative Horst Lohnstein 
Summing  up  so  far,  we  have  seen  that  propositions  marked  with  indicative  or 
subjunctive I1 can combine with  a [+wh]-phrase to form a wh-question. The semantic 
composition  thereby  leads to a Boolean  lattice representing  the meaning of  the wh- 
question. By the  same operations  the  assertion is  derived  by  substituting the  [+wh]- 
phrase with the [-whl-phrase. Therefore, the only difference between these two kinds of 
sentence formation rests with differences in the [k wh]-specification  of the participating 
phrases, reducing the differences between these two sentence moods to properties of the 
participating lexical items. Y/N-questions are formed from the propositionally induced 
bipartition without the need of any further lexical material. 
If  we  look  to  propositions  marked  with  imperative  or  subjunctive  I,  these 
combinations fail to supply any of the first mentioned effects. The explanation for that 
is quite simple if  one has noted that only epistemic contents can be true or false and 
therefore allow for a bipartition of  the set of indices. Since this does not hold for the 
factive  domain  (facts  cannot  be  true  or  false,  they're  just  facts)  no  bipartition  is 
possible. It follows that question formation with propositions from the factive domain is 
generally impossible, and that assertive clauses cannot be formed because there is no 
partition  to  reduce.  Note  that  in  all  these  constructions,  the  possibility  of  forming 
declarative or interrogative objects is blocked for the same reason. 
4.  On the interaction of syntax and semantics 
Let us now relate the concepts of a compositional semantics for questions, declaratives 
and imperatives to the syntactic principles of sentence formation in German. 
If we concentrate on independent root clauses for the moment we find the following 
general  picture  about  the  distribution  of  lexical  and  phrasal  elements  in  the  left 
periphery of German clauses according to effects on the sentence mood constitution. 
Wemi  gibdgabe ,  Maria ti ein Buch ti  I  wh-question 
indicative  gibtlgabe ,  Maria 1; ein Buch ti  1  yln-question 
subjunctive I1  Ihrer  gibdgabe ,  Maria t, ein Buch t,  I  declarative 
Freundin 
*Wem,  gib lgebe  ti ein Buch t,  I  ungrammatical 
imperative  gib Igebe,  deiner Freundin ein Buch ti  I  not a yln-question 
subjunctive I  Deiner/(Ihrer)  gib lgebe ,  (Maria) ti ein Buch t,  1  not a declerative 
Freundin, 
The position SpM (the former SpecCP position) can be occupied by a [+wh]-phrase, a [- 
wh]-phrase or can remain empty. These kinds of occupation can take place for all verbal 
moods except an imperative that does not allow for a [+wh]-phrase in the SpM-position. Sentence mood constitution and indefinite noun phrases 
It is obvious, that only lexical or phrasal material in the SpM position is relevant for the 
determination  of  the  resulting  sentence  mood  in  combination  with  the  (temporally 
specified) proposition represented here as a TP. This means that A-bar-movement of a 
[+wh]-phrase serves the purpose of specifying the properties of the sentence mood if the 
verbal  mood  is  indicative  or  subjunctive II.  Although  these  structural  options  are 
available for all verbal moods (except  imperative to  which  we return)  the  sentential 
mood effects arise for indicative and or subjunctive I1 only. 
We now arrive at the point at which the syntactic structures can meet the semantic 
objects and we can see how the syntactic structure and the syntactic processes involved 
in sentence formation lead to the relevant objects of semantic interpretation. 
Since, in  German, two root  operations  have to  be  assumed  to derive the various 
sentence types illustrated in  (18), namely A-bar-Movement of a [+wh]-phrase  into the 
position SpM and head movement of  the finite verb into the position MO,  we can now 
relate the semantic operations to the moved constituents in  a  1 :  1 fashion. The [+wh]- 
phrases are the phrasal  elements which  interact  with  the  propositional  bipartition  to 
yield the wh-question or the declarative sentence respectively. If no phrase is moved to 
the  SpM-position  the  unmodified  bipartition  remains,  deriving  the  y/n-question  as 
desired. 
Again,  we  have to  restrict  these operations  to indicative  or  subjunctive I1  verbal 
mood. In the other cases an ungrammatical structure results or no modal effect arises. 
But  note  that  long  extraction  of  a  [+wh]-phrase  into  an  imperative  main  clause  is 
possible in German. See (6) repeated here as (19) for convenience. 
(19)  (i)  [Wohin], sag mir, t,  dass Du nie wieder t,  fahrst! 
([To which place], tell me, that you will never go again t,!) 
(ii)  Sag mir, wohinj du nie wieder t,  f'ahrst! 
(Tell me, [to which place], you will never go again t,!) 
In  (19)(i)  the  matrix  clause  is  marked  with  imperative  and  is  at  the  same  time 
compatible with a [+wh]-phrase.  The sentence mood does not change and the scope of 
the wh-Operator is restricted to the embedded clause. (19)(i) has the same interpretation 
as (19)(ii) according to sentence mood. We therefore have to conclude that the SpM- 
position in imperative clauses is available even for [+wh]-phrases and that the reason 
for  the  ungrammaticality  of  short  wh-movement  in  imperative  clauses  is  due  to 
conditions of interpretation. Furthermore, there seems to be a last resort principle for the 
interpretation of  wh-chains, which allows the chain to be interpreted at the position of 
the intermediate trace. 
Let us now look more closely at the distribution of  the finite verb and the act Fege 
called the announcement of the judgement (Kundgabe des Urteils). As can be seen from 
the examples in (20), all independent root clauses reveal the verb-second pattern, which 
means that the finite verb occupies the position  M'."  Contrasting these patterns with 
embedded clauses in  German, we generally find the finite verb in the final position of 
the clause according to the OV-order of ~erman." 
In  See Vikner (1994, 1995) and Schwartz / Vikner (1996) 
I1  An apparent exception are V/2-complement clauses which are assumed to exist in German. But, as 
Rers (1997) has polnted out, these constructions behave in nearly all counts entirely differently from 
'thats-complement clauses. Furthermore, V/2-complement clauses appear only under brldge verbs, i.e 
verbs which allow for extraction out of their complement clause. These properties suggest that V12- The  following  structural  description  shows  that  embedded  clauses  in  German  are 
generally verb final. 
(20) 
Peter weiB,  wem  I  Maria ein Buch geschenkt hat 
(Peter knows, )  (whom  Mary a book given has) 
Peter weiB,  1  dassfob  Maria ihrer Freundin ein Buch geschenkt hat. 
(Peter knows, )  (thavwhether  Mary her girlfriend a book given has) 
D3s ist die Frau,  die  I  Ihrer Freundin ein Buch geschenkt hat. 
(This is the woman, )  (who  her girlfriend a book given has) 
This regularity suggests that the position of the finite verb marks the distinction between 
embedded vs. independent clauses. But what is the difference between  these two kinds 
of clause structures from the sentence mood perspective? 
First of all, the position MO  seems to be the position relevant for marking the place of 
the modal  anchoring of  the respective proposition. This can  either be the context of 
discourse or the grammatical context. Take modal anchoring to be a two place relation 
between  a proposition  and  some kind  of  context. For every  proposition  the  relevant 
context has  to be specified by  some regular  grammatical  means.  Since propositions 
expressed by  independent  clauses are anchored  in  the  context  of  discourse,  and  the 
propositions expressed by embedded clauses are anchored in the grammatical context, it 
appears to be the case that the position of the finite verb marks the anchoring place of 
the respective proposition. 
Take that to be  the case. Then, we can assume that if  the finite verb occupies the 
position  MO.  the  modal  anchoring  of  the  proposition  takes  place  in  the  context  of 
discourse and otherwise (if it remains in its final position) the proposition is anchored in 
the grammatical context. 
Note  now, that  anchoring of  a proposition  in  the context of  discourse  is  another 
formulation  for Frege's  announcement of  the judgement  (Kundgabe des Urteils). We 
therefore arrive at the hypothesis that  the occupation of  the head position  MO  by  the 
finite verb is a device for the modal anchoring of the proposition in the discourse. This 
expresses that  a proposition  with  declarative  mood  is  announced,  with  interrogative 
mood it is asked, and with imperative mood it is requested. 
According to  the  positioning  of  the  finite  verb  we do  not  find  differences  with 
respect to distinctions in the verbal mood. All independent clauses have the finite verb 
in MO  irrespective of the specification of the verbal mood. The restrictions necessary to 
block the occurrence of  some verbal  moods (for instance imperative) from embedded 
co~nplement  clauses in German have another status as completely integrated complementizer clauses 
and therefore, have not to be treated in the same way as usual verb final complement clauses. Sentence mood constitution and indefinite noun phrases 
clauses have to be formulated with respect to properties of the epistemiclfactive domain. 
As pointed out in Bredelkohnstein (2001a) further properties of the verbal inflectional 
system of German allow us to account for some of these cases. 
We end up with a theory of sentence mood that captures the three acts of  Frege's 
Judgement  (Urteil)  and  generalizes  to  the  main  sentence  moods  (declarative, 
interrogative, imperative) which seem to appear in all languages of the world.12 
Especially for German (and with some minor modifications for the whole class of the 
Germanic Vl2 languages) the theory allows for the derivation of the relevant sentence 
mood  distinctions in  a compositional  fashion, not  only  with  respect  to the  semantic 
objects but also according to the syntactic structures and the distribution of the elements 
which are relevant for the sentence mood constitution. 
This happens in  a uniform way in the single left peripheral  system of the syntactic 
structure which is provided by the mood phrase MP. 
We therefore  arrive  at  a  language  specific  parameterization  for  sentence  mood 
constitution, as expressed in the following structure: 
indicative 
subjunctive I 
subjunctive I1 
imperative 
[+wh]  I  boolean lattice 
I  /  bipartition  is added to the discourse 
[-whl  I  reduced bipartition 
5.  Indefinite noun phrases and sentence mood 
In  the preceding  sections we have pointed out that the basic element of  the sentence 
mood is a bipartition of the set of indices, which can become reduced, differentiated or 
can remain empty. 
We now  want  to  look  at  some data concerning sentence mood  distinctions and 
indefinite noun phrases. As the data in (22) suggest, there seems to be a dependency 
between the mood of a sentence containing an indefinite noun phrase and the referential 
binding of this very noun phrase by a pronoun. 
(22)  A dog was in the garden. 
(i)  Peter has fed it. 
'*  See SaddockIZwicky (1985) Horst Lohnstein 
(23)  Who has seen a dog? 
(i)  *Peter has fed it. 
(ii)  Peter was at the poodle show. 
(iii)  Peter. He has fed it. 
(24)  Has there been a dog in the garden? 
(i)  "Peter has fed it. 
(ii)  The garden is hermetically locked, since it's entirely poisoned. 
(iii)  Yes. Peter has fed it. 
The crucial point with these data belongs to the fact that, irrespective whether the clause 
is a yln- or a wh-question, the pronoun it can bind the indefinite a dog if  the mood is 
declarative  (22), but  not  if  the  mood  is  interrogative.  This  can  be  seen  from  the 
examples (23)(i) and (24)(i). 
It is, of course, not problematic that  (23)(i) and (24)(i) are only partial  answers.13 
Other  partial  answers  without  a  pronoun  binding  into  the  respective  questions  like 
(23)(ii)  and  (24)(ii)  appear  to  be  unproblematic.  (23)(iii)  and  (24)(iii)  show  that 
referential access of the pronoun to the indefinite noun phrase is possible if  a complete 
answer has been given before, thus reducing the space of answers to exactly one. 
Let us explore the relevant properties of indefinites a bit further. In Egli (1991), von 
Heusinger  (1996,  1997) noun phrases  are translated into term building  &-expressions 
which are interpreted as choice functions. A choice function takes a set of individuals as 
argument and maps it onto a member of this set. 
In the case of indefinite noun phrases the choice function takes the set of individuals 
given by the N-denotation and maps it onto an element of this set. This element, then, 
becomes the most salient individual of its kind. On the other hand, definite noun phrases 
that are on a par with pronouns are interpreted as choice functions that map the set of 
individuals given by the N-denotation  onto the most salient individual of  its kind. In 
short, with an indefinite noun phrase an individual of some kind is introduced into the 
discourse  and  becomes  salient.  With  a  definite  noun  phrase  this  very  individual  is 
selected. 
In our example the choice function corresponding to the indefinite noun phrase a dog 
introduces one element out of the set of  all dogs into the discourse and makes it the 
most salient dog. The choice function corresponding to the pronoun it picks up this very 
dog. This relation is called referential binding of an indefinite noun phrase. 
Returning to our examples in (22) to (24), the expression a dog introduces a new dog 
into the discourse, making it the most salient one, and the choice function corresponding 
to the pronoun it has to select exactly this newly introduced dog, in order to derive the 
intuitive interpretations.  This  is possible  in  the example (22), because  the  indefinite 
noun phrase appears in a declarative sentence. It is impossible in the examples (23) and 
(24), because the indefinite noun phrase appears in a yln- or wh-question respectively. 
As the examples (23)(iii) and (24)(iii) show, pronominal binding is possible once the 
question has received a complete answer. How are these facts explained with respect to 
the proposed theory of sentence mood? 
As  we  have  seen, in  the  case of  declaratives  a  one class  object  is  added  to the 
discourse, while  in  the  case of  interrogatives  a  multiple  class  object  is  added.  An 
indefinite  noun  phrase  inside a  declarative  is  therefore uniquely  introduced  into  the 
13  A partial answer does not reduce thc space of all answers to exactly one, but reduces it some degree. 
Only complete answers yield only one possibility. See Higginbotham (1996) for details. Sentence mood constitution and indefinite noun phrases 
discourse. When placed in an interrogative sentence it is introduced with every class of 
the respective partition, and therefore in a multiple way. In this latter case, pronominal 
binding  is blocked,  as (23) and (24) show. However, if  there  is  a complete answer, 
pronominal binding is possible. 
These observations  suggest that the following condition C for pronominal binding 
has to hold. 
(C)  Pronominal binding is possible only if the referent  in  the discourse is uniquely 
introduced. 
With this condition at hand the data in (22) to (24) are entirely covered. 
Let us now explore more closely the properties of  choice functions and pronominal 
binding. Like every other function a choice function has a domain and a range. 
(25)  f:  domain  -+  range 
The domain  is given by the set of  individuals denoted by  the noun of  the respective 
noun phrase. The article specifies whether a new individual is introduced or whether the 
most salient individual is being selected. The latter option is on a par with the behavior 
of pronouns. 
Now,  if  the  indefinite  noun  phrase  is  introduced  into  the  discourse  by  being 
embedded in a question, it is represented in every class of the corresponding partition. 
Therefore, the range of the choice function corresponding to the pronoun is not uniquely 
given until the question is answered. In terms of choice functions the condition (C) can 
now  be  reduced  to  a  general condition  of  functional  evaluation,  namely,  that  every 
function (especially every choice function) need a uniquely given range in order to be 
defined properly. This condition, together with the proposed theory of sentence mood, is 
sufficient to derive the binding differences in (22) to (24). 
From these observations  we can conclude that choice functions, in order to work 
properly, need a uniquely defined range. From this generalization it should follow that 
even pronominal  binding into imperatives should work well, since imperatives do not 
allow for partitioning at all, since they are to be evaluated with respect to the factive 
domain. As the example in (26) shows, this is indeed the case. 
(26)  Feed a dog in the morning, Peter! 
You will see it will follow you over the whole day. 
To sum up, I have presented a theory of sentence mood which derives the main sentence 
mood and sentence type distinctions in German (and the other Germanic VJ2-languages 
too)  in  a  compositional  fashion  both  with  respect  to  their  syntactic  and  semantic 
properties, and to their systematic interaction. This theory, along with the assumptions 
about choice functions, allows us to account for binding differences of  indefinites  in 
differently marked sentence types. Horst Lohnstein 
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0.  Starting Point 
The goal of this paper is to study the influence of information structure in the referential 
status of  linguistic expressions  such as bare plurals  and indefinite NPs in  Spanish. In 
particular, we will argue for the following claims: (a) Spanish bare plurals can receive a 
generic interpretation in  object position and (b) Spanish bare plurals in object position 
can  be  topics  in  siru. We will  focus on object position  because  of  the well  known 
semantic and syntactic constraints that affect preverbal subject bare plurals in ~~anish.' 
There are two reasons why it is important to pay attention to the interaction between 
information structure and the interpretation of Bare Plurals in Spanish. First, it has been 
argued that Spanish bare plurals in object position can only be existentially interpreted 
(Laca 1990, 1996; Zubizarreta 1998). This interpretation arises in examples like (1). In 
these examples, the bare plurals are always weak NPs in Milsark's (1977) sense: 
(1)  a.  Eva trajo novelas a la reuni6n. 
'Eva brought novels to the meeting' 
3 ,, ,  [ novel (x) A brought-to-the-meeting (s, E, x)] 
b.  Juan compr6 manzanas para su hermana. 
'Juan bought apples for her sister' 
3 ,, .  [ apple(x) A bought-for-her-sister  (s, J, x)] 
It is also important to note that Spanish bare plurals cannot denote kinds in the sense of 
Carlson  (1977). Bare plurals  in  Spanish cannot be  arguments of  predicates  selecting 
kind-denoting arguments, as the ungrammaticality of  (2) shows (see Longobardi  1999, 
2000 for Italian): 
(2)  a.  Edison invent6 *(las) bombillas. 
Edison invented *(the) bulbs 
'Edison invented bulbs' 
Special thanks for their suggestive comments must be given  to Brenda Laca, Louise McNally  and 
Manuel Leonetti. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the  10"  Colloquium on Generative 
Gramrnar (University of Alcali de Henares, April  12-14, 2000), the Preferably non Lexical Semantics 
meeting,  (University of Paris 7,  Paris, May, 30 -31  , 2000)  the GISSL  Workshop (Universitat de 
Girona, Girona, July 22, 2000) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft fiir Sprachwissenschafl  (University of 
Leipzig, Leipzig, February 2-March 3, 2001). We want to thank the audiences of these meetings for 
useful suggestions. Any errors are our responsibility.  '  See Bosque (1996) and the references cited there 
We will use very  simple logical forms, disregarding the semantic representation of Tense. Variable s 
ranges over situations; variable x ranges over individuals. Information Structure and the Referential Status of Bare Plurals 
The topical status of  bare plurals  in  these examples is made clear in  question-answer 
contexts like (6) and  (7). In these cases there is a previous mention of the bare plural in 
the question and the answers convey information about the relation between Pedro and 
the apples in (6),  and about the Council's intentions concerning brick houses in (7): 
(6)  a.  Pedro nunca come manzanas, jverdad? 
'Pedro never eats apples, right?' 
b.  No, hombre, manzanas, Pedro las come todos 10s dias. 
'Not really, apples, Pedro eats them every day' 
(7)  a.  Me han dicho que van a construir una barriada de casas de adobe para 
estudiantes. 
'I have heard that they are planning to build a new urban area of brick 
houses for students' 
b.  No puede ser. Estoy segura de que, casas de adobe, el  ayuntamiento no 
permite construirlas. 
'It cannot be possible. I am sure that, brick houses, the Council does not 
permit building them' 
In  this  paper,  we  will  show that  bare plurals  in  object  position  can  have  a  generic 
interpretation in sentences with a generic operator (either explicit or implicit), and with 
a characteristic  information structure. We will  also show that  exactly in  those cases, 
bare  plurals  can  be  clause-internal  argumental  topics.  To achieve  this  goal, we  will 
explore the parallel semantic behavior of indefinites and bare plurals in object position. 
The paper is structured as follows: In section  1, we present the semantic background 
we assume with respect to the denotation of bare plurals and indefinite NPs. In  section 
2, we deal with the role played by information structure in  shaping the mapping from 
syntactic structure to logical  form in Spanish, following the model put forth by Partee 
(1991) and Biiring (1995). We will show how, in sentences with a special topic-focus 
articulation,  bare plurals  and  indefinite NPs  in  object position  can  receive  a  generic 
interpretation. In  section 3, we will defend the claim that generic bare plurals in object 
position are topics. We will explore some control properties of  these NPs that support 
our claim. Finally, in section 4, we present some remaining problems. 
1.  The denotation of indefinite NPs and Bare Plurals: unselective 
binding and tripartite structures at LF 
In this section we will present the theoretical background we assume with respect to the 
interpretation of indefinite NPs and bare plurals, and with respect to the mapping from 
syntactic structures to logical forms. 
1.1.  The denotation of Indefinite NPs and Bare Plural NPs 
With  respect  to  the  semantic denotation  of  indefinite NPs  and  bare plurals,  we  will 
adopt Kamp's  (1981) and Heim's (1982) framework in  which indefinite NPs introduce 
an  open  formula  (a  variable  with  a  predicate  condition  on  it)  into  the  logical 
representation of the sentence. Diesing (1992) and Longobardi (1999, 2000) extend the 
same kind of denotation to bare plurals: Norberto Moreno & Isabel PCrez 
(8)  a.  un gato: cat(x) 
b.  gatos: cat(x) 
[Heim 1982, Kamp 198  11 
[Longobardi 1999,2000  for bare 
plurals in Romance languages] 
Since this variable is not inherently quantified, it can be bound by an operator at LF. In 
the absence of  any quantificational operator, Spanish indefinite NPs and bare plurals in 
object position  can only receive an existential interpretation, since the variables with 
which they are associated are bound by the process of existential closure that applies at 
the sentence level: 
(9)  a.  Eva ha criado un perro en casa. 
'Eva has raised a dog at home' 
b.  3,. ,  [dog(x) A raise-at -home(s, E, x)] 
(10)  a.  Eva ha leido noveias 
'Eva has read novels' 
b.  3,. .  [novel(x) A read(s, E, x)] 
The existential interpretation of indefinite NPs and bare plurals licenses entailments of 
the following sort: 
(1 1)  a.  Eva ha leido novelas.  Eva ha leido libros 
'Eva read novels'  'Eva read books' 
b.  Eva ha criado un perro en 
su casa.  +  Eva ha criado un animal en su casa. 
'Eva raised a dog at home'  'Eva raised a pet animal at home' 
1.2.  The Mapping Hypothesis 
We  follow  Heim  (1982)  and  Kamp  and  Reyle  (1993)  in  assuming  that,  at  LF, 
quantificational elements such as modals, adverbs of quantification, habitual aspect, and 
so on, trigger the partitioning of a sentence into three elements: an operator, a restrictive 
clause (the domain or range of quantification) and a nuclear scope (which contains the 
assertion), (12). The quantificational element is treated as an unselective quantifier that 
binds every free variable in the restrictive clause. Free variables in the nuclear scope are 
closed off by the process of existential closure: 
(1  2)  Operator ,  [ Predicate- 1 (x)]  3 ,  [Predicate-2 (x), Predicate-3 (y)] 
RESTRICTIVE CLAUSE  NUCLEAR SCOPE 
domain of quantification  assertion 
The relevant question  is, then, what pieces of  syntactic structure are mapped onto the 
restrictive  clause,  and  which  ones  are  mapped  onto  the  nuclear  scope.  We  will 
tentatively  adopt Diesing's Mapping Hypothesis  (Diesing  1992) as an  answer to this 
question, (13). Her proposal amounts to the claim that the nuclear scope of an operator 
in  a tripartite structure is made up from the verb phrase: Information Structure and the Referential Status of Bare Plurals 
(1  3)  Diesing's Mapping Hypothesis (Diesing 1992): 
a.  Material from VP is mapped onto the nuclear scope. 
b.  Material from IP is mapped onto the restrictive clause. 
According to these assumptions, the generic interpretation of  subject indefinite NPs in 
sentences like (14a)  can  be  obtained  if  we  assign  such  sentences  logical  forms  like 
(14c), in  accordance  with  Diesing's  hypothesis.  The  indefinite  is  mapped  onto  the 
restrictive clause in  accordance with Diesing's Mapping hypothesis, since it occupies 
the subject (Spec IP) position:4 
(14)  a.  Un gato siempre hace ruido por las maiianas 
'A cat always makes noise in the morning' 
b.  [IP A cat always [vp makes noise in the morning]] 
c.  ALWAYS ,, ,  [cat(x) A C(s,x)] [make-noise-in-the-morning(s,x)] 
Indefinite NPs in  object position can also receive a generic interpretation in sentences 
like (IS), where there is a quantificational operator such as an adverb of quantification 
(1 5a,b) or a null generic operator (I 5c): 
(1 5)  a.  Juan siempre aplaude a un buen mhsico. 
'Juan  always applauds a good musician' 
b.  Juan siempre agradece un regalo. 
'John is always grateful for a gift' 
c.  Reconoces a un caballero por su forma de hablar.  [Leonetti 19911 
'You identify a gentleman by his way of talking' 
The logical form of (I 5a) is the one we have in  (1  6): 
(16)  ALWAYS,, ,  [good-musician(x) A C(s, J, x)] [applaud(%  J, x)] 
In this case, the indefinite NP is not existentially interpreted since it is mapped onto the 
restriction of the operator. Therefore, inferences of the following type are not licensed: 
(17)  Juan siempre aplaude a un buen mdsico  -I-> Juan siernpre aplaude a un artista 
'Juan always applauds a good musician'  'Juan always applauds an artist' 
It is important to note that, in the syntactic representation of the sentence, the indefinite 
NP  is  within  the VP, but,  at LF, is mapped  into  the restrictive  clause,  in  apparent 
contradiction to Diesing's hypothesis. 
4  We introduce in  the logical representation of  sentences a predicate C that relates  individuals to the 
eventualities  in  which  they  are  participants.  We  will  use  this  device  to  represent  the  implicit 
quantification over eventualities apparent in  many sentences, as is the case in  (14). Intuitively, the 
logical form in (14c) says that all the eventualities of the (pragmatic) appropriate type in which a cat is 
a participant are eventualities in which it makes noise in the morning. 
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2.  Information Structure and Logical Form 
Partee (1991), von Fintel (1994), Hajicova et al. (1998), among others, have pointed out 
that the information structure of  a clause plays a crucial role in the process of  deriving 
logical forms. 
According  to  Partee  (1991),  topic-focus  articulation  (TFA)  contributes  to  the 
formation of tripartite structure as follows: 
(18)  a.  Focus Material projects onto the nuclear scope. 
b.  Non-focused (focus-frame) material projects onto the restrictive clause 
We will show that the TFA is fundamental to deriving the generic interpretation of bare 
plurals in object position. But first let us consider the generic interpretation of  Spanish 
indefinite NPs in object position. Leonetti (1990, 1991) noted that indefinite NPs which 
receive a generic interpretation in object position are usually part of the topical portion 
of  the sentence. In  the framework we  are  assuming, this  amounts  to  saying that  the 
indefinite generic NP is mapped onto the restriction  of  the generic operator, given its 
topical character. Note that for the indefinite object in a sentence like (19a) to have a 
generic interpretation, the sentence must have the intonational structure in  (19b), where 
the verb is assigned prosodic prominence: 
(1  9)  a.  Juan siempre aplaude a un buen musico. 
b.  Juan siempre APLAUDE a un buen mdsico 
(20)  a.    TO PI^ Juan] siempre [~~~~s  aplaude] [T~PIC  a un buen musicoj 
b.  ALWAYS,,,  [good-musician(x) A C(s, J, x)] [applaud(s, J, x)j 
The TFA will predict a LF such as (20b) if  the information structure of  the sentence is 
as  in  (20a).~  The  LF  in  (20b)  gives  the  right  truth  conditions  for  the  generic 
interpretation of the sentence. 
If  there  is  a  parallelism  in  the  denotation  of  indefinite  NPs  and  bare  plurals  in 
Spanish, as we have assumed following Diesing (1992) and Longobardi (1999, 2000), 
we  expect  Spanish  bare  plurals  in  object  position  to  have  the  possibility  of  being 
interpreted generically. 
Consider the sentences in (21). In these sentences, generic interpretation of the bare 
plurals  is  triggered  by  an  implicit  generic  operator  (associated  with  nonperfective 
tense). In  the sentences in  (22), generic interpretation is related to the presence of the 
adverb of quantification, siempre: 
(21)  a.  Ana veia peliculas  francesas en el extranjero. 
'Ana used to watch French movies in other countries' 
5  In (2021)  we want to represent that the indefinite object a un  buen musico is topical. In principle, the 
topic-focus articulation in (20a) can represent a case of verb-focus. This kind of example can only be 
produced if the object is 'activated'  in the discourse (in the sense of Lambrecht 1994). It is a debated 
question  if  Romance  Languages  allow  topical  elements  within  the  focus  domain  in  topic-focus 
articulations like the following: 
(i)  [TOPIC  Juan] siempre  aplaude   TOPIC^ un buen mdsico] I 
Since this is a controversial issue, we will only consider the possibility of verb focus in (20a). Nothing 
crucial  in  the  argumentation  hinges  on  this  matter.  (see  Nikolaeva  2001  and  the  references  cited 
therein) Information Structure and the Referential Status of Bare Plurals 
b.  Maria consigue novelas japonesas en las bibliotecas. 
'Maria obtains Japanese novels at the libraries' 
c.  Correos admite giros urgentes hasta las ocho. 
'The Post Office admits express postal orders until eight o'clock' 
(22)  a.  Juan siempre aplaude a mhsicos minusva'lidos. 
'John always applauds handicapped musicians' 
b.  Juan siempre compra estatuillas africanas en los Estados Unidos, 
'Juan always buys African statues in the USA' 
Note,  however,  that  the  generic  interpretation  of  the  bare  plural  in  object  position 
requires a particular intonational/information  structure. In each of the sentences above, 
the focal  domain  cannot include  the bare plural  (where F  means Focal  Domain)  as 
shown  in  the  question-answer  pairs  in  (22).  The  topic-focus  articulation  of  these 
sentences is the argument-focus or narrow focus. The PP identified by the wh-word is 
the focus in each case. The bare plural is out of the focus domain: 
(23)  a.  A.  -  iD6nde veia Ana una pelicula francesa en aquella tpoca de 
prohibiciones? 
'Where did Ana use to watch  a French movie in  those years  of 
censorship? 
B.  -  Ana veia peliculas francesas [Fen  el extranjero] 
'Ana used to watch French movies in other countries' 
b.  A.  -  iD6nde consigue Maria una novela japonesa hay en dia? 
'Where does Maria obtain a Japanese novel in these days?' 
B.  -  Maria consigue novelas japonesas  [F en las bibliotecas] 
c.  A.  -  iHasta quC hora admite Correos un giro urgente? 
'Until  what  time  does the  Post  Office  admit  an  express postal 
order? 
B.  -  Correos admite giros urgentes [F hasta las ocho] 
'The Post Office admits express postal orders until eight o'clock' 
In  the following question-answer pairs, bare plurals are also non-focussed material. In 
(24a), we find a deaccented object to the right of the accented verb (Lambrecht  1994). 
In  (24b), the  bare  plural  can  be  considered  a  partial  topic,  in  the  sense of  Biiring 
(1995):~ 
(24)  a.  A.  -  Me han dicho que Juan insult6 a un mdsico de la orquesta. 
'They told me that Juan insulted a musician in the orchestra' 
B.  -  No puede ser. Juan siempre [F aplaude] a mdsicos minusvilidos. 
'That, it can't be. Juan always applauds handicapped musicians' 
b.  A.  -  iD6nde suele comprar Juan arte africano? 
'Where does Juan use to buy African art?' 
B.  -  Juan siempre compra estatuillas africanas  en Estados Unidos] 
'Juan always buy African statues in the USA' 
6  It is important to note that in all of these examples, the bare plural is not the only topic in the sentence. 
It can be considered a secondary topic, in addition to the primary topic, which is usually the subject of 
the  sentence.  Secondary  topics  are  topical  elements  (mainly  objects)  such  that  the  utterance  is 
construed to be ABOUT the relationship between it and the primary topic. For the notion of secondary 
topic, see Nikolaeva 2001. Norberto Moreno & Isabel PCrez 
From the TFA of these sentences, we can derive the following Logical Forms, in which 
the bare plurals have been mapped onto the restriction of the generic operator: 
(25)  a.  Gen,,, [French movie(x) A watch(s, A, x)] [abroad(s, A, x)] (LF for 21a) 
b.  ALWAYS,,, [handicapped-musicians (x) A C(s, J, x)] [applaud(s, J, x)] (LF for 
22a) 
Since these bare plurals are generically interpreted, inferences such as the following are 
not licensed: 
(26)  a.  Juan siempre aplaude a m6sicos minusvilidos -I-> Juan siempre aplaude 
a artistas minusvilidos 
'Juan  always  applauds  handicapped  musicians'  -I->  'Juan  always 
applauds handicapped artists' 
b.  Correos admite giros urgentes hasta las ocho -I-> Correos admite giros 
hasta las ocho. 
'The  Post  Office admits express postal  orders until  eight  o'clock'  -I-> 
'The Post Office admits postal orders until eight o'clock' 
3.  Generic Bare Plurals are Topics 
We have just seen that for the bare plurals to receive a generic interpretation they must 
be within the non-focused part of the sentence (focus framelbackground). Now we will 
explore the syntactic effects associated with these information structures. In particular, 
there are certain syntactic facts concerning control properties that suggest that generic 
bare plurals in object position may display topic-like behavior. 
Katz (1993) notes that only presuppositional NPs can control the null subject of the 
extrasentential  constructions  known  as  free  adjuncts  (FA)  (Stump  1985).  These 
constructions are illustrated in  (28a,b) for English, and in  (29a,b) for Spanish. In these 
examples, a proper noun (a typical case of presuppositional NP) is the controller of the 
null subject of the free adjunct: 
(27)  Katz's Generalization (1993): 
Only presuppositional NPs can control the null subject of Free Adjuncts 
(28)  a.  Wearing an ugly mask, Sarah would frighten everyone. 
[From Stump 19851 
b.  Crossing the street, Jane went into the store. 
c.  Alone, John decided to read a book. [From Stump 19851 
(29)  a.  Enfadado, Juan no puede concentrarse. 
'Angry, John cannot concentrate'. 
b.  Cansado,  Juan decidid irse a dormir. 
'Tired, John decided to go to sleep'. 
Other presuppositional NPs controlling free adjuncts, such as definite NPs, bare plurals 
in the domain of a quantificational operator, or indefinite NPs with a specific use, are in 
(30). Information Structure and the Referential Status of Bare Plurals 
(30)  a.  Being intelligent, your brother attended the conference. 
b.  Crossing the street, women usually enter the store. 
c.  Being intelligent, linguists go to conferences.  [Katz 19931 
d.  Desperate, a student cheated on the exam. 
When a NP is not presuppositional, it cannot control the null subject of a free adjunct. 
For  example,  bare  plurals  in  the  following  sentences  can  only  be  existentially 
interpreted. They  are  weak  NPs  in  Milsark's  sense.  Therefore,  they  cannot  act  as 
controllers: 
(31)  a.  * Crossing the street, women went into the store. 
b.  * Being intelligent, linguists attended conferences. [Katz 19931 
However, it seems that in  addition to being presuppositional, controllers must be topics, 
as has been generally argued in the case of backwards pronominalization (Catden 1982, 
Kuno  1972, Reinhart  1982). Note  that  a presuppositional  NP inside a focus domain 
cannot act as controller of  a null subject of a free adjunct. This is shown in  (32) and 
(33): 
(32)  a.  * Cansado, se ha dormido [Juan]  FOCUS ~~~~i~ 
b.  Cansado, Juan se ha dormido. 
'Tired, Juan fell asleep' 
(33)  a.  * Enfadado con su hermana, se fue al cine [Juan]  FOCUS  ~~~~i~ 
b.  Enfadado con su hermana, Juan se fue al cine. 
'Angry with his sister, Juan went to the movies' 
Postverbal  subjects in  Spanish  are  always focal.'  This  kind  of  sentence can  be the 
answer to questions like the following: 
(34)  A.  -  iQuikn se ha dormido? 
'Who fell asleep?' 
B.  -  Se ha dormido [~Juan] 
'JUAN fell asleep' 
A.  -  iQuiin se fue a1 cine? 
'Who went to the movies?' 
B.  -  Se fue a1  cine [~Juan] 
'JUAN went to the movies' 
These data suggest that the right generalization must be stated in terms of topic-hood: 
(36)  Only topics can be controllers of the null subject of free adjuncts 
Consider the sentences under (37). (37a) shows that generic indefinite NPs can control 
free  adjuncts  as  well  as  specific  indefinites,  (37b).  Indefinite  NPs  with  existential 
readings cannot be controllers, (37c): 
'  See Contreras (l983), Zubizarreta (1998). 
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(37)  a.  Desesperado ante la posibilidad de suspender, un alumno siempre copia. 
'Desperate  for  the  possibility  of  failing  the  exam,  a  student  always 
cheats' 
b.  Comprado con carifio, Juan siempre agradece un regalo. 
'Bought with love, Juan is always thankful for a gift' 
c.  * Desesperado ante la posibilidad de suspender, ha copiado un alumno. 
'Desperate for the possibility of  failing the exam, there is a student who 
cheated in the exam' 
Spanish bare plurals  in  object position can act as controllers  of  null  subjects of  free 
adjuncts if they are interpreted generically, hence out of the focus domain, as shown in 
(38): 
(38)  a.  [Prohibidas en su pais proi], Ana veia [peliculas francesasli [Fen  el 
extranjero] 
'Forbidden  in  her  own  country,  Ana used  to  watch  French  movies  in 
other countries' 
b.  [Escasas en Europa proi], Juan siempre compra [estatuillas africana~]~  [F 
en  EE.UU.1 
'Being  uncommon  in  Europe,  Juan  always  buys  African  statuettes  in 
EEUU ' 
c.  [Dificiles de encontrar en las librerias proi], Maria consigue [novelas 
japonesasIi [F  en las bibliotecas] 
'Being  hard  to  find  in  the  bookshops,  Maria  obtains  Japanese  novels 
from the libraries' 
d.  [Urgentes y de mixima importancia proi], Correos admite [girosli [F  hasta 
las ocho] 
'Being urgent, the Post Office admits postal orders until eight o'clock' 
What these examples show is that generic bare plurals in object position are topics. Note 
that  when  the bare plural  is  within  the  focus domain,  it  is not  possible  for the  null 
subject of a free adjunct to be controlled by the bare plural: 
(39)  a.  Ana leia [novelas japonesasIF con gusto/ Ana leia con gusto [novelas 
japone~as]~ 
'Ana used to read Japanese novels with pleasure' 
b.  * Bien escritas, Ana leia [novelas japonesas]~  con gusto 
'Well written, Ana used to read Japanese novels with pleasure' 
4.  Conclusions and open questions 
We have tried to show that many of the interpretative properties of Spanish bare plurals 
can be explained if  we treat them semantically as open formulas that introduce a free 
variable  into  the  logical  representation  of  a  sentence,  as  has  been  proposed  by 
Longobardi  (1999, 2000)  for Italian.  Concretely,  we  have  shown  that  Spanish  bare 
plurals'  interpretation is affected by sentence-level genericity and therefore, bare plural 
NPs can receive a presuppositional generic-like interpretation if they are within the non- 
focussed part of a sentence. Being non-focussed material  they are projected, in  logical Information Structure and the Referential Status of  Bare Plurals 
form, onto the restriction of a generic-like  operator present in the sentence. We have 
also suggested that, in those cases, bare plurals are topics. Their control properties seem 
to confirm our proposal. 
Of  course, some questions remain open. The most important one is the following: 
since we have assumed that bare plurals are open formulas from the semantic point of 
view, very  much  like indefinite NPs, we are forced to find an explanation  for their 
differences concerning scope possibilities  (noted by Carlson  1977). Unfortunately, we 
don't have an answer for that. 
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1.  Overview: An idea about specificity 
Current  analyses  of  specificity  are unable  to  provide  an  explanatory  account  for  why 
specific and nonspecific uses of  indefinites are available. While Abusch (1994), Reinhart 
(1997), and Kratzer (1998) provide successful mechanisms for deriving specific readings, 
they do not provide a fundamental explanation for the availability of this mechanism. This 
is due to the fact that specific indefinites are treated as involving an interpretive component 
or procedure unique  to themselves:  storage  (Abusch)  or  choice function  (Reinhart and 
~ratzer),'  for example. It would be preferable if specific indefinites could be understood as 
deriving  from the use of  independently  motivated  meaning components and interpretive 
mechanisms. 
Here I will pursue the idea, building on Portner & Yabushita (1998), that specificity has 
to  do with  the  indefinite's  interaction  with  a topical  domain  (note similarities  with  the 
proposals  of  En$  1991,  Cresti  1995,  and  Schwarzschild  2000).  In  this  conception, 
specificity is a matter  of  degree: the narrower the topical  domain, the more specific the 
indefinite. More precisely, sentences containing specific indefinites will be understood  as 
involving ordinary existential quantification in combination with a topical domain function: 
(I)  [Top, [ Mary met a,  certain man ]] 
3x[(finman)(x) & met(m, x)] 
(2)  [Topi [ Every professor rewarded every student who read some, book he had 
reviewed for the New York Times I]  (Kratzer 1998) 
Vx[professor(x) 3 t'y[(student(y)  & 3z[(booknfi(x))(z) & read(y,z)]) 3 
rewarded(x,y)]] 
I would like to thank the organizers of the Leipzig workshop, Kerstin Schwabe and Klaus von Heusinger, 
for providing a stimulating forum for presentation and discussion. I also thanks the audiences there, at the 
Washington  Area  Language & Logic  Group,  and  at  the  University  of  Southern  California  for  very 
enlightening feedback. I particularly  appreciate the assistance of Sylvia Chou and Jingqi Fu for helpful 
discussions on both contcnt and data. 
The paper is submitted to a special issue of "Theoretical  Linguistics",  edited by Klaus von Heusinger and 
Kerstin Schwabe  '  There are also analyses which treat all indefinites as choice functions (Winter 1997, von Heusinger 2000, 
for example), but of course in that case specific indefinites can't be analyzed as deriving from a "choice 
function reading".  I'm not sure whether my ideas about topicality could he combined with this pure choice 
function view to give an explanation of the Chinese data parallel to mine. 
ZAS Papers in Lirzguistics 23, 2001, 171-179 This analysis is very similar to the choice function approach. The latter would have (2)'  in 
place of (2): 
The two ideas are equivalent in the case where f,(x) in (2) is the characteristic function of a 
singleton set. If it represents a larger set, the indefinite will be "less specific";  it is hard to 
judge  through intuition whether allowing this possibility is a good thing. Apart from this, 
the approach in (2) has the significant advantage of not needing to grant indefinites a novel 
type of meaning, one different from that which they exhibit in  non-specific cases. Rather, 
specificity  is  the  combination  of  the  ordinary  semantics  for  indefinites  plus  the 
independently needed pragmatic concept of topic. 
2.  Evidence from Mandarin Chinese 
Mandarin Chinese provides evidence that this approach to specificity is correct. At the most 
straightforward level. Wu (1998) points out contrasts of the form in (3): 
(3)  a.  You  yi  xie  xuesheng  chuxi.lehuiyi.  (Wu 1998, ex. (1)) 
exist  one  CL  student  attend  meeting 
'There are some students who attended the meeting.' 
b.  Xuesheng  you  yi  xie  chuxi.le huiyi. 
student  exist  one  CL  attend  meeting 
'Some of the students have attended the meeting.' 
The common noun in a quantificational structure may be overtly topicalized, and this leads 
to a reading involving a pre-established domain of  quantification, "specific"  in En$'s sense. 
(Portner & Yabushita  1998 discuss similar cases in Japanese.) However, this type of data 
provides  only  indirect  evidence  for  the  idea  that  specific  indefinites  without  overt 
topicaljzation can  be explained in  a similar way. In this talk, I'll look for further support 
based  on the interpretation  of  indefinites whose common  noun part has  not been overtly 
topicalized. 
I will discuss two types of data involving a semantic interaction between indefinites and 
another quantificational element, the distributive operator dou. 
Sec.2.1. The  interpretation  of  indefinites  in  the  scalar  lian  ...  dou  'even ...  all' 
construction. 
Sec.2.2. Some interactions  among  mei  'every',  dou  'all',  and  indefinites,  and  the 
effects of these interaction on specificity. 
Some key properties of Mandarin: 
I.  Mandarin commonly employs topics, both overtly and covertly. Topicality and (Non-)Specificity in Mandarin 
2.  Mandarin does not show scope ambiguity in ordinary active sentences (e.g., S. F 
Huang 198  1, C.-T. Huang 1982, Aoun & Li 1993, Liu 1997). 
3.  Cases of apparent scope ambiguity in such sentences actually involve specificity 
(C.-T. Huang 1993, Liu 1997; contra S.-Z. Huang 1996). 
The type  of  specificity  relevant to point  3  (labeled G-specificitj by  Liu) at first glance 
seems rather broad  for our purposes,  in  that it also includes phrases  like mei+NP  'every 
NP'. However, given their occurrence with the distributive marker dou, Lin (1998) shows 
that  these  are  better  treated  as  involving  reference  to  (or  in  some  cases  indefinite 
quantification over) a group. For example, mei ('every')+NP refers to the supremum of the 
set denoted by the NP, SUP(II NP 11). 
(4)  Mei  ge  ren /  zhe  xie  ren  dou xihuan  ni. 
every  CL  person this  CL  person DM like  YOU 
'Everyone likes you.'/'everyone in this group of people likes you.' 
II dou II = [hP . hG .b'y[(C(y) & G(y)) 2  P(y)ll 
mei ge ren 
V  NP 
I 
xihuan 
I 
ni 
The ability to associate with the distributive marker dou can be seen as diagnostic for G- 
specificity, except for some complex cases which we'll discuss in section 2.1.  In addition, 
dou has some other properties we'll  need to keep in  mind. The example in  (5)-(12) below 
are from Liu (1997). 
The associate of dou can be a sentence-initial topic: 
(5)  Quanbu  de  laoshi  wo  dou  yujian.le. 
a1 l  DE  teacher I  DM  meet.ASP 
'I met all of the teachers.' 
Contrasting with (5), dou must follow its associate: 
(6)  *Wo  dou  yujian.le  quanbude  laoshi. 
I  DM  meet.ASP  all  DE  teacher Dou is obligatory  with certain determiners (with an  exception  to  be  discussed in  section 
2.2): 
(7)  Mei  ge  ren  *(dou) xihuan Laowang. 
every  CL  person DM  like  Laowang 
'Everybody likes Laowang.' 
Dou's associate can be a referential noun phrase: 
(8)  Women  dou  mai.le  yi  zhang  hua. 
We  DM  buy.ASP  one  CL  picture 
'We all bought a picture.' 
Dou's associate must be plural (with certain exceptions discussed in section 2.1 below): 
(9)  *Wo  dou  mai.le  yi  zhang  hua. 
I  DM  buy.ASP  one  CL  picture 
With a few interesting exceptions to be discussed below, dou's associate must be what Liu 
calls "G-specific".  This explains the facts in (10)-(12). First, liang ge xuesheng ('two CL 
student') can only be interpreted as 'both students': 
(10)  Liang  ge  xuesheng  dou  pao.le. 
two  CL  student  DM  run.ASP 
'Both students ran.' 
Second, a bare noun is interpreted as a definite: 
(1 1)  Xuesheng  dou  zou.le. 
student  DM  1eave.asp 
'The students all left.' 
And third, appoximative quantifiers are impossible, as they are plausibly incompatible with 
a specific interpretation: 
(12)  *San  dao  wu  ge  xuesheng  dou pao.le 
three  to  five  CL  studentDM  run.ASP 
2.1  The lian..  .dou Construction 
Though in  general dou doesn't  associate with singular NPs, in  a few cases in  may. The 
scalar lian  ...  dodye construction in (13) is one example; also possible are similar sentences 
without lian, as in (14). Topicality and (Non-)Specificity in Mandarin 
(13)  Lian  wo  doutye  zhidao.le,  ta  dangran  zhidao.(Liu 1997:96) 
even  I  DMtalso  know.ASP  he  of course  know 
'Even I have come to know it, of course he knows it too' 
(14)  Wo  yi  ge  ren  dou  bu  jiedai. 
I  one  CL  person DM  NEG  host 
'I didn't host a single person.' 
These indefinite+dou constructions show that the domain of  quantification for indefinites 
may be represented via a possibly covert topic, thus supporting the proposed analysis. 
In  these examples, dou can be seen as having its ordinary meaning, but contributing this 
meaning  to the  sentence's  implicature, rather than  its  truth-conditional  semantics.  We'll 
focus on the examples with lian here. 
Example  (15a) shows an instance  in  which  dou, in  a lian ...  dou structure, appears to 
associate with, and quantify over, the sentence's topic. (15b) is a similar case in which the 
topic is, according to Liu (1997), covert: 
(15)  a.  Wo  de  pengyou  lian  yi  ge dou  mei  lai. 
1  DE  friend  even  one CL DM  NEG  come 
'As for my friends, not even one has come.' 
b.  (Wo)  lian  yi  ge  ren  dou  bu  jian.  (Liu 1997: 97) 
I  even  one  CL  person DM  NEG  see 
'I don't even see a single person.' 
Notice that lian+indefinite is an NPI:' 
(15)  c.  *Wo  lian  yi  ge  ren  dou  jian. 
I  even  one  CL  person DM  see 
(15c) shows that it won't quite do to say simply that dou in (15)  quantifies over the set of 
friends. If  we simply say that (15a)  means  'all  of my friends haven't  come',  there is no 
reason why (1%) couldn't be interpreted in a similar way as 'I see everyone'. Instead, we 
need to take into account the scalar nature of lian, making clear that the NP marked by lian 
is ranked at as 'least likely' of all of the elements quantified over by dou. This works out in 
a  reasonably  straightforward  fashion  with  (13),  where  the  element  marked  by  lian  is 
referential,  but  in  the  lian+indefinite  cases  like  (15a),  it's  unclear  how  to  place  the 
quantifier yi ge (ren) ('a person')  into a scale with the set of individuals (or property of 
individuals) denoted by wo de pengyou ('my friends').  Thus, a more sophisticated account 
is called for. 
hs  pointed  out to me by Jingqi Fu (p.c.), example (15c) can occur on an modalized  reading like 'I am 
willing to see even one person.'  In  such a case, the implicit modal would presumably license lian gi ge 
ren. A slight modification of (15c) which disallows such an interpretation is (i): 
(i) Lian yi ge ren dou kan *(bu) jian. 1 even one CL  person DM look NEG see (16) outlines a basic  semantic analysis for lian  ...  dou, based  on  the idea that,  when  lian 
marks an  indefinite, dou quantifies over a set of alternative domains of  quantification for 
this indefinite: 
(1  6)  Di [[lian  XI [PRED .. .  .cloui..  .I],  D an implicit topical set of alternatives to X and X 
at the extreme end of a contextually given scale on D: 
(i)  asserts PRED(X). 
(ii) implicates Vx~D[Pred(x)]. 
Here, the topical  set consists of  alternative domains of  quantification  for yi ge ren. Via 
lian's scalar implicature, each of these is wider than the original domain personnc. Then, 
dou quantifies over this set, as illustrated in the following analysis of (l5b): 
(17)  Assertion: -3y[personnC(y) & see(], y)] 
Implicature:  VXE D[-3y[y~  Xi  & see(], y)]], 
where DL{X : X is a group of people) and the elements of D are ranked as in: 
{personnC < . ..< (x : x is a person of whatever sort)). 
Notice that yi ge ren ('one person') is interpreted under the scopes of negation and dou, so 
that dou quantifies over the set X of alternative domain sets. Though dou is not quantifying 
over the object's denotation  II yi ge ren II, this noun phrase must nevertheless precede it. I 
propose that  this  is  so for syntactic reasons:  in  general, dou must follow  a noun  phrase 
associated with what it quantifies over. On dou's ordinary usage, this noun phrase directly 
denotes the set which dou quantifies over, as in (4)-(12). But in  the pragmatic  lian  ...  dou 
case,  dou  quantifies  over  a  set  of  contextually  given  alternatives  based  on  the  focus 
structure of  this  "associate"  noun  phrase.  And  when  this  associate  is  an  indefinite, the 
alternatives are sets or properties which function as alternative domains of quantification. 
The  semantic  analysis  outlined  above  is  supported  by  the  ungrammaticality  the 
corresponding  non-negative  sentence  (15c).  If  non-negative,  the  sentence's  implicature 
would be entailed by what it asserts, since if  I see a person relative to some small domain 
Dl  (the  assertion), I  necessarily  see  a  person  relative  to  any  wider  domain  D2  (the 
implicature).  This explains lian yi ge ren's status as an NPI. 
2.2.  A Constraint on Specific Readings 
S.-2. Huang  (1996) points  out that  mei  'every'  may  occur  without  dou if  an  indefinite 
occurs in its scope: 
(18)  Mei  yi  ge haizi  dou  mi  yi  ge  gexing.  (Huang 1996: 48-9) 
every  one CL  child  DM  take-fancy  one CL  singing-star 
'Every child takes a fancy to a singing star.' 
(19)  Mei  yi  ge  haizi  mi  yi  ge  gexing. 
every  one  CL  child  take-fancy  one CL singing-star 
'Every child takes a fancy to a singing star.' Topicality and (Non-)Specificity in Mandarin 
Moreover, while (1 8) allows yi  ge gexing  'a singing star' to have a specific interpretation, 
(19) does not. Thus, it appears that a non-specific indefinite can  (but a specific indefinite 
cannot) serve whatever need of mei that dou otherwise does. 
The fact that only non-specific indefinites license mei can be explained in terms of the idea 
that  this  licensing  sets up  a  dependency between  the  mei  NP  and  the  indefinite.  This 
dependency can be represented using the notion of domain function. This in turn supports 
the analysis of specificity in terms of the properties of such a domain function. 
Huang takes this pattern as evidence that specific readings in Mandarin are actually cases of 
wide scope indefinites. She proposes that mei 'every'  must have an indefinite in  its scope 
and  assumes  that  dou  is  a  type  of  temporal  indefinite.  Her  idea  runs  counter  to  the 
arguments that Mandarin SVO sentences do not, in general, exhibit scope ambiguity.' 
Supporting  evidence  comes  from  ba  sentences.  Using  ba  allows  an  object  to  be 
positioned  before  the  verb,  and  requires  that  this  object  receive  a  specific  or  definite 
interpretation: 
(20)  Mei  yi  ge  xuesheng  *(dou) ba  yilzhe  ge  laoshi  dezui.guo. 
every  one  CL  student  DM  BA  onelthisCL  teacherupset.ASP 
'Every student upset althis teacher.' 
Yi ge  laoshi is  always  specific  in  this  structure,  as  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  dou  is 
obligatory. Yet it is able to vary with the subject, and on this reading the sentence implies 
that each student has upset a particular teacher, e.g. just one in  herlhis life. This shows that 
the sense of specificity for the object associated with the presence of dou is not wide scope, 
but rather is better analyzed in terms of a functional relationship, as in the present theory or 
the choice-function approach. 
In  terms of  the idea that dou is typically  needed  in  conjunction with ~nei  because mei 
requires a distributor, we would interpret (18)-(19) as showing that non-specific indefinites 
can introduce a distributive operator parallel to dou. This might be  something like a null 
version of each in The girls met a boy each. 
(21)  [Mei  yi  ge  haizilj  [DMi  [ti mi  [yi  ti  ge  gexing]]] 
every one CL child  DM  t  fancy  one  t  CL  singer 
See Liu (1997: 54-63) for a clear discussion. A compelling point is that if we replace yi ge gexing with an 
NP that doesn't support specificity (non-G-specific in Liu's terms), the result is not ambiguous in the way 
(18) is: 
(i)  Mei  ge  xuesheng dou  dadui.le  suiduodao  ti.  (Liu 1997: 63) 
every  CL  student  DM  answer-correctly.ASP ten:more:CL question 
'Every student answered about ten or more questions correctly.' Here, the movement of dou and its coindexation with the subject represents the dependency 
between universally quantified subject and indefinite object which licenses the subject and 
simultaneously  renders the specific reading unavailable. Note  that  the derivation  in  (21) 
leads to a structure in  which the subject in coindexed with a trace inside the indefinite (as 
well as its own trace inside the verb phrase)4. I propose that such a trace is interpreted as an 
argument of the indefinite's  domain function (roughly, "a  singer particular to t,"). Thus, if 
the indefinite is associated with a topical domain function, we have the following: 
(22)  TOP, [Mei.yi.ge haizi], [DM,  [ti mi [yi,  ti  ge gexing]]] 
DM([hx . 3y[(f,(x)nsinger)(y) & fancy(x, y)]])(mei(child)) = 
Vx[(C(x) & SUP(child)(x)) 3  3y[(f,(x)nsinger)(y) & fancy(x, y)]] 
The fact that the topical domain function takes as an argument the variable x universally 
bound by the DM pragmatically  implicates that the function varies  with x.  That is, it  is 
strongly preferred that f,  provides different singers for different choices of children.  But 
this means that the various children do not all fancy the same singer; that is, the indefinite 
cannot be specific in the strong sense.5 
One problematic issue has to do with cases parallel to (19) but with a referential subject 
instead of a universally quantified one: 
(23)  Zhe  xie  haizi  xihuan yi  ge  laoshi. 
this  CL  child  likes  one  CL  teacher 
'These children like a teacher.' 
Given the analysis above, one might expect that a covert distributive marker inside yi ge 
laoshi  could  raise  to  the  VP and  provide  the  subject  with  a  distributive  interpretation. 
However, such  a  reading  is not  available.  I propose that this  is because  the necessary 
movement of the distributive marker would not be syntactically licensed;  more precisely, 
since ?he xie huizi ('this CL child'), in contrast to a universally quantified subject like mei 
yi ge haizi ('every one CL child') in  (19)/(21), does not syntactically require a distributive 
marker, there is no syntactic motivation for such a movement in  (23).  Under a minimalist 
conception of movement, if a movement operation is not necessary, it is impossible.  Thus, 
in a case of "merge over move", the only way to get a distributive reading of the subject in 
(23) would be to have the distributive marker dou directly generated on VP. 
Aoun & Li (1993) argue, based on the lack of scope ambiguity  in SVO sentenccs, that Chinese subjects 
originate in the IP domain.  If this is correct, a slightly more complex interpretation  for the distributive 
marker in (21) would be needed.  The opposite position with regard to VP internal subject in Chinese has 
been argued as well. 
I would also point out that treating the relationship between the indefinite and DM in terms of movement 
is only a matter of convenience. We could express the same analysis in terms of the idea (Choe 1987) that 
whcn distributivity is marked (here on the "distributed  share", in Choe's terminology), this simply signals 
that a distributive operator is to be introduced in the semantics. 
5  It could, however, be intermediate-scope specific like (2) Topicality and (Non-)Specificity in Mandarin 
3.  Conclusion 
We have  seen  evidence  that  (i)  an  overtly  topical  domain  for  an  indefinite  leads  to 
specificity, (ii) the co-occurrence of  dou with indefinites can be understood in terms of  a 
covert alternative-set of domains, and (iii) the fact that specific indefinites cannot license 
rnei 'every' can be explained in terms of introducing a dependency between the mei NP and 
the indefinite's domain function.  Together these three points lend support to the hypothesis 
that a topical domain function is often present  with indefinite NPs in  Mandarin, and that 
specificity or non-specificity results from its properties. 
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Abstract 
This paper is about the semantics of  wlr-phrases. It is argued that wh-phrases should 
not be analyzed as indefinites as, for example, Karttunen (1977) and many others have 
done, but  as functional expressions with  an  indefinite core -their  function being to 
restrict possible focuslbackground structures in direct or congruent answers. This will 
be argued for on the basis of  observations made with respect to the distribution of term 
answers  in  well-formed  question/answer  sequences.  This  claim  having  been 
established, it  will  be  integrated  in  a categorial  variant  of  Schwarzschild's  (1999) 
information-theoretic approach to F-marking and accent placement, and -second-  its 
consequences with  respect to the focus/background structure of  wh-questions will be 
outlined. 
1.  Answers, Focus, and Background Deletion 
Since the work of  Hermann Paul (1920) and M.A.K. Halliday (1967) it has been com- 
monly assumed that in well-formed, i.e., congruent, questionlanswer sequences (QIA- 
sequences) there is a rather systematic correlation between the wlz-question Q and the 
focuslbackground structure (FB-structure) of its direct (sentential) answers A, cf. (1). 
(I)  A is a directlcongruent answer to Q, only if every constituent in A that 
corresponds to a wh-phrase in Q is focussed (i.e., F-marked). 
This generalization can be illustrated by the QIA-sequences given in (2).' 
(2)  a.  Who likes John? [MARYIF  likes John, ... 
b.  Who likes whom? [MARYIF likes [JOHNIF, . . . 
c.  What did Sandra say? Sandra said [that Mary kissed [JOHNJF]~,  ... 
In (2a) the constituent Mary corresponds to the wh-phrase who, and Mary has to be fo- 
cussed; in (2b) Mary corresponds to who, John corresponds to whom, and both have to 
be focussed. Given that the generalization in  (1) is  in fact basically correct, then  (2c) 
shows that the property of being focussed does not coincide with the property of being 
accented in  a strict sense, but that a focussed and accented constituent may license an 
abstract focus (F-marking) on a larger constituent containing it. Dynamically speaking, 
^  The  paper is submitted to a special issue of "Theoretical Linguistics", edited by Klaus von Heusinger 
and Kerstin Schwabe 
I  As usual, accents are indicated by capitals. 
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to be specified. 
Although tempting, the generalization given in (I) cannot be strengthened from 'only 
if' to 'if  and only if,'  since one always has to reckon  with the presence  of  so-called 
'contrastive  topics,'  cf. (3).  In  the following, however,  the  possibility  of  contrastive 
topics will be almost completely ign~red.~ 
(3)  a.  Whom do John and Mary like? 
b.  [MARYIF  likes [JOHNIF  and [JOHNIF  likes [SANDRAIF. 
Another property of  (1) worth mentioning is that it is a generalization about sentential 
answers. Typically, however, questions are not answered by sentential answers, but by 
'short' or so-called 'term answers,' cf. (4) and (5). 
(4)  a.  Who likes John? Mary. 
b.  Who likes whom? Mary, John; . .. 
c.  What did Sandra say? That Mary kissed John. 
(5)  a.  Whom do John and Mary like? 
h.  Mary, John and John, Sandra. 
This immediately raises the question of  whether, and -if  so-  in what way, sentential 
answers and term answers are related  to each other. Apart from the obvious parallel 
between the FB-structures of sentential answers in  (2) and (3) and the term sequences 
in  (4) and (3,  there are good  reasons  to assume that  the  latter  are derived from the 
former by some kind of elliptical process. To mention just two arguments, term answers 
and  the  respective  wh-phrases  have to  agree  in  case, cf. (6), and term  answers  may 
occur  in the form of  reciprocals, cf. (7). Both phenomena, however, are known  to be 
strictly local, confined more or less to the minimal clause they are contained 
(6)  Wen traf Hans? *Ein Mann. / *Eines Mannes. / *Einem Mann. / Einen Mann. 
Who met Hans? *[A man]-nom / *[A man]-gen / *[A man]-dat 1 [A man]-acc 
'Who did Hans meet? A man.' 
(7)  Wem  vertrauen  Schroder und Blair?  Einander. 
Whom trust  Schroder and Blair?  Each other. 
'Who do Schroder and Blair trust? Each other.' 
The way  term  answers  are derived  from sentential  ones  seems to be  quite  straight- 
forward:  starting  from  a well-formed  sentential  answer everything  is  phonologically 
reduced that is not embedded in an F-marked node. Thus, this kind of elliptical process 
has to  be  conceived of  as an  instance of  background  deletion, and can be stated in  a 
maximally theory neutral (and descriptive) manner as indicated in (8). 
'  But cf. e.g. the discussion in Biiring (1997), Krifka (1998), Reich (2001). 
For further evidence, cf. e.g. Schwabe (l994), Reich (2001). 
4  In the following, 1 will always switch to German data, if the point to be made can be better illustrated 
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(8)  Background deletion in @A-sequences (optional) 
Let (Q,  A) be a well-formed QIA-sequence and let the FIB-structure of (senten- 
tial) A be of the form Q [POIF  ct~  [PIIF  L&  ... [Pn.1]~a,,  (where n 2  1, a,,  0 5 i 5 n, 
possibly null), then p-reduce aci for 0 I  i 5 n: a  [[P~F  el  [PIIF  e2  . . . [P,,  .llF%. 
As recent research on ellipsis has  shown, background deletion plays a crucial role in 
presumably  all kinds of elliptical processes, and may thus be considered as a general 
strategy underlying elliptical phenomena in  general.' Typically, this process is further 
restricted  by  additional  syntactic  and/or  semantic  requirements  like,  for  example, 
'directionality  requirements'  in  RNR-Constructions  (cf.  e.g.  Klein  1993, Hartmann 
1999) or 'correspondence requirements'  in  VP-ellipsis phenomena  (cf. e.g. Fiengo & 
May  1994,  Merchant  1999).  However,  apart  from  the  implemented  maximality 
condition,  background  deletion  in  QIA-sequences  seems  to  be  rather  -but  not 
completely-  unrestricted (cf. Kuno 1982)." 
2.  The Problem 
Keeping this in mind, consider the discourse given in (9) (cf. Schwarzschild 1999:  161). 
(9)  (John drove Mary's red conVERtible.) 
a.  What did he drive before that? 
b.  He drove her [BLUEIF  convertible. 
As I will  show below  in some detail, 'standard'  projection theories on F-marking like, 
for example, that in Selkirk (1996), as well as information-theoretic approaches like that 
developed in Schwarzschild (1999), predict -first-  that the prenominal adjective blue 
in  (9b) is F-marked, and -second-  that no other constituent is. However, given that 
the assumptions about the derivation of term answers made above are basically correct, 
the FIB-structure of the answer in  (9b) together with  the generalization  in (8) predict 
that (lob) is a well-formed term answer in the context of (1Oa). But in fact it is not. The 
correct term answer is that given in (10c) -it  is the whole constituent corresponding to 
the wh-phrase. 
(10)  a.  What did he drive before that? 
b.  *  [BLUEIF. 
c.  Her [BLUEIF  convertible. 
'  Cf. e.g. Rooth (1992b), Klein (1993), Romero (1998), and Schwabe & Zhang (2000). 
Term answers of category VP need to contain the uninflected part of the verbal predicate: 
(i) Was  machte Peter? *Petdhattkei  [Anna ein FAHRrad t,]~ 
What did  Peter? "Pecef-bettgkti [Anna a  bike  t;lF 
'What did Peter do? Peter bought a bike for Anna.' 
(ii) Was  hat Peter gemacht? Perer-ket [Anna ein FAHRrad gekauft]~ 
What has Peter done?  %%-k  [Anna a  hike  bought]~ 
'What has Peter done? Peter has bought a bike for Anna.' 
As a  consequence,  term  answers of category VP are confined  to the  perfective  forms of tense in 
German. Actually, it turns out that this contrast is not restricted to the nominal domain, but can 
be observed with respect to the sentential and the verbal domain, too, cf. (1  I) and (12). 
(I 1)  (John said that he likes to drive conVERtibles.) 
a.  What else did he say? 
b.  *[OLDtimers]~. 
c.  That he likes to drive [OLDtimer~]~. 
(12)  (Peter hat Anna ein CAbrio gekauft 
'Peter bought a conVERtible for Anna') 
a.  Und was  hat  er sonst noch gemacht? 
and  what has he else  Part  done 
'And what else did he do?' 
b.  Er hat [SANdral~  ein Cabrio  gekauft. 
he has Sandra  a  convertible bought 
'He bought a convertible for SANdra' 
c.  *SANdra. 
d.  SANdra ein Cabrio gekauft. 
Again,  it  is the  constituent  corresponding  to the  wh-phrase that  constitutes  the term 
answer and not the constituent in focus. Thus, this data together with the generalization 
about the derivation of term answers stated in (8) strongly suggests that it is not only the 
prenominal adjective that is F-marked, but in fact the whole constituent corresponding 
to the vvh-phrase.'  Moreover, it suggests that this effect is due to some property of the 
wh-phrases involved. This is what I will call the functional character of wh-phrases. The 
major claim I want to argue for in this paper is that this property has to be located in the 
semantics of wh-phrases. 
Obviously,  it  may  be  immediately  objected  that  this  data  just  shows  that  the 
assumptions about the derivation of  term answers made above are too simplistic and 
have to be revised or restricted in  one way or another. The crucial point is, however, 
that I see no straightforward way of doing so without merely stating the facts;>nd  even 
if  someone came up with  a proposal, (8) still  seems to be  the null hypothesis and is, 
therefore, the theoretically preferred option. Hence, I will assume from now on that the 
constituents  corresponding to a wh-phrase are in  fact F-marked. Then, obviously, the 
question emerges, why 'standard approaches' to F-marking do not permit this F-marker, 
and whether there is any straightforward and natural way of modifying (one of) them in 
such a way that they do. 
7  Following  a different  line of  argumentation, Drubig  (1994) draws similar (although  not  identical) 
conclusions with respect to the FIB-structure of so-called 'negative contrastive constructions' like not 
..  ., but .  .. in English or nicht ..  ., sondern .  .. in Getman. For further discussion, cf. Reich (2001).  '  Examples like (10) suggest that the derivation of term answers has to respect the 'minimal functional 
complex'  containing the focus. This restriction  may in fact lead to correct results  in  examples like 
(lo), but it won't do so in  more complex cases like (I  1) -sf. *Her BLUE convertible. vs.  That he 
likes to drive her BLUE converfib[e.-  or in cases where the term answer is constituted hy a lexical 
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2.1.  The Problem within Projection Approaches 
First  of  all, let's  have  a  look  at  so-called  'projection  theories,'  the  most  prominent 
representative of which is presumably Selkirk (1984, 1996). Selkirk (1996) assumes that 
F-marking is controlled by the set of rules given in (13) and (14). 
(1  3)  Basic Focus Rule 
An accented word is F-marked. 
(14)  Focus Projection 
a.  F-marking of the head of a phrase licenses the F-marking of the phrase. 
b.  F-marking of an internal argument of a head licenses the F-marking of 
the head. 
Now,  reconsider  Schwarzschild's  example  (9)  in  the  light  of  (13)  and  (14).  The 
prenominal  adjective blue is accented; hence it  is F-marked by the Basic Focus Rule 
(1 3). However, being an adjunct, it cannot license F-marking of  the non-accented head 
of  the DP, cf. (14b). Since there is no other candidate that could license F-marking of 
the head, it has to be concluded that the head is not F-marked. But since the head is not 
F-marked, F-marking of the DP isn't licensed either. 
Is there a straightforward way of  modifying this approach? As far as I can see, no. 
The crucial  problem  is  that  any  mechanism  that  allows  F-markers  to project  from 
prenominal  adjectives to the  DP containing  them  cannot prevent  the  F-marker  from 
projecting to VP if  the DP is an internal  argument of  the verbal  head; i.e., the QIA- 
sequence in (15) would be predicted to be well formed in general, especially in an out of 
the blue utterance. 
(15)  a.  What did John do? 
b.  *He [drove Mary's [RED] convertible] 
2.2.  The Problem within Information-Theoretic Approaches 
The  other  prominent  approach  that  can  be  traced  back  to  the  work  of  Arnim  von 
Stechow (cf. von  Stechow  1981), but became well known  with the work of  Schwarz- 
schild  (1999),  assumes a  more  direct  connection  between  the  information-theoretic 
notion  of  being  'given'  and F-marking.  Schwarzschild  (1999) provides  us  with  two 
basic  information-theoretic principles, the first stating that  non-F-marked  constituents 
must be GIVEN, cf. (16),  the second being an instruction to F-mark as little as possible, 
cf. (17). 
(1 6)  G~v~~ness 
If  a constituent is not F-marked, it must be GIVEN. 
(17)  AvoroF 
Do not F-mark. 
Contrary to Selkirk's conception, the existence of  an F-marker is not due to a consti- 
tuent being accented, but rather accenting is a consequence of F-marking. This is en- 
sured by a constraint called FOC, cf. (18). The distinction between Foc-marked and F- 
marked phrases, however, is not  important for our purposes, since in  all the relevant 
examples discussed so far each F-marked constituent is at the same time a Foc-marked 
constituent. (18)  Foc 
A Foc-marked phrase contains an accent 
There are two more things to say. First, it has to be determined precisely what it means 
for a constituent to be GIVEN, cf. (19). 
(19)  Definition of GWEN (partial, informal version) 
a.  An utterance U counts as GWEN iff it has a salient antecedent A and 
modulo existential type-shifting, A entails the existential F-Closure of U. 
b.  Existential F-Closure of U := the result of replacing F-marked phrases in 
U with variables and existentially closing the result, modulo existential 
type shifting. 
Second, it has to be emphasized that the constraints GWENness, AVOITIF  and FoC  are 
organized in an optimality theoretic manner, i.e., one is  allowed to violate constraints 
according to the partial order given in (20). 
(20)  Ranking '>>' ('overrules') of Constraints 
a.  G1VENness >> AVOITIF 
b.  Foc >> AVOIDF 
Having introduced the most basic assumptions of  Schwarzschild's approach to F-mar- 
king, I can now show why  in  the convertible example (9) the DP her [BLUEIF  con- 
vertible mustn't  be F-marked: As Schwarzschild (1999: 161) shows himself, the DP in 
question is GIVEN  in  the sense specified in (19), cf. (21), hence F-marking of the DP is 
optional; since F-marking is optional, it is ruled out by AVOIDF. 
(21)  John drove Mary's red convertible ENTAILS 
a.  3X3P[P(her X convertible)]  3  DP is given. 
b.  3X3y[y  drove her X convertible)]  a  VP is given. 
c.  3X[He drove her X convertible]  2  S is given. 
Again, the question to be answered is whether there is a straightforward way to modify 
this approach. This time the answer is 'yes, in principle.'  The only reason why the DP 
mustn't  be F-marked is  a violation  of  AVOIDF.' However, as is clear from  (20), the 
constraint AVOIDF  can be violated if  there is another constraint that  is ranked higher. 
Since neither  GIVENness  nor  FOC will  force F-marking  on  the DP, there  must  exist 
another,  independently  needed  constraint that allows for violation of  AVOIDF.  In  the 
following  two sections it  will  be argued that  there  is  in  fact  good evidence for the 
existence of  a constraint with this property, a constraint that allows for the presence of 
(focus-sensitive) rhetorical relations. 
NN~  that the  assumption  that  the  whole DP is F-marked does not  influence the realization  of  the 
accent within the DP. This is simply, because  this assumption results  in embedding one Foc-phrase 
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3.  A Slightly Modified Hamblin Approach: Functional wh-Phrases 
3.1.  Questions and Answers 
Since it will turn out that one of the rhetorical relations to be licensed by this constraint 
is the QIA-relation, the semantics of focus and the semantics of wh-interrogatives I am 
assuming need to be outlined. To this effect, consider the well-formed QIA-sequence 
in (22). 
(22)  a.  What did John drive? 
b.  John drove [Mary's red conVERtible]~. 
Without any argument, I will adopt the structured meaning approach to F/B-structures 
as developed in von Stechow (1981) and Cresswell & von Stechow (1982), i.e., the F/B- 
structure  in  (22b),  repeated  as  (23a),  is  represented  as  the  structured  proposition 
consisting  of  the  focus  'Mary's  red  convertible'  and  the  property  'being  driven  by 
John,' cf. (23b). 
(23)  a.  John drove [Mary's red conVERtible]~ 
b.  (Mary's red convertible, hr.John drove x) 
Following Hamblin's (1973) dictum that "a  question sets up a choice-situation between 
a set of propositions, namely, those propositions that count as answers to it"  and taking 
the insight  into account that  FB-structures are at  the heart of  the  QIA-relation, it  is 
absolutely straightforward to construe a question like (22a), repeated here as (24a), as 
denoting a set of structured propositions, cf. (24b) and more precisely (24c). 
(24)  a.  What did John drive? 
b.  ((Mary's red convertible, hx.John drove x), 
(Peter's Porsche, hx-.John drove x),  . . .  ] 
c.  hpjx[thing'(x) & p = (x, hy.John drove y)] 
Thus, wh-interrogatives are still taken to denote sets of possible answers; the notion of 
being a possible answer, however, is now relativized to possible FB-structures. 
3.2.  Wh-Phrases as Functional Expressions 
Of course, the propositions contained in the denotation of a wh-interrogative have to be 
structured  independently.  This  is exactly  what I take to be  the  task  of  wh-phrases. 
Concretely, I propose to analyze wh-phrases not as a (type-shifted) variant of indefinites 
like something, cf. (25a), but as primarily functional expressions with an indefinite core 
that shape the F/B-structure of possible answers, cf. (25b). 
(25)  a.  'Traditional':  (what)' = hQhp3x[tking'(x) & Q(x)(p)] 
b.  Proposal:  (what)' = hQhp3P3x[thing'(x) & Q(P) & p = (x, P)] 
Given this, the well-formedness condition imposed on QIA-sequences, as stated in  (1) 
above, can be reduced to the simplest condition one can think of, namely the E -relation, 
cf. (26)."' 
''  Of course, modulo the treatment of contrastive topics. (26)  A is a congruent answer to Q iff [[An  E [QJ. 
As far as the logical form and the interpretation of wh-interrogatives are concerned, the 
functional view on wh-phrases is in essence consistent with the 'traditional analysis'  of 
wh-interrogatives within the generative framework (cf. e.g. von  Stechow 1993), i.e., a 
wh-interrogative like (27a) will be analyzed on  the level of  Logical Form as indicated 
in (27b). 
(27)  a.  What did John drive? 
SpecC  C ' 
I 
?  A  John  drove  tl 
The wh-phrase what undergoes (overt) wh-movement (or an analogous set of operations 
like e.g.  'copy  and delete,'  cf. Chomsky  1995) and leaves a coindexed  trace behind. 
Abstracting  away from the role  of  variable assignments, the  interpretation  of  the P 
John drove tl results in  the proposition  that John drove xl. This proposition, then,  is 
shifted by an  'interrogativator'  '?'  -located  in C and interpreted as the function hqhp[p 
= q]-  to the singleton set {that  John drove XI). Up to this point the interpretation of the 
logical  form  (27b)  follows  completely  the  'traditional  analysis;'  contrary  to  the 
'traditional analysis,' however, adjunction of the index  1 is not interpreted as 'common 
h-abstraction' resulting in the function Lxl.[that John drove XI]  from individuals to sets 
of  propositions  (cf. Heim  & Kratzer  1998), but  as  what  I'd  like to  call  'Hamblin- 
abstraction,'  AH, resulting in  the function hHxl.{that John drove xl) from properties to 
truth  values, i.e., in  a set of properties. Informally speaking, the process of Hamblin- 
abstraction hH  is equivalent to  'common h-abstraction'  within  the set of propositions 
(that John drove XI],  i.e., hHxl.{that  John drove xl) is basically  equivalent to the set 
(Lxl.that John drove XI)."  The wh-phrase what, finally, singles out from this set the 
property 'being driven by John,' hl.that  John drove XI, and builds the set of structured 
propositions  consisting  of  all  and  only  those  structured  propositions  (u,  hy.John 
drove y),  where u is an individual that satisfies the restriction of the wh-phrase involved. 
This is exactly the intended result. 
I1  As far as I  know,  Hamblin  (1973) was  the  first  to  make  crucial  use  of  what  I  call  'Hamblin- 
abstraction'  within his set-based model for natural  language interpretation. Rooth (1985) and others 
following him, referred to Hamblin-abstraction in modeling the semantics of  'association with focus,' 
although  on  a  different  level  of  interpretation.  It  should  be  mentioned  that  the  use  of  Hamblin- 
abstraction  presupposes  a  formal  language that  allows for expressions  that  denote  functions  from 
variable assignments to 'common  denotations,'  i.e.,  a language like the one developed in Montague 
(1970). For a  similar model  as well  as a  precise  definition of Hamblin-abstraction,  the  reader  is 
referred to Reich (2001). QuestionIAnswer Congruence and the Semantics of wh-Phrases 
4.  Integration into an Information-Theoretic Approach 
4.1.  Rhetorical Relations and the Restriction RHET-REL 
4.1.1.  The Rhetorical Relation answer 
Actually, my claim above that the answer (23a) denotes a structured proposition, was a 
bit too simplifying. The structured meaning approach -at  least in its standard formu- 
lation-  is a focus movement approach and the movement of  the focus has to be trig- 
gered s~mehow.'~  In the spirit of Jacobs (1984), I assume therefore that focus movement 
is  always triggered  by  an  operator,  in  case of  so-called  'free  foci'  by  a  rhetorical 
relation, and in the special case of answers by a rhetorical  relation  that I'd like to dub 
answer. The rhetorical  relation  answer is a two-place relation that  first binds the 
focus (the foci) in the answer and thus triggers the generation of  a structured propo- 
sition,  cf.  (28),13 second  introduces  a  variable  r ranging  over  sets  of  structured 
propositions and referring anaphorically to the contextually salient question, cf. (28b), 
(28)  a,  answer [ F [John drove [Mary's red conVERtibleIF]] 
b.  answer(r,(Mary's red convertible, hw.John drove x)) 
and,  third,  checks  whether  this  structured  proposition  is  a  possible  answer  to  the 
question, i.e., whether it is an element of the question's denotation, cf. (29). 
(29)  I[answer(Q, A)J = 1 iff [AJ  E [Q], 
Now, everything is  available to systematically  coerce F-marking of  the  constituents 
corresponding to wk-phrases.  One just  has to introduce an  additional constraint on F- 
marking that allows for the presence of  the focus-sensitive rhetorical relation answer 
-I  call it RHET-REL  (RHE~orical-RELation),  cf. (30a)-  and to give it priority over the 
constraint AVOIDF  introduced by Schwarzschild (I 999), cf. (30b). 
(30)  a.  RHET-REL 
F-mark, if  required to fulfill a rhetorical relation 
b.  RHET-REL  >> AVOIDF 
The well-formedness condition of QIA-sequences thus turns out to follow directly from 
the  interplay  of  the  semantics of  focus,  the  semantics  of  MJ~-constructions,  and the 
semantics/pragmatics  of  the  rhetorical  relation  answer, licensed  by  the  constraint 
RHET-REL  overruling AVOIDF. 
" It  is  a  well-known  problem  that,  in  general,  focus  movement  leads  to  the  violation  of  island 
constraints, cf. e.g  the discussion in von Stechow (1991). In Reich (2001), however, it is argued that 
there is  an independently justified  variant of  the structured  meaning approach that substitutes focus 
binding for focus movement, and thus avoids the problem of violating island constraints. However, to 
keep things simple, I will stick to the movement approach for the remainder of the paper. 
13  In  fact, I am assuming that any rhetorical relation has to behave focus-sensitively. It may turn out that 
this  requirement  is  too  strict,  but  nevertheless  it  seems to constitute  a reasonable  methodological 
guideline. 4.1.2.  The Rhetorical Relation contrast 
It should be emphasized that the assumption of an additional constraint RHET-REL  is in 
fact independently motivated  by examples involving so-called  'contrastive  focus,'  cf. 
e.g. the German data in (31). 
(31)  a.  Anna wird Alex zur  Party einladen. 
Anna will  Alex to the party invite 
'Anna will invite Alex to the party' 
b.  Ja,  sie  wird [ALEXIFeinladen. Aber leider  nicht [PEterIF. 
Yes, she will  [ALEXIF  invite.  But  unfortunately not  [PEter]~. 
'Yes, she will invite ALEX. But unfortunately, she won't invite PEter.' 
According to the definition of GWEN above, every constituent of sie wird Alex einladen 
in (31b) is GIVEN in the context of  (31a). Since they are all GIVEN, none of them has to 
be  F-marked  (G~v~~ness);  since  none  of  them  has  to  be  F-marked,  F-marking  is 
forbidden  by  AVOIDF. The  constituent  Alex,  however,  does  carry  an  accent,  and, 
therefore,  has  to  be  F-marked."  This,  again,  raises  the  question  of  what  it  is  that 
overrules the constraint AVOIDF  and licenses F-marking of the constituent Alex. 
The answer I  want to argue for is that the possibility  of  F-marking  the constituent 
Alex is due to the presence of  a  rhetorical  relation  contrast  binding  'contrastive 
foci.' This in turn raises the question of how to define such a rhetorical relation. To see 
this, consider, the following examples typically being discussed under the notion 'con- 
trastive focus' (cf. e.g. Rochemont 1986, Rooth 1992a): 
(32)  a.  [An [AMERicanl~  farmer] met [a [CaNAdian]~  farmer]. 
b.  John is neither [[EAger]~  to please], nor [[EAsyl~  to please], 
nor [[CERtain]~  to please]. 
c.  [[JOHNIF  hit [BILLIF] and then [[HEIF hit [HIMIF] 
Structurally, the examples cited in (32) all have one property in common: each of them 
contains at least two (maximal) constituents of  the same category (DP, VP, or S) that 
differ  in  focus, but  are  identical  in  background.  In  (32a),  for example,  the DP an 
[AMERicrzn]~  farmer  is contrasted with the DP a [CaNAdi~n]~  farmer  and vice versa, 
the focus simply serving the purpose of  ensuring comparability  on the one hand  and 
distinctiveness  in  denotation  on  the  other  hand.  I conclude  from  this  data  that  the 
rhetorical  relation  contrast may  adjoin  at LF at  any  constituent  (quite similar  to 
Rooth's  1992a operator -T),  but needs to bind at least one focus in  its scope. (32a), for 
example, is represented at the level of LF as (33a). and interpreted as (33b). 
(33)  a.  [contrast  [ F [ an [AMERicanIF farmer]]] met 
[contrast  [ F [ a [CaNAdian]~  farmer]]] 
b.  met'(contrast((American, U.an  X farmer)), 
contras  t((Canadian, U.an  X farmer))) 
14  The accent ohserved is dcfinitcly not a default accent in all-g~ven  utterances, for in German the default 
accent in  all-given  utterances  is  typically  reallzed  on  the  inflected part  of  the  predicate,  cf.  Reis 
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As  far  as  truth-conditions  are concerned,  contrast is  simply  vacuous,  cf.  (34b); 
contrast  presupposes, however, the presence of a contextually salient LF-constituent 
that differs in focus, but matches the background of the structured meaning in its scope, 
cf. (34b).Is 
(34)  a.  contras  t((a, p))= P(a); 
b.  contrast((a,  p)) is defined iff there exists acontextually salient LF- 
constituent ~[y]]  = (a', P'), such that a $ a', but P = P'. 
Definition (34) together with the constraint RHET-REL  on F-marking thus does not only 
account for the specifics of  the FB-structures in examples like (31) and (40), but also 
for the specific interpretational effect --contrastiveness-  triggered by their use. 
Having defined the rhetorical relation contrast,  we are now in the position to give 
a fully explicit account of  Schwarzschild's convertible example (9), repeated here as 
(35) for convenience. 
(35)  (John drove Mary's RED convertible.) 
a.  What did he drive (before that)? 
b.  (Before that,) He drove [her [BLUEIF   convertible]^. 
c.  [her [BLUEIF  convertiblelp. 
In  section 3 it has been  argued that the wh-interrogative  (35a) denotes the set {(u, hw. 
that John dl-ove x); u is a driveable object)  of  structured propositions.  Consequently, 
any declarative that  is meant to answer the question (35a) necessarily  needs to be F- 
marked on the constituent corresponding to the wh-phrase what in (35a). Although this 
constituent is GWEN  in the relevant sense, and thus F-marking should be suppressed by 
AVOIDF,  the F-marker is licensed by the constraint RHET-REL,  when it is bound by the 
rhetolical  relation  answer; the focus on the constituent blue constitutes a symmetric 
(or asymmetric) contrastive focus that is bound by the rhetorical  relation contrast. 
Altogether,  both  the  sentential  answer  in  (35b)  and  the  term  answer  in  (35c)  are 
represented as (36a) on the level of Logical Form, and they are interpreted as indicated 
in (36b). 
(36)  a.  answer[  F [He drove [contrast  [ F [her  ~onvertible]]]~]] 
b.  answer (r,  (contrast((blue, ilX.her Xconvertible)), hw.  he drovex)) 
On the basis of  the definitions of  the rhetorical relations answer and contrast,  as 
well  as  the  generalization  about the derivation of  term  answers, (35b) and  (35c) are 
correctly predicted to be well-formed answers in the context of (35a). 
4.2.  Functional expressions and the restriction FUNCE 
Finally, I'd  like to outline an  important  consequence of  the functional  view  on  wh- 
phrases for the FIB-structure of  wh-interrogatives. It is well known that wh-phrases in 
IS  It should be noted that the definition of contrast  in (34) does not directly capture the existence of 
asymmetric  contrastive  foci.  As  far  as I  can  see, however,  there  is  in  principle  no  problem  to 
generalize (34) in such a way that asymmetric contrastive foci can be accounted for, too. 
191 German  (at  least  in  simple wh-interrogatives)  are typically  unaccented,  cf. (37a)  vs. 
(37b), although they do not constitute GWEN information in a strict sense. 
(37)  (out of the blue) 
a.  Wer  hat (eigentlich) SANdra eingeladen? 
Who has (anyway)  SANdra invited? 
'Who invited SANdra, anyway?' 
b.  *WER hat (eigentlich) SANdra eingeladen? 
WHO has (anyway)  SANdra invited? 
'WHO invited SANdra anyway?' 
This does not mean, however, that they never carry any accent. But if they do, this has 
-in  general-  an  additional  pragmatic  effect:  either  the  question  becomes  more 
emphatic, cf. (38a) and  (38b), or accenting triggers a  'disputational'  implicature (the 
existential implicature is called into question), cf. (38a) and (38c), or it correlates with 
an echo-reading, cf. (39). 
(38)  a.  Heute koche ich ma1  wieder. 
Today cook  I  Particle again 
'I'll do the cooking again today.' 
b.  Schon. Und WAS  kochst du? 
Good.  And WHAT cook  you 
'Good. And WHAT are you going to cook?' 
c.  Und WAS  willst du  kochen? 
And WHAT want  you cook 
'And WHAT do you want to cook?' 
(39)  a.  Peter hat gestern  Sushi gegessen. 
Peter has yesterday Sushi ate 
'Yesterday, Peter ate Sushi.' 
b.  WAS  hat Peter  gestern  gegessen? 
WHAT has Peter yesterday ate 
'WHAT did Peter eat yesterday?' 
As Reis (1989) points out the most straightforward way to account for this data is to 
assume that, in  general, wh-phrases in  German  are simply  not  F-marked.  This fully 
accords  with  the  observation  made  in  Rosengren  (1991)  that,  in  German,  the  FIB- 
structures of wh-interrogatives seem to be subject to exactly the same regularities as the 
FIB-structures in declaratives. 
However,  when  having  a  look  at  comparative  evidence this  assumption  is  rather 
surprising; in  Hungarian, for example, wh-phrases  have to move into a distinguished 
focus position, cf. (40).Ifi 
(40)  Nem tudtuk  hogy Mari  mit  tett  az  osztalra 
not  know- 1 .PI. that  Mary what-Acc laid Art table-on 
'We don't know, what Mary laid on the table.' 
'"his  has been argued for extensively in Horvath (1986) 
192 QuestionlAnswer Congruence and the Semantics of wh-Phrases 
Moreover, Ladd (1996:171) reports that in Turkish, a wh-in-situ  language, wh-phrases 
even need to be accented, cf. (41). 
(41)  Halil'e NE  verdiniz 
Halil  WHAT you-gave 
'What did you give to Halil?' 
Obviously, this data rather suggests that wh-phrases are focussed than that they are not. 
But given that the functional view on wh-phrases  is basically correct, this data may be 
accounted for in a rather natural way: whereas the property of structuring propositions is 
part  of the lexical semantics of wh-phrases  in  German  (and English) -and  thus  wh- 
phrases in German (and English) have to be conceived of as functional elements-  wh- 
phrases in Turkish seem to lack exactly this property -and  thus have to be considered 
as non-functional in this respect-;  since, however, for reasons of QIA-congruence, the 
propositions in the question's denotation need to be structured, this task is taken over by 
a genuine syntactic mechanism, namely focussing. 
Actually, in German and English wh-phrases are not the only expressions that behave 
in  such a way. Similar observations can  be made i.a. with  respect to focus particles, 
negation, or sentential adverbials, cf. (42). 
(42)  a.  John only introduced BILL to Mary. 
b.  John did not introduce BILL to Mary, but JOHN 
c.  Unfortunately, John introduced BILL to Mary. 
This  parallel  behavior  shows  that  the  prima  facie  peculiar  behavior  of  wh-phrases 
simply  mirrors  their  membership  in  the  class  of  functional  expressions:  functional 
expressions are always considered to be given, for their primary function is not to add 
new information to a context, but to systematically operate on 'old information.' Within 
Schwarzschild's approach to F-marking this behavior can be captured by introducing a 
further  constraint,  FUNCE (Fu~ctional  Expressions),  that  rules  out  F-marking  of 
functional  expressions,  cf.  (43a).I7  Obviously,  FUNCE must  be  able  to  overrule 
GIVEN~~SS,  cf. (43b). 
(43)  a.  FUNCE 
Do not F-mark functional expressions 
b.  FUNCE  >> GrvE~ness 
c.  RHET-REL  >> FUNCE 
Furthermore, giving the constraint  RHET-REL  priority  over the constraint FUNCE,  cf. 
(43c), allows the pragmatic effects triggered by focussing functional expressions to be 
derived  from  the  presence  of  covert  rhetorical  relations,  e.g. the  rhetorical  relation 
contrast. 
17  Note that FUNCE allows for F-marking wh-phrases in Turkish, cf. the discussion above 5.  Summary 
On the basis of the assumption that term answers are derived from sentential ones by 
eliding their background, I argued that wh-phrases  should be considered as functional 
expressions that shape the FIB-structure of  possible answers. I therefore proposed  to 
treat wh-interrogatives as denoting sets of structured propositions and to derive the well- 
formedness conditions on QIA-sequences from the interaction  of  the semantics of wh- 
questions, the semantics of  FIB-structures  and the semantics/pragmatics  of  rhetorical 
relations.  To coerce F-marking  of  the  constituents  corresponding to  a  wh-phrase,  I 
proposed to extend Schwarzschild's approach to F-marking by an additional constraint 
called  RHET-REL  that  allows  for  violations  of  AVOIDF. Finally, I  showed  that  the 
assumption that wh-phrases are functional expressions allows to consider their peculiar 
behavior with respect to accenting as an instance of a more general  phenomenon  that 
can be captured by an independently needed constraint FUNCE.  The proposed extension 
of Schwarzschild's approach can be summarized as follows: 
(44)  a.  RHET-REL 
F-mark, if required to fulfill a rhetorical relation. 
b.  FUNCE 
Do not F-mark functional expressions. 
c.  Extending '>>': 
(i)  RHET-REL >> AVOIDF 
(ii)  FuncE >> GlVENness 
(iii)  RHET-REL  >> FUNCE. 
Finally,  it  should be  pointed  out  that  the  mechanics  introduced  so  far  need  to  be 
generalized  to  complex  wh-phrases  like  whose  mother  or  how  many  apples;  this, 
however, is another --complex-  story (cf. Reich 2001). 
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0.  Introduction: Indefiniteness and grammaticalization of 
determiners: the corpus 
Object  of  this  study is  the  marking of  nominal  indefiniteness  in  Old  Italian,  more 
precisely Old Tuscan texts, in three collections of novellas. 
In  this  period  of  early  Romance  literacy,  nominal  phrases'  can  appear  as  bare 
singulars or bare plurals, but  also with one or more functional elements  receding the  t:  noun.  The elements discussed here  will be these semantically  indefinite  determiners 
that  can  appear  alone  with  a  bare  noun  in  a NP  (-N),  excluding hereby  indefinite 
elements  which  are  only  able to  appear  in  the  second  (or  later)  position  of  a  NP 
(Det-N),  like  certo  ('certain')  in  Modern  Standard  Italian  (un  certo  uorno,  *certo 
uorno). 
The choice of the three corpus texts has been guided by the relative homogeneity of 
text  types,  i.e.  the  thematic  and  formal  continuity  as  testified  in  the  anonymous 
Novellino (written by  1280-1300) and the ever since canonical Decamerbn by Giovanni 
The paper is submitted to a special issue of "Theoretical  Linguistics",  edited by Klaus von Heusinger 
and Kcrstin Schwabe  '  We will not discuss here the status of the examined determiners as the head of a maximal projection, 
i.e. the DP-hypothesis according to Abney 1987, or the existence of a functional projection inside the 
DP, namely QP, cf. Lobel, E.  (1989): Q as a  functional  category. In: Bhatt , Chr. (ed.):  Synractic 
Phrase Srruct~ire  Phenomena in Noun Phrases and Sentences, AmsterdamlPhiladelphia, 133-157. For 
the sake of simplicity, we will call every expression containing a noun  or a pronoun  a NP. We will 
furthermore not discuss  whether  the  indefinite  elements preceding a  noun  are part of the same or 
different syntactic categories, cf. Vater  1982 or Krifka  1989. It  is highly  probable that we have to 
distinguish elements  able to be postponed or to appear separate from the  noun  in  certain partitive 
constructions ("quantifier  floating",  for example ulcuno) from elements whose position is relatively 
fixed (for example uno; cerro is certainly on its way to an adjective-like element, being already able to 
cooccur with uno in our texts, though still actualizing nouns also alone. All the other elements cannot 
cooccur). To be  able to compare their textual  distribution, we  only analyze the  actual prenominal 
realizations  of  these elements,  regardless of  the fact  that  they  can  probably  also appear in  other 
positions. 
2  Semantic indefinitness is to be understood in the Heimian sense as 'novelty of discourse referents'  at 
the semantic level of  'file cards',  irrespective of  the actual reference of certain NPs in the text. The 
most important interpretation rule in  'file-change  semantics'  is the  "Extended-Novelty-Familiarity- 
Condition": 
"For p to be felicitous w.r.t. F it is required for every NP, in p that 
(i) if NP, is [-definite],  then i e:  Dom (F); 
(ii) if NP,  is [+definite], then 
a)  i  E Dom (F), and 
b)  if NP, is a formula, F entails NP,." 
(Heim 1988:369f.). In  short: [+definite]  means  'familiar with  respect to  the file',  [-definite] 'novel 
with respect to the file'. 
ZAS Papers  in Linguistics 23, 2001, 197-210 Boccaccio (the major part of the novella is written in the second half of the 141h century) 
and, finally, the slightly epigonic Novellino by Masnccio Salernitano (written from 1450 
to 1475176). 
The anonymous Novellino is one of  the earliest Italo-Romance narrative texts. The 
late  131h  century  marks  the  relatively  late  beginning  (in  the  context  of  Romance 
languages) of the Italo-Romance writing tradition and therefore represents an important 
turning  point  in  the  emancipation  of  Romance  languages  from  Latin  domination. 
Boccaccios Decamer2n  has  served  as  a  model  for prose  literature  for centuries, in 
particular  since  Pietro  Bembo  in  his  influential  Prose  della  volgar  lingua  (1525) 
established  him, together with Petrarca for poetry, as the summit of artistic linguistic 
perfection  in  literature  and  marks  the  language  variety  used  by  Boccaccio  as  the 
obligatory variety to choose for any work of high literature in the Italo-Romance world. 
Even before this, Masuccio had imitated content and style of  Boccaccio, although his 
southern Italian origins (Salerno) and a certain portion  of  narrative originality allow to 
consider his Novellino an independent work of Italian narrative. 
In view of the fact that the overwhelming part of written texts in the centuries central 
to our study,  i.e.  the late  13Ih, the  141h and the  15'~  century, is in  Latin, a language 
without any nominal determiners, and that Modern Italian like every Modern Romance 
language has definite and indefinite articles and a great variety of indefinite quantifiers 
and pronouns3, the main question of this discussion will be: What is the textual function 
of indefinite determiners in these early texts? Where do they appear at the beginning of 
their "grammaticalization  path"4 to obligatory articles? What are the relevant semantic 
properties of nominal indefinite elements that determine their further development into 
articles,  positive  and  negative  quantifiers  or  "negative  polarity  itemsns? How  can 
modern dynamic model-theoretic semantics like DRT or "file change  semantic^"^ deal 
with these properties and the diachronic facts, in view of the fact that the basic unit of 
meaning  in  these models  is  not  the  sentence but  the  (entire) discourse - the central 
entity  when  it  comes  to  the  grammaticalization  of  determiners  (see  below)?  This 
becomes  even  more  problematic  as  the  semantic  models  in  question  work  with  a 
basically dichotomic conception of  the semantic potential of  determiners7 and consider 
also bare NPs (at least those containing a count noun) simply as indefinite. 
1.  Emergence and Function of Nominal Determiners in Germanic 
and Romance Languages 
In  a  recent  study on  the  development  of  Germanic article  systems, Elisabeth  Leiss 
(2000) considers both articles and verbal aspect markers as 'grammatical synonyms' in 
that  they  indicate  'boundedness'  of  objects  and  events,  which  become  thereby 
'percepts',  'tokens', whereas bare noun phrases or non-finite verbs tend to indicate mere 
concepts, 'types'8. The common function of aspect systems and articles is, according to 
'  Cf. Longobardi '1991, Renzi '1991. 
"f.  HoppertTraugott 1993 und HeinelClaudilHiinnemeyer 1991. 
Cf. Hoeksema 1983, Ladusaw 1993, Ramat 1997 for Italian venmo. 
Cf. Heim 1988, Kamp & Reyle 1993.  ' Cf. for example the "Extended-Novelty-Familiarity-Condition  of Heim 1988 cited above 
"Cf.  the early sketch of the principal article functions in Coseriu  1955. Indefiniteness and Specificity in Old Italian Texts 
Leiss, the indication  of  referentiality9, i.e. they  indicate the  reference  of  the internal 
verb-argument.  Languages  with  the aspectual opposition  'perfective' - 'imperfective' 
can do without articles, because the mere value of  'perfective'  action or event allows to 
conclude to the existence of  a specific, determined  object  involved  in  this  action  or 
event  (cf.  approxinlately  in  the  English  example  Peter  has eaten  an apple.), while 
'imperfective'  aspect favors the  'concept-status'  of  the  intended  referent  (generic  or 
non-specific:  Peter  used  to eat an apple every day  in his youth). Loss  of  aspectual 
marking is, according to Leiss, often accompanied by the gradual ~bli~atorification'~  of 
nominal determiners, which in the beginning cooccur preferably with count nouns in the 
focus of information, marking their important and new referential status as percepts (in 
so-called  'hypodetermining  languages').  Later,  (definite)  articles  turn  to  mark 
anaphorically known referents, i.e. given information in  the background of the textual 
information  structure  ('hyperdetermining  languages').  Only  with  real  'percepts', 
identifiability becomes an important property of the intended referents. In this scenario, 
we can notice a strong correlation between  (in-)definiteness and information' structure, 
in that nominal determiners first mark foregrounded information and in  a second step 
acquire the textual value of 'given' -  vs. 'new'  information (definite vs. indefinite in  a 
textual approach to (in-)definiteness like the one in Heim 1988, for example). Leiss is 
able to  show this  correlation for Gothic and  Old High  German, but  its  adequacy for 
Romance languages, all of  which preserve  an aspectual differentiation  at least in  the 
past  tenses  (simple past  as perfective and 'aorist',  imperfect tense as imperfective or 
iterative/edurative/habitual) remains to be shown. 
The beginning  of  a  systematic  use  of  nominal  determiners  in  late Latin  texts  is 
analyzed in  detail  in the seminal work by Selig  1992. Latin  demonstratives,  ipse and 
later  almost  exclusively  ille, occur  first  with  non-continuous  discourse  referents  of 
considerable importance (protagonists, important details like objects, times, places), so 
that we can in  a first step see a certain correspondence between the findings of  Leiss 
and Selig: nominal determiners seem to systematically mark foregrounded information, 
often  with postverbal  internal  arguments, before  they  spread to continuous discourse 
referents, changing their textual potential. Selig points out, however, that on the way to 
systematic  grammaticalization  of  definite  determiners  as  anaphoric  devices  and - 
always  later  and  neither  functionally  nor  distributionally  symmetrical  to  them"  - 
indefinite determiners as cataphoric, referent-introducing signals, we have to accept an 
intermediate period of systematic marking of each important, individualized discourse 
referent, i.e. of  marking of  specific and highly "persistent"'2 textual elements13. In  this 
period, non-specific and generic reference may still remain  unmarked, a characteristic 
of  Leiss'  'hypodetermining languages'.  From this intermediate period to the obligatory 
marking of each continuous discourse referent  (at least in argument  by  the 
9  Cf. the main idea of von Heusinger  1997: the epsilon-operator as the common semantic element of 
definite and indefinite article serves to determine a 'representative'  of a set, to form a term out of a 
non-fixed element of a set. 
10  One characteristics of grammaticalization processes, cf. Lehmann 1985. 
11  Cf. Christophersen 1939, Coseriu 1955, Moravcsik 1969, Hawkins 1978, Chesterman 1991 etc. 
I'  Cf. Givbn, T. (1983): Topic Continuity  in  Discourse:  An  Introduction. In: Givdn, T. (ed.):  Topic 
Cor~rinuit)  in Discourse: A Quantitative Cross Language Stud)'. AmsterdadPhiladelphia, 1-41. 
13  Stage  I1  in  Greenbergs  1978  scheme  of  different  stages  in  definiteness  marking  and  article 
grammaticalization. 
l4   or a typological language classification  according to the possibility of admitting bare noun phrases in 
argument position cf. Chierchia 1998. Elisabeth Stark 
definite and, also, of each new (singular) discourse referent by the indefinite article, the 
earlier apparently fundamental distinction between  specific and non-specific reference 
seems to get lost. 
2.  Specificity and textual information structure 
The notion of specificity is fundamental to the following speaker-oriented distinction: 
"An  indefinite ["I  singular noun phrase may be used to denote a particular entity, or to 
speak  of  any  arbitrary  member  of  the class described  by  the  noun  phrase."'6  In  the 
former case, the respective noun phrase can be interpreted specifically, whereas in  the 
latter, it is to be interpreted non-specifically. 
Regardless  of  the  debate  whether  definite  andlor  indefinite  descriptions  involve 
reference or not, and whether reference is better to be described as a semantic or purely 
pragmatic  phenomenon,  recent  accounts,  both  theoretical  and  empirical,  show  the 
relevance of specificity at a discourse pragmatic level: in modern languages possessing 
definite  and  indefinite  articles",  the  early  stages  of  determiner  grammaticalization 
systematically demonstrate a high preference to mark specific, i.e. particular important 
discourse elements in textsi8.  Speakers and writers highlight  specific referents, first by 
certain indefinite elements, later in the text by definite determiners, searching to lend a 
certain profile ('foreground vs. background of the story') to their texts. Recent semantic 
accounts  of  specificity  have  attempted  to  explain  the  often  mentioned  existential 
presupposition  of  specific indefinites by  '(textual)  givenness'  in  a broad  sense as the 
central  semantic element  of  specific  noun  phrases  and thereby  a  certain  affinity  of 
specific  and definite  noun  As  there  are  special  contexts which  provoke  a 
specific  and  others  which  provoke  a  non-specific  interpretation  of  indefinite  noun 
phrases20 (sometimes  there  are  also  pragmatic  reasons  excluding  one  or  the  other 
interpretation),  Haspelmath  1997  analyzes  the  occurrences  of  different  series  of 
indefinite  pronouns  in  contexts  which  favor  specific  interpretation  (concerning 
especially  arguments of  predicates  aspectually marked  as perfective)  and  in  contexts 
which  favor  non-specific  interpretation  (especially  "negative  polarity  contexts"  like 
questions,  the  protasis  in  conditionals,  scope  of  negation,  "irrealis"  contexts  like 
imperatives, futures etc)". 
IS  Specificity-distinctions exist also for definite noun phrases, see for further discussion Lyons  1999, 
165-178. 
I6  Lyons 1999, 165. 
I'  See  also  Lyons  1999,  177f.,  who  mentions  a  great  variety  of  languages  (for  example  of  the 
Austronesian  family)  indicating  both  specificity  and  definiteness  (i.e.  their  common  feature  of 
'familiarity'  to the speaker) by only one article. 
I8  Cf. the results in  Skrelina ICebelis  1972, Blazer  1979, Givon  1981, Heinz  1982, Selig 1992, Elvira 
1994, Rosen 1994. 
19  Cf. the short discussion of specificity in  Heim  1988, 220-226; see further Ens  1991, who  shows a 
partitive  "inclusion-relation"  between  specific  referents  and  a  prementioned  group  ("weak 
antecedents",  cf. En$  1991, 7ff.), DelfittoICorver  1998 who attribute a "familiarity presupposition" to 
specific referents which causes certain syntactic phenomena, Van Geenhoven 1998 etc. 
'O  Cf. for example Heim 1988,22Off.,  following FodorISag 1982. 
21  Note  that Eva Lavric,  following  Kleiber, shows in  her publications  the necessity  to differentiate 
between  'hypothetic'  (like the  scope of  negation, arguments of world-creating predicates etc) vs. 
'factive contexts' and the opposition of 'referent known' vs. 'referent unknown'  to the speaker, which Indefiniteness and Specificity in Old Italian Texts 
To sum up: Besides the obvious correlation between  (in-)definiteness and information 
structure accounted for in each textual concept of (in-)definiteness as, roughly speaking, 
'given'  vs.  'new  information'  (the  basic  distinction  also  in  DRT  and  "file-change 
semantics",  see  above),  the  speaker-oriented  category  of  specificity  is  also  to  be 
considered whenever  one analyzes information packaging  in  texts. Particularly  in  the 
early stages of  grammaticalization  like the one discussed here  with  Old Italian texts, 
specificity seems to be a decisive factor which provokes the marking of noun phrases by 
determiners in  general and it seems to be  a feature that can be explicitly  marked  by 
lexical  differentiation  in  the  paradigm  of  indefinite  elements  (cf. Haspelmath  1997, 
Lyons 1999, 174ff.). The guiding question of the following account will be if a simple 
dichotomy 'definite'  vs. 'indefinite'  in the sense 'given'  vs. 'new information'  (or "file 
card",  for example)  is  sufficient to understand  the functioning  of  the  most  frequent 
indefinite determiners in the texts, and  also if  the category  of  "introducing  discourse 
referents" is adequate at all, at least at a discourse-pragmatic level, to describe certain 
indefinites or if  it could not be precisely  the signaling of  'non-introduction'  that is the 
textual  contribution  of  some of  the  analyzed  indefinites.  Interestingly  enough, Hans 
Kamp (this volume) discusses precisely this problem in his proposal of a "use-oriented 
approach to specificity and related notions",  when he asks, from the speaker's point of 
view, "what indefinite NP to choose" (6),  if the hearer of  a discourse element does not 
have "a  representation  in his entity library for the entity  [...I  which  the speaker  [...I 
represents"  (4) by  a noun phrase. Kamp mentions  some contexts (for example trans- 
sentential anaphora to an indefinite) which  incite  a non-existential  interpretation,  and 
asks whether it  could be "part of  the semantics of  such discourses that the indefinite 
gets a non-existential  interpretation"  (8f.). In  this  case, we could  probably  go a  step 
further in  investigating  indefinite  elements  and  show  that  sometimes not  only  their 
context  elements,  but  their  lexical  semantics  itself  incites  specific  or  non-specific 
interpretation. 
The above mentioned correlations of  (in-)definiteness and information structure lead to 
a  detailed  analysis  of  the  following  distributional  characteristics  of  indefinite 
determiners:  If  nominal  determination  serves  to  highlight  'rhematic',  foregrounded 
discourse referents  in 'hypodetermining  languages' and to mark the  'given'  vs.  'new' 
status  of  the  respective  discourse  referents  in  'hyperdetermining  languages'  (Leiss 
2000), we have to examine the sentential distribution of the occurrences of  indefinites, 
i.e.  their  occurrences in  pre-  or postverbal  position  (in  the  main  syntactic  functions 
subject and object) and their occurrences in main vs. subordinate clauses with finite or 
non-finite  verbs,  together  with  their  cooccurences  with  perfective  vs.  imperfective 
aspect  (in  the  Romance  languages  in  the  past:  passuto  remoto  vs.  imperfetto).  If 
specificity  is furthermore the main  feature admitting anaphoric  reference  to  the  new 
referent introduced by the indefinite noun phrase in question22,  and if  it is in general the 
main  motivation  to mark a discourse referent (see above, especially Selig 1992), we 
have to discuss the cataphoric potential of the indefinite noun phrases and their ability 
to introduce a central discourse referent. Finally, we will search for a pattern of lexical 
differentiation  inside the  group of  the  discussed  indefinite  determiners  according to 
are both understood  as revealing the opposition of  'specific'  vs.  'non-specific'. Haspelmath provides 
linguistic evidencc for  this  distinction  by  showing  that  some languages have  a different series of 
indefinite  pronouns  for  specific  indefinites  denoting  referents known  and  those  unknown  to  the 
speaker, for example in Russian, cf. Haspelmath 1997,45-48. 
2'  Cf. Karttunen  1976. Elisabeth Stark 
specificity vs. non-specificity and will therefore study the distribution of indefinite NPs 
in highly 'specific'  vs. 'non-specific'  contexts according to Haspelmath 1997. 
3.  Properties of indefinites in Old Italian 
To understand the lexical differentiation in Old Italian indefinite determiners, we have 
to shed a light on Modern Standard Italian, a clearly 'hyperdetermining language' (Leiss 
2000). In Modern Italian, there is a textual opposition of  definite (neutrally marked by 
the definite article il and its allomorphs) and indefinite noun phrases, the former being 
either marked by the indefinite article derived from the numeral unoZ3  for singular count 
nouns in argument position, a partitive article (dellz4  for singular mass nouns in certain 
syntactic positions, especially in preverbal subject and in object position, and with zero 
or a plural partitive (dei) or alcuni ('some') or certi ('certain')  with plural count nouns. 
Zero is  in  these cases always interpreted non-specifically  and  extremely  restricted  in 
preverbal position2s. 
We will in the following concentrate on the correspondences or differences between 
the  major  indefinite  nominal  markers  in  Old  and  Modern  Standard  Italian,  i.e.  the 
distribution  of  uno, alcunoZ6  (in Modern  Italian  only under  scope of  negation  in  the 
singular meaning  'nobody',  with  specific indefinite interpretation  'some'  only in  the 
plural), certo ('a certain'), being an often mentioned indicator of  specific interpretation 
and occurring (interestingly enough) also alone as a nominal determiner in Old Italian, 
and  zero, since bare noun  phrases  are usually  interpreted  as  indefinite  in  the above 
mentioned semantic theories (DRT, FCS). We have analyzed up to 200 occurrences of 
each of  the three indefinite determiners and will discuss only the singular occurrences 
here, and, additionally, by a random selection of  100 occurrences of bare singular noun 
phrases. 
Before  we  will  have  a  closer  look  at  the  correlations  between  distributional 
properties  of  uno,  ulcuno,  certo  and  zero  and  textual  information  structure,  the 
2'  Cf. Givdn 1978 and Renzi 1976. 
24  probably inherited of Gallo-Romance languages and appearing relatively  late, so that it bas not been 
considered in this study. 
" For details see Renzi '1991.  Besides this  general sketch of indefinite descriptions, Modern  Italian 
possesses a great variety of quantifiers and indefinite pronouns, which form, according to Haspelmath 
1997, three major groups: qualche ('some'  or 'any') for specific and to a large extend non-specific 
uses  (occurring in  contexts  of specificity and  in  irrealis contexts, in  questions, conditionals, under 
indirect negation, i.e.  in  complement sentences of  negated  matrix  predicates, and  direct negation), 
nessuno ('nobody') for negative contexts and questions, and a series of -unque  (chiunque, qualunque, 
engl.: 'whoever',  'whatever'  and so on) in comparatives and free-choice contexts. We will not discuss 
here the distribution of pronominal indefinites and further quantifiers. 
26  The most frcauent occurring indefinite determiner and mmuxm in Old Italian texts after uno: 
I1 
I1  Novellino (ononymour)  Oecarnerbn (Boccvccioj  I1  Novellino (Musuccioj 
(27029 wordr. 4599 different  (269588 wordr, 17646 diflkrenr  (135102 ,vord.v,  14100 different 
Lerrtrnota (Yjj  Lemmata (?I)  Lemmata (Yj) 
1  olcurto det  1  8 (oul of lolallv I0 occurrences)  1  153 (out of 200 analyzed  1  156 (out of ZUO analyzed  I 
1  I  I occurrences of totaliv 1  114)  1  occur~nces  of tolally 419)  1 Indefiniteness and Specificity in Old Italian Texts 
etymology of uno and alcuno has to be summarized. Classical Latin had a rather clear- 
cut distribution  of  indefinite nominal markers2',  in  that quidam (not continued in  the 
Romance  languages)  was  predominantly  used  with  indefinite  NPs  with  specific 
interpretation,  especially  in  subject  position,  while  aliquis,  the  first  part  of  the 
compositional  and  nowadays  negative  alc-uno,  accompanied  non-specifically 
interpreted indefinite noun phrases, and uno was neutral in this regard. 
3.1.  Distribution of indefinite determiners in the sentence 
Discussing only the two major argumental positions in  the sentence, i.e.  subject and 
object position, and more precisely the occurrences of  indefinites in preverbal position 
and special topicalization  structures like left dislocations or hanging topicsz8, we can 
observe a rather clear distribution of the two syntactic functions: 
Table 1 
The two lines in bold in  table 1 show the percentage of preverbal subjects and objects of 
all  preverbal  occurrences  with  indefinite  determiners.  Up  to  a  half  of  all  preverbal 
occurrences of  uno, alcuno and  certo (34,7570; 43,75%; 33,33%) are subjects, while 
only 8,4370 of preverbal uno, 25,45% of preverbal alcuno and 0,007~  of preverbal certo 
are  objects.  Only  zero  shows  almost  no  difference  between  subjects  and  objects 
occurring  preverbally, being much  more freely admitted in  these positions  with  non- 
specific or generic referents.  Interestingly, zero is already quite rare  with  subjects in 
general (3,6770 of the totally 300 zero occurrences in  all the three texts). None of the 
indefinites occurs in special topicalization structures. 
These data suggests that we already deal with a 'hyperdetermining  language'  (Leiss 
2000), since the great majority of indefinite subjects appears in preverbal position in our 
texts,  and since a clear  majority of  indefinite objects  appears  in  postverbal  position, 
regardless of the informational status of  'new'  of  all the discourse referents concerned. 
Constituent  order is thus  no longer  able to  indicate  information  structure,  indefinite 
determiners mark 'new' referents by their semantic potential. 
3.2.  Specificity as a feature of the singular determiners 
3.2.1.  Specificity and 'zero' 
Concerning the textual  information organization, Old Italian  uno already seems to be 
especially used for the introduction of specific and important discourse referents: 
27  Cf. Orlandini  1983, Mcllet  1994. 
2X  Cf., among others, Cinque 1977 and  1979, Lambrecht  1994 Table 2 
If we look only at the two last lines of table 2, more than half of the occurrences of uno 
introduce highly persistent referents, and about a quarter introduce protagonists, central 
objects,  places  and  so on, whereas the other determiners  are relatively  rare  in  these 
functions.  The  only  slight  exception  is  represented  by  zero,  which  accompanies 
discourse referents with a certain cataphoric potential  (25,33%) - a fact that  is partly 
explained by its generic value: 
Table 3 
Besides  these clearly generic cases, there are many  other  occurrences  of  bare  noun 
phrases which cannot be grouped without problems under the heading of 'generic', even 
sometimes not under 'indefinite': 
(I)  Marato starzdosi sopra la poppa  e verso il mare riguardando, di niuna cosa da 
lor guardandosi, di corzcordia andarono e, lui prestamente  di dietro preso,  il 
gittarono in mare; e prima per ispazio di piu  d' un miglio dilungati furono,  che 
alcuno si fosse pure avveduto Marato esser caduto in mare. 
'While  Marato  was  standing  at  the  stern  and  looking  towards  the  sea, not 
bothering  about  them, they  all  went  together  towards  him  and, after  quickly 
having seized him from behind, they threw him into the sea, and they were more 
than one mile away when somebody realized that Marato had fallen in the sea.' 
(Boccaccio, Decameron: 127) 
Mare  in  the  prepositional  phrase  in mare refers  not  only  to  a  uniquely  identifiable 
discourse referent in this context, but also to an already mentioned, i.e. textually given 
one. It refers back to a definite noun phrase (e  verso il mare riguardando) and forward 
to another bare noun phrase (in mare). Zero in locative PPs is a rather common feature 
of  early stages of article grammaticalization and is still preserved in  Modern Standard 
Italian, especially with the preposition29 in. Contrary to the normally non-referential or 
better 'non-actua~ized'~'  or generic use of noun phrases in Modern Standard Italian, our 
?'  Cf.  Renzi  '1991,  412.  Renzi  classifies  these  cases  under  'non-referential',  which  becomes 
problematical  in  sentences with clear perfective aspect: Poi andarono in teatro ('Then they  went to 
the theatre'). 
30  Cf. Coseriu  1955. Indefiniteness and Specificity in Old Italian Texts 
texts show a rather systematic differentiation between PPs with important locations for 
the  ongoing story (normally  with  indefinite or definite determiners)  and  peripherical 
ones"  like in  example  (I),  where the fact of  Marato's  being  thrown  in  the water  is 
sufficient regardless of the identification of the concerned sea. This is an example of the 
difficulties in analyzing bare noun phrases simply as indefinite (or generic): it is neither 
the mere concept of  'seahood' nor a new discourse referent in the above passage, but an 
unimportant one. 
3.2.2.  Certo vs. alcuno -  From non-specificity to negativity 
Analyzing the presumed specificity of certo and the possible non-specificity of alcuno, 
given its etymology (see above), we can observe a gradual specialization of these two 
elements on 'specific'  vs. 'non-specific contexts' from the  151h century (Decamerhn) to 
the 1  6Lh  century (Novellino of Masuccio): 
Table 4 
Table 5 
In  the  Deculizerhn  (table  4),  uno  and  zero  appear  with  more  than  half  of  their 
occurrences in main clauses, as arguments or adjuncts of finite verb phrases and slightly 
more often in the scope of a perfectively marked verb. Alcuno and certo (with very few 
occurrences in  all  the  three  texts,  so that  the  statistics have  mere  indicative  value), 
however, do not differ very much from this behavior, except perhaps in the interesting 
detail that alcuno cooccurs only in 20,14  % of  its singular occurrences with perfective 
aspect. 
While all indefinites analyzed still mainly occur with finite verbs, we find a clearer 
picture in Masuccio (table 5) when it comes to the distribution according to textual fore- 
or  backgrounding.  Uno  and  certo  are  now  by  far  the  most  important  referent- 
introducing  devices  in  main  clauses,  while  only  a  fifth  of  alcuno's  occurrences 
(22,66%) is found in these contexts. Together with the finding that perfective aspect in 
the past  marks the main  'story  line'  in  (Romance) narrative texts, alcuno's  5,47%  of 
occurrences with  perfectively marked  verbs  indicate its specialization on  background 
information. 
'' Cf. Stark (in press). Elisabeth Stark 
If we have now a closer look at the 'non-specific contexts'  (see above), we can observe 
a  continuous  loss  of  the  initial  non-hypothetical,  but  non-specific  interpretations  of 
alc~no'~  and its drift towards negative contexts -  modern alcuno in the singular almost 
exclusively occurs in the scope of sentential negation33: 
Table 6 
Table 5 
Table 8 
Considering only two criteria, cooccurrence with  sentential  negation on the one hand 
and  perfective  aspect  on  the  other,  we  can  see  an  important  development from  the 
almost  archaic anonymous Novellino  in the late  13'~  century  (table 6) with generally 
very  little  lexical  variation  in  the  field  of  nominal  indefiniteness  and  a  systematic 
marking of highly important specific discourse referents by uno in  the foreground of the 
single novellas, regardless of negation. Boccaccio's Decarnerbn (table 7) shows one of 
the most varied  paradigms  of  indefinite determiners (and pronouns)  in  our corpus. It 
demonstrates  the  obvious  'specificity  opposition'  of  uno  vs.  alcuno,  the  former 
appearing rarely in negative or negative polarity contexts (and occurring with important 
discourse referents, as demonstrated above), the latter still appearing in  foregrounded 
portions  of  the  text  (with  perfective  aspect),  but  occurring  already  more  often 
particularly in negative contexts. The latest text, Masuccios Novellino (table 8), shows a 
strengthening of this development towards Modern  Standard Italian, with more than  a 
third of the alcuno-occurrences in negative contexts. 
32  See above, footnote 21, for the distinction between  hypothetical  and non-specific,  i.e. not known to 
the speaker. 
33  Cf. Ramat 1997 for the parallel, but earlier development of veruno. Indefiniteness and Specificity in Old Italian Texts 
3.2.3.  Lexical differentiation 
A synopsis of all the three texts shows that uno and certo are definitely the Old Italian 
determiners in the textual foreground (compare also the findings for textual persistency 
of  discourse referents introduced by uno and certo in  table 2), uno having almost lost 
the etymological potential of being neutral with respect to specificity oppositions: 
Table 9 
For an impressive example of the almost complementary distribution of uno and alcuno 
with respect to 'specificity'  contexts, see the following example: 
(2)  I due fratelli,  come che molta speranza non prendessono di questo, nondimeno 
se  n' andarono a unu religione  di frati  e domandarono alcuno  santo e savio 
uomo che udisse la confessione d' un lombardo che in casa loro era infermo; e 
fu  lor dato un frate  antico di santa e di buona vita e gran maestro in Iscrittura e 
nzolto  venerabile  uomo,  nel  quale  tutti  i  cittadini  grandissima  e  speziale 
clivozione aveano, e lui menarono. 
'The two brothers, although they did not have much hope from this, went to a 
monastery and asked for a holy and wise man who could hear the confession of a 
Lombardian who was in their house, sick, and they were given an old monk of 
holy  and good life and a great master of the Holy Bible and a very venerable 
man, who was devotionally honored by all the citizens, and they took him with 
them.' 
(Boccaccio, Decanzeron: 30) 
The  internal  argument  of  the  'world-creating  predicate'  domandare  ('to  ask  for') 
without existential presupposition  is introduced  by alcuno, indicating clearly the non- 
factual status of this discourse referent. Only when the semantics of the main predicate 
(fu lor &to  - 'they  were given')  implies the existence  of  its internal  argument (still 
postverbal  in  our example and with  very similar lexical  material) and when  the noun 
phrase in  question  introduces an important discourse referent (in this case one of the 
protagonists),  the  'real'  referent-introduction  is  done by  uno. Even  if  this  example 
provides further evidence for the variable-analysis of indefinites, bound by (existential) 
operators (here inside the VP'~),  we want to point out that in  Old Italian texts there is 
very little ambiguity as to the opposition between specific or non-specific interpretation 
of  indefinite noun phrases -  Old Italian writers knew "what  indefinite to choose"  (see 
the quotation from Kamp, above). 
j4  Cf. among others Carlson  1977, Heim 1988, Van Geenhoven 1998. 
207 4.  Conclusion 
A close examination of the textual distribution of  the four main  Old Italian  indefinite 
determiners uno, alcuno, certo and zero in singular noun  phrases in three collections of 
novellas with respect to 'specific'  vs.  'non-specific'  contexts and sentential and textual 
information  organization,  revealed  a  rather  clear-cut  lexical  differentiation  in  Old 
Italian.  Uno and certo occur preferably with important text referents,  while alcuno is 
non-specific  (hypothetical) and only slowly acquiring its modern negative value. The 
function of zero resists any simple classification as 'indefinite', i.e. referent-introducing, 
being  much  more  common  also in  the  singular  than  in  Modern  Italian  and  having 
several values (generic, non-referential, non-specific etc.). 
Finally,  the  most  astonishing  finding  is  the  loss  of  'neutrality'  of  Latin  unus 
according  to the specific  -  non-specific  opposition  in  Old Italian.  Here,  the  whole 
paradigm of the main indefinite determiners allows to treat specificity or non-specificity 
as a lexical feature of elements. From there on, however, we assist a gradual spread of 
uno also to non-specific contexts from the 14'~  century to contemporary Standard Italian 
(cf. tables 6 to 8; simultaneously, alcuno is restricted to negative contexts, zero to non- 
referential  ones, and  certo  loses  its  status as  a  determiner),  where  the  two  possible 
interpretations  of  uno  in  ambi  uous, particularly  in  opaque contexts, can  be  indeed  8  discussed as a matter of syntax3 or even pragmatics36. 
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1.  Introduction 
'Correction'  is the name of a sentence with contrastive focus' the phonological/phonetic 
realization of which is a single contrastive pitch accent. These sentences predominantly 
appear in (fictional) dialogues. The first speaker uses grammatical entities against which 
the  next  speaker protests  with  a  sentence  nearly  identical  except  that  it  contains  a 
prosodically marked corrective element. This paper makes contrastive focus visible by 
means of  'KF'  (contrastive focus). The focus domain is bracketed: [ ... ]KF.  Arabic 
numbers of  sample sentences index first sentences. Capital letters index the focussed 
syllable  of  the  corresponding correction  by  the  next  speaker. Using  (1A)  the  next 
speaker corrects the time when the treasure was found. 
(1)  [Kinder fanden im Mai  in  einem vogtlandischen Bergwerk  einen  wertvollen 
SLberschatz.1 F 
(1A)  [Am 20.  APRILIKF  fanden  die Kinder den  Schatz. Im Mai  wurde er schon 
~~~gestellt." 
When  discourse  analysts  say  that  meaning  is  brought  about  interactively,  tuples  of 
sentences followed by one or more sentences with contrastive focus make use of this 
principle  of  communication. Interaction  ends when  no further protest follows. In  that 
case, speakers have tacitly agreed upon the last entity mentioned in the given sentential 
context, and they have accepted what was expressed as part of their common ground3. 
The  sentential  context  that  never  was  protested  against  becomes  part  of  common 
ground,  too.  So  far  sentences  with  contrastive  focus  follow  pragmatic  principles. 
Although they are representative speech acts they interrupt the flow of texts of any type. 
Only when the correction has been accepted the communicative partners go back to the 
original  type  of  text  and  continue  the  text  pattern.  This  paper,  however,  is  more 
interested in the internal structure of  a correction sentence and in  the relation between 
the pairs of sentences serving as utterances of first and of next speakers. This paper also 
aims  at  pointing  out  the  difference  in  information  structure  between  categorical 
sentences and next sentences with contrastive focus as their only focus marking which 
are intended andlor interpreted as corrections. 
To interpret  a  sentence  as  a  correction  you  need  a  context  which  supports  this 
interpretation.  There  are clear  cases and  there  are borderline  cases. Let  us  compare 
The paper is submitted to a special issue of "Theoretical Linguistics",  edited by Klaus von Heusinger 
and Kerstin Schwabe 
I  The phonological  realization  of  contrastive  focus,  contrastive  stress  embedded  in  a  characteristic 
prosodic contour, gets a very short characterization in 3.2. 
*  F indexes presentational focus with its bracketed focus domain: [ ... IF. 
3  In this paper common ground comprises grammatical knowledge, too. 
ZAS Papers in Linguistics 23, 2001, 21  1-230 several examples. Sentence 1A undoubtedly is a correction. Sentences (2A) and (3A), 
on  the  other hand, must be regarded  as borderline  cases.  Sentence (2A) without  the 
bracketed context might just as well be interpreted as new information which was added 
by the next speaker in continuation of the information given in sentence (2). (2A) might 
even  have  been  produced  by  the  first  speaker  himself.  In  that  case  [In  der 
Eingangszone] does not replace the information on the locality mentioned in (2) by an 
alternative but may be regarded as a specification of  the place [in einem Bergwerk]. 
The speaker indicates his ability to specify the information hitherto given. 
(2)  [Kinder  fanden  am  20.  April  in  einem  vogtlandischen  Bergwerk  einen 
wertvollen SILberschatz.]F 
(2A)  [In der EINgangszone]KF/F eatdeckten sie ihn. 
(Die Eingangszone  gehort  der  GeMEINde,  die Stollenanlagen  den  friiheren 
BeTREIbern. Die Unterscheidung hat rechtliche KonseQUENzen.) 
Sentence (3A) is an even weaker example for a correction. The lexical entry "finden / to 
find" expresses an unintended event. But it is open to an interpretation with a preceding 
action  causally  linked  to  the  event  of  "finding".  Using  /  understanding  (3A)  as  a 
correction fixes the interpretation of  to find  as an event of finding by chance. 
(3)  [Kinder  fanden  am  20.  April  in  einem  vogtlandischen  Bergwerk  einen 
wertvollen SILberschatzIF. 
(3A)  [AUSgebuddeltIKFF haben  sie  ihn,  [unter G~ROLL  hervorgeholtIKF,  nicht 
einfach so geFUNden. 
When Kai Alter and Ina Mleinek in our project "Intonation  and Meaning" of the DFG- 
research  group  349  conducted  production  experiments  with  sentences  in  unclear 
contexts many of the subjects did not produce the prosodic contours of corrections. In 
their  interpretation  tests  the subjects even  failed to  hear contrastive  focus when  the 
contexts did not correspond. Both kinds of  tests convinced us that the interpretation of 
contrastive focus depends on context. 
When examples (I) to (3) are interpreted as corrections they protest against the untrue 
or incorrect representation of  a situation. But not all the corrections are directed to the 
semantic  level  of  their  structural  description.  There  are  protests  against  the 
morphological structure of  entities, against their phonological structure or even against 
the phonetic realization of single elements (cf. (4)), 
(4.1)  [Anna hat sich mit ihrem NACHhr gestritten]F 
(4.1A) Sie hat sich mit ihrem [NachBARNIKF gestritten. 
(4.2)  [Anna hat sich mit ihrem NACHbarn gestritten.]F 
(4.2A) Sie hat sich mit ihrem Nachbarn [ZERstrittenIKF. 
(4.3)  [Das ist aber eine tolle MaCHIneIF 
(4.3A) Eine tolle [MaSCHIneIKF. 
or even against all kinds of incorrect quotations (cf. (5)). Correction by contrastive focus 
(5)  [In  einem  vogtlandischen  Bergwerk  fanden  Kinder  beim  Spielen  einen 
mittelalterlichen SILberschatz.]F 
(5A)  [In einem STEINbruchIKF fanden Kinder beim  Spielen einen mittelalterlichen 
Silberschatz. 
(5A)  is a sentence by Pasch (1983). Correction (5A) restores the quote. In such a case 
of metalinguistic correction the next speaker is forbidden to change anything but 
the deviant part(s) for extralinguistic reasons. 
The whole variety of examples has to be taken care of when a theory of corrections is to 
be constructed. In this paper we will first compare the grammatical properties of pairs of 
first and next sentences  (i.e., corrections), and then  draw conclusions with respect to 
their corresponding information structures and finally suggest a model for correction- 
sentences. 
2.  The information structure of categorical sentences 
In  order to  be  able to compare  corrections  with  so-called  categorical  sentences, we 
would like to repeat the well-known grammatical properties of the latter: 
-  The information structure of categorial sentences is divided up into background and 
focus. For each sentence, the division is made on the basis of  the given linguistic and 
extralinguistic context. 
-  Background  information  of  German  categorical  sentences  is  characterized  by 
scrambled  DPs  and  by  the  placement  of  anaphoric  pronouns  in  the  so-called 
Wackernagel-Position. 
-  DPs  expressing  background  information  normally  are  characterized  by  definite 
articles or possessive pronouns.  In the rare cases when indefinite articles characterize 
background information, they are interpreted generally or specifically. Definite articles 
in  the  background  part  of  the  sentence  may  have  all  the  interpretations  possible: 
definite, indefinite, general. But when definite articles are to express focus information, 
they have to refer not only specifically but uniquely. 
-  The focus domain may be either medium or minimum. Focus accent is realized by 
the phrasal-  or  word  accent  of  the  deepest  embedded  verbal  complement  or  verbal 
adjunct. 
-  In  assertive  main  clauses,  focus is  expressed  by  a characteristic  falling prosodic 
contour. 
-  The defocused DPs and PPs expressing background information are moved to the left 
of  the focus domain, i.e., outside maximal VP, to be even more precise: to the left of 
the so-called attitudinal adverbials and particles. There is  good reason  for attitudinal 
adverbials  and particles to form the right  border  between  background  and focus in a 
sentence.  Background  information  is  known  or  at  least  accessible  to  all  the 
communicative  partners.  But  attitudes  do not  belong  to  propositional  meaning  and 
therefore can never become the mental possession of next speakers. 
-  The  movement  of  finite  German  verbs  is  syntactically  motivated.  In  assertive 
German main clauses finite verbs are head-moved to Co independent of their status in 
the information structure of the sentence. 
-  The so-called topic position in Spec CP can be filled by background as well as focus 
material. -  Therefore, background constituents in assertive clauses  always are either placed in 
Spec CP and /or between the finite verb to the left and attitudinal adverbials to the right. 
Their  order  is  defined  by  the  movement  rules  for either  pronominals  or  scrambled 
elements: pronouns precede definite DPs with the exception that the definite subject-DP 
may precede pronouns or that a pronoun may follow a subject-DP even if it is within the 
focus domain. Besides, the inner sequence of pronouns and of definite DPs is regulated 
by  cases, and pronominal adverbials normally follow other pronouns, PPs with definite 
articles normally follow definite DPs. 
-  Focus information in the topic position can be expressed by either presentational or 
contrastive focus. Contrastive focus may be the only focus accent in the clause, or it 
may be part of a so-called Bridge Contour. 
-  Preferably, the topic position is filled by topics (referring background constituents) 
or by  frame adverbials  (which often are counted  among topics). But other non-topic 
constituents are allowed in Spec CP as well. There are speculations that either topics or 
even  a larger  class  of  sentence-initial  constituents  are  thematically  connected  to the 
topic of  the text and help to organize the inner structure of  texts and even characterize 
types  of  texts.  As  far  as journalistic  reports  are  concerned,  they  tend  to  put  focus 
information in sentence-initial position and thereby put it in the foreground of  attention. 
When  more  sentences  of  that  kind  follow  each  other,  the  reader  /  hearer  gets  the 
impression of a rhythmic sequence of  important news, and he or she seems to read at a 
higher speed hurrying from one focussed beginning to the next. 
Sentences (6.1) and  (6.2)  are categorical  sentences. The answers  (6.1.1)  and  (6.1.2) 
repeat the defocused constituents verbally. The focussed constituent can be topicslized 
(cf.(6.1.2)). The alternative answers in (6.2) are constructed as parts of a continuous text 
as  far  as  information  structure  is  concerned,  i.e.  the  speaker  uses  the  defocused 
constituents  as expressions of  background  information  realized  by  means of  definite 
articles or pronouns. The focussed constituents can  be  topicalized  again  (cf.  (6.2.3), 
(6.2.4)). 
(6.)  Wo fanden Kinder einen mittelalterlichen Silberschatz? 
(6.  I. I)  Kinder fanden  einen mittelalterlichen  Silberschatz  [in einem  vogtlandischen 
BERGwerkIF. 
(6.1.2)  [In einem vogtlandischen BERGwerkIF fanden Kinder einen mittelalterlichen 
Silberschatz. 
(6.)  Wo fanden Kinder einen mittelalterlichen Silberschatz? 
(6.2.1)  Die Kinder fanden den Schatz [in einem vogtlandischen BERGwerkIF. 
(6.2.2.)  Sie fanden ihn [in einem vogtlandischen BERGwerkIF. 
(6.2.3.)  [In einem vogtlandischen BERGwerkIF fanden die Kinder den Schatz. 
(6.2.4.)  [In einem vogtlandischen BERGwerkIF fanden sie ihn. 
In question-answer pairs sensu stricto (6.1.1), (6.1.2) the next speaker should not use the 
definite  article or the pronoun  with  specific reference, for then  he  would  give  more 
information  than  he  was  asked  for  in  (6.) Sentences  in  (6.2) are  not  answers  sensu 
stricto. 
But many of  the characteristics of  categorical sentences do  not hold in corrections, for 
corrections have their own information structure, which will be explained next. Correction by contrastive focus 
3.  The information structure of corrections 
3.1.  Articles and movement 
Normally,  corrections  react  to  first  sentences  and  therefore  are  backward-referring 
utterances. They may either keep the syntactic structure of first sentences or change it. 
(5)  [In  einem  vogtlandischen  Bergwerk  fanden  Kinder  beim  Spielen  einen 
mittelalterlichen SILberschatz.]F 
(5A)  In  einem vogtlandischen  Bergwerk  fanden Kinder beim Spielen [Beutestucke 
aus dern zweiten WELTkrieglKF. 
(5A) keeps the constituent order of  (5). But very often, the contrasted constituents are 
moved into Spec CP: 
(5B)  [Beutestucke aus dern zweiten WELTkrieglKF fanden Kinder beim Spielen in 
einem vogtlandischen Bergwerk. 
Putting contrasted constituents  into  Spec CP follows  the  principle  mentioned  above 
when  focussed  constituents  in  the  topic  position  of  categorical  sentences  were 
explained. Second speakers begin  increasing their  speaking rate when  they reach  the 
non-corrected part  identical  with the first speaker's construction. Besides, it is normal 
that the non-corrected parts of  the first sentence are pronominalized or left out, so that 
in  the extreme case the ellipsis only consists of  the domain of  the contrastive focus. 
What was called the extreme case is normal usage in dialogs. 
4 
(5B')  [Beutestiicke aus dern zweiten  WELTkrieglKF fanden Kinder /  ... fanden  sie 
dort / wurden gefunden. 
(5C)  [Beutestucke  aus  dern  zweiten  WELTkrieglKF  (waren  es).  /  Es  waren 
[Beutestucke aus dern zweiten WELTkrieglKF. 
(5B")  (Nein,) [Beutestucke aus dern zweiten WELTkrieglKF. 
(6)  Die Kinder fanden  beim Spielen  [einen mittelalterlichen Silberschatz  in  einem 
vogtlandischen BERGwerkIF. 
(6A)  Die Kinder fanden beim Spielen einen mittelalterlichen Silberschatz [in einem 
STEWbruchIKF. 
(6B)  Die  Kinder  fanden  [in  einem  STEINbruchIKF  beim  Spielen  einen 
mittelalterlichen Silberschatz. 
In (6A) constituents with indefinite articles follow those with definite articles just like in 
categorical  sentences. But  (6B) violates several principles of  information structure of 
German  categorical  sentences.  Not  only  has  the  contrasted  constituent  been  moved 
between  background  constituents,  there  is  a  definite  DP following  it,  too.  (6B), 
however, is a grammatically and information-structurally correct sentence. It proves that 
corrections have their own information structure. The constituent indexed by [ ... ]KF 
constitutes focus. The rest of  the sentence automatically constitutes the background  of 
the correction. Therefore the grammatical rules helping to divide categorial sentences 
into background and focus do not hold in corrections. 
cf. Schwabe (2000): Coordinate Ellipsis and Information Structure. Besides,  there are different  reasons  to  change the  articles in  corrections. First, next 
speakers who correct may  know the situation with all  its participants. Therefore they 
can change articles for better knowledge of the referents of  the DPs. In  (6C), the DPs 
refer specifically. This is the kind of change of reference we forbade in question-answer 
pairs  sensu  stricto.  The corrected  constituent  "im  Kirchdorfer  STEWbruch"  in  (6C) 
refers specifically as well. 
(6C)  Die  Kinder  fanden  beim  Spielen  den  mittelalterlichen  Silberschatz  [im 
Kirchdorfer STEINbruchIKF. 
But  the  next  speaker  may  also  refer  unspecifically  with  the  constituent  den 
mittelalterlichen Siberschatz when he uses (6C) as a sentence in a continuous text with 
(6C) following (6), and  "the medieval treasure"  being accepted as a discourse referent 
which had already been introduced by (6). This kind of  change of articles which does 
not change reference was allowed in question-answer pairs sensu stricto above. 
The Grammar of German forbids certain kinds of movements in  categorical sentences 
or  fully  focussed  sentences  but  allows  them  in  corrections.  The corrections in  (7A) 
show the otherwise immovable entities as contrastively focussed constituents in  Spec 
CP  : 
So-called unseparable prefixes: 
(7.1 A)  [ANIKF hat er das Licht gemacht, nicht aus. 
infinite verb forms separated from their otherwise unseparable directional argument: 
(7.2A)  [GeSETZTIKF hat er den Stuhl auf die Terrasse, nicht geworfen. 
infinite verb forms separated from their unseparable predicatives: 
(7.3A)  [GeWESenIKF ist er Lehrer, nicht geworden. 
What is interesting but so far has not been explained is that the (parts of) constituents 
which may appear in Spec CP when contrastively focussed, are not allowed  in the topic 
position  of  dependent  clauses, i.e.,  directly behind  Co (cf. (7.3.1)),  whereas  their 
counterparts in  doubly focussed  constructions  with  the  so-called  Bridge  Contour are 
allowed there, too, (cf. (7.4)). 
(7.3.1A)  Ich weiR, *daR geWEsen er Lehrer ist. 
(7.4)  IStuDIERT hat er LinGUIstik, IgeWORden ist er dann \LEHrer. 
(7.4.1)  Ich  weiI3,  dass  IstuDIERT  er  LingUIstik  hat,  aber  geWORden  dann 
\LEHrer ist. 
Summary: 
Examples (6B) through (6C) exemplify that what is new  information  in  a correction 
need not conform to focus in categorical sentences, and what is background information 
in corrections does not correspond to  background information in categorical sentences. 
In  corrections, all the constituents of the first sentence which have not been  protested 
against are accepted as 'background'. As far as corrections are concerned, we better put 
focus  and  background  in  inverted  commas  because  they  are  defined  by  other 
grammatical  means  than  focus  and  background  in  categorical  sentences.  'Focus'  is Correction by contrastive focus 
defined by the focus domain of contrastive focus. It is neither restricted to the focusable 
(sub-)  constituents  of  a  categorical  sentence  nor  to  their  positions  in  categorical 
sentences. But the articles in 'focus' constituents do conform to the restrictions of focus 
constituents: definite articles in  'focus' refer uniquely only. 
3.2.  The prosodic realization of  contrastive focus 
The prosodic realization of contrastive focus deserves a paper of  its own. But at least a 
few  characteristics of  contrastive  pitch  accent  must  be  mentioned  here  in  order  to 
complete the model of correction presented in chapter 4.: There is a marked increase in 
frequency on the contrastively  focussed syllable. It is true that  the absolute  value of 
frequency need  not  be  much  above that  of  presentational  focus peaks;  but  this  is 
compensated for by the often lower onsets of  contours with contrastive focus relative to 
contours  with  presentational  focus.  Speakers  seem  to  produce  the  clearest  possible 
marking by means of  least effort. Increase of frequency must be understood as relative 
not  absolute increase. What else  is  remarkable  is  that  the frequency peak  is  on  the 
contrastively  focussed  syllable  rather  than  before  as  is  often  the  case  with 
presentational focus. The prosodic marking is clearly audible and visible in  its context. 
It is the formal representation of  the linguistic sign 'contrastive focus'. 
3.3.  The focus domain of  contrastive focus 
3.3.1  Focus induced by context only 
The next speaker can protest against a whole sentence. The sentence protested against 
and the next  sentence must fit into the same context. Lang (1976) called this kind of 
context CI (common integrator) or in German GEI (gemeinsame Einordnungsinstanz). 
(8.1)  Warum redet denn Anna nicht mit ihren Kindern? 
[Weil Peter nicht EINgekauft hat]F. 
(8.1A) Nein, [weil die Tochter trotz ihres Hausarrests AUSgegangen ist]KF 
In these examples, CI is a class of reproachable activities of Anna's children. 
(8.2)  Wo bleiben denn die Kinder? 
Anna [ist im KInoIF 
(8.2A) Sie [kauft fiir Oma EINIKF 
CI are the activities keeping a child from returning home in time. 
The next speaker can also protest against any part of form and meaning of the sentence, 
against phrases, words, constituents of word formation or even against affixes or single 
sounds of  words. The few  German  words  like  the  impersonal  pronoun  man  which 
cannot  be  stressed  cannot  express  contrastive  focus  either  except  when  their 
phonological form is protested against as in (8.3A). 
(8.3)  Men sitzt AUFrecht! 
(8.3A) MAN! If the notion of CI is to be applied to examples like 8.3, it can only refer to a class of 
phonetic realizations of the vowel in the one-syllable word man. The kind of CI  will be 
different once more in  (8.4), where it comprises  a class of dialectal variations of the 
impersonal pronoun man. 
(8.4)  Mer sitzt AUFrecht! 
(8.4A) MAN! 
To find  out how  large the  respective focus  domain  is we have to  compare the  next 
sentence with the first sentence and define the focus domain subtractively: 
(9)  Wamm wurde Anna nicht zum Nachbarschaftsfest  eingeladen? 
Es gibt Spannungen; denn sie [hat sich mit ihrem NACHbarn gestritten1F 
(9A)  sie hat ihren Nachbarn [SCHLECHT  gemacht1KF 
(9B)  sie hat sich rnit [ALlenIKF Nachbarn  gestritten. 
(9C)  Anna hat sich mit ihrem Nachb  [ZERstrittenIKF. 
(9D)  sie hat sich mit ihrem [NachBARNIKF zerstritten. 
(9A) through  (9D) form  a  series  of  corrections.  (9A) protests  against  the  meaning 
expressed by the predicate,  (9B) against the quantification in  the modifying PP, (9C) 
protests against a derived lexical entry, and (9D) corrects the morphological form of a 
word. Although  in  (9D) only one sound is concerned, the pitch accent is placed on  a 
syllable, of  course, and  the minimal  focus domain  is a word  or word  form. To add 
emphasis to the correction, several contrastive foci may be used. 
(9D')  [NACH-BARNIKF. 
(8A')  Nein, weil [ihre Tochter -  TROTZ -  ihres HAUSarrests -  AUSgegangen ist]KF. 
What these examples show, too, is, that tuples of foci need not alter the focus domain. 
Depending on context, a functionally  or  structurally  ambiguous  phrase may  express 
more  than  one correction  and  even  have different  focus domains:  Finite  verbs,  eg., 
express  several  kinds  of  meaning:  the  lexical  meaning  of  the  verb  stem,  temporal 
meaning, and sentence mood, and each of them can be protested against. Protest against 
sentence mood  is  called  Verumfokus.  Hohle  (1982)  showed  how  the  corresponding 
contrastive foci are realized when synthetically or analytically constructed verb forms 
are  used.  When  there  is  only  one  syllable  available,  contrastive  focus  is  context 
dependent in three ways. 
(10A)  Peter hat [geSAGT]KF -  protest against lexical meaning 
Peter [HATIKF gesagt -  protest against tense 
Peter [HATIKF gesagt -  Verumfokus =protest against sentence mood. 
(1 IA)  Peter [SAGteIKF -  protest against lexical meaning, or protest against sentence 
mood 
Peter [sagTE]KF -  protest against tense. 
(12A)  Peter [SAGT ]KF -  protest against lexical meaning, or against tense, or against 
sentence mood. Correction by contrastive focus 
Finding out which kind of protest is relevant can only be found out by means of context. 
Let  us move to another obvious kind  of  context dependence of  the focus domain: 
correction of coordinated constituents: 
(13)  Warum  wurde  Anna  nicht  zum  Nachbarschaftsfest  eingeladen?  Es  gibt 
Spannungen; denn Anna hat sich mit Klaus, Peter und Bert gestritten. 
(13A)  Sie hat sich mit Klaus, Peter und [OTTOIKF gestritten. 
(13Bl)Sie hat sich mit [Hans, Siegfried und OTTOIKF gestritten. 
For (l3B1) you might again find several contrastive foci in one focus domain. 
(13B2) Sie hat sich mit  [HANS, SIEGfried und OTTOIKF gestritten. 
3.3.2.  Context-sensitive focus versus focus associated with operators 
It is well known that there is a class of focussing particles. The associated focus may be 
presentational focus (cf. (14)) as well as contrastive focus (cf. (14.1A)): 
(14)  Zu  unserem  20.  Hochzeitstag  hatten  wir  wieder  unsere  Kinder 
eingeladen.  Urspriinglich  wollten  auch alle kommen.  Aber es kommen 
nur [die ~0HnelF. 
(14.1)  Zum 20. Hochzeitstag hatten die Miillers wieder ihre Kinder eingeladen. 
Es wollten auch alle kommen. 
(14.1A)  Nur [die SOHneIKF. Hast Du  denn noch nicht von dem enttauschenden 
Brief ihrer Tochter Anja gehort? 
Different from the examples with context-sensitive contrastive focus, example (14.1A) 
has  its focus domain fixed by "nur",  but  its corrective meaning is context-dependent. 
When the focus-sensitive  particle  itself  is protested  against only contrastive focus is 
realized, and the correction is context-dependent, Cf. (14.2A). 
(14.2)  Habe ich das richtig verstanden, ... auch [die SOHnelF? 
(14.2A)  [NURIKF die Sohne. 
The  sentence pairs  in  (14)  deserve  a  detailed  description  and  there  are  several  in 
structured meaning semantics (cf. among others Jacobs (1982), Krifka (1998)) as well 
as in  alternative semantics (cf. among others Rooth (1985), Rooth (1996)). This paper 
only  wants  to  remind  that  they  are  associated  with  presentational  as  well  as  with 
contrastive focus.  A  second class of  elements  associated  with  focus which  are of 
greater relevance for our subject are the focus-sensitive  German  operators  nicht  and 
sondern. But before we can discuss these we have to set up an explanatory frame: All 
the  corrections  hitherto  spoken  about  are  backward-referring  corrections.  The next 
speaker protests against an entity already given, and he proposes a marked replacement, 
whereby the negator nein is optional. 
(15.1)  Peter [ist geKOMmen1F. 
(15.1A)  (Nein.) [PAULIKF ist gekommen. 
A similar interpretation is achieved by a forward-referring correction by  means of the 
focus sensitive operator nicht in the second conjunct of a coordination. (15.2A')  [PAULIKF ist gekommen, und nicht [PEterIF . 
(15.2A")  [PAULIKF ist gekommen, und [NICHTIF ~eter.~ 
Some more examples: 
(16A)  Petra  Meier  hat  in  dieser  Saison  im  Eislaufen  gute  Chancen.  Den 
[DREIfachenIKF Rittberger  hat  sie gestern  gezeigt, nicht  den doppelten  aus 
ihrem normalen Kiirprogramm. 
(17A)  Peter  scheint  recht  egozentrisch  zu  sein.  [AUFgestandenIKF  ist  er, 
[RAUSgeranntIKF, er [konnte die Aussprache nicht tollerieren1F. 
A  third  variant  are  backward-referring  corrections  which  have  the  German  focus- 
sensitive operator sondern in the second conjunct and the focus-sensitive operator nicht 
in the first conjunct. 
(15.3.A)  Peter  ist [NICHTIKF gekommen, sondern [PaulIF ist ~ekomrnen.~ 
Some more examples: 
(18A)  Nicht  [in  einem  vogtlandischen  BERGwerkIKF  fanden  die  Kinder  den 
mittelalterlichen Silberschatz, sondern [in einem SteinbruchIF. 
(19A)  Peter [konnte nicht langer ruhig SITzen bleiben]KF, sondern [ist AUFgestanden 
und RAUSgeranntJF 
(20A)  Es ist nicht, dass Peter die Aussprache nicht [AKzeptierenIKF konnte , sondern 
er konnte sie nicht [DURCHhaltenIF. Er hat schlechte Nerven. 
(21A)  Nicht  [den  DOPpelten  RittbergerIKF aus  ihrem  normalen  Kiirprogramm  hat 
Petra Meier gestern gezeigt, sondern [den DREIfachenIF. 
Examples with backward-referring  context-sensitive corrections are often described  in 
frameworks of  information  structure.  Examples  with  focus-sensitive  operators  are  a 
typical  subject of  semantics. 
The three  types  of  constructions  have  similar  semantic  interpretations  but  differ  in 
certain structural as well as pragmatic respects. Let us begin with the latter: 
-  The sentences with focus-sensitive operators overtly  negate the untrue or incorrect 
(part of a) sentence. Context-sensitive backward-referring corrections don't. They only 
consist of  an overt replacement. But it is possible to add nein / nein, das stimmt nicht / 
nein, das ist nicht wahr / nein, das ist nicht korrekt (cf. (15.1A)). These are sentential 
utterances with das refering to the first sentence. Nicht, on the contrary, is an operator 
with a propositional domain and a focus of negation. What is in the scope of negation 
need not always be the focus of the sentence in terms of information structure.' Because 
of  the context-dependent  interpretation  of  contrastive focus not  every  focusing nicht 
affects contrastive focus8. But any contrastive focus associated with nicht is its focus, of 
course. When nicht is in the first conjunct and the sentence has a sondern-clause  as its 
5  The second conjunct mostly is an elliptic construction. 
'  The underlined words may be deleted when the second conjunct is an elliptic construction.  '  Cf. Wen kennt Luise nicht? [PEterIF kennt Luise nicht. 
Scmantic paraphrase: There is an  individual  xi with  the name of Peter for whom  it  is not true that 
Luise knows him,. 
Cf. Wunn koi~~inf  denn Peter? Ich we$  nur soviel, er komnlr nichf [im  MAflF. 
Nuch dem letzen Anruf  kommt er nicht [im  MAIIKF, sondern [im  JUniIF. Correction by contrastive focus 
second conjunct, the focus of nicht always is contrastive focus. This follows from the 
lexical meaning of  nicht ..., sondern and can be used as a general test for contrastive 
focus  which  may  be applied  implicitly even to backward-referring  context-sensitive 
corrections. 
-  The  focus-sensitive  operator  nichr  is  not  a  truth  functional  operator.  As  ~orn~ 
formulated  it, rzicht  can  be used  as a so-called metalinguistic negation  correcting not 
only semantic (and among those not only the ones fulfilling the definition of classical 
negation) but all the other properties of sentences -just like corrections. 
-  "sondern"  fixes  its  focus  domain  and - indirectly  - the  focus  domain  of  the 
contrastive focus in  the preceding main clause, too, because what is in  the domain of 
presentational  focus  of  "sondern"  is  the  (part  of  the)  constituent  to  replace  the 
contrastively marked (part of  the) constituent in the first conj~nct.'~  In context-sensitive 
backward-referring corrections as well as in forward-referring constructions with focus- 
sensitive nicht in the first conjunct on the contrary, the focus domain can be fixed only 
by  means  of  the context by  subtracting  the  identical  'background'  constituents  and 
comparing the 'foci'. Therefore, when context-sensitive backward-referring corrections 
cannot be uttered immediately after the corresponding first sentence it is useful for the 
second speaker to overtly refer back and remind the communicative partners of the form 
and content of the first sentence to be corrected by him. 
(22)  Du hast vorhin gesagt, PEter sei gekommen. (Das stimmt nicht.) [PAULIKF ist 
gekommen. 
-  Form  and  usage  of  the  different  correction-constructions  coincide.  Whereas 
backward-referring  corrections  normally  appear  in  dialogs,  forward-referring 
corrections and  "nicht  . . . sondernX-constructions are preferably  used  in  monological 
speech. The speaker contrastively announces a) what he considers more correct than the 
corresponding entity in the following negative clause (forward correction) orb) what he 
himself will correct afterwards (by means of "sondern"). The speaker may either overtly 
refer to an utterance of  a first speaker which he intends to correct, or he may increase 
attention by  negating certain possibilities and arguing in favor of  the other. Backward- 
referring context-sensitive corrections correct utterances of  partners as soon as it is the 
next speakers turn. 
-  Just as focus-sensitive particles and nicht can be  associated with contrastive focus 
"sondern"  can, too. (cf. (23) and (23A)). 
(23)  Nicht  [den  DOPpelten  RittbergerIKF  aus  ihrem  normalen  Kiirprogramm  hat 
Petra Meier gestern gezeigt, sondern [den DREIfachenIF. 
(23A)  sondern [den dreieinHALBfachen1KF. 
-  How is it possible for backward-referring context-sensitive corrections to do without 
overt negation?  The explanation partly  depends on the meaning of  contrastive focus 
and partly  is pragmatically based and depends on knowledge about the sequencing of 
sentences in different types of texts which will be explained in chapter 4. In this chapter 
we  only  want  to  show  that  there  is  a  difference  in  meaning  between  sequences of 
sentences with presentational and with contrastive focus. 
Cf.  Horn (1985):  Metalinguistic  Negation and Pragmatic Ambiguity. 
10  Cf. Lang (1984): The Semantics of  Coordination. (23)  Speaker A: [Peter hat sich eine GaRAge gekauft]F. 
Speaker B: [Seine Frau hat sich ein AUto gekauft]F 
Normally, the communicative partners interpret this sequence of sentences in a way that 
both statements are true. In their common ground, the garage as well as the car belong 
to the property of the couple. 
(23A)  Speaker A: Peter [hat sich eine GaRAge gekauft]F. 
Speaker B: [Seine Frau hat sich ein AUto gekauft]KF. 
Normally,  the  communicative  partners  interpret  the  sentence  of  speaker  B  as  a 
correction  of  the utterance of  speaker A. It is not  true, that  a garage  was bought  by 
Peter. What holds is that his wife bought a car. As both  sequences of sentences only 
differ in  the prosodic contour, the difference in  meaning must depend on contrastive 
focus.  In  3.4  we  will  explain,  that  contrastive  focus  is  a  linguistic  sign  with  a 
characteristic  prosodic  realization  and  a  systematic  meaning.  Its  meaning  will  be 
characterized  as  an  existentially  bound  proposition:  there  is  an  element  in  the 
grammatical  representation  of  the  first  sentence  not  identical  with  the  contextually 
marked one in the next sentence, but both fit in the same CI and belong to equivalent 
focus domains. Correspondingly, contrastive focus cannot be reduced to a prosodically 
deviant placement of  word stress or phrasal stress. Cf. (24). 
(24)  I'll tell you a joke.:  [An AMEriean farmer met a CaNAdian farmer]F. Said the 
AMEriean farmer to the CaNAdian farmer: .  .  . 
In a fully focused sentence at the beginning of a text, presentational focus is not realized 
in the Determiner Phrase constituting the subject of  the sentence, and it is not realized 
on the adjective either. But we know, too, that a sentence can contain multiple foci. The 
reasons are manifold. In (24) we are confronted with two presentational foci affected by 
grammatical parallelism. It  is a kind of constructively determined focus. In  conformity 
with context, we find constructively determined contrastive focus, too. 
(24A)  No, it happened in the old world: [A DAnish farmer met an ENGlish farmer]KF. 
(24) contains a syntactic construction parallel to that of (24A). But only  (24A) can be 
interpreted  as  a  correction. This  supports  the  conclusion  that  contrastive  focus  is  a 
linguistic sign which correlates a characteristic form with a characteristic meaning. Its 
formal semantic description will be explained below. 
3.4.  Semantic Form of corrections 
In  this  chapter  we  will  only  speak  about  context-sensitive  backward-referring 
corrections. Different semantic theories treat the phenomenon of meaning differently. In 
this  paper,  meaning  is  understood  as  being  separable  into  Semantic  Form  (part  of 
linguistic knowledge) and context (conceptual structures)."  The Semantic Form (SF) of 
a sentence is compositionally constructed out of  the underspecified SFs of  words and 
affixes on the basis of syntactic surface structure. The SFs of  sentences are interpreted 
"  cf. M. Bierwisch, E. Lang (eds)  1987: Grarnrnatische  und  konzeptuelle Aspektc  van Dirnensions- 
adjektiven. 
D. Wunderlich: Cause and the structure of verbs. Correction by contrastive focus 
in context. We leave it open here whether it is possible to compose fully underspecified 
meanings of sentences or whether semantic composition and interpretation necessarily 
intersect.12 In this chapter the meaning of a sentence represented with contrastive focus 
is exemplified by the simple example [HANSIKF kommt  in dialogue (25) -  (25A). 
(25)  Wer hat sich denn nun tatsachlich alles angemeldet? 
Peter [KOMMTIF. 
(25A)  [HANSIKF kommt. Von Peter habeni wir [noch keine NACHricht t,+F]F  l3 
The SF  of  [HANSIKF  kommt  consists of an assertive proposition plus an existentially 
bound  proposition,  the  meaning  of  contrastive  focus.  The  assertive  part  is 
compositionally constructed out of the SFs of the lexical entries of words and affixes14. 
Therefore, we may consider this framework a variant of  structured meaning semantics 
the different authors of which used different means to compose the assertive meaning of 
the sentence. 
(i)  Hans:  EX  [[[Person, x] : [MALE, x]]  : [Name, x, Hans]] 
The SF of the sentence has to reflect the information structure of the sentence. Being 
contrasted, Hans is not the topic of the sentence. Its SF is constructed by means of  the 
epsilon operator and becomes a semantic argument of  komm-. 
IS 
(ii)  komm-:  hx hT hs [s INST [KOMM, x, TI ] 
(iii)  Future Tense:  hP [P [E T': [T' NACH To]]] 
(iv)  Assertive Mood:  hP 3 s [P, s] 
When information structure is paid attention to in  the SF of the sentence it has to be 
mapped on the syntactic surface structure. This affords several type shifts for the LEs to 
be properly composed.16 
(v)  S-Structure  CP  /'---. 
Spec CP  C ' 
[Hans* i ]KF  A 
C0  VP 
kommt j  A 
The latter is practiced  by  J. Diilling in several papers. Cf. e.g., Diilling (1997): Semantic Form and 
Abductive Fixation of Parameters. 
13  German verbs are moved for syntactic reasons independent of  whether they are focus or background 
constituents.  Traces in  the focus domain indexed by +F indicate that their antecedents are part of the 
focus of the sentence. 
14  Affixes are lexical entries. Cf. Chapter 4. 
Is  Cf  Steube (2000): Ein kognitionswissenschaftlich basiertes Modell fiir die Informationsstrukturierung 
(in Anwendung auf das Deutsche). 
Spath  (in  preparation):  Satzbedeutung  und  Informationsstruktur.  Zur  Semantischen  Komposition 
prosodisch unmarkierter Satzstrukturen. 
16  cf.  Partee (1986): Noun Pbrasc Interpretation and Type-Shifting Principles. The SF  of the assertive part of the sentence is: 
(vi)  3 s [ s INST [KOMM, ex  [[[Person, x] : [MALE, x]] : [Name, x, Hans]], e T': 
[T' NACH To]]] ) 
Realizing contrastive pitch  accent Hans is  in the focus domain. And the meaning of 
Hans  is  the  'content'  of  contrastive  focus.  The  meaning  of  contrastive  focus  is 
considered to be the SF  of a separate LE which is conjunctively added to the SF  of the 
assertive part  of  the meaning of  the sentence. It has  a general format with a variable 
which can be replaced by  any contrasted element in  the grammatical description  of a 
correction. In (25A) the SF  of Hans replaces the variable in the SF  of contrastive focus. 
(vii)  hp [p] A 3!y, sl [sl represented by  SI  = (s .  .  .  [HANSIy ]roc,,  dolnoin . . .) I 
17 
to  be  read:  a proposition  p  and exactly one y,  exactly  one situation  sl  so that  sl  is 
represented by the first sentence SI  which equals the next sentence S except that Hans 
replaces y, and Hans, y constitute identical focus domains. In example (25) : y = Peter. 
After replacing p in the meaning of contrastive focus by the SF  of the assertive part of 
the next sentence, we get: 
(viii)  3 s [s INST [KOMM, ex  [[[Person, x] : [MALE, x]] : [Name, x, Hans]],  E T': 
[T' NACH To]]]  A  3!y, sl [SI  represented by SI  = (s .  .  .[ Hansly lr,,,,  domain  .  .  .)] 
The  SF of  the  contrastively  focused  sentence  is  underspecified  very  much.  The 
communicative partners have to make out what is the first sentence and what is the next 
sentence by noticing which parts of  the two sentences are equal and which part of  the 
first  sentence is  intended  to be replaced  by  which  one of  the next  sentence,  both 
constituting (part of) an  identical  focus domain. This way, the meaning of contrastive 
focus brings about textual coherence between the contrastively marked sentence and the 
first  sentence. But even this  interpretation  is  underspecified  as far  as the underlying 
negation  of the first sentence is concerned. This pragmatic problem  will be solved in 
chapter 4. 
4.  A model for sentences with contrastive focus as their only focus 
marking 
In  his book "Speaking:  From Intention to Articulation"  (1989), Levelt introduced two 
cognitive levels. Cognition  1 is responsible for the planning of  the whole text, of  its 
type,  of the way it can be presented to the relevant communicative partners. Likewise, 
Cognition  1 is responsible for the general principles of textual coherence. As far as our 
question is concerned, Cognition  1 is responsible for the sequencing of information and 
for the interaction of first and next speakers in a broad sense. 
''  There is a discussion on what the semantic relation bctween the assertive part of the compositionally 
constructed meaning of a sentence and the meaning of  contrastive focus is. For Dolling (1988) and in 
this paper the meaning of  contrastive focus is an integral part of the meaning of the whole sentence 
and belongs to SF. Becausc of the examples with metalinguistic negation, Jacobs (1982) argued that it 
is  an  implication  and  not  a  presupposition.  Rooth  (1996) argues  against  the  status  of  existential 
presuppositions, too because presuppositions should project what they don't do in all contexts. And in 
chapter  1 the interpretation of  corrections was explained  as fundamentally context-dependent. Our 
theory must further argue against presuppositions because they  are doubtful  SF constituents. Correction by contrastive focus 
Cognition 2 constitutes the interface to the level of formulation (= grammar). According 
to Levelt, in Cognition 2 the information is represented in a propositional format, and it 
is prestructured  by information structural categories. Cognition 2 marks the pieces of 
information  which  will  become the topic  and  the comment, the background  and the 
focus of the following sentence dependent on its backward context. There is a pragmatic 
principle that no proposition to be verbalized by grammar is without new information. 
Therefore each proposition to be verbalized in a sequence will enlarge common ground 
as  long  as  it  is  not  explicitly  blocked.  Corrections  do  so  and  propose  explicit 
replacements. If a corrections is not protested against in its turn its 'focus'  will become 
part  of  common  ground,  too.  On  the  basis  of  this  principle  backward-directed 
corrections need not explicitly negate the corrected part of  information. But fonvard- 
directed corrections produced by the same speaker must do so. This pragmatic principle 
includes  the  pragmatic  explanation  for  the  difference  between  backward-directed 
corrections  and  nicht  ...  sondern  constructions.  Nicht  ...  sondern  constructions 
explicitly express what context-sensitive background-referring corrections only imply. 
The cognitive categories are mapped onto the grammatical categories of the different 
levels of grammar which will realize them. The mapping of  cognitive structures onto 
grammatical  structures is achieved via the lexicon, since meanings  (Semantic Forms) 
are underspecified  constructions of cognitive primitives. The SFs of  words and affixes 
contain  all  the  entries  necessary  for  their  combination  into  Semantic  Forms  of 
sentences. As mentioned above, information structure is part of the object of  semantics 
since  it has  an  influence  on  the  truth  conditions  and  on  the  conditions  of  use  of 
sentences".  The SFs of  sentences are mapped  onto syntactic surface structures. The 
latter follow the principles of  information structure, too because the relevant cognitive 
markings  like  topic,  comment,  background,  and  focus which  have been  transmitted 
from Cognition 2 to all the grammatical levels passed so far will partly be realized by 
syntactic  means  as  well.  From  syntax,  these  cognitive  categories  will  be  further 
transmitted  to the levels of morphology and phonology to be formally realized there, 
too, whenever these formal means are relevant and, therefore, marked on those levels. 
Dealing with  sentences  in  which  contrastive focus  is  the  only  focus marking,  we 
noticed that the only cognitive categories relevant  for corrections are topic and focus: 
therefore contrastive focus and its focus domain  are marked (the rest  is automatically 
interpreted as belonging to background); and it is necessary to mark topics because they 
have an influence on the structuring and on the type of a text. The rest is automatically 
interpreted as comment. Let us exemplify the model of sentences with contrastive focus 
by (26) and (26A) and begin with the cognitive level of Cognition 2: 
(26)  Wer hat sich denn nun tatskhlich alles angemeldet? 
Peter IKOMMTIF. 
(26A)  [HANSlKF kommt. Von Peter [haben wir noch keine NACHricht.]F 
Cognition 2: 
(26)  -[KOMMTlF: 
(ix)  Discourse referents: x, s, T 
Cognitive representation: PETER = x  A  [KOMM (x, Future, s)]F 
+T 
IR Cf. footnole 14 (26A) JHANSlKF kommt. 
(x)  Discourse referents: x, s, T 
Cognitive representation: ( [HANSIKF = x A  KOMM (x, Future, s) )* 
On  the  level  of  Cognition  2, the  Topic- and  Focus-parts  of  the  proposition  to  be 
verbalized  are  marked,  and  the  entire  proposition  is  marked  by  an  asterisc  as  a 
correction. The correction mark on the level of  Cognition 2 merely expresses that the 
marked proposition  interrupts the sequence of presentation of information and protests 
against a verbalized information already given. 
The mark has to be realized grammatically and is transmitted to the relevant levels of 
grammar. As the correction-mark has a formal and a semantic realization, there must be 
several places  where grammar has to take notice of it: 
1  .I  by the context-dependent fixation of the focus domain on all levels of grammar 
1.2  by  the  phonological  realization  of  the  prosodic  contour,  especially  on  the 
contrastively marked syllable in the focus domain 
2.  by marking the syntactic or semantic, morphological or phonological  'content' 
of the lexical  entry (or its projection) which is protested against 
3.  by adding the SF  of contrastive focus to the SF of the sentence. 
We will exemplify the grammatically relevant properties of example (26A). 
Each lexical entry has its SF, GF (grammatical form), and PF (phonological form). 
1. Hans will be represented as follows: 
(xi)  GF:  [+N, -V] 
[ + specific] 
[proper name] 
(xii)  SF:  EX  [[[Person, x] : [MALE, x]] : [Name, x, Hans]] * 
Correction (26A) protests against the  SF of Peter, and therefore the SF  of Hans must be 
marked as (part of) the 'content' of  the SF of contrastive focus. 
(xiii)  PF  of the sentence : [ Ihansl ]KF Ikommtl 
In the prosodic contour of the sentence contrastive focus is realized on Hans. Therefore 
the mark KF. The focus domain has been indicated by angled brackets. 
2. Hans  is the subject of  komm.  Komm- is an  intransitive verb; its noun  phrase  in 
subject position has nominative case and  bears theta role 1 (the role of agent). 
(xiv)  GF:  [+V, -N] 
[DP  --I 
[nominative] 
[@ 11 
These grammatical  features  must  correspond  to  those  in the theta grid  of  the  SF of 
komnz-. Correction by contrastive focus 
(XV)  SF :  hx  hT  hs [s INST [KOMM, x, T, s] ] 
[nominative] 
[@ 11 
In  3.4  we exemplified how  the  meanings  of  the  lexical  entries  are compositionally 
constructed to form the SF  of the sentence and how the SF  of contrastive focus is added 
to the assertive part of the meaning of the correction. We need not repeat that here. 
Next we would like to give an example with a correction directed to a formal feature of 
a word: 
(27)  Sieh mal, [Anna griiBt den NACHbar wieder]F. 
(27A)  Anna griiRt den [NachBARNIKF wieder. 
To find out what the second speaker protests against, let us first look at the SFof gruy-: 
(xvi)  SF: hy  hx  hT  hs [s INST [GRUSS- x, y, TI] 
[Acc]  [Nom] 
[O 21  [O 11 
The  oblique  argument  is  characterized  by  the  theta  role  THEME 
and  by  accusative  case. DPs replacing  the  variable  y  must  fulfill  these  conditions. 
Declension  class  i  in  the GF of Nachbar  [+N, -V, masculine, declension  class  i]  is 
responsible  for the  way the lexical  entry of  the ending [accusative case, singular] of 
Nachbar is phonologically  realized. Like the other oblique cases and the nominative 
plural of Nachbar it has to be realized by I-n 1  and not by zero as in (27). 
Our lexicon contains entries of the endings, too. The characteristics of the ending and 
of the stem must agree. 
(xvii)  GF of  ending: [Acc] 
[sgl 
[declension class i] 
[masculine] 
(xviii) PF of that ending: I- n I*. 
The PF of  the corresponding ending is marked  by  *. This ending has  an empty SF. 
Therefore, the  correction  is  directed  to  the  formal  representation  of  the  wordform. 
Example (27A) shows that the variable in the SF of contrastive focus may be replaced 
by a grammatical element represented on a level other than SF. In view of examples like 
this, the SF of  contrastive focus was formulated by means of the relation  "sentencel is 
represented bv SIC'  and not by means of  the relation  "the situation sl  is an instance of 
the proposition .  . ."  often used in two-level semantics (cf. the SF  of komm-). 
We have to generalize the correction [HANSIKF and build up a correction format 
containing a variable to  be  replaced by any  grammatically categorized  element.  The 
categorical structure of the SF of contrastive focus and the way it is combined with the 
SF  of the affirmative part of next sentence, however, remain as before. Generalized SF  of  contrastive focus (version 1): 
19  (xix)  hp [p] A I!@,  sl [SI represented by SI  = (S ..  . [Yl@]~,,,,~,,,i,  ...)I  Whereby: 
SI = first sentence 
S = next sentence 
sl = the situation spoken about by the first sentence 
Y the entity in the next sentence realizing contrastive pitch accent 
Y, 0  have the same CI. 
p = compositionally constructed assertive SF of next sentence. 
Gerhild Zybatow made me aware of the fact that corrections, however, react not only on 
utterances but even on implicit information the next speaker has reason to assume that it 
is  part  of  the  incorrect  common  ground  of  his  partners.  In  cases  like  these  the 
formalization by means of  "the situation is an instance of the proposition ..." would be 
best. Therefore,  dependent on the respective context, the SF  of contrastive focus should 
either contain the predication "represented by SI" or  the predication "is an instanceof a 
proposition". The variable for both predications is P: 
Generalized SF  of contrastive focus (version 2): 
(XX)  hp [PI A 3!@,  SI [[P, s11 = (r .  .  . [y/@]focus  domain ...  11, whereby : 
dependent on P, C either is S or the proposition p of the next sentence. 
Finally,  we  will  sum  up  the  different  ways  of  markings  which  are  necessary  for 
corrections: 
-  On the level of cognition 2 the whole proposition to he verbalized is marked, because 
corrections  do not constitute normal representative speech acts in so far as they do not 
obey the rules for continuous presentation of information. 
-  The extension of the focus domain is fixed by context and discovered by comparing 
the identical parts  of the first and the next sentence and subtracting the focus domain 
from these. The focus domain is marked by  angled brackets and by the sign  KF. The 
minimum focus domain is a word or wordform. That means that the next speaker does 
not protest against e.g., an isolated bound morpheme but against the way a special LE 
has its affix realized. The next speaker does not protest against a connotation either, but 
he protests against a connotatively incorrect wordform or its projection. 
-  The marked  syllable by  which  contrastive  focus is prosodically  realized  need  not 
agree with  the position  of  word accent or phrasal  accent. If  the contrasted  word had 
been Peter, a disyllabic word, its PF would normally realize KF  on the accentuated first 
syllable but keep the whole word within the focus domain. 
(xxi)  PF: [ / PE -  ter 1 ] 
KF 
Only when the second syllable had to be corrected by contrastive focus -  is.  in order to 
protest against a form like Pedro - word accent would not become contrastive focus: 
cf.  [/ pe - TER / ] KF/. 
[The  AMErican soldierJKF is an example for the possible disagreement between the 
actual position of  KF  and the normal position of phrasal accent. When KF is expressed 
in  the  normal  focus position  of  the phrase  the American  SOMier, contrastive  focus 
''  Neither  in  this  nor  in  any other representation of  this  paper  does the  existential  operator  express 
existential force. 
228 Correction by contrastive focus 
alone is not able to fix the focus domain. The American SOLdier is ambiguous between 
narrow focus on [SOLdierIKF and phrasal focus [the  American SOLdierIKF . 
-  Beside  the  formal  properties  of  the  correction  sign,  the  'content'  of  the  SF of 
contrastive focus must be marked. It is found in the SF, GF or PF of a lexical entry or of 
its projection. The 'content'  replaces the variable 0  in the SF of contrastive focus. 
The formal side of the LE of contrastive focus is a relatively constant prosodic contour, 
and its SF has a generalized format the variables P, 0  and Y of which are replaced in 
accord  with  the  corrected  element  and  the  cognitive  or  grammatical  level  of  its 
description. 
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1.  Introduction 
It has been argued by various authors that there is no general correspondence between 
focus and new information, and background and old information, respectively (cf. e.g. 
Rochemont 1986, Schwarzschild 1999). On the other hand, with respect to noun phrases 
there  are  results  indicating  that  (de)accenting  does  have  an  influence  on  the  NP's 
reference. Bosch (1988), for example, points out the role of markedness in noun phrase 
interpretation.  Van  Deemter  (1994)  discusses  the  role  of  accenting  to  indicate  a 
subsectional  anaphor.  Jiiger  (1998)  shows  that  weak  quantifiers  are  interpreted 
existentially or as partitives depending on the type and the position of the accent. Krifka 
(1999) argues for a class of  "non-novel"  indefinites, which presuppose their discourse 
referents and have to be deaccented. 
Consider  the  definite  the  shed  in  (1). Depending on  whether  it  is  accented, the 
interpretation of the noun phrase is radically different. With an accent on shed we will 
conclude that there is exactly one shed belonging to John's cottage. Without the accent, 
on the other hand, we have to interpret the shed as referring  to the cottage itself, the 
speaker obviously making a disapproving comment. With the accent on the descriptive 
content the definite refers to an  object distinct from John's cottage thus introducing a 
novel discourse referent. Without an accent, the definite is identified with a previously 
given discourse referent. 
(1)  (John has an old cottage.) 
a.  Last summer he reconstructed the SHED. 
b.  Last summer he RECONSTRUCTED the shed 
This paper focuses on definite descriptions. It will be shown that a definite description 
refers to a given discourse referent if the descriptive content is completely deaccented. 
But if  there is a focussed element within  the descriptive content it introduces a novel 
referent.  This  amounts  to  allowing  two  readings  for  definite  descriptions  without, 
however, allowing two readings for the definite article. 
This  approach  is,  of  course,  based  on  a  uniqueness  view  on  definiteness.  In 
particular, I will employ the account in Farkas (2000) and (2001, in this volume). Farkas 
presents a notion of uniqueness subsuming familiarity: Definites have to be "no-choice" 
either by being identical to a given referent or by means of their description. According 
to  Farkas  proper  names  and  pronouns  contribute  an  identifying  condition  whereas 
definite descriptions have to be determined by their descriptive content. Farkas argues 
that this difference in interpretation accounts for the different positions of proper names 
The paper is submitted to a special issue of "Theoretical  Linguistics",  edited by Klaus von Heusinger 
and Kerstin Schwabe 
ZAS Papers in Linguistics 23, 2001, 231-249 and pronouns, on  the one hand, and (full) definite  descriptions,  on  the other,  in  the 
definiteness hierarchy discussed in the functional literature: 
Definiteness hierarchy:' 
personal pronounlproper name > definite description > specific indefinite > non-specific indefinite 
I will  follow Farkas with  respect  to  interpreting  definites  as being  "no-choice"  NPs 
either via identity to another referent or via description. I will, however, argue that her 
account of definite descriptions is too coarse grained. Taking the difference induced by 
accenting  into  account  a  shift  in  the  division  between  identifying  definites  and 
description  based  definites  into  the  region  of  definites  descriptions  suggests  itself: 
Deaccented definite descriptions referring to a given referent achieve uniqueness via an 
identity  condition, but  if  there  is  an  accent  on  the  descriptive  content,  the  definite 
achieves  uniqueness  by  making  use  of  its  description,  thus  establishing  a  novel 
discourse referent. 
pronounlproper name > given DD  > nnn-given DD  > specific indefinit > non-specific indefinit 
(identifying,  (description based, 
deaccented)  accented) 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  In  the  next  section  I  will  briefly  discuss  the 
uniqueness  view  of  definites  comparing Hawkins  and  Lobner, then  present  Farkas' 
notion  of  "no choice"  NPs and discuss why Farkas'  story can't be  all there is. In the 
third  section  the  correspondence  between  (de)accenting  and  (non)givenness will  be 
shown, and the different uses will be spelled out within the DRT framework. Moreover, 
the non-givenlgiven distinction will be related to the well-known attributivelreferential 
distinction.  Subsequently,  in  section  four,  I  will  sketch  the  semantics  of  focus  in 
complex  definite  noun  phrases  pointing  out  the  role  of  the  bridging  antecedent  in 
establishing  the  set  of  alternatives. Finally,  we will  come back  to the  scale of noun 
phrases in the definiteness hierarchy and have a brief look at pronouns and indefinites. 
Throughout this  paper only singular definite descriptions (the shed, the old shed, the 
shed of  John's cottage) in argument position will be considered. 
2.  The uniqueness view of definiteness 
Definiteness  is  semantically  associated  either  with  familiarity  or  with  uniqueness. 
According to familiarity theories of definites, e.g. Heim (1982), the referent of a definite 
noun phrase is an entity which is given because it has been mentioned previously in the 
discourse (or because it is prominent in the utterance situation). Uniqueness theories, on 
the  other  hand,  regard  definiteness  as  indicating  that  the  noun  phrase's  referent  is 
unique with respect to some pragmatically given domain. A review of the pros and cons 
of the two perspectives goes beyond the scope of this paper (cf. e.g. Hauenschild 1989). 
Distinguishing between  given  and  non-given  definite  descriptions  I will,  of  course, 
employ a uniqueness account of definiteness. 
I  cf. Farkas (2000) (De)accenting Definite Descriptions 
2.1.  Hawkins (1978), (1991) 
A particular prominent  account of  the uniqueness perspective  is Hawkins  (1978) and 
(1991). Hawkins takes the anaphoric and deictic uses of  definites as his starting point. 
The basic  idea  is  that  the  use  of  a  definite  is  felicitous  if,  within  a  pragmatically 
determined  domain, there is exactly one entity satisfying the description  (for plurals: 
there is unique maximal  set within the domain). Pragmatic domains, called P-sets, are 
sets of  entities  structuring the  universe  of  discourse,  and are  provided  by either the 
previous  discourse,  the  utterance  situation,  or  general  knowledge  about  relations 
between entities. The meaning of the definite article is defined relative to a P-set: "The 
conventionally implicates that there is some subset of  entities, {P),  in  the universe of 
discourse which is mutually manifest to Speaker and Hearer on-line, and within which 
definite referents exist and are unique."  (Hawkins, 1991, p.414). Indefinites, as opposed 
to definites, conversationally implicate non-uniqueness. 
For example, the noun phrase the professor  may be felicitously uttered if. there is a 
unique professor within the P-set established by the previous discourse. But it may as 
well  be  felicitously  used  if  the  situation  or  general  world  knowledge  provide  an 
appropriate P-set.  E.g.  if  students  arrive for a new  class, they  may  ask  Who is  the 
professor? because there is a unique professor given by the situation. Or, if a university 
class has been  mentioned  in the previous discourse class, the use of  the professor  is 
felicitous because we know that classes at a university usually have a unique professor. 
Moreover, the appropriate P-set may be inferred  from information within  the definite 
NP itself, e.g. the professor of nzy liizguistics class. Information within the definite NP 
may even re-establish a previous discourse set: the professor we have just  been talking 
about. 
Unlike definite descriptions, demonstrative expressions and pronouns, according to 
Hawkins, do not achieve uniqueness  by making use  of  a P-set.  They "will  require a 
form  of  uniqueness  relative  to  entities  that  are  physically  identifiable  or  textually 
introduced,  without  regard  to  P-sets"  (Hawkins  1991  p.  416).  The  latter  form  of 
uniqueness, however, is not spelled out in the paper. 
2.2.  Lobner (1985) 
Lobner (1985) presents  a uniqueness  theory  of  definites  taking  the opposite  starting 
point, the paradigmatic  cases being those where  the definite article is required by the 
semantics of the neon. Nouns are classified into sortal nouns, which denote sets (e.g. 
table) and  relational  nouns,  which  involve  an  internal  argument  (e.g.  daughter  of 
somebody). Within the class of  relational nouns there are special cases of  functional 
nouns which have a unique value, e.g. mother.' 
According to Lobner the definite article in  all its uses indicates that the descri  tive 
content  has  to  be interpreted  as  a  functional  concept  yielding  a  unique  value!  He 
distinguishes  between  "semantic  definites"  and  "pragmatic  definites".  Semantic 
definites are given by functional nouns, whose internal argument is mainly provided by 
the utterance situation. Being a functional noun a mother e.g. is not acceptable (unless 
Sortal nouns may also be used in a functional way, e.g. rable is used functionally if someone points to 
an orange box and says: The table is laid. Moreover, functional nouns may be used in a sortal way, 
e.g. if a caretaker in a kindergarten informs her colleague: A morher has corrtplained about the  food.  '  Lbbner uses the term  "functional concept" instead of  "function" to stress the procedural  aspect and 
indicate effective computability. nzother is used in a sortal way). For pragmatic definites the functional concept has to be 
established by the context, either by a modifying expression or by an implicit link to a 
node  representing  another  discourse  referent  (Lobner  assumes  a  semantic  network 
representation). For example, in  "Bill went out with a woman last night. The woman 
was nasty to him. " the definite the woman has to be linked to the node representing the 
woman Bill went out with last night which renders a functional concept paraphrased by 
the wonzun Bill  went out with last night. 
2.3.  Farkas (2000), (2001) 
Farkas  (2000)/(2001 in  this  volume)  starts  from  the  so-called  definiteness  hierarchy 
which  stems from cross-linguistic  observations  on  the markedness  of  direct objeck4 
Different types of  nouns phrases form a scale with respect to whether they tend to be 
case-marked if in direct object position: Personal pronouns are on top of the scale, being 
most likely to be marked  as a direct object, followed by proper names, definite noun 
phrases, specific  indefinite  and  non-specific  indefinites. Farkas  rearranges  the linear 
scale into a partial order, including demonstratives and partitives: 
[personal pronouns, proper names] > [definite descriptions, demonstrative descriptions] > 
[partitives, specific indefinites] > non-specifics 
Given that hierarchy, Farkas asks why noun phrases rank  as they do. With respect to 
definites, i.e. pronouns, proper names and definite descriptions, she poses the questions 
(a) what makes them a natural  class, and (b) what distinguishes pronouns and proper 
names on the one hand from definite descriptions on the other. 
Farkas follows Hawkins in viewing definiteness as indicating uniqueness, subsuming 
familiarity  as  a  special  case  of  uniqueness.  Her  central  notion  is  the  notion  of 
"determined  reference"  of  a variable. This is explicated on the basis of DRT (Kamp, 
Reyle  1993): A variable  introduced by a noun phrase has determined reference if  for 
every update of an assignment function embedding the previous (input) DRS the value 
assigned to this variable is the same. Noun phrases introducing a determined reference 
variable are "no-choice".  The notion  of  determined  reference implements uniqueness 
without referring to a particular domain within which the referent has to be unique. The 
only requirement  is that there is no other choice for assigning a value to the variable. 
But  the  reason  why  a  variable  has  a  determined  reference  is  deliberately  left  open 
because this is where pronouns and proper names depart from definite descriptions. 
Pronouns are handled in the usual DRT manner, i.e. they introduce a variable x in the 
domain of  the respective DRS and add an identifying condition x=y  where the newly 
introduced variable is equated with a variable y previously given. Proper names are also 
assumed  to induce an  identifying condition, e.g. x=Sarah,  where  the  referent  of  the 
name stays constant across assignments  and  worlds.  Thus both  pronouns  and proper 
names  contribute  an  identifying  condition  directly  associating  the  variable  they 
introduce with the entity serving as its value. Therefore, proper names and pronouns are 
said to achieve determined reference directly. 
Descriptions, on the other hand, have to achieve determined reference by means of 
the description. This may be the case if the descriptive content denotes a singleton set, 
as  e.g.  the  moon  or  the  strongest  man  in  the  world.  For  descriptions  other  than 
4  Farkas (2000) discusses a typology of definites which is recapitulated  in section 2 of Farkas (2001) in 
this volume. I will mainly refer to the (2000) paper. 
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singletons Farkas assumes that  the domain is restricted to (a subset of) variables that 
have been introduced before, the description being unique within the restricted domain. 
Thus a  noun  phrase  like  the  girl is  interpreted  as  "the  unique  element  among  the 
previously  mentioned  discourse  referents  which  is  a  girl".  According  to  the  (2001) 
paper uniqueness may be restricted to a salient subdomain of the input DRS. 
Answering the questions above, (a) the class of semantically definite noun phrases is 
characterized as  being  no  choice NPs,  and  (b) the  difference between  pronouns  and 
proper names on the one side and definite descriptions on the other stems from their 
different ways  of  achieving  determined  reference,  either  directly  by  introducing  an 
identifying  condition  or by  a  description  eventually  relating  to  a  restricted  domain. 
Pronouns  and  proper  names  outrank  definite  descriptions  on  the  definiteness  scale 
because they achieve determined reference directly. 
In this paper, I will follow Farkas in taking a uniqueness perspective on definites and 
regarding anaphoricity as one way of  achieving uniqueness. Furthermore, I will follow 
her  in distinguishing  between  definites that  achieve determined  reference  directly by 
introducing an identifying condition, and those that achieve determined reference based 
on  their description. But there are some problems: First, the reason she gives for why 
identifying conditions achieve determined reference is not really convincing. She argues 
that the antecedent has determined reference because for any assignment function the 
value is uniquely determined. But this is trivially true for any variable simply because 
assignments  are  functions.  In  fact,  an  identifying  condition  does  not  per  se render 
determined  reference - in  principle  the  variable  can  be  identified  with  any  of  the 
variables  previously  given. To  determine the  referent  we  have to  take  a  resolution 
procedure  into  account  which  is  based  on  the  order  of  accessibility  of  discourse 
referents  and  will  (normally)  give  a unique  result  Second, Farkas'  view  of  definite 
descriptions  implies  that  definite  descriptions  which  don't  involve  singleton 
descriptions must refer to given referents. I will argue below that this assumption cannot 
be maintained. 
3.  Given vs. non-given definite descriptions 
This paper  focuses on  definite  descriptions.  The  central  claim  is  that  even  definite 
descriptions can come both ways, either being identical to an  antecedent or exploiting 
their  descriptive  content,  depending  on  whether  or  not  the  descriptive  content  is 
accented.  If  deaccented, the definite represents an  identity  anaphor. Let us call these 
uses  "given  definites".  If  there is an  accent on  (part of) the descriptive content, the 
definite is not an identity anaphor (which does not imply that there is no anaphoricity at 
all). Since these definites do not refer to a given referent, they  are called  "non-given 
definites"."~iven  and non-given definites are, of course, uses of definite descriptions - 
throughout  this  paper  we  are  talking  about  occurrences  of  definite  descriptions  in 
utterances, not about definite descriptions in isolation.) 
We will first turn to the non-given definites in this section, demonstrating how they 
achieve uniqueness, and show that they need an accented part in  their description to do 
so. Next we will come to the given definites, showing that they have to be deaccented, 
and  discuss  the  accessibility  order  of  antecedents  which  is  basic  to  resolve  the 
They are called  "nongiven"  instead  of  "novel"  because  they may  involve  a  bridging  anaphoric 
relation, see below. 
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definites  will  be  given. Finally  the  two uses  are  related  to the  referentiallattributive 
distinction which is well known in the literature. 
3.1.  Non-given definites 
Let us first consider non-given definite descriptions. Since a non-given definite is not 
identical to a given discourse referent, it has to make use of its description to single out 
a unique referent. There are two possibilities:  Either  the  description  is  such  that  it 
determines a unique referent by itself, or it needs the support of a "bridging"  antecedent. 
Prototypical examples for self-sufficient descriptions are nouns that denote a singleton 
due  to  their  semantics  (the pope)  or  superlative  constructions  (the biggest  crook). 
Complex  descriptions  involving  adjectival  modification,  attributive  genitives  or 
restrictive relative clauses may also be able to determine a unique referent (the Italian 
president, the president ofitnly, the man who is elected  for president in ~tal~).~ 
According to our assumptions the description has to be accented. Compare (5)(a) and 
(b). In  (5)(a) pope  is  accented.  Since it  is  an  out-of-the-blue  utterance,  the  definite 
description  obviously introduces  a  novel  referent.'  In  (5)(b)  the pope  is  deaccented, 
rendering the utterance unacceptable in the beginning of  a discourse. (6)(a)-(c) present 
examples for complex noun phrases. To be acceptable as an out-of-the-blue utterance, 
the  entire  description  has  to  be  accented,  cf.  (6)(a).  Still,  if  at  least  part  of  the 
description  is  accented,  the  definite  is  acceptable  as  introducing  a  novel  referent, 
(6)(b)l(c). 
(5)  (What's new?) 
a.  Last week I met the POPE. 
b.  #Last week I MET the pope. 
(6)  a.  Last week I met the ITALIAN PRESIDENT1 the PRESIDENT of 
ITALY 
b.  Last week I met the Italian PRESIDENT1 ITALIAN president. 
c.  Last week I met the president of ITALY I the PRESIDENT of Italy. 
If  the description  of  a definite is not suited to determine a unique referent by  itself, it 
needs the support of a "bridging"  antecedent (we are still talking about non-given cases, 
i.e.  excluding  identity  anaphors).  Consider  the  rooj  the  dean  and  the  girl  in  the 
examples in  (7). In  each of them the description relates to  a given referent to achieve 
uniqueness: The roof is part of the previously introduced cottage, the dean is supposed 
to be the dean of the faculty, and the girl is obviously a member of John's children. 
(7)  a.  John has an old cottage. Last summer, he repaired the ROOF. 
b.  The faculty has a meeting. It is chaired by the DEAN. 
c.  John has two children. The GIRL is called Sue. 
Familiarity theories of  definites usually regard these cases as being  (implicitly) given 
because  there is a relation  to  a given  referent.  If  we  regard  these definites  as being 
given,  however,  we  would  have  to  believe  that  whenever  a  discourse  referent  is 
1  The last two examples may be regarded as involving an explicit bridging antecedent. 
7  Since it is an outof<hehlue utterance the accent has to he a default sentence accent. But we will for 
the moment ignore the difference between  sentence accent and contrastive accent, and  we will also 
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introduced,  all  entities  related  to  that  referent  are  introduced  simultaneously. 
Introducing the cottage referent in (7a), for example, would simultaneously trigger the 
introduction  of  the roof, the door, the kitchen, the mortgage, the previous owner, the 
landscape  etc. This is  improbable.  But  if  we  don't  accept  that  all  these  entities  are 
introduced together with the cottage referent, then we have to admit that the roof  in (7a), 
although  involving  an  anaphoric relation, does  introduce  a novel  referent. The same 
argument applies to the dean in (7b): If  the you reject the idea that introducing a faculty 
referent  simultaneously  triggers  the  introduction  of  a  dean  referent  then  the  dean 
referent has to be novel.  In  (7c) the  situation is slightly different because there is a 
plural referent which the girl is a member of. So  it might be argued that the girl has in 
fact been introduced by introducing the children. But note that there is no chance for a 
pronoun to pick up the girl, we don't even know that there is a girl among the children. 
This is strong evidence that the girl introduces a novel referent, too. 
Let us call the antecedents employed by the definites in  (7) to achieve uniqueness 
"bridging  antecedents",  and the relation between the referent of the definite description 
and the  antecedent a "bridging relation".'  The nature of  the bridging relation may be 
rather unspecific. Note, that it need not be a function (cf. membership, part-of etc.). It  is 
only the combination of  the bridging relation and the description of  the definite which 
yields uniqueness. For example, in (7a) being a part of  John's cottage is by no means 
unique - the cottage will presumably comprise more than  one part.  But being  a part 
which is a roof has to be unique for the definite to be felicitous. 
In (8) the example from the introduction is repeated. This example shows that it is 
the  accent  alone which  tells us  how  to  interpret  the  definite: With  an  accent on the 
descriptive part  the  definite  has  to  be  interpreted  as  introducing  a  novel  discourse 
referent  and  since shed  doesn't  denote a singleton  it  needs a bridging antecedent to  -  -  L. 
achieve uniqueness. Thus in  @)(a) the shed  is  interpreted  as  the  shed belonging  to 
John's cottage and is newly introduced. But if the description is deaccented, as in (8)(b),  .  ..  . 
the  definitehas to  be  identified with  a previously given  discourse referent. Thus we 
infer that the shed refers to John's cottage the speaker making a disparaging remark. 
(8)  (John has an old cottage.) 
a.  Last summer he reconstructed the SHED. 
b.  Last summer he RECONSTRUCTED the shed. 
A  similar  example  is  the  one  in  (9)  from  van  Deemter  (1994).  According  to  van 
Deemter,  if  the  noun  phrase  the  women  is  accented,  it  has  to  be  interpreted  as  a 
subsectional  anaphor referring to  a proper pan of  the antecedent. From our point  of 
view, being a proper part is just  one of  various possible bridging relations. As opposed 
to the example in (8), the definite description in (9) is in the topic pan of the sentence. 
Thus in (9)(a) the accent renders the definite a contrastive topic. Nevertheless, it triggers 
the introduction of a new discourse referent. 
(9)  (The crowd was approaching the castle.) 
a.  The WOMEN were very EXITED. 
b.  The women were very EXITED. 
Jager (1998) also shows that accenting has an influence on noun phrase interpretation. 
8  The notion of an inferential "bridge" goes back to Haviland, Clark (1974). Our "bridging antecedent" 
is called an indirect antecedent there, e.g. We  checked the picnic supplies. The beer was warm. He discusses weak  quantifiers  in  topic  position  and compares  cases like (lO)(a)/(b). 
Both (a) and (b) trigger a partitive reading interpretation of three unicorns (provided, 
according to Jager, that the accent is a rising one). But depending on the position  of the 
accent, the noun either denotes a property of the actual referent, cf. (a), or it denotes a 
property of the antecedent, cf. (b). In this respect, the examples in (10) are similar to the 
ones in (8) and (9). 
(10)  a.  There is a whole herd of unusual animals all around. Three UNICORNS 
are in the 
GARDEN. 
b.  There is a whole herd of unicorns all around. THREE unicorns are in the 
GARDEN. 
That there is a correspondence between accenting and the reference of  a definite has 
already been discussed in Bosch (1988). Bosch uses the notions of explicit and implicit 
focus, the former representing entities mentioned in the preceding discourse, i.e. given 
referents, and the latter representing entities from the scenario, e.g. the bridged cases 
above which we would classify as being non-given. According to Bosch, deaccented 
definite  referential  expressions,  full  NPs  and  personal  pronouns  alike,  take  their 
referents  from  explicit  focus,  whereas  intonationally  marked  definite  referential 
expressions draw upon implicit focus. His example in (1 1) is similar to the example in 
(8)  showing  that  accenting  prevents  the  definite  from  taking  up  a  given  referent. 
Moreover, Bosch  gives  an  explanation  which  comes  close to  the  idea presented  in 
Farkas (2000)/(2001) and in this paper, distinguishing between access via classification 
(i.e. description)  and  access via linguistic properties such as gender and  number  (i.e. 
non-semantic properties of antecedents). 
(I I)  When Jones returned 
a.  ... they ignored {him,  the idiot, the bastard, the old goat, the pig). 
b.  ... they ignored (HIM, the IDIOT, the BASTARD, the old GOAT, the 
PIG}. 
Let  us  now  briefly  consider  functional  nouns,  which  in  Lobner  (1985)  are  the 
paradigmatic cases of definites descriptions. Consider roof and dean in (7) above. They 
are clearly functional in the sense of  Lobner because (usually) a house has exactly one 
roof, and a faculty has exactly one dean. In (7) the definites achieve uniqueness exactly 
as Lobner predicts, since the bridging antecedents correspond to the internal argument 
given by the semantics of  the nouns.  So, instead of assuming a bridging relation, one 
might regard the noun as denoting a function taking the faculty referent as its argument 
and yielding the dean-referent as its value. However, the bridging antecedent need not 
coincide with the internal argument, cf. (12). Although the internal argument is clearly 
preferred as a bridging antecedent, Lobner's  functional concept doesn't  cover the full 
range of bridging cases. 
(12)  I met a couple at the party yesterday. The wife was beautiful. 
Moreover, a functional noun  may, of course, occur in a given definite. Suppose, e.g., 
that  (7)(a) is continued by  He  had  tried  to evade  that job,  but finally  the  roof  was 
leaking.  This  time,  the  roof  is  clearly  an  identity  anaphor.  Thus,  whether  it's  a (De)accenting Definite Descriptions 
functional noun or a sortal or relational noun doesn't make any difference for the way in 
which  the  definite  achieves  uniqueness  (except  for  the  preference  for  a  bridging 
antecedent to correspond to the internal argument). Viewing definiteness as indicating a 
function is intuitively appealing because the mathematical concept of  a function gives 
us existence and uniqueness for free. But functional nouns are no first class definites. 
3.2.  Given definites 
As discussed above, givenness is used here in a strict sense, for identity anaphors only. 
Non-given  definites make use of  their descriptive content to  achieve uniqueness. But 
how  do given  definites  achieve uniqueness?  Identification  with  another referent,  as 
such, does not  give a unique result. Of course, the descriptive content of  the definite 
will exclude unsuited candidates. Still there may be more than  one referent  satisfying 
the description. Consider the man in (13). There are four possible referents: the man, the 
bar, the suitcase, the barkeeper. The description man rules out the bar and the suitcase. 
But the barkeeper will probably be a man, too (cf. Heusinger 2000 for more examples of 
this  type).  The  reason  why  we  will  not  identify  the  man  with  the  barkeeper  is  a 
structural one, given by binding constraints. 
(13)  (A man came into the bar. He was carrying a black suitcase.) 
The barkeeper stared at the man with sudden alarm. 
For given definites as well  as for pronouns, to determine the referent appropriate for 
identification we have to take the accessibility of discourse referents into account. In the 
field of natural language processing there is a broad discussion on anaphora resolution. 
It  is  well-known  that  there  are various  factors contributing to  the  accessibility  of  a 
referent (cf. e.g. Preuss et al. 1994, Grosz et al. 1995). Such factors relate to structural 
properties  of  the  respective  noun  phrases,  e.g.  distance  and  syntactic  position,  and 
define an  order of accessible antecedents. Semantic conditions enter the game if  there 
are equally accessible antecedents, thus reducing ambiguity. So the question of  which 
referent  has  to  be  identified  with  a  given  definite  is  primarily  determined  by  the 
accessibility of referents. Its descriptive content has only an auxiliary function. This is 
the reason why (a) given definites may be substituted for by pronouns (thus stripping 
their descriptive content), and (b) given definites, in  spite of  their descriptive content, 
have to obey the same accessibility rules as pronouns. 
There  is  a  consequence  which  is  often  neglected  in  semantics:  The  idea that  a 
discourse referent once introduced is forever accessible turns out to be a fiction. After a 
certain (rather small) number of ensuing sentences a referent is definitely not accessible 
any more. But if  a referent is no longer accessible, it can't be regarded as being given 
anymore. So it  may be introduced again. Introducing a discourse referent, after all, is 
just  like putting someone on the stage. It will be pushed in the background step by step 
by its followers. The notion of givenness employed here is not only restricted to identity 
anaphors but the referent to be identified with the anaphor has to be accessible as well. 
To conclude: Farkas skips an important step when  saying a pronoun  introduces  a 
referent x together with an equation x=y where y is a given discourse referent. In fact, a 
pronoun introduces half of an equation, x=?, and there is, first and foremost, a request to 
find  the  appropriate  antecedent.  To achieve  this  accessibility  has  to  be  taken  into 
account. This applies to pronouns as well as given definite descriptions. 3.3.  Two uses of definite descriptions 
Accounting for the different ways of achieving a unique referent, we will  assume that 
given definites, i.e. identity anaphors, are presupposed. This is in  accordance with the 
main stream view on definites in the literature (e.g. Heim 1982). Non-given definites, as 
opposed to this, will be regarded as being asserted, in a line with indefinites introducing 
a  novel  discourse referent.  It  may  be  argued  that  the  existence and the  uniqueness 
requirements are presupposed because they can hardly be affected by a denial. But at 
least the fact that the novel referent has the property denoted by its descriptive content is 
part of the assertion and can be denied (Last summer, John reconstructed the SHED. - 
No, he reconstructed the HEN HOUSE.). That such a denial is impossible if the definite 
is in topic position may well be due to the characteristics of topics. 
Spelling  this  out  in  a  DRT  framework,  given  definites  will  be  represented  like 
pronouns  whereas  non-given  definites  are  treated  like  indefinites  plus  uniqueness 
condition. For  example,  in  (15a)  pope  carries  an  accent  indicating  novelty.  So the 
definite triggers the introduction of a novel variable y and induces the conditions that y 
satisfies the description and is unique, as shown in (15)(b). 
(15)  a.  John met the POPE. 
b.  [x, y: x=John, pope(y), [[z: pope(z)] -->[: z=yl, met(x,y)] 
In  (16) the first sentence is represented by the DRS in (16)(b). In  the second sentence 
girl  is deaccented. So the definite induces an  identifying condition plus the condition 
that the referent satisfies the girl-predicate. Both conditions are presupposed  (indicated 
by  underlining).  Following the presupposition-as-anaphors  theory  (cf, van  der Sandt 
1992), presuppositions have to be  bound or accommodated.  Updating  of  K1  and K2 
results in the DRS in (16e), where the girl-referent from K2 has been identified with the 
girl-referent in K1 (assuming that the girl-referent in K1 is the most accessible referent 
which  is a girl). The second girl-condition  is  supposed to be bound by  the first one. 
(1 6)(e) then is equivalent to (I 6)(f). 
(16)  a.  John met a girl. 
b.  Kt: [x, y: x=John, girl(y), met(x,y)] 
c.  The girl was BEAUTIFUL. 
d.  K2: [z: z=?, girl(z), beautiful(z)] 
e.  K1 + K2: [x, y, z: x=John, girl(y), met(x,y), z=y, girl@),  beautiful(z)] 
f.  K1 + K2: [x, y:  xJohn, girl(y), met(x,y), girl(y), beautiful(y)] 
In (17) and (18) the different readings of the shed-example are demonstrated. In (17)(c) 
shed is accented thus introducing a novel referent. Since shed doesn't denote a singleton 
(due to lexical and/or world knowledge) the definite requires a bridging antecedent (w) 
together  with  bridging  relation  R,  and  it  introduces  a  uniqueness  condition.  The 
identifying  conditions  for  the  pronoun  and  those  for  the  bridging  antecedent  are 
presupposed. Moreover the bridging relation  is presupposed, cf. (17)(d). Updating K1 
with K2 results in  (17)(e) where the identification conditions are resolved. (Note, that 
the  shed  cannot  be  identified  with  the cottage  because  the  bridging  relation  is  not 
allowed to be reflexive, cf. the element-of relation or the part-of relation.) The fact that (De)accenting Definite Descriptions 
the bridging relation holds between the cottage-referent and the shed- referent has been 
acc~mmodated.~  (l7)(e) is equivalent to (17)(f). 
(17)  a.  John has an old cottage. 
b.  K1: [x, y: x=John, old-cottage(y),  owns(x,y)] 
c.  He reconstructed the SHED. 
d.  K2: [u,v, w: u=?, w=?, shed(v), R(w,v), [z: R(w,z), shed(z)] -->[: z=vl], 
reconstmcted(u,v)] 
e.  K1+K2:  [x,  y,  u,  v,  w:  x=John,  old-cottage(y),  owns(x,y), u=x,  w=y, 
shed(v), R(w,v), [[z: R(w,z), shed(z)] --> [: z=vJ, reconstmcted(u,v)] 
f.  Kl+K2: [x, y, v: x=John, old-cottage(y),  owns(x,y), shed(v), R(y,v), [[z: 
R(y,z), shed(z)] --> [: z=vJ, reconstmcted(x,v)] 
In  (18)(b) shed is deaccented thus indicating that it  has to be identified with  a given 
referent.  Both  identifying  condition  and  the  descriptive  condition  are  presupposed. 
Updating  renders  the DRS  in  (18)(d) identifying  the  shed-referent  with  the  cottage 
referent. The descriptive condition has to be accommodated. 
(1 8)  a.  John has an old cottage. 
b.  Last summer he RECONSTRUCTED the shed. 
c.  K2': [u,v: u=?, v=?, shed(v), reconstructed(u,v)] 
d.  Kl+K2': [x, y, u, v: x=John, old-cottage(y),  owns(x,y), u=x, v=y, 
shed(v), reconstmcted(u,v)] 
e.  Kl+K2': [x, y:  x=John, old-cottage(y),  owns(x,y), shed(y), 
reconstmcted(x,y)] 
Comparing  this  analysis  with  the  account  of  definites  proposed  by  Farkas,  given 
definites go with pronouns achieving determined reference directly. It's only the non- 
given  ones that have to  make use of  their descriptive content to achieve determined 
reference. Moreover, the latter do not require uniqueness with respect to the referents 
introduced  before,  but  uniqueness  with  respect  to  the  world,  in  most  cases  being 
supported by  a bridging  antecedent.  The analysis  of  definite descriptions  given  here 
doesn't agree with Farkas'  analysis of  definite descriptions. But it does agree with her 
analysis of definites in general, making a clear distinction between definites which are 
directly no-choice and definites which are no-choice by description. 
This analysis of definite descriptions admits two uses of definite descriptions. But it 
does not  admit two readings of  the definite article. The definite article the  uniformly 
indicates  the  uniqueness  requirement.  The  two  uses  are  due  to  accenting  and 
deaccenting, respectively,  which  is a  feature given  on  the  surface  of  the  linguistic 
expressions. Thus the two uses must not be regarded as an ambiguity which has to be 
resolved  by  the  hearer  depending  on  the  respective  context.  Instead,  the  speaker 
indicates  the intended use by  intonation. If  the  intended use  doesn't  match  with  the 
context. the utterance is not felicitous. 
Let  us  assume  that  R  is  an  underspecified  relation  that  may  be  madc  more  specific  by  world 
knowledge inferences. 
24  1 3.4.  Referential vs. attributive use 
Naturally, the idea that there are two uses of definite descriptions is not a novel one. It 
was first proposed by Donnellan (1966) who distinguished between a referential and an 
attributive use of definite descriptions. The attributive use is similar to Russel's view of 
definite  descriptions  assuming  that  the  description  is  part  of  the  assertion.  The 
referential use comes close to  Frege's  or Strawson's  view  where the existence of an 
appropriate referent is regarded as a presupposition. But there is a subtle difference that 
will be discussed below. 
Donnellan's  famous example is  "Who is the man with the martini?". Suppose the 
chairman  of  a teetotalers  meeting  is  informed  that  someone in  the  room  is  secretly 
drinking a martini. Then he may ask this question without having a particular person in 
mind. But if  the same question  is asked by a guest at a party  seeing an  interesting- 
looking person holding a martini glass, then the question is about that particular person. 
In the former case the definite description is used attributively, asking something about 
whoever or whatever fits the description. In  the latter case it  is used  referentially,  to 
enable the hearer to pick out whom or what the question is about. In the attributive use 
the referent has to be determined  solely by  means of the description  whereas  in  the 
referential  use the description  is only accompanying a demonstration act. This is why 
Kaplan paraphrases the referential use by a demonstrative:  "Who is that man with the 
martirzi?" or "Who is that?" followed by an appositive, parenthetical, whispered  "the 
rnan with the martini"  (Kaplan 1989, Afterthoughts, p. 583) 
Donnellan does not argue in terms givenness or novelty of discourse referents and, of 
course,  he  is  far  from  taking  accenting  into  account.  Nevertheless  the 
referentiallattributive distinction seems to correspond to the givenhon-given distinction 
made  in  this  paper:  The  correspondence between  non-given  and  attributively  used 
definites is evident, both requiring that the referent is determined solely by means of the 
descriptive content. To realize the correspondence between given and referentially used 
definites  we have to regard  the  accessibility  of  discourse  referents  as the  anaphoric 
counterpart  to  a  demonstration  act.  Thus  the  context  may  be  either  the  previous 
discourse  or  the  utterance  situation.  Given  definites  as  well  as  referentially  used 
definites  involve  direct  reference.  Either  accessibility  of  an  antecedent  or  a 
demonstration  act  will  provide  a  unique  solution  for  identification,  the  descriptive 
content being mere auxiliary information. 
To see that in the referential use the description in fact has to be deaccented whereas 
in the attributive use there has to be an accent, consider (19) and (20) below. In (19) the 
referential  use  is  demonstrated.  Assume  a  situation  like this:  Sherlock Holmes  and 
Watson are chasing a drug dealer gang. They are sitting in a bar watching a clandestine 
meeting. One of the suspects makes a call on a mobile phone and then starts to leave the 
bar. Homes advises Watson: 
(19)  FOLLOW the man with the mobile. 
As against that, to demonstrate the attributive use, assume that Holmes and Watson are 
on their way to the bar where the gangsters will meet, and Holmes tells Watson what to 
do: ... One of the men will have a mobile. They will wait for a phone call and then leave 
separately. ... 
(20)  Follow the man with the MOBILE. (De)accenting Definite Descriptions 
There is an additional property of the referential use which makes Donnellan's account 
notoriously difficult: According to Donnellan, in the referential use the description may 
not apply to the referent without rendering the use of the definite infelicitous (and the 
sentence without a truth-value). For example, the man with the martini may actually be 
drinking water, but  the  definite  will  still  refer  to the  interesting-looking  person  the 
speaker was curious about. On the other hand, Donnellan explicitly claims that by using 
the  expression  referentially  the  speaker  presupposes  that  this  very  man  is  drinking 
martini, which from the point of view of semantics, is simply contradictory. 
One may shift this problem into the area of pragmatics allowing for accommodation 
as long as there is sufficient similarity (martini being similar to water or white wine, but 
not  to  tomato juice).  However,  there  is  an  observation  discussed  in  Bosch  (1988) 
indicating  that  the  discrepancy  in  the  referential  use  between  the  presupposed 
description and the actual properties of the referent is a systematic one: For a definite 
description,  if  the description  is  accented  it  cannot  be used  metaphorically, but  has 
apply literally. Bosch notes that the accented NP in (21)(b) as opposed to the deaccented 
variant,  cannot  be  interpreted  as being co-referential  with  Jones, but  that  a  "literal" 
interpretation where the pig indeed refers to a pig is possible. 
(21)  a.  When Jones returned they ignored the pig. 
b.  When Jones returned they ignored the PIG. 
Now suppose that Holmes is very upset because his own daughter is addicted to drugs. 
Then in the first situation he can give Watson the order in (22) instead of (19). But in 
the  second  situation, if  Holmes  would  utter  (23)  instead  of  (20)  Watson  would  be 
completely lost because presumably there is no such animal in the bar. 
(22)  FOLLOW the pig. 
(23)  Follow the PIG. 
In  the referential case, but not in  the attributive one, pig  can be used  as a derogatory 
designation  for the  drug dealer. This, firstly, confirms Donnellan's  claim  that  in  the 
referential  use  the  referent  need  not  exactly fit  the  description. Secondly, occurring 
systematically  with  metaphoric  descriptions  we  can  no  longer  attribute this  effect to 
some sort of  accidental similarity, as in the case of martini looking like water. We may 
explain the discrepancy effect of the referential use along the following  lines: In  the 
attributive  use,  the  description  is  the  only  information  available  to  determine  the 
referent. In  the referential use, on the other hand, the description has a mere auxiliary 
function,  the  demonstration  being  decisive  to  determine  the  referent.  Hence  the 
descriptive  information  need not perfectly  match  with  the referent's  properties.  Still, 
there are two awkward questions left: (a) How much deviation is possible? -  the man 
~virh  the nznrtini will not work for a man with tomato juice, and (b) what are we to make 
out  of  a  presupposition  which  contradicts  contextual  information? - according  to 
lexicallworld  knowledge the intersection between  man  and pigs  is empty, and this is 
essential in the attributivelaccented use. 4.  Focus in definites descriptions 
We have seen in the previous section that accenting does have a decisive influence on 
the  interpretation  of  a  definite  description  making  it  introduce  a  novel  discourse 
referent.  How  does  this  combine  with  the  focus  semantic  interpretation  of  definite 
descriptions? The  general  idea of  focus  semantics  is  that  a  focus  triggers  a  set  of 
alternatives providing, e.g. the quantificational domain of adverbs like only. This idea is 
widely  accepted. Nevertheless  the  nature  and  the  range  of  the alternatives  is  by  no 
means  clear.  Assuming  that  the  set  of  alternatives  comprises  the  entire domain  of 
entities of the appropriate type renders the idea of alternatives trivial. But constraining it 
by employing a specific function, ALT, is also problematic. In this section, I will show 
that for definite descriptions the bridging antecedent plays a central role in determining 
the appropriate set of alternatives. 
Let us  start with  the example in (24) taken from Heusinger (1998). The context is 
supposed  to  be  an  international  faculty  party.  There  are  some  students  and  some 
professors from various countries including exactly one Dutch professor: 
(24)  Sam only introduced the DUTCH professor to John. 
In Heusinger (1998) the Alternative Semantics of Rooth (1992) is extended to apply to 
complex  definite NPs.  Alternative  Semantics is  a  two-dimensional  theory  of  focus, 
computing simultaneously the ordinary meaning of an expression  denoted by [a]" ) 
and its alternative meaning, i.e. the set of alternatives for this expression (denoted by 
[@IA  ). For example, in  "John only talked to SUE. " the focus on Sue triggers a set of 
alternatives comprising individuals,  {Sue,  Bill, Mary, ....I. The alternative meaning of 
the VP talked to SUE inherits these alternatives rendering a set of predicates,  (talk-to- 
Sue, talk-to-Bill, talk-to-Mary, ....). The meaning of only then consists in asserting that 
none of the alternatives except the ordinary meaning applies to the John. 
Following this schema, the definite description the DUTCH professor in (24) should 
be computed by combining the alternatives of DUTCH with the meaning of professor, 
and combining the result with the meaning of the definite article. Heusinger assumes the 
alternatives  of DUTCH  to  be  given  as in  (25)(a). They  are combined  with  the noun 
denotation by intersection, cf. (25)(b). Then there is a problem with the definite article 
which  we  will  skip  here. The interesting  point  with  respect  to our question  is that, 
according  to  Heusinger,  the  alternative  meaning  of  the  definite  description  should 
comprise the union of the intersections, i.e. (25)(c): 
(25)  a.  [DUTCHFIA  = ALT(dutch') = (dutch', english', french', ...  ) 
b.  [DUTCHF  profe~sor]~  =  {dutch'nprof',  english'nprof', 
french'nprof', ...  ) 
c.  [the  DUTCHF  profes~or]~  =  u  (dutch'nprof',  english'nprof', 
french'nprof', ...I 
Suppose, however, that there is a stateless professor at the party. If  Sam introduced the 
stateless professor to John, the proposition in (24) is clearly false. But if  we assume the 
ALT-function to enumerate nationalities, the stateless professor will not be an element 
of  the  alternative  meaning  of  "the DUTCH  professor"  as  given  in  (25)(c).  Hence 
"introduce the stateless professor to John" will not be excluded by the meaning of only. (De)accenting Definite Descriptions 
You will, of  course, argue that being stateless is a relevant alternative to being Dutch, 
English, French etc. and  the ALT-function  has to include this property.  But consider 
(26) and imagine a situation like this: Sue and Ben, and no other children live in a house 
with a large garden. Each of the children has a favorite tree in the garden, but there are 
many  other  trees.  In  this  situation  the  contextually  relevant  alternatives  to  Sue are 
clearly Sue and Ben, and nobody else. The proposition in (26) is intuitively false if  Sam 
watered  any  tree  in  the  garden  except  for  Sue's  tree.  However,  computing  the 
alternative meaning of  SUE'S tree in the manner of (25)(c) will give us just  Sue's and 
Ben's tree. As in the case of the stateless professor, the other trees will not be included, 
and hence, not be taken into account by the meaning of only. But in this case it does not 
seem appropriate for the ALT-function to include a property like "childless". 
(26)  Sam only watered SUE'S tree, 
The problem of the stateless professor and the "childless"  trees stems from the implicit 
assumption  that  the  alternatives  given  by  a  focussed  modifier  cover  the  entire 
background of the definite, i.e. the entire set of  professors and trees. But that can only 
be guaranteed if the alternatives of a focussed expression comprise the entire domain of 
the respective type, e.g. [DUTCHFIA  = D<e,tz. The reason for using the ALT-function 
was to bring in contextual restrictions. But, obviously, this is the wrong place. To give 
the correct results, the set of alternatives related to the definite description in (24) has to 
comprise all professors present at the party, regardless of  their nationality (or whether 
they are stateless or have dual nationality). The relevant restriction is, rather, a different 
one:  The  set  of  alternatives  of  the  DUTCH  professor  in  (24)  should  not  include 
professors who stayed away from the party. 
To see that this is the correct restriction, let us first consider the example in  (27). 
Suppose, Sam is the one who has to take care of the guests visiting the institute, and 
show them around. 
(27)  (Yesterday Sam met with a Dutch group.) 
Samlhe only introduced the PROFESSOR to John 
The definite the PROFESSOR in  (27j obviously refers to the Dutch group. Due to the 
accent it introduces a novel discourse referent, but as professors are by no means unique 
in  the  world  the  definite  has  to  make  use  of  a  bridging  antecedent  to  achieve 
uniqueness. The Dutch group is a suitable antecedent inducing a membership relation. 
Thus the PROFESSOR in (27) is interpreted as the unique member of the Dutch group 
who  is  a  professor.  From  (27)  we  can  infer  that  Sam did  not  introduce  any  other 
member of  the Dutch group to John. But we can not infer that Sam did not introduce 
somebody else to John. If, for example, Sam introduced some nice girls from a Finnish 
group to John, (27) would still be true. Hence, the relevant set of alternatives for the 
PROFESSOR in  (27) is mediated by the same bridging antecedent which also mediates 
the uniqueness  of  the referent  itself, i.e. the Dutch  group. Moreover, the alternatives 
have to  stand  in  the  same relation  to  the  bridging  antecedent  as  the  referent  of  the 
definite description does, i.e. membership. 
The  definite  in  (24),  i.e.  the  DUTCH  professor  is  no  more  unique  than  the 
PROFESSOR in  (27). Similar to the latter it needs a bridging  antecedent to satisfy the 
uniqueness condition imposed by the article. Suppose the context is like this: (28)  (The international faculty party last week was a great success. Many students 
and even some professors appeared.) 
Sam only introduced the DUTCH professor to John. 
Then  the DUTCH professor  has  to be  interpreted as relating to the professors  which 
appeared  at  the  party.  Compared  to  the  simple description  in  (27)  in  the  complex 
description there is a deaccented part, i.e. professors.  According to the deaccented part 
the  bridging  antecedent  has  to  comprise  professors,  and  there  has  to  be  a  unique 
member  of  the  professors-antecedent  who  is  a  Dutchman.  Analogous  to  (27),  the 
statement in (28) is true even if  Sam introduced some professor to John who did not go 
to the party. So, as in the case of  (27), the bridging antecedent gives us the relevant set 
of alternatives. 
There are two implications: First, for bridged definites, in determining the relevant 
set  of  alternatives  the  focussed  element  doesn't play  a role.  Constraining  the  set of 
alternatives of the complex definite description by constraining the alternatives of the 
focussed  element,  i.e.  using  an  ALT-function,  may  give  too  few  elements,  cf.  the 
stateless professor and the "childless"  trees. Instead, the set of  alternatives is provided 
by the bridging antecedent, including only elements that stand in the same relation to 
the bridging  antecedent as the definite's referent does. Second, being provided by the 
bridging antecedent the set of  alternatives (minus the definite's referent) is an genuine 
anaphor.1° It  may in  fact be picked up explicitly by the others, as in (29)."  Thus the 
focus-semantic analysis of a definite description has to match with the semantics of the 
others (cf. Kamp 2000). 
The  definite,  but  not  the  indefinite  others,  is  adequate  to  refer  to  the  elements 
excluded by only. The referent of the others has to be bound to the alternatives-anaphor 
triggered by bhe DUTCH professor. 
(29)  (Sam only introduced the DUTCH professor to John.) 
The others were dancing all the time. 
5.  Conclusions 
Let us finally come back to the scale of noun phrases in the definiteness hierarchy. The 
analysis  of  definite  descriptions  given  here  is  perfectly  compatible  with  Farkas' 
distinction between definites making use of  identification  and definites making use of 
their descriptive content. It departs from Farkas' analysis only with  respect to definite 
descriptions showing that the division line between  inherently no-choice definites and 
description based no-choice definites lies within the area of definite descriptions: If  the 
description  is  deaccented  the  definite  has  to  be  identified  with  a  given  discourse 
referent, but if  there is an  accented part it introduces a novel  discourse referent. This 
analysis  confirms  the  idea  that  there  are  two  uses  of  definite  descriptions 
(givenlreferential vs. non-givenlattributive) without, however, stipulating an ambiguity 
'O  This is in a line with the account in Rooth (1992) where at least one of the alternatives has to be bound 
(or accommodated). 
"  Note that the indefinite others would not be adequate: 
Sam only irlrrod~rced  the DUTCHprofessor to John. #Others were dancing all the time. (De)accenting Definite Descriptions 
of  the  definite  article.  Instead,  the  intended  use  is  indicated  on  the  surface of  the 
linguistic expression by intonational features. 
Taking the full scale of noun phrases into account the question arises how accenting 
affects the end points of the scale, i.e. pronouns and proper names, on the one hand, and 
indefinite noun phrases, on the other. Pronouns and proper names may be accented too. 
So we might assume that they also introduce a novel referent when accented. There are 
cases that  seem to support this idea. In  (30), for example, the pronouns obviously do 
introduce novel referents, and in fact they have to be accented."  So we could argue that 
in  (30) the minimal  descriptive content of  the pronoun,  i.e. being male or female, is 
exploited to establish a novel referent via bridging to the couple referent. 
(30)  (Last week I met a remarkable couple.) 
HE looks after the children and SHE makes a lot of money 
However, the majority of  accented pronouns does not  support this  view. Pronouns as 
well  as proper  names  can  clearly  be  accented without  introducing  a novel  discourse 
referent.  Actually,  accented  pronouns  and  proper  names  are  prototypical 
counterexamples to the focus-novelty correspondence, cf. the examples in (31) and (32) 
from Schwarzschild (1999). 
(31)  (Who did John's mother vote for?) 
She voted for JOHN. 
(32)  (Who did John's mother praise?) 
She praised HIM. 
Schwarzschild  concludes  from  these  examples  that  although  lack  of  intonational 
prominence  indicates  givenness,  the  converse  doesn't  hold:  It  is  not  the  case  that 
prominence indicates novelty. In this paper we have seen that within certain limits, i.e. 
related to the descriptive part of definite descriptions, the converse does hold. But we 
deliberately  excluded  cases  where  the  accent  is  on  the  definite  article  itself,  or  a 
demonstrative, as in (33): 
(33)  a.  He would be THE man for the job. 
b.  (witness pointing to one of the defendants:) 
I saw THIS man coming out of the bank. 
In  (33) accenting clearly does not trigger the introduction of  a novel  referent. It just 
indicates that there are alternatives, e.g. in (33)(b) there are other demonstration acts the 
witness could have made. Maybe accenting pronouns is ambiguous, either concerning 
their descriptive content, or concerning the referential capacity similar to (33)(b). 
Considering indefinite  noun  phrases  at  the  other  end of  the  scale, Krifka (1999) 
argues  for a  special  class of  "non-novel  indefinites"  that  presuppose  their  discourse 
referents and have to be deaccented. Evidence for this class stems e.g. from adverbial 
12  Such examples require  animated referents. Analogous German examples with  unanimated  referents 
are not acceptable (in  German, pronouns are marked  for gender or sex). This is an examples from 
Bosch (1988): 
*Went, drr  die Mutter vor~  den1 Bolzen liisen  willst, nlusst  du ihn/lHN fesrhulren  und sie/SIE  nuch 
rechrs drehen. quantification  as  in  (34)(a)/(b).I3~he  domain  of  quantification  is  given  by  the 
deaccented indefinite, which forces us to assume that deaccented indefinites may pick  . - 
up existing referents and "requantify"  over them. 
(34)  a.  A freshman usually wears a BASEBALL cap. 
('most freshmen wear a baseball cap') 
b.  A FRESHMAN usually wears a baseball cap. 
('most wearers of baseball caps are freshmen') 
Krifka's  non-novel  indefinites  suggests  that  deaccenting  goes  with  specificity. 
However,  the  indefinite  in  (35)(a),  though  deaccented,  is  clearly  non-specific 
introducing  a  novel  referent.14  Deaccenting  in  (35)(a)  appears  to  be  due  to  the 
presupposition induced by only, i.e. that Sue owns a motor cycle. But if  the indefinite is 
substituted for by a non-given definite, the accent is still there although the definite is 
also part of the presupposition of only, cf. (35)(b). 
(35)  a.  Only SUE owns a motor cycle. 
b.  (... Yesterday, the Dutch group visited the faculty) 
But only SUE met the DEAN. 
Apparently,  the  accent-novelty  correspondence  observed  for  definite  descriptions 
doesn't carry over to pronouns and indefinites, thus confirming their position at either 
end of the definiteness scale. 
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